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STATEMENT  :- 
 
 The title of this Thesis is regarding 
Doctrine, Therefore the title is taken as 
specified by civil procedure code law sec.11 
i.e. Doctrine of Res judicata. 
 Infact this is an original research work. 
It reflects the real situation of the law, 
parties and courts. 
 Actually the term Res judicata is derived 
from the Roman law and its most obvious and 
general meaning. This doctrine is accepted by 
the world. 
 This doctrine depends upon and expressed 
in the maxim “ Nemo debet eadem causa”  
 Once court pronounce the judgement. If one 
of the party is aggrieved by the said 
judgement, they have to approach to upper 
court. 
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 There are different stages in the court. 
It is very material point to show that at what 
stage court has decided that point regarding 
Res judicata. Sometimes parties wave this legal 
aspect at proper stage buy later on party took 
this legal aspect, at that time how far its 
effect to the case. 
 I have tried as my best level to consider 
this doctrine. 
 I hereby declare that for the above thesis no 
Degree or Diploma or Distinction has been conferred on 
me either by this University or any other University. 
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Date :-     -------------------- 
(Lata Karia ) 
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by my guide Dr. N. R. Jani for the current 
topic the subject chosen by them is the 
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I prefer civil side. Once upon a time a 
complicated case we have faced, there was a 
puzzle in my mind to understand the 
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Estoppel and Doctrine of Res judicata, but 
after the discussion with my senior late 
Shri D. K. Nanavaty, I got clear picture 
since then I thought to high light this 
topic and it prompted me to undertake this 
venture. 
 
 It is well known that any subject or 
topic in law is as vast as an ocean, still 
I have made all efforts to deal with the 
various sides and sights.  
 
L. T. KARIA 
1 
A C K N O W L E G E M E N T 
 
I am extremely obliged and great full 
to the Respected Shri N. R. Jani, who had 
been extremely kind enough to contribute a 
useful forward guide line to me. 
 
 My sincere thanks are due to Mr. N.R. 
Vekaria the president of Junagadh Junior 
Chamber Education Trust Law College is one 
of the branch trough this branch I am here 
Shri Nanjibhai has appreciated my subject 
and encouraged me by guiding about my 
subject. 
 
 I am heartily thankful of my husband 
Twarit J. Joshipura. When I was in puzzle 
after my two chapters, but from the 
initiation inspired me to give the justice 
with my subject. 
 
 I am really thankful to the Dr. D. G. 
Modi and will always remain indebted to him 
for my subject. He discussed and enlighten 
the subject. It gives me delight to humbly 
place the name of JMFC. Paresh Parmar for 
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CHAPTER – 1  -- H I S T O R Y 
 
  The rule of res judicata has a very 
ancient history. It was well understood by 
Hindu lawyers and Mahomedan jurists. It was 
known to ancient Hindu Law as Purva Nyaya 
(Formar Judgement). The plea has been 
illustrated in the text of Katyayan  thus "If a 
person though at law sues again, he should be 
answered "You were defended formarly". Under 
the roman law, a defedent would repel the 
plaintiff's claim by means of execeptio  res 
judicata or a plea of previous judgment. it was 
recognized that "One suit and one decision was 
enough for any single dispute' and that "a 
matter once brought to trial should not be 
tried accept, of course, by way of appeal".  
Julian defined the principle thus "And 
generally the plea of former judgment is a bar 
whenever the same question of right is renewed 
between the same parties by whatever form of 
the action." The doctrine has been adopted by 
the countries of the European continent which 
had modeled their civil law on the Roman 
pattern. In France, the doctrine is known as 
'Chose jugee' (thin adjudged). 'The principle 
of preclusion of relitigation, or 
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conclusiveness of judgment, has struck deep 
roots in Anglo American Jurisprudence and is 
equally well known in the Commonwealth country 
which have drawn upon the rules of Common Law. 
 The spirit of the doctrine of res judicata 
is succinctly expressed in the well known 
common law maxim debet bis vexari pro una et 
eadem causa (no one ought to be twice vexed for 
one and the same cause). The principle has been 
recognized in all civilized societies. Lord 
Coke declared :"it has well been said  interest 
republicae ut sit finis litium (interest of the 
state is that there should be limit of law 
suits), otherwise great oppression might be 
done under colour and pretence of law. As 
observed by the Privy council in Soorojomonee v 
suddanund, the rule has been enunciated in 
England. The doctrine had long been recognized 
in India even prior to enactment of the Code of  
civil procedure 1859. 
 At times, the rule worked harshly on 
individuals. For instants when the former 
decision obviously erroneous. But its working 
was justified on the great principle of public 
policy, which required that there must be an 
end to every litigation. The basis of the 
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doctrine of res judicata is public interest and 
not absolute justice. The argument ab 
inconvnienti might be admissible if the meaning 
of statute is ambiguous or obscure, but if the 
language is clear and explicit, its 
consequences are for the Legislature and not 
for the Courts to consider. In that event, as 
was remarked by Coleridge, J. in Garland v 
Carlisie, "the suffering must appeal to the 
law-giver and not to the lawyer." 
  In the celebrated decided in AIR 1916 
PC 78 Sheoparsan Singh v. Rammandan Singh. Sir  
Lawrence Jenkins stated : 
  Though the rule of the Code may be 
traced to an English source, it embodies a 
doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the 
law as expounded by the Hindu Commentators. 
Vijnanesvara and Nilkantha include the plea of 
a former Judgment among those allowed by law, 
each citing for this purpose the text of 
Katyayana, who ascribes the plea thus: If a 
person though defeated at law sue's again he 
should be answered, "You were defeated 
formerly." This is called the plea of former 
judgment.      
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CHAPTER – 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
 
S Y N O P S I S  
1. Derivation. 
2. Unit No.1 Application of the doctrine. 
3. Spirit of the doctrine. 
4. Designed for the protection of the 
public and the Individual. 
5. Res judicata distinguished from 
estoppel. 
6. Early Hindu notion of the doctrine. 
7. Mohammedan Law-Giver’s View. 
8. View of Roman law. 
9. Early English notion of the doctrine. 
10. Limited operation of the rule. 
11. Development of the rule. 
12. Adoption of the English doctrine in 
British India. 
13. Introduction of the rule of res judicata 
in British India. 
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14. History of the legislative attempts at 
codification of the law of res judicata 
in British India. 
15. Explanation II criticized. 
16. Extension of the rule to foreign 
judgment. 
 
1.Derivatin. - 
 The Term res judicata is derived from the 
Roman law, and, its most obvious and general 
meaning, it signified at Rome, as it signified 
in England and in America, that a matter in 
dispute had been considered and settled by a 
competent court of justice. 
 
2. Unit No.1-Application of the 
doctrine. – A.I.R. 1942 All. 302 (D.B.) 
 The doctrine of res judicata is of 
universal application and “in fact a 
fundamental concept in the organization of 
jural society”. Justice requires that every 
cause should be once fairly tried and having 
been tried once, all litigati9on about it 
should be concluded for ever between the 
parties.” It is a rule common to all civilized 
systems of jurisprudence that the solemn and 
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deliberate sentence of the law upon a disputed 
fact or facts pronounced that after a proper 
trial by its appointed organs should be 
regarded as a final and conclusive 
determination of the question litigated and 
should for ever set the controversy at rest. 
 
3.Spirit of the doctrine.- 
  A.I.R. 1946 Outha 33(F.B.):  
A.I.R. 1956 Raj.166 (D.B.)  
A.I.R. 1960 S.C.941 held that.... 
 The spirit of the doctrine is 
succinctly expressed in the well-known maxim 
nemo debet eadem causa (no one shall be twice 
vexed for the same ezuse.) At time the rule 
worked harshly on individuals (e.g. when the 
former decision was obviously erroneous) but 
its working was justified on the great 
principle of public policy interest 
reipublicaeut sit finis litium (it is for the 
public good that there be an end of litigation)  
 
4.Designed for the protection of the 
public and the individual. –  
The doctrine of res judicata is designed 
for the protection of the public and the 
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individual from repeated and useless litigation 
of the same cause of action. The protection of 
the individual against double vexation has been 
included as one element of policy underlying 
the doctrine of res judicata, although the 
primary purpose of the doctrine is said to be 
the protection of society, although the primary 
purpose of the doctrine is said to be the 
protection of society, and the protection of 
the individual is said to be secondary. It is 
clear that a Person against whom a judgment has 
been rendered in a court of competent 
jurisdiction will not be allowed to relitigate 
the same cause of action, and thus undoubtedly 
and adverse decision in a plaintiff’s action of 
trover or trespass bars subsequent possessor 
action. 
 
5. Res judicata distinguished from 
estoppel.- 
   The plea of res judicata as a bar to an 
action belong to the province of adjective law, 
ad litis ordinationem, but difference of option 
prevails among jurists as to whether the rule 
belongs to the domain of procedure or 
constitutes a rule of the law of evidence as 
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furnishing a ground of estoppels. In England, 
and I may say also in for there judgments in 
personam which operate as res judicata, are as 
often treated as falling under the category of 
estoppels by record. Sir Fitz James Stephen, 
the distinguished jurist who framed our Indian 
Evidence Act (1 of 1872), and whose views have 
been accepted by our Indian Legislature in 
framing Sec.40 of that Act, adopted what seems 
to me the only logical and juristic 
classification by treating the rule of res 
judicata as falling beyond the proper region of 
law of evidence, and appertaining to procedure 
properly so called. That the effect of the plea 
of res judicata may, in the result, operate 
like an estoppel by preventing a party to a 
litigation from denying the accuracy of the 
former adjudication cannot be doubted. But here 
the similarity between Res judicata & Estoppel 
equally clear that the ratio upon which the 
doctrine of estoppel, properly so called, 
rests, is distinguishable from that upon which 
the plea of  res judicate is founded.  The 
essential features of estoppel are those which 
have found formulation in Sec.115 of the 
Evidence Act, the provisions of which proceed 
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upon the doctrine of equity that he who, by his 
declaration, act, of omission, has induced 
another to alter his position, shall not be 
allowed to turn round and take advantage of 
such alteration of that other’s position.  All 
the other rules to be found in chapter VIII of 
the Evidence Act relating to the estopeel of 
tenant, or of acceptors of bills of exchange, 
bailees or licensees, proceed upon the same 
fundamental principles. On the other hand, the 
rule of res judicate  does not owe its origin 
to any such principle, but is founded upon the 
maxim  nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem 
causa – a maxim which is itself an outcome of 
the wider maxim interest reipublicae ut sit 
finis litium. The principle of estoppel, as I 
have already said, proceeds upon different 
grounds, and I think the framers of the Indian 
Codes of procedure acted upon correct juristic 
classification in dealing with the subject of 
res judicate as appertaining to the province of 
procedure properly so called.  Perhaps the 
shortest way to describe, the difference 
between the plea of res judicate and an 
estoppels, is to say that whilst the former 
prohibits the Court from entering into an 
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inquiry at all as to a matter already 
adjudicated upon, the latter prohibits a party, 
after the inquiry has already been entered 
upon, from proving anything which would 
contradict his own previous declaration or acts 
to the prejudice of another party, who relying 
upon those alterations or acts, altered his 
position. In other words, res judicate 
prohibits an inquiry in limine, which at 
estoppel is only a piece of evidence. Further, 
the theory of res judicate is to presume by a 
conclusive presumption that the former 
adjudication declared the truth, whilst “ an 
estoppel”, to use the words of Lord Coke, is 
where a man is concluded by his own act or 
acceptance to say the truth, which means, he is 
allowed, in contradiction of his former self, 
to prove what he now chooses to call the truth. 
Thus the plea of res judicate proceeds upon 
grounds of public policy so called, whilst an 
estoppel is simply the application of equitable 
principles between man and man—two individual 
parties to litigation. 
 
6. Early Hindu notion of the doctrine.- 
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   The doctrine of res judicate which 
treats the final decision of a competent 
tribunal as “ irrefragable truth “ was well 
understood by Hindu lawyers. One of the four 
kinds of effective answers to suit was “ a plea 
by former judgment“. It was laid down by 
Katyayana that “ one against whom a judgment 
had formerly been given, if he bring forward 
the matter again, must be answered by the plea 
of purva nyaya or former judgment “.  The Hindu 
Jurisprudence recognizes the doctrine by laying 
down that “ the plaintiff should be non-suited 
if the defendant avers: in this very affair, 
there was litigation between his and myself 
previously, and it is found that the plaintiff 
had lost his case”.  
 
 
 
7. Mohammedan law-givers’ view.- 
   Among Mohammedan law givers similar 
effect was given to the plea of  Niza-I-
munfasta of  Amar Mania taqrir mukhalif.  
 
8. View of Raman law.- 
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   Under Roman law, as administered by the 
Praetor’s Court, a defandant could repel the 
plaintiff’s claim by means of ex-ceptio res 
judicata  or plea of former judgment. The 
subject received considerable attention at the 
hands of Roman jurists and the general 
principle recognized was that “ one suit and 
one decision was enough for any single dispute 
and that “ a matter once brought to trial 
should not be tried except, of course, by way 
of appeal.” 
 
9. Early English notion of the doctrine.- 
   The doctrine has long been recognized 
in England with greater or less distinctness. 
“The rule of the ancient common law”, is that 
where one is barred in any action real or 
personal by judgment, demurrer, confession, or 
verdict, he is barred as to that or the like 
action of the like nature, for the same thing 
for ever. Brown L. J. in  Brunsden v. Hamphrey. 
It has probably never been better laid down 
than in  Gregory V.Molesworth  in which Lord 
Hardwicke held, that where a question was 
necessarily decided in effect, though not in 
express terms, between parties to the suit, 
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they could not raise the same question as 
between themselves in any other suit in any 
other form; and that decision has been followed 
by a long course of decisions, the greatr part 
of which will be found noticed in the very able 
notes of Mr. Smith, to the case of the  Duchess 
of Kingdom. 
 
10. Limited operation of the rule.- 
A.I.R.1958 Andh.Pr. 363 (F.B.) held that….…    
      Systems, however, the operation of the 
rule was confined to cases in which the 
plaintiff put forward his claim to “ the same 
subject-matter with regard to which his request 
had already been determined by a competent 
court and had passed into judgment.” In other 
words, it was what is described as the plea of 
“ estoppel by judgment” or “ estoppel by 
record” which was recognized and given effect 
to. In several European continental countries 
even now the rule is still subject to these 
qualifications, e.g. in the Civil Code of 
France, it is said “ The authority of the thing 
adjudged (chose jugee) has place only in regard 
to that which has constituted the object of a 
judgment. it is necessary that the thing 
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demanded be the same; that the demand be 
founded upon the same causes; that it be 
between the same parties and found by and 
against them in the same capacity.” 
 
11. Development of the rule.- 
   In other countries, and notably in 
England, the doctrine has developed and 
expanded, and the bar is applied in a 
subsequent action not only to cases where claim 
is laid to the same property but also to the 
same matter as was directly and substantially 
in dispute in the former litigation. In other 
words, it is the identity of the issue, which 
the already been necessarily tried” between the 
parties and on which a finding has been given 
before, and not the identity of the subject- 
matter which attracts the operation of the 
rule. Put briefly, the plea is not limited to 
“estoppel by judgment “ but is also extended to 
what is described as “ estoppel by verdict “. 
The earliest authoritative exposition of the 
law on the subject in England is by Chief 
Justice Degrey in the Duchess of Kingston’s  
case which has formed the basis of all 
subsequent judicial pronouncements in England, 
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America and other countries the jural systems 
of which are based on or inspired by British 
Jurisprudence. In that case a number of 
propositions on the subject were laid down, the 
first of them being that “ the judgment of a 
court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon 
the point, is as a plea a bar, or as evidence 
conclusive, between the same parties upon the 
same matter, directly in question in another 
Court.”  
 
12. Adoption of the English doctrine in   
British India.- 
    The substance of the rule as 
enunciated and recognized in England was, 
however, approved of and acted upon in numerous 
cases by the Judges, and imported, almost res 
integra, in this country. Long before the 
enactment of a complete Code of Civil Procedure 
in India it was laid down as a general rule, 
that “ a court cannot entertain any cause which 
shall appear to have been heard and determined 
by any Judge before “ Even after the enactment 
of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, their 
Lordships of the Privy Council acted expressly 
upon the English rule observing that the term 
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“cause of action” is to be construed with 
reference rather to the substance than to the 
form of action, and they are of opinion that in 
this case the cause of action was in substance 
to declare the will invalid, on the ground of 
the want of power of the testator to devise the 
property he dealt with. But even if this 
interpretation were not correct their Lordships 
are of opinion that this clause in the Code of 
Procedure by no means prevent the operation of 
the general law relating to res judicata, 
founded on the principle nemo debet bis vexari 
pro eadem causa. This law has been laid down by 
a series of cases in this country with which 
the profession is familiar. It has probably 
never been better laid down than in a case 
which was referred to in Gregory v. Molesworth 
in which Lord Hardwicke held that wherea 
questionwas necessarily decided, in effect 
though not in express terms, between parties to 
the suit, they could not raise the same 
question as between in any other suit in any 
other form; and that decision has been followed 
by a long course of decisions, the greater part 
of which will be found noticed in the very able 
notes of Mr. Smith to the case of the  Duchess 
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of Kingston in Soorjomounce Dayee v. Suddamund. 
They referred to that rule with approval in 
Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari observing that 
“ by the general law where a material issue has 
been tried and determined between the same 
parties in a proper suit, and in a competent 
court, as to the status of one of them in 
relation to the other, it cannot, in their 
opinion be again tried in another suit between 
them “. And in Khugowalie Singh v. Hussain Bux 
their Lordships observed, as to the statement 
of the rule in the Duchess of Kingston’s case, 
that there was nothing “ technical or peculiar 
to the law of England in the rule as so stated. 
It was recognized by the Civil Law and it is 
perfectly consistent with Sec.2 of the Civil 
Procedure Code of 1859. 
 
13. Introduction of the rule of res 
judicata in British India.- 
    In British India the rule of res 
judicata seems to have been first introduced by 
Sec.16 of the Bengal Regulation III of 1793, 
which prohibited the Zilla and City Courts “ 
from entertaining any cause, which from the 
production of a former decree or the record of 
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the Court, shall appear to have been heard and 
determined by any Judge or any superintendent 
of a court having competent jurisdiction. The 
earliest legislative attempt at codification of 
the law on the subject was, however, made in 
1859, when the first Civil Procedure Code was 
passed. Section z of the Code barred the 
cognizance by courts of suits based on the same 
cause of action, which an been heard and 
determined before by courts of competent 
jurisdiction. It will be seen that this was 
only a partial recognition of the English rule 
in so far as it embodied the principles 
relating to estoopel by judgment only and did 
not extend to “ estoppel by verdict “. In 1877 
when the Code was revised, the operation of the 
rule, was extended to Sec.13 and the bar was no 
longer confined to the retrial of a dispute 
relating to the same cause of action but the 
prohibition equally applied against reagitating 
an issue, which had been heard and finally 
decided between the same parties in a former 
suit by a competent court. The section has been 
amended and amplified twice again and has 
assumed its present form in Sec.11 of the Code 
of 1908, the principle amendments which have a 
19 
bearing on the question before us, being (a) 
that the expression “former suit” was defined 
as instituted and (b) that the competence of a 
court is not regulated by the course of appeal 
of the former suit but its capacity to try the 
subsequent suit as an original Court.  
 
14. History of the legislative attempts 
at codification of the law of res 
judicata in British India.- 
    The first product of the earliest 
legislative attempt was Act VIII of 1859. Its 
Sec.2 ran thus : 
“The civil courts shall not take 
cognizance of any suit brought on a cause 
of action which shall have been heard and 
determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, in a former suit between the 
same parties, or between the parties under 
whom they claimed.” 
From the reading of this provision it is 
quiet clear that this enactment provided only 
for that portion of the doctrine of res 
judicata which relates to what is designated 
“bar by judgment”, which really imports “the 
20 
bar of a suit by a judgment on the merits in a 
former suit on the same cause of action”. 
(a) Bar by verdict. – Section 2 left 
unnoiced and ignored the remaining protion of 
the doctrine, the portion relating to the “bar 
of the trial of an issue by judgment on that 
issue,” the portion that has often, though not 
quite correctly, been indicated by the 
expression “bar by verdict”. The gist of that 
branch of the doctrine is that an actual 
decision on any matter directly in issue in a 
suit is conclusive of that issue in every 
subsequent suit brought on any cause and for 
any purpose or object. This distinction has 
been held to be of great practical importance, 
especially by American lawyers, and there is no 
doubt but that confusion has sometimes resulted 
from an inadvertence to it. It was explained 
clearly in the judgment of the United states 
Supreme court Cromwell v.sac. 
(b) bar by verdict acted upon in India : 
This defect in the rule enacted by Sec.2 was 
made up by the courts continuing on general 
principles, to act upon the rule of the 
conclusiveness of judgments as to issues also. 
Mr. Justice  Mahmood pointed out in 
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Tamaitunnissa V. Lutfunnissa that in “section 2 
the principle of res judicata was embodied only 
to a limited extent; but in interpreting the 
section, the Privy Council holding that, apart 
from legislative enactment, the principle of 
res judicata was an essential part of the law 
of procedure in every civilized country, 
applied that principle to the trial of issues 
as well as to the trial of suits.” 
(C)Causes of the alteration in the statute 
: The expression “cause of action” gave rise to 
a number of difficulties. Its vague character 
produced a crop of cases. According to an 
eminent authority it means and includes every 
fact which it is material to be proved to 
entitle the plaintiff to succeed, every fact on 
which the plaintiff bases his title to the 
relief asked by him. Sir M.E.Smith in 
delivering the decision of their Lordships of 
the Privy Council in Soorjomonee Dayee v. 
Suddanund  expressed it as their opinion that 
the term “cause of action” it to be construed 
with reference rather to the substance than to 
the form of action. In Krishna Behari Ropy 
V.Brojeswari he further expressed it as the 
Lordship opinion that in sec.2”the expression 
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cause of action cannot be taken in its literal 
and most restricted sense.” In Chand Kaur V 
Pratap Singh Load Waston in delivery their 
Lordship decision said,”the cause of action has 
no relation whatever to the defence  which may 
be set up, nor does it depend upon the 
character of the relief prayed for by the 
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds 
set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, 
or in other words, to the media upon which the 
plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a 
conclusion in his favour.” In Naro Hari V. 
Anpurnabai Mr. Justice West in delivering the 
judgment of the Bombay High said with reference 
to that expression of opinion, that their 
Lordships”would not allow a matter once 
disposed of, to be litigated again in a suit 
framed so as to differ formally from the 
previous one”; and by substances they seem to 
mean the aggregate of circumstances on which 
the former suit proceeded or ought to have 
proceeded with reference to the relief sought 
to be obtained... His (Plaintiff’s) cause of 
action, into whatever Protean forms it may be 
moulded by the ingenuity of pleaders, is to be 
regarded as the same, if it rests on fac5ts 
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which are integrally connected with those upon 
which a right and infringement of the right and 
infringement of the right have already been 
once asserted as a ground for the Court’s 
interference.... This is the principle involved 
in Lord Westbury’s decision in the case of 
Hunter V. Steward, which has been adopted in 
recent decisions of this Court, but without any 
conscious departure from the rule that matters 
naturally connected with each other so as to be 
proper for investigation together ought to be 
brought forward at the same time, and are to be 
considered as forming but a single cause of 
action. The enactment of Civil Procedure Code 
of 1859, Sec 2, was therefore very considerably 
modified in the following form as Sec.13 of Act 
X of 1877 : 
“No Court shall try any suit or issue in 
which the matter, directly and 
substantially in issue, has  been heard 
and finally decided by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, in a former suit 
between the same parties, or between 
parties under whom they or any of them 
claim, litigating under the same title. 
 
24 
  Explanation I.- The matter above 
referred to must, in the former suit, have 
been alleged by one party, and either 
denied or admitted, expressly or 
impliedly, by the other. 
  Explanation II.- Any matter which might 
and ought to have been made ground of 
defense or attack in such former suit 
shall be deemed to have been a matter 
directly or substantially in issue in such 
suit. 
  Explanation III.- Any relief claimed in 
the plaint, which is not expressly granted 
by the decree, shall, for the purpose of 
this section, be deemed to have been 
refused.  
  Explanation IV – A decision is final 
within the meaning of this section when it 
is such as the court making it could not 
alter (except on review) on the 
application of either party or reconsider 
of its own motion. A decision liable to 
appeal may be final within the meaning of 
this section until the appeal is made. 
Explanation V- Where person litigate 
bona fide in respect of a private right 
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claimed in common for themselves and 
others, all persons interested in such 
right shall, for the purpose of this 
section, be deemed to claim under the 
persons so litigating. 
   Explanation VI – Where a foreign 
judgment is relied on, the production of 
the judgment duly authenticated is 
presumptive evidence that the court which 
made it had competent jurisdiction, unless 
the contrary appear on the record; but 
such presumption may be removed by proving 
the want of jurisdiction.” 
 
(d) The genesis of Sec.13,ActX of 1877 .- 
The principle clause and first explanation are 
founded on the definition in Livingstone’s code 
of Evidence for the state of Lousiana, Sec. 
192. The Second, Third, Fourth and fifth 
explanation rest on decisions of English or 
Indian Courts. The Sixth is taken from 
Livingstone’s code, Sec.198 In fact the Chief 
alteration made by Sec.13 is the statutory 
recognition of the principle of “bar by 
verdict”. 
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(e) Estoppel against defendant.- As a 
matter of fact Sec.2 was amended in order to 
provide for estoppel against defendant, and 
this object was attained apparently by 
introducing the work “issue”. Section 13 of Act 
X of 1877 deals with two matters, first, the 
trial of suits, and second, the trial of 
issues. It is founded on a long course of 
judicial decisions, and especially on the dicta 
of the Privy Council, and has formulated in 
express terms of the rule, which previously was 
only expressed in part by legislative 
enactment, that the principal of res judicata 
applies both to the trial of suits and to the 
trial of issues. The distinction between the 
two things appears to me to be clear. A suit in 
a finding; and the rule contained in Sec.13 
goes the length of saying that not only is a 
suit, which has once been tried and determined, 
not again maintainable, but an issue which has 
once been directly and substantially raised and 
decided shall not be litigated a second time. 
The reason of the maxim nemo debet bis vexari 
pro eadem causa seems to me to apply as much as 
to the trial of issues as to the trial of suits 
for in either case the harassment to litigants 
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would be similar if matters could be reagitated 
after having been once duly adjudicated upon. 
 
15. Explanation II criticized. – 
  While conceding that the “ bar by 
verdict ” has met with general approval, its 
extension by Explanation 2 to the cases of mere 
constructive verdict has been often condemned 
as unsuitable of India; but this is due to some 
extent, to its being forgotten that the said 
explanation has now introduced any novel 
principle, and is, in fact, in accordance with 
a rule as recognized and acted upon in England 
and in the United States. The explanation has 
often been justified on principle of expediency 
and public policy.      
 
16. Extention of the rule to foreign  
judgment – 
   
Another material alteration made by Sec.13 
was the express extension of the doctrine of 
res Judicata with certain limitations to 
foreign judgments, the limitations being 
enacted by Sec.14 which in the Civil Procedure 
Code of 1882 stands as follows : 
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“No foreign judgment shall operate as a 
bar to a suit in British India-  
(a) if it has not been given on marits of 
the case; 
(b) if it appears on the face of the 
proceedings to be founded on a 
incorrect view of International law or 
of any law in force in British India; 
(c) if it is in the opinion of the Court 
before which it is produced contrary 
to natural justice; 
(d) if it has been obtained by fraud; 
(e) if it sustains a claim founded on a 
breach of any law in force in British 
India. 
  A proviso was added to the section by 
act VII of 1888, thus restricting the 
operation of the rule. The proviso thus 
added was in the following terms : 
  “Where a suit is instituted in British 
India on the judgment of any Foreign Court 
in Asia or Africa except a Court of Record 
established by Letters Patent of Her 
Majesty or any predecessor of Her Majesty 
or a Supreme Councillor court established 
by an order of Her Majesty in Council, the 
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Court in which the suit is instituted 
shall not be precluded from inquiry into 
the marits of the case in which the 
judgment was passed.” 
(f) Indian rule of res Judicata as enacted 
in the Civil Procedure a Sec.13 of Act X 
of 1877 was re-enacted in the Civil 
Procedure Code of 1882 in the following 
terms : 
 “No court shall try any suit or 
issue in which the matter directly and 
substantially in issue has been 
directly and substantially in issue  
in a former suit between the same 
parties, or between parties under whom 
they or any of them claim, litigating 
under the same title, in a court of 
jurisdiction competent to try such 
subsequent suit or the suit in which 
such issue has been subsequently 
raised, and has been heard and finally 
decided by such Court. 
Explanation I – The matter above 
referred to must in the former suit have 
been alleged by one party and either 
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denied or admitted, expressly or 
impliedly, by the other. 
Explanation II – Any matter which 
might and ought to have been made ground 
of defence, or attack in such former suit 
shall be deemed to have been a matter 
directly and substantially in issue in 
such suit. 
Explanation III – Any relief claimed 
in the plaint, which is not expressly 
granted by the decree, shall, for the 
purpose of this section, be deemed to have 
been refused. 
Explanation IV – A decision is final 
within the meaning of this section when it 
is such as the Court making it could not 
alter (except on review) on the 
application of either party or reconsider 
of its own motion. A decision liable to 
appeal may be final within the meaning of 
this section until the appeal is made. 
Explanation V – Where persons litigate 
bona fide in respect of a private right 
claimed in common for themselves and 
others, all persons interested in such 
right right shall, for the purpose of this 
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section, be deemed to claim under the 
persons so litigating. 
Explanation VI – Where a foreign 
judgment is relied on, the production of 
the judgment duly authenticated is 
presumptive evidence that the Court which 
made it had competent jurisdiction, unless 
the contrary appear on record; but such 
presumption may be removed by proving want 
of jurisdiction.’ 
“From the perusal of the re-enacted 
section it is quite clear that it has 
not been materially altered and that 
it is as a re-production of the old 
rule of law.’ 
 Incomplete character of Sec.13 in 
Civil Procedure Code of 1882. The section 
even in its present form is not complete 
or exhaustive of the effect of res 
Judicata. It does not deal with the case 
of judgment in rem, nor with that of 
parties represented by, thought not 
claiming under, the parties to the former 
suit. 
 Where res Judicata applies only to a 
trial by a court of original jurisdiction 
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or even by an appellate Court.- The 
Calcutta High Court in Abdul Majid V. Few 
Narain Mahato, held that a trial by an 
original court only is contempted, and 
that the section has no application to the 
disposal of an appeal; and that when there 
is no res Judicata a the time of the trial 
of the original suit, the appellate Court 
is bound to decide the appeal on the 
merits. The contrary was held, however, by 
a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in 
Balkishan V. Kisjanlal (A.I.R. 1947 
Nag.248 (D.B.); Krishnan Nair V Kambi, 
A.I.R.1937 Mad.544:1937) in  which a 
decision of the High Court in a suit for 
rent of 1292 F. was held to be res 
Judicata in a second appeal, presented 
prior to that decision, in a suit for rent 
of 1293 F. Mr. Justice Mahmood (with whom 
Sir John Edge,<J. and Straight, 
J.concurred) said that, ‘the doctrine, so 
far as it relates to prohibiting the trial 
of an issue, must refer not to the date of 
the commencement of the litigation, but to 
the time when the Judge is called upon to 
decide the issue. The rule contained in 
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Sec. 13 is not limited to the courts of 
first instance, it applies equally to the 
procedure of the first and second 
appellate court by reason of secs.582 and 
587 (Civil Procedure Code), respectively 
and indeed, even to miscellaneous 
proceedings by reason of Sec.647.’ The 
Panjab Chief Court also held the same in 
Nur Muhammad V. Jamun,  in which case the 
plaintiffs had first sued for a 
declaration as to the invalidity of a gift 
of certain property, and while an enquiry 
was being held into it on remand, the 
donor died and the plaintiffs brought 
another suit for possession of the same 
property, and the appeals in both the 
suits were disposed of by the lowe 
appellate Court on the same day. The 
decision in the declaration suit had not 
been appealed from and was therefore held 
to have become final and to constitute res 
Judicata in the suit for possession in 
which an appeal was presented to the Chief 
court. 
 (g) The law of res Judicata,as 
embodied in Sec.11  of Act V of 1908 is 
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not exhaustive.- The provisions of Sec.13 
in Civil Procedure Code of 1882 have, as 
largely modified, been re-enacted in 
Sec.11of the present Code, namely Act V of 
1908. It is interesting to see that 
although of Act V of 1908 is not 
exhaustive.- The provisions of Sec.13 in 
Civil Procedure Code of 1882 have, as 
largely modified, been re-enacted in 
Sec.11of the present Code, namely Act V of 
1908. It is interesting to see that 
although   of Act V of 1908 is not 
exhaustive.- The provisions of Sec.13 in 
Civil Procedure Code of 1882 have, as 
largely modified, been re-enacted in 
Sec.11of the present Code, namely Act V of 
1908. It is interesting to see that 
although  the Indian Legislature has from 
1859 onwards made several attempts to 
codify the law on the subject and the 
present Sec.11 is a largely modified and 
improved form of the original Sec.2 of Act 
VIII of 1859, it must be borne in mind 
that the section, as even now enacted, is 
not exhaustive of the law on the subject, 
and the, and the general principle of res 
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Judicata apply to matter on which the 
section is silent and also govern 
proceedings to which the section does not 
in terms apply. In soorjomonee Dayee 
v.Suddamund Mahapattar, their Lordship of 
the Judicial Committee said : ‘We are of 
opinion that Sec.2 of the Code of 1859 
would by no means prevent the operation of 
their general law relating to res Judicata 
founded on the principle nemo debet bis 
vexari pro eadem causa.’ Ram Kirpal V. Rum 
Kauri clearly shows that the pleas of Res 
Judicata still remains apart from the 
limited provisions of the Code.  
In the words of Sri Barness Peacock: 
 “The binding force of such a judgment in 
such a case as to present depends not upon 
Sec.10 Act X 1877” Snow repealed by Code of 
Civil Procedure)”but upon the general 
principles of law. If it were not binding there 
would be no end to litigation.” 
 The matter was considered in Hook V. 
Administration of Bengal when theif Lofship 
once again laid down ‘that Sec.11 of the Code 
is not exhaustive of the circumstances in which 
an issue is res Judicata. Although the section 
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did not in terms apply, the plea of res 
Judicata still remained, apart from the limited 
provisions of the Code, and it was that plea 
which the respondents had to eet in the present 
caswe.” This dictum was reaffirmed by Lord 
Buckmaster in Ramchandra Rav V. Ramchandra Rao 
where it was remarked that the principle which 
prevents the same cause being twice agitated  
is of general application and is not limited by 
the specific words of the code in this 
respect.’ 
 (h) Burden of Proof- Any party, who is 
desirous of setting up res Judicata way of 
estoppel, must establish (except as to any of 
them which may be expressly or impliedly 
admitted) each and every of the following : 
  (i) that the alleged judicial decision was 
what in law is deemed such; (ii) that the 
particular judicial decision relied upon was in 
fact pronounced, as alleged;(ii) that the 
Judicial Tribunal renouncing the decision had 
competent jurisdiction in that behalf; (iv) 
that the judicial decision was final;(v) that 
the judicial decision was, or involved, a 
determination of the same question as that 
sought to be controverted in the litigation in 
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which the estoppel is raised; (vi) that the 
parties to the judicial decision, or their 
privies, were the same persons as the parties 
to the proceeding in which the edstoppel is 
raised, or their privies, or hat the decision 
was conclusive in rem.”(A.I.R.1954 (T.C.)43-45) 
 The expression “cause of action” can be 
reasonably used in connection with proceedings 
other than suits and it must be construed with 
reference rather to substance than the form of 
action. 
 A.I.R.1949 Pat.270, held that..... 
 “Cause of action” however, is wrongly the 
infringement of the right at a particular 
moment. The expression “cause of action” and 
part of the cause of action must be taken as 
meaning respectively the material facts and any 
material fact in the case for the plaintiff. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE 
LAW OF RES JUDICATA 
 
 Section 11, C.P.C.- No Court shall try any 
suit or issue in which the matter directly and 
substantially in issue has been directly and 
substantially in issue in a former suit between 
the same parties, or between parties under whom 
they or any of them claim, litigating under the 
same title, in a court competent to try such 
Court. 
 Explanation I – The expression “former 
suit” shall denote a suit which has been 
decided prior to the suit in question whether 
or not it was instituted prior thereto. 
 Explanation II – For the purposes of this 
section, the competence of a court shall be 
determined irrespective of any provisions as to 
a right of appeal from the decision of such 
Court.  
 Explanation III – The matter above 
referred to must in the former suit have been 
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alleged by one party and either denied or 
admitted expressly or impliedly by the other. 
 Explanation IV – Any matter which might 
and ought to have been made ground of defence 
or attack in such former suit shall be deemed 
to have been a matter directly and 
substantially in issue in such suit. 
Explanation V – Any relief claimed in the 
plaint which is not expressly granted by the 
decree, shall, for the purposes of this 
section,  be deemed to have been refused. 
Explanation VI – Where persons litigate 
bona fide in respect of public right or of a 
private right claimed in common for themselves 
and others, all persons interested in such 
right shall, for the purpose of this section, 
be deemed to claim under the person so 
litigating. 
 
 S Y N O P S I S 
1. Scope of the law of res Judicata. 
2. Applicability (general) – Essential 
conditions of re judicata. 
3. Applicability of doctrine of res Judicata. 
4. Section 11, C.P.C.-If exhaustive. 
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5. Distinction between res Judicata and 
estoppel. 
6. Doctrine of res Judicata and lis pendens. 
7. Whether res Judicata a technical rule or 
is based on public policy. 
8. Plea of res Judicata. 
-(A) Scope of the plea of res Judicata  
-(B) Mode of pleading. 
-(C) Mode of Proof 
-(D) Stage at which plea of res Judicata 
may be  
     allowed to be raised. 
-(E) Waiver of the plea res Judicata  
9. Plea of res Judicata if can be waived. 
10. Judgments in tem and judgment in personam. 
11. Judgment not inter or in rem. 
 
Change made in the section -   
  This section corresponds with Sec.13 of 
the code of 1882 except in the following 
particulars: 
(1) Explanation I is new and has been inserted 
on the suggestions of Sir Bhahyam Iyengar 
to remove a conflict of authority as to 
the meaning of the expression “firner 
suit”. 
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(2) Explanation is also new and is intended to 
affirm the view that the competence of the 
jurisdiction of a court does not depend on 
the right of appeal from its decision. 
(3) The words “public right” in Explanation VI 
are new. They are intended to give due 
effect to suits relating to public 
nuisances (sec.91) 
(4) Explanation IV to Sec.13 of 1882 code has 
been omitted altogether. The reason of the 
omission is stated to be that it was 
liable to misconstruction and that the law 
is well established apart from the 
explanation.  
(5) Explanation VI to Sec.13 of 1882 Code now 
stands as Sec-14, with some modifications. 
 
1. Scope of the law of res judicata. - 
 A.I.R. 1960 S.C.941 (1961)1 S.C.A. 10; 
(1960) 3 S.C.R. 590 held that.... 
  The principles and doctrine of res 
judicata have been enunciated in a nut-shell by 
their Lordship of the Supreme Court in a recent 
decision in Satyadhyan V.Smt.Deorajini Debi, in 
the following words: 
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“The Principle of res judicata is based on 
the need of giving finality to judicial 
decisions. What it says is that once a res 
judicata it shall not be adjudged again. 
Primarily it applies as between past 
litigation and future litigation. When a 
matter whether on a question of fact, or 
on a question of law has been decided 
between two parties in one suit or 
proceeding and the decision is final, 
either because no appeal was taken to a 
higher court orbecause the appeal was 
dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither 
party will be allowed in a future suit or 
proceeding between the same parties ot 
canvass the matter again. The principle of 
res judicata is embodied in relation to 
suits under Sec.11 C.P.C but even where 
Sec.11 C.P.C does not apply, principle of 
res judicata has been applied by court for 
the purpose of achieving finality in 
litigation. The result of this is that the 
original Court as well as he higher court 
must in any future litigation proceed on 
the basis that the previous decision is 
correct.” 
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 A.I.R.1949 All.596: 1949 All.L.J.33; Jint 
Ram V. Jagar Nath Ram. A.I.R.1959 Pat.489 held 
that... 
 Under the old code of Civil Procedure, 
1859 bar of res judicata depended on the 
identity of causes of action whereas in the 
present code the bar of res judicata depends 
upon the identity of the issues in the two 
suits. Moreover the old Code did not include 
the rule of constructive res judicat, whereas 
sec.11 C.P.C. has been enacted (in the present 
code) to give statutory recognition to the rule 
of constructive res judicata also by appending 
Explanation IV to Sec.C.P.C.   
 The object of res judicata is toavoid 
unnecessary suits and the principle is one of 
convenience and rest and not of absolute 
justice. It is founded on two maxims of Roman 
Jurisprudence, one maxim is  “interest 
republicae ut sit finis litium” (it is in the 
interest of State that there should be an end 
of litigation) and the other maxim is “Nemo 
debet bis vexari pro una et eadem cause” (no 
man should be vexed twice over for the same 
cause).  
  A.I.R.1946 Oudh 22(F.B.):20 Luck,339.  
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   A.I.R.1956 Raj.166 (D.B.) 
  A.I.R.1953 Bom.393  
  A.I.R.1963 All.210 (F.B.) 
  held that.....  
   The bar which law imposes on 
subsequent litigation is created by the 
existence of a previous judgment whereby the 
matter has once already been fully canvassed 
and fairly and finally decided between the 
parties by a competent court of law.  
 A.I.R.1916 P.C.78 held that.... 
  The rule of res judicata while founded on 
ancient precedent is dictated by a wisdom which 
is for all time. “It has been will said” 
declared Lord Coke “interest republicae ut sit 
finis litium (it concern state that there be an 
end to litigation), otherwise great oppression 
might be done under colour and pretence of law. 
 Though the rule of the code amy be traced 
to English source it embodies a doctrine in no 
way opposed to the spirit of Hindu law as 
exposed by other Hindu commentators. 
Vijhanesvara and Nilkantha include the pleas of 
former judgment among those allowed by law each 
citing for the purpose the text of Katyana who 
describes the plea thus: If a person though 
45 
defeated at law sue again he should be 
answered: “Your were defeated formerly”. This 
is called the plea of former judgement. There 
must be some finality to litigation and the 
rule that a title once settled by a decision 
should not be questioned again between the same 
parties is intended not only to prevent a new 
decision but also o prevent a new investigation 
so that the same person may not be harassed 
again and again in various proceedings upon the 
same question. The rule of res judicata ousts 
the jurisdiction of the Court and has, 
therefore, to be construed carefully with 
reference to the parties, competency of the 
Court and the issue on which the parties joined 
in the previous litigation.  
 A.I.R.1927  All. 189 held that  
 The rule of res judicata  so far as it 
relates to the trial of an issue refers not to 
the date of the commencement of the litigation 
but to the date when the Judge is called upon 
to decide the issue.  
  A.I.R.1937 Mad.545, 1937 M.W.N.299 held 
that.... 
  It is plain from the terms of Sec.11 
C.P.C.  that it is equally well settled that 
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the competence of a court for the purpose of 
Sec.11 of the Civil Procedure code is to be 
determined irrespective of any provision as to 
a right of appeal for the decision of such 
Court. 
  A.I.R.1928 Cal.777 (F.B.), 
   A.I.R.1949 Cal.430 (F.B.), 
   A.I.R.1951 Pat.370  
   A.I.R.1954 All.215  
   A.I.R.1963 Mys.120  
   held that.... 
  What is made conclusive between the 
parties is the decision of the court and that 
reasoning of the Court is not necessarily the 
same thing as its decision or in other words 
what is res judicata is the point directly 
decided and not the reasoning thereof on which 
such decision is based. The object of the 
doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon 
the parties special principles of law as 
applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain 
their rights and the facts upon which these 
rights directly and substantially depends, and 
to prevent this ascertainment from becoming 
nugatory by precluding the parties from re-
opening or re-contesting that which has been 
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finally decided. Although the rule of res 
judicata is cardinal principle of legal systems 
of most civilised countries and many eoulogiums 
have been lavished upon this doctrine said to 
be most salutary the application of the rule of 
res judicata should be influenced by no 
technical considerations of form but by matter 
of substance within the limits allowed by law. 
 
  A.I.R. 1936 P.C.46, 
   A.I.R. 1957 All.575 
  A,I.R. 1963 Punj.178  
  held that..... 
 The law does not compel the Court trying 
the latter suit to hold without trial that the 
decision in the earlier suit was correct; it 
merely estops the parties to the earlier suit 
and privies from showing that it is incorrect. 
The Judge trying the latter suit must give 
effect to the decision but he is not bound to 
hold that it is right. A decision even on 
question of law operates as res judicata 
between the parties. Thus an erroneous decision 
of law in a former suit or proceeding is as 
much binding on the parties as a correct 
decision of law.  
48 
  A.I.R.1928 Cal.777 (F.B.) held that.... 
 The law courts are in no way authorised to 
alter the rights of the parties. They profess 
at all events to ascertain the law and if the 
binding character of a decision upon a concrete 
question of law as to the particular terms of a 
finding is to fluctuate with every alteration 
in the current of authority, the court will 
become an instrument for the unsettlement of 
rights rather than for ascertainment thereof. 
The Legislature may be statute alter the right 
of the parties and when it does so, it makes 
provision as it thinks fit and proper to 
prevent injustice. A decision will continue to 
operate as res judicata unaffected by any 
change in the current of authorities on the 
point. Similarly a question once decided 
earlier against a party Court has enunciated a 
rule different from what was recognised in 
previous cases. Therefore in it, should not be 
ignored, unless, indeed, the express words of 
the stature clearly contradict those 
principles. 
 
  A.I.R.1955 S.C.481  
  A.I.R.1960 M.P.250  held that.... 
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 It is important to note that a decision 
may not amount to res judicata yet it may 
operate as a judicial precedent and may throw a 
heavy burden on a party challenging it. Thus 
where the Privy Council had construed a 
document a will operate as res judicata against 
a person who was not a party to the previous 
litigation yet it operate as judicial 
precedent.           
  This section aims at enunciating the 
whole rule of res judicata, and the aim has 
been substantially achieved, 
  A.I.R.1924 All.815 (F.B.) held 
that.... 
  but it is not exhaustive as to the 
effect of a res judicata. It does not deal at 
all with the case of judgments in rem, nor with 
that of parties represented by, though not 
claiming under the parties to the former suit. 
Accordingly it has been maintained at Allahabad 
that the section does not embody the entire 
rule of res judicata, and that a suit might be 
barred by that rule, even if all the conditions 
laid down in the section were not present. The 
same view has been taken also by the Bombay 
High Court. But the reasoning adopted by the 
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Allahabad Court as to applicability of the 
general principle of res judicata based on the 
ground that the present section is not 
exhaustive on the subject with which it deals, 
is applicable only to cases falling outside the 
terms of the section. Therefore, in 
interpreting the section the fundamental 
principles of the rule embodied in it should 
not be ignored, unless, indeed, the express 
words of the statute clearly contradict those 
principles. It would, however seem that this 
section con not be applied quite literally; if 
it could then the Court trying a second suit 
would be bound by the decision of a point in a 
first suit treated by the Court in appeal as 
irrelevant.  
  A.I.R.1927 Mad.450 held that.... 
   It would not be right on the part of a 
court extend the section to cases which can not 
be brought within the four corners of it.   
  A similar rule is enacted in Sec.10. 
But it does not form part of the rules, 
however, is vast. The rule in Sec.10 relates to 
matters sub judice, whilst the rule in this 
section relates to matters which have passed 
into rem judicatam. The one bars only a “suit”; 
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the other bars both the trial of a “suit” and 
of an “issue” subject to their respective 
conditions. Those conditions are not all the 
same in Sec.10 as they are in this section, and 
the working of the two sections as to the 
distinction is so clear that it is not easy to 
confound the two rules. 
 
2. Applicability (general) Essential 
Conditions of res judicata. – 
  To constitute a matter as res judicata 
all the conditions enumerated in Sec.11, C.P.C. 
must be satisfied. The essential conditions for 
the application of the doctrine of res judicata 
are : 
(1) The matter directly and substantially in 
issue in the subsequent suit or issue must 
be the same matter which is directly and 
substantially in issue either actually or 
constructively in the former suit. 
(2) The former suit must have been between the 
same parties or between parties under whom 
they or any of them claim. 
(3) The parties must have litigated under the 
same title in the former suit. 
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(4) The court which decides the former suit 
must have been a court competent to try 
the subsequent suit in which such issue is 
subsequently raised. 
(5) A.I.R. 1958 Andh.Pra.363 (F.B.) held 
that..... 
The matter directly and substantially 
in issue in the subsequent suit must have 
been heard and finally decided by the 
Court of the first suit. 
It is necessary that the cause of 
action on which both the suits are based 
should be the same. Thus res judicata can 
not come into operation where the suject 
matter of the two suits as also the 
capacities in which they were brought are 
altogether different and the causes of 
action of the two suits are also not the 
same. 
 
3. Applicability of the doctrine of res  
Judicata. – 
  A plea of res judicata founded on the 
general principles of law may be available to 
cases not strictly covered by Sec.11, C.P.C., 
but in cases strictly falling under Sec.11 
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C.P.C., it will certainly be wrong to ignore 
the specific conditions prescribed by the 
section and to sustain the plea of res judicata 
merely on general principle. To do so, would be 
to defeat the purpose and intention with which 
the Legislature enacted the section. 
  Section 1, C.P.C. does not in terms 
apply to appeals, though the word “suit” is 
often used as including appeals, it con not be 
so interpreted in Sec.11 as the section would 
thereby the inconsistent with Explanation Ii 
which was introduced as late as 1908 in the 
Code of Civil Procedure, yet in the light of 
general principles of res judicata the appeals 
are also barred by res judicata if there is a 
previous final judgment between the parties.  
 A.I.R.1937 Mad.544 held that..... 
 Thus the rule of res judicata is not only 
limited to courts of first instance but it 
applies equally to the prcedure of first and 
second appellate courts and indeed to 
miscellaneous proceedings by reason of the 
general principles.    
 A.I.R.- 1942 Mad.421(D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1939 Sind.329 held that..... 
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 Where after the commencement of the trial 
of an issue and during the pendency of its 
appeal a final judgment of the same issue is 
pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction 
in another case (which remains unchallenged by 
way of ppeal or revision), it operates as res 
judicata.   
A.I.R.- 1938 All. 635(D.B.)held that..... 
In an Allahabad case it has been heod by 
their Lordships that the trial Court was wrong 
in ignoring the prior judgment of the High 
Court in second apeal between the same parties 
for the same controversy in a subsequent suit 
because a Letters Patent Appeal against the 
judgment of the second appeal was still pending 
and not yet decided, their Lordship held that 
the finding of second appeal was binding under 
Sec.11 C.P.C. 
A.I.R.- 1948 Oudh.270  
A.I.R.- 1961 All.278 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1932 All.416 
held that..... 
The decision in an earlier suit on the 
same question will not operate as res judicata 
in a subsequent suit when a different law is in 
force.   
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A.I.R.- 1938 Lah.369 (F.B.) 
held that..... 
But a change of procedure embodied in the 
statute after the decision of the suit will not 
materially affect the binding nature of the 
former decision. Thus where the suit was tried 
according to the procedure then in force and 
was taken to the highest Court of appeal, the 
mere fact that the procedure then in force was 
of a summary character will be immaterial for 
the purposes of Sec.11 C.P.C. 
A.I.R.- 1928 Cal.777 (F.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1923 Cal.629 (F.B.) 
held that..... 
Similarly any change of current of 
authorities pronounced by courts of law will 
not affect the previous decisions base3d on 
former view of law nor any question decided 
earlier against a party can be reagitated 
merely because a special Bench of the High 
Court has enunciated different rule of law. 
A.I.R.- 1935 Pat.59 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
  Although ordinarily it is not open to 
a litigant to have recourse to two different 
proceedings for the enforcement of his right, 
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there are cases in which different concurrent 
remedies may be pursued without trenching upon 
the rule of res judicata or the doctrine of the 
election of remedies, this is, however, subject 
to the restriction that if the party aggrieved 
is successful in one proceeding, the judgment 
absorbs all his other judicial remedies. 
A.I.R.- 1932 Mad.254 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
  Although civil suit and criminal 
prosecution may be based exactly on the same 
cause of action the parties are, strictly 
speaking, not the same, the burden of proof is 
differently placed, and different consideration 
may come in. the result may, therefore, be a 
conflict in decision. The risk of such a 
conflict is one that is inherent in the 
division of causes into civil and criminal. The 
judgment of neither is binding on the other and 
each must decide the case on the evidence 
before it. If they arrive at different 
conclusions, it is regrettable but unavoidable.  
A.I.R.- 1925 Lah.160 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
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  A finding given in a suit which is perhaps 
an entirely useless suit and need not have been 
instituted at all does not operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit relating to the 
same matter if the other requirements of the 
law laid sown in Se.11, C.P.C., have been 
fulfilled.    
 
A.I.R.- 1959 A.P. 448 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
Where is subject-matter of the two suits 
as also the capacities which they were brought 
was altogether different and the cause of 
action on which both the suits were based were 
not the same, the bar of res judicata can not 
come into operation in such a case.     
A.I.R.- 1927 Cal. 421 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
Similarly if a man fights a case on false 
statements and does not call necessary evidence 
in support of his own statements, he cannot 
afterwards gain any advantage for his 
omissions. He must be considered to be as much 
bound by the decisions as he should have  been 
if he put forward a true case and called all 
the available evidence. 
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A.I.R.- 1929 Lah. 769 
held that..... 
On  a question having been raised whether 
the decisions as to custom in one locality 
between the same parties is binding on them qua  
the custom followed by them in other 
localities. It was held that custom in Punjab 
is primarily trial and at any rate in the case 
of two villages situate within a few miles of 
each other it is not possible to contend that 
the decision given on the question of custom in 
a suit about the property situate in one 
village is not res judicata in a suit brought 
about property situate in a neighbouring 
village. 
A.I.R.- 1922 Sind. 6 
A.I.R.- 1937 Mad. 544  
A.I.R.- 1956 All. 237(D.B.) 
held that..... 
The use of the word “suit” in Secs.10 and 
11, C.P.C., do not restrict its applicability 
to suits only but extends to civil 
miscellaneous proceedings also  by virtue of 
Sec.141, C.P.C. Hence the rule of res judicata 
is applicable to Civil Miscellaneous 
proceedings also by virtue of Sec.141, C.P.C., 
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as well as on general principles of res 
judicata. 
A.I.R.- 1938 Lah. 369 (F.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1952 All. 48  
held that..... 
Decisions which are contemplated to 
operate as res judicata under Sec.11, C.P.C. 
are those which are given after a complete 
observance of law and not those which are more 
or less orders passed in an executive capacity. 
A.I.R.- 1924 Pat. 362 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
Accepting the decision under protest and 
acting in accordance with it does not take away 
the binding effect of res judicata. 
The rule of res judicata does not in term 
apply to execution proceedings but on general 
principles of res judicata, it has been applied 
to executing proceedings also with a view to 
give finality to litigation. 
A.I.R.- 1953 Cal. 765 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1962 Ker. 15   
A.I.R.- 1962 Orissa. 54  
held that..... 
Similarly the rule of constrictive res 
judicata has been applied to the execution 
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proceedings on the ground that constructive res 
judicata is founded on the public policy to 
give finality to litigation.  
A.I.R.- 1938 Bom. 173  
held that.....     
The rule of res judicata has been made 
applicable to foreign judgments also pronounced 
by courts of competent jurisdiction by virtue 
of Sec.13 of the code of Civil Procedure 
subject to the six limitations in the aforesaid 
section and also subject to other conditions 
included in Sec.11 of the code of Civil 
Procedure. 
A.I.R.- 1928 Mad. 327  
held that..... 
Under Sec.13 C.P.C. res judicata will 
apply to any matter directly adjudicated upon 
by foreign judgment while sec.11 C.P.C., refers 
to the decision of issues. Thus decision of 
every issue in a foreign judgment is not 
binding on courts in India but the foreign 
judgment will have3 to be scrutinized to see 
what matters have been directly adjudicated and 
what particular reliefs have been granted or 
refused.  
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A.I.R.- 1929 Lab. 627  
A.I.R.- 1964 Ker. 4 (F.B.) 
held that..... 
If a court pronounces judgment upon title 
or possession toland situate outside its 
jurisdiction, the courts of the country where 
the land is situate and also the courts of any 
other country are justified in refusing to 
recognize it or to be bound by it. 
 
A.I.R.- 1936 Pat. 268 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1960 s.c. 941  
A.I.R.- 1958 All. 54 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1962 H.P. 43 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
The rule of res judicata has been made 
applicable to the two stages of the same suit 
or proceeding. If in the earlier stage of the 
same suit a matter in issue has been finally 
adjudicated upon, then the defeated party will 
not be allowed to reagitate the same matter at 
the later stage of the same suit on the 
principle of constructive res judicata and also 
by reason of the general policy of law. The 
parties aggrieved by the earlier order may 
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pursue their remedy by way of review or by 
appeals according to law. 
A.I.R.- 1953 S.C. 33 
A.I.R.- 1954 All. 801 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1927 All. 189 
A.I.R.- 1959 All. 764 
held that..... 
The decisions of courts exclusive 
jurisdiction like revenue courts, land 
acquisition courts, administration courts, etc. 
operate as res judicata on the general 
principles of res judicata. A subsequent suit 
in the civil Court on the same ground or for 
the same relief between the same parties which 
may have the effect of setting aside the decree 
of the Court of exclusive jurisdiction is not 
maintainable and is barred by res judicata.  
 
A.I.R.- 1933 Nag. 373  
A.I.R.- 1937 Lah. 4 
A.I.R.- 1959 All. 764 
held that..... 
The principle of res judicata apply to 
insolvency proceedings also. Under the 
Provincial Insolvency Act, the insolvency 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the 
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civil courts to try questions of title to 
property alleged to belong to the insolvent, 
although Sec.11 C.P.C. does not in term apply 
to insolvency proceedings yet under the general 
principles of the res judicata the finding of 
insolvency courts will be binding  
 
A.I.R.- 1952 Punj. 99 
A.I.R.- 1921 P.C. 11 
A.I.R.- 1922 p.c. 80 
held that..... 
The rule of res judicata also applies to 
company matters under the Indian Companies Act.  
 
A.I.R.- 1956 Pat. 182 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1962 Panj. 498 
held that..... 
The rule of res judicata on the general 
principle has been applied to the filing of 
successive writ petitions on the same cause of 
action by the same person (Party) on grounds 
which could have been taken in the earlier 
application have been discouraged so that the 
opposite-party may not be unnecessarily 
harassed on more than one occasion in respect 
of the same matter. 
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4. Section 11. C.P.C. – if exhaustive.- 
A.I.R.- 1941 Cal. 104 
A.I.R.- 1921 P.C. 11 
held that..... 
Section 11, C.P.C. does not codify or 
crystallize the entire law regarding the 
doctrine of res judicata. It deals with some of 
the circumstances under which a previous 
decision will operate was res judicata, but not 
with all. Where other circumstances than those 
provided for in Sec.11 C.P.C., exist, principle 
of res judicata may be invoked without recourse 
to the provisions of that section.  
A.I.R.- 1921 P.C. 498 
held that..... 
Plea of res judicata still remains apart 
from the limited provisions of the Code.  
 
A.I.R.- 1922 P.C. 80 
A.I.R.- 1957 A.P. 841 
held that..... 
The principle which prevents the same 
cause being twice litigated is of general 
application and is not limited by the specific 
words of the Code in this respect.  
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A.I.R.- 1932 P.C. 161 
held that..... 
Their Lordships of the Privy Council have 
laid down that it is well settled that the 
statement of the doctrine of res judicata is 
not exhaustive and that recourse may properly 
be had to decision of the English courts for 
the purpose of ascertaining the general 
principles governing the application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R.- 1941 Cal. 498 
held that..... 
But on matters which clearly fall within 
the explicit provisions of Sec.11,C.P.C., the 
section can not beflouted or over ridden and 
the prohibitions and the limitations prescribed 
in the section cannot be ignored.  
The essence of a Code is to be exhaustive 
on the matters in respect of which it declares 
the law and it is not in the province of a 
judge to go outside the letter of the enactment 
according to its true constructions. 
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A.I.R.- 1954 Raj. 4 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1935 Cal. 792 (D.B.) 
A.I.R.- 1952 Mad. 384 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
Any other interpretation in Sec.11`C.P.C. 
will render the section nugatory and indeed 
meaningless. 
 
A.I.R.- 1953 Cal. 765  
A.I.R.- 1956 All. 237 (D.B.) 
held that..... 
General principles of res judicata as well 
as constructive res judicata apply to 
proceedings, other than suits, including 
execution proceedings. Conditions of 
applicability of principles of res judicata 
actual or constructive contained in Sec.11, 
C.P.C. must be complied with as far as 
possible. 
 
5.  Distinction between res judicata and  
estoppel.- 
Res judicata costs the jurisdiction of the 
Court while estoppel does no more than shut the 
mouth of a party. Estopple never means anything 
more than that a persons shall not be allowed 
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to say one thing at one time and the oppsite of 
it at another time; while res judicata means 
nothing more than that a person shall not be 
heard to say the same thing twice over. 
The doctrine of res judicata no doubt 
resembles with the doctrine of estopple in some 
respects but the two are materially different. 
The distinction between the two doctrines was 
explained by Mahmood J.,in the following words: 
“The effect of the pleas of res 
judicata may, in the result, operate like 
an estopple by preventing a party to a 
litigation from denying the accuracy of 
the former adjudication can not be denied. 
“but here the similarity between the 
two rules virtually ends.  
“Perhaps the shortest way to describe 
the difference between the plea of res 
judicata and an estoppel is to say that 
while the former prohibits the Court from 
enteing into an enquiry at all as to a 
matter already adjudicated upon, the 
latter  prohibits a party after the 
enquiry has already been entered upon from 
proving anything which would contradict 
his own declaration or act to the 
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prejudice of another party who relying 
up[on those declaration or acts, has 
altered his position. In other words, res 
judicata prohibits an enquiry in limine, 
whilst an estoppel is only a piece of 
evidence.”  
 
 A.I.R.1942 Cal.92(98)(D.B.) held that..... 
 The doctrine of res judicata chiefly 
differs from estppel inasmuch as the former 
results from the decision of the Court while 
the latter results from an act of party 
himself. 
 The plea of res judicata  is not merely a 
plea of estoppel. It amounts to an ascertion 
that the very legal rights of the parties are 
such as they have been determined to be by the 
judgment of a competent court and no other 
Court should proceed to determine this again. A 
matter once formerly decided is decided once 
for all as between the parties to the decision 
or as between those claiming under them. That 
which has been delivered in judgment must be 
taken for established truth. In all probability 
it is true in fact even if it is not expedient 
that it should be held as true non-the-less.  
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The operation of the doctrine is thus the 
transformation of a question of fact into a 
question of law. 
 On the other hand, in case of estoppel 
there is no doubt that the express admission of 
a party to the suit or admission implied from 
his conduct, are evidence and strong evidence 
against him, he is not estoppel or concluded by 
them unless another person has been induced by 
them to alter his condition. In such a case the 
party is estoppel from disputing their truth 
with respect to that person and those claiming 
under him and that transaction. 
 
 A.I.R.1942 Cal.92,(D.B.) held that..... 
 It is well-established rule of law that 
estoppel binds parties and privies and not 
strangers.   
 
 A.I.R.1958 All.54,(D.B.) held that..... 
  Now there is no doubt that estoppel by 
conduct is of the very essence of the rules of 
estoppel embodied in Sec. 115,116 and 117 of 
the Indian Evidence Act but since the acts of 
the parties which come in for consideration in 
a litigation the acts, that is of the party 
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sought to be estoppel and those of the other 
who has been led thereby to change his position 
and who therefore pleads the bar of estoppel 
against the former must necessarily be acts 
performed prior to the commencement of the 
litigation, so that the conduct of a party in 
the course of the litigation while it may 
affect the question of costs, should be wholly 
irrelevant for judging those acts.  
 
 A.I.R.1952 Mad.384, 
 A.I.R.1921 Mad.248,(F.B.)  
held that..... 
 Since estoppel results from the acts or 
conducts of the parties consequently the 
decision of a court for which a party is not 
responsible and which might be erroneous cannot 
operate as an estoppel.  If it is a judgment in 
rem, it is binding on all persona whether 
parties or not. If it is any other kind of 
adjudication it binds the parties if it falls 
within Sec.11 C.P.C. or the general principle 
of res judicata recognised by the decision. 
Estoppel by record is what is provided for in 
Sec. 11 C. P. C. It is not within the province 
of any court to introduce another kind of 
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estoppel by judgment not covered by Sec.11 
C.P.C.or the general principles of res 
judicata.  
 
A.I.R.1951 Pat.595,(D.B.)  
held that..... 
Similarly it was also held by Patna High 
Court that Sec.11 C.P.C. has not the effect of 
doing away with the estoppel by record which 
still exists. 
 
  A.I.R. 1930 Bom.135,(D.B.)  
held that..... 
 There can be no estoppel against an Act of 
Parliament or against an Act of Legislature and 
the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to 
defeat the plain privisions of the stature.  
 
  A.I.R. 1957 Tripura 11,(F.B.)  
  held that..... 
 A plea of estoppel not having been raised 
in the pleadings and no evidence given on the 
point was not allowed to be raised in the 
second appeal. 
 The essence of estoppel by judgment is 
that a party cannot be allowed to say any one 
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thing at one time and another at later time. It 
will be seen that the estoppel pleaded and 
upheld by the Supreme Court was an estoppel 
between the parties to the prior action. There 
was no question of that judgment being pleaded 
as an estoppel against third parties.  A 
judgment could be an estoppel only as between 
the parties to it, unless it is a judgment in 
rem which is binding against all the world. In 
srinivasa Aiyangar V. Srinivasa  Aiyangar and 
Ramamurthi Dhava V. Secretary of State  
 
 A.I.R.1914 Cal.281,  
  held that..... 
following certain observations in Bigelow 
on Estoppel and certain dicta of Lord Coke, it 
was held that judgments in personam could also 
create an estoppel against strangers. Those 
decisions were dissented from in Peari Mohan 
Shaha V. Durlavi Dassaya  
 A.I.R.1921 Mad.248,(F.B.)  
  held that..... 
and they were expressly overruled by the 
Full Bench of the Madras High Court in 
Secretary of State V. Sayed Ahmad Badsha Sahib 
Bahadur.  
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 A.I.R. 1959 Andh.Pra.280, at p. 284(D.B.)  
  held that..... 
     That judgment in personsam cannot be 
construed as being conclusive against persons 
not parties thereto is borne out by the scheme 
of the Indian Evidence Act from Sec. 40 to 44.  
Only judgments referred to in sec. 41 
constitute conclusive proof of what they 
contain and sec. 43 in terms provides that 
judgments not judgments is a fact in issue or 
relevant under some other provision of the Act. 
Even if they are relevant this would not be 
conclusive. And a subsequent suit not between 
the parties to the prior litigation but between 
some of the parties thereto and strangers no 
question of estoppel can therefore arise.   
 
 A.I.R.1954 S.C. 82,(F.B.)  
  held that..... 
 Now it may be convenient to quote the 
observations of his Lordship Bhagwati J. who 
delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
Sunderbai V. Devaji Shanker Deshpande “Estoppel 
is a rule of evidence and the general rule is 
enacted in Sec.115 of the Evidence Act which 
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lays down that when one person has by his 
declaration, act or omission caused or 
permitted another person to believe a thign to 
be true and to act upon such belief neither he 
nor his representative shall be allowed in any 
suit or proceeding between himself and such 
person or his representative to deny the truth 
of that thing. This is the rule of estoppel by 
conduct as distinguished from an estoppel by 
record, which constitute the bar of res 
judicata. ” 
  At another place in the same judgment it 
was contended before their Lordships that on a 
true construction G had agreed not to adopt a 
son to her deceased husband S, that the matter 
had passed from the stage of mere 
representation into an agreement and that, 
therefore, it would be a case of breach of 
contract, if any.  Their Lordships observed : “ 
We are afraid this position cannot avail him. 
Even though the matter may have passed from the 
stage of a representation into an agreement 
there are cases where the courts are entitled 
to entertain a plea of estoppel in order to 
prevent fraud or circuity of actin. Authority 
for this position is to be found in the 
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following passage from Bigelow on Estoppel, 6th 
Ed., pp.639-40:” 
“Situation may arise in which a 
contract should be held an estoppel, as in 
certain cases where only an adequate right 
of action would, if the estoppel were not 
allowed, exist in favour of the injured 
party. In such a case the estoppel may 
sometimes be available to prevent fraud 
and a circuit of action”  
 
6.  Doctrine of res judicata and lis 
pendens.- 
   The doctrine of lis pendens forms no 
part of the rule of res judicata the reason 
upon which it is based is in some respects 
similar in principle to the doctrine of res 
judicata.  The rule of lis pendens though 
analogous yet is not co-extensive with the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
 
 A.I.R.1949 Bom.367,(372)(D.B.) held 
that..... 
 The distinction between the two doctrines, 
viz. res judicata and lis pendens has been very 
ably pointed out in detail in a very 
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illuminating judgment by his Lordship Bhagwati 
J., as he then was to the effect that res 
judicata means a matter adjudicated upon or a 
matter on which judgment has been pronounced. 
The rule has been put on two grounds, one the 
hardship to the individual for not being vexed 
twice for the same cause and the other public 
policy that there should be an end to 
litigation.  The rule is based on the principle 
that the cause of action which would sustain 
the second suit having been merged in the 
decision of the first, does not survive any 
more. And it is well established that every 
suit has got to be sustained by a cause of 
action and there is no longer a cause of action 
after the decision of the first suit. Up to the 
decision of the first suit it would be possible 
to bay that there is a cause of action which 
could sustain both the suits. This is the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
 Lis pendens is an action pending and the 
doctrine of lis pendens is that an alience 
pendente lite is bound by the result of the 
litigation. It is a doctrine common to court 
both of law and equity and rests upon this 
foundation that it would plainly be impossible 
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that any action or suit could be brought to a 
successful termination if alienations pendente 
lite were permitted to prevails. The palintiff 
would be liable in every case to be defeated by 
the defendant’s alienation before the judgment. 
Ordinarily a decree of a court binds only the 
parties and the privies in representation or 
estate. But he who purchases during the 
pendency of a suit is held bound by the decree 
that may be made against the person from whom 
he derives title. Where there is a real and 
fair purchaser without notice, the rule may 
operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded 
upon the public policy, the effect of which is 
not to annual the conveyance but only to render 
it subservient to the rights of the parties in 
litigation. As to the rights of these parties 
the conveyance is treated as if it never had 
any existence and it does not vary them. 
  It is also settled law that in absence 
of fraud or collusion the doctrine of lis 
pendens applies to a suit which is decided ex 
parte or by compromise. If the compromise will 
not operate as lis pendens. This is the 
doctrine of lis pendens.  
78 
  Now the distinction between the 
doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of 
lis pendens is that although both have the same 
end in view, viz. finality in litigation, the 
former that between the same parties or their 
privies once the decision is reached in a suit 
the same question shall not be canvassed in any 
other suit, and the latter that whatever the 
party may chose to do by way of transfers, 
pendete lite, the transferee pendente lite 
shall be bound by the result of the litigation; 
there is however this difference that the res 
judicata is concerned with more actions than 
one whereas lis pendens is concerned with the 
very same suit during the pendency of which 
there is an alienation of right, title and 
interest of one of the parties thereto.  
  In the case of res judicata the same 
cause of action may sustain various actions 
(suits) simultaneously but once the cause of 
action is merged in the judgement pronounced in 
a previously decided suit, there is no cause of 
action left to sustain the second suit. Whereas 
in the case of lis pendens, however, the cause 
of action continues as it was sustaining the 
suit for the adjudication of the rights of the 
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parties and the doctrine applies during rhe 
pendency of that suit sustained on that cause 
of action. Whatever be the litigation 
irrespective of whatever has happened between 
his transferor and himself. 
 
 A.I.R.1949 Bom.367,(D.B.)  
  held that..... 
 Once, however, even in the case where the 
doctrine of lis pendens applies a judgment is 
pronounced and the cause of action is merged in 
the judgment, that judgment is the final 
pronouncement which binds not only the parties 
to the suit but also transferees pendente lite 
from them, and the transferees would 
legitimately be treated as the representative-
in-interest of the parties to the suit. Then 
there would be no lis or action  which would 
survive. This lis or action can only be 
sustained by a cause of action and the cause of 
action having can only be sustained by a cause 
of action and the cause of action having merged 
in the judgment pronounced by a competent 
court, there would be no more occasion for any 
lis to continue pending and if it is in the 
same suit in which the doctrine of lis pendens 
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applies there would be no question of the 
applicability of the res judicata. The rule of 
res judicata would come into operation only if 
the judgment was pronounced in another suit 
which came to be decided earlier thatn the one 
in which the doctrine of lis pendens applied. 
But once that judgment was pronounced it would 
have the effect of finally determining the 
rights of the parties and the cause of action 
which would sustain the suit in which the 
doctrine of lis pendens applied would be merged 
in the judgment duly pronounced in what may be 
described as the previously decided suit. Thus 
the rule of res judicata prevails over the 
doctrine of lis pendens and binds not only the 
parties thereto but also transferees pendente 
lite from them.  
 
 A.I.R.1934 Cal.552,(D.B.)  
  held that..... 
 A similar view was expressed by their 
Lorships of the Calcutta High Court that in 
case of conflict between the two doctrines of 
res judicata and lis pendens, the former 
prevails over the latter. 
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 In Faiyaz Hussain Khan V. Prag.Narain Lord 
Machnaghten quotes with approval the statement 
of the doctrine by Cranworth, L.C. as being : 
Pendente lite neither party to the 
litigation can alienate the property in 
dispute so as to affect his opponent” 
 The principle of lis pendens enforced in 
England both by courts of law and equity is 
embodied in sec.52 of the Transfer of Property 
Act. The section does not declare that all the 
transfers made during the pendente lite are 
null and void; but what is provided for is that 
such transfers will be subject to the decree or 
order passed or made in the suit. In other 
words, the transfers will be subservient to the 
decree or order. 
 
 A.I.R.1928 Mad.635,(D.B.)  
 A.I.R.1947 Mad.18,  
 A.I.R.1943 Cal.18,  
 A.I.R.1938 Cal.1,  
  held  that.... 
 In Rangaswami Nadar V.Sundrapandia Thavar,  
 it was held that with regard to alienation 
pendente lite the rule is not that the 
alienation is absolutely void, but the matter 
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will not affect the rights of any party thereto 
under any decree or order which may be made in 
the suit. In other workds the trnasfer will be 
available and valid subject, however, to the 
result of the suit during the pendency of which 
the transfer is made. To the same effect are 
the observations in Nachappa Goundan V. 
Samiappa Goundan, Muhammad Juman Mia V.Akali 
Mudiani and alos in Ramdhone V. Kedar Nath.  
 
 A.I.R.1959 A.P.280  
  held  that.... 
 It follows that the decree or order does 
not create a right in any party in respect of 
any specific property transferred, no question 
of lis pendens can possibly arise. 
 
7. Whether res judicata a technical rule  
or is based on public policy.- 
 A.I.R.1961 S.C.1457 
  held  that.... 
 On the question whether the rule of res 
judicata is merely a technical rule or is based 
on high public policy it will be of advantage 
to quote the observations of his Lordship 
Gajendragadkar  J., who delivered the judgment 
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of a recent Supreme Court decision in Daryao V. 
State of U.P.: 
“Now the rule of res judicata as 
indicated in Sec.11 C.P.C., has no doubt 
some technical aspects, for instance the 
rule of constructive res judicata may be 
said to be technical, but the basis on 
which the said rule rests is founded on 
considerations of public policy. It is in 
the interest of the public at large that a 
finality should attach to the binding 
decision pronounced by courts of competent 
jurisdiction, and it is also in the public 
interest that individuals should not be 
vexed twice over with the same kind of 
litigation..... 
 “In considering the essential elements 
of res judicata one inevitable harks  back 
to the judgment of Sir William B. Hale 
‘from the variety of cases relative to 
judgments being given in evidence in civil 
suits, these two deductions seem to follow 
as generally true : First, that the 
judgment of a court of concurrent 
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is 
as a plea, a bar or as evidence, 
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conclusive between the same parties, upon 
the same matter, directly in question in 
another Court; secondly, that the judgment 
of the Court of exclusive jursdiction, 
directly upon the point, is in like manner 
conclusive upon the same mater, between 
the same parties, coming incidentally in 
question in another court for a different 
purpose.’ As has been observed by Halsbury 
‘the doctrine of res judicata is not a 
technical doctrine applicable only to 
record; it is a fundamental doctrine of 
all courts that there must be an end of 
litigation. Hulsbury also adds that the 
doctrine applies equally inall courts and 
it is immaterial in what Court the former 
proceeding was taken, provided only that 
it was a court of a competent 
jurisdiction, or what form the proceeding 
took, provided it was really for the same 
cause (page 187, para.362). Res judicata 
it is observed in Corpus Juirs, 
jurisprudence, and is put upon two 
grounds, embodied in various makes it to 
the interest of the state that there 
should be an end to litigation – interest 
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republicae ut sit finis litium; the other, 
the hardship on the individual that he 
should be vexed twice for the same cause – 
nemo debet bis vexari pro eaden causa. In 
this sense the recognised basis of the 
rule of res judicata is different from 
that of technical estoppel. Estoppel rests 
on equitable principles and res judicata 
on maxims which are taken from the Roman 
Law. Therefore, the argument that res 
judicata is a technical rule ...  can not 
be accepted.” 
 
8.Plea of res judicata. - 
 A plea of res judicata is often said and 
sometimes even held to affect jurisdiction but 
is really only a plea in bar of a trial of a 
suit or an issue, as the cas mya be, and does 
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus 
the hearing of suit, notwithstanding a valid 
objection on the ground of res judicata or the 
dismissal of a suit as barred by res judicata 
may be a wrong exercise of jurisdiction; but is 
neither usurping of jurisdiction nor a denial 
of its exercise. It is clear, however, that the 
plea of res judicata going to the root of the 
86 
case, like the plea of bar by Limitation Law, 
may be raised at any stage and even for the 
first time on second appeal notwithstanding the 
provisions of O.VIII r.2.  But the Court will 
not listen to the plea at such a late stage 
where is would be necessary to take evidence 
before deciding the question. The punjab Chief 
Court thus held on that ground, that the person 
raising the plea for the first time on appeal 
cannot allege in support of it facts not 
already on the record. The case of muhammad 
Ismail V. Chattar Singh in which the countlrary 
view was taken seems to be doubtful authority. 
It goes without saying that a plea of res 
judicata depending on a finding of fact which 
has not been challenged in the lower appellate 
Court cannot be maintained. It must also be 
observed that a plea of res judicata, unless 
raised in defence, cannot be decided by the 
Court be, a plea of estoppel by res judicata 
can prevail even where the result of giving 
statue.  But a plea of res judicata must be 
based on the grounds of the decision actually 
stated but do not justify the decision, it is 
not proper or competent of the parties to find 
a plea of res judicata. In all such cases it 
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lies upon favour in another proceeding and this 
he may do by producing such documents as will 
bring the case under the section. A party 
cannot by manipulation of the form of plaint 
get round the bar of res judicata. But the plea 
of res judicata being as stated above, one in 
bar of a trial of a suit or an issue, and not 
affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, may be 
waived by a party. A decision in a former suit 
that the issue between the parties is barred by 
the rule of res judicata is in itself a 
decision, which operates as res judicata in a 
subsequent suit.  
 The plea of res judicata which prevents 
the same cause being, twice litigated is of 
general application and is not limited by the 
specific words of Sec.11, C.P.C. The plea of 
res judicata being one in restraint of the 
right of a litigant to have his case fully 
tried and determined, the judgment which is 
pleaded as bar this right must be strictly 
construed.  The party who is sought to be 
affected by the bar of res judicata should have 
notice of the point which is likely to be 
decided against him and should have opportunity 
of putting forward his contentions against such 
88 
a decision. In the absence of such noticed the 
order that may follow cannot be regarded as an 
implied adjudication.  
 The plea of res judicata presupposes that 
there is decree or judgment, which has legal 
existence or validity. If the decree is nullity 
and non-existent in the eye of law, no plea of 
res judicata can be founded upon it the 
defendant in the suit in which the decree was 
passed is just as much as any stranger to the 
suit, being free under Sec.44 of the Indian 
Evidence Act to show that it is so. 
 (A)Scope of the plea of res judicata : As 
already stated that the plea of res judicata is 
not confined to the provisions of Sec.11 C.P.C. 
but has a wider application under the general 
principles. But where it is contended than an 
issue should not be retried inasmuch as it was 
directly and substantially tried in a former 
suit between the same parties, the question has 
to be determined upon the provisions of Sec.11, 
C.P.C. and it is not open to rely upon the 
principle of finality which forms the basis of 
the general law of res judicata apart from 
those provisions. A party cannot by 
manipulation of the ground that the plaintiff 
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could not establish his contention bars a 
subsequent suit on the same contention in 
another form. A plea of estoppel by res 
judicata can prevail even where the result of 
giving will be to sanction what is illegal in 
the sense of being prohibited by statue. The 
plea of res judicata is not dependent upon the 
merits of the reason given for a particular 
conclusion- the conclusion whether right or 
wrong is binding upon the parties. The theory 
of res judicata requires the position and the 
case of the been given is not permitted to show 
that it is erroneous whether as plaintiff or as 
defendant in a subsequent proceeding but not a 
party in whose favour it was rendered. The 
latter may be prevented from doing so, if to 
permit is will contravene the principle of not 
allowing a person derive an equitable benefit 
by adopting inconsistent position.  A plea in 
bar can be allowed to succeed only where is the 
law expressly provides for it or the 
implication is so irresistible that its 
provisions are inconsistent with a contrary 
hypothesis.    
 Normally res judicata  pleaded in bar to 
the bearing of the whole suit or some issue in 
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it. When so pleaded all the grounds in support 
of the plea must be urged once for all. But 
when no issue as to res judicata is raised but 
only a particular decision is incidentally 
considered as a bar by one Court and no bar by 
the appellate Court, the plea is not wholly 
excluded thereby, especially when the whole 
suit is directed to be tried on fresh evidence. 
A plea of res judicata is only a plea of 
estoppel by judgment. If a party is unable to 
make out one species of estoppel but the 
circumstances disclosed on the record make out 
a case of another species of estoppel yet the 
party is entitled to rely on such species of 
estoppels proved from record. The plea of res 
judicata can not be raised for the first time 
in second appeal. 
 (B)mode of pleading :  It is not correct 
to say from the statement in the plaint that 
the suit is barred by res judicata inasmuch as 
all the conditions requisite for the 
application of rule of res judicata are not 
stated in the plaint and it is impossible to 
say that on face of the plaint that the suit is 
barred by res judicata. In pleading res 
judicata it is not necessary to set out the 
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ploeading in earlier suit at length. In 
determining the question whether the issue 
which it is sought to be raised in subsequent 
suit was fairly raised between the parties in 
the former suit, it is permissible to look into 
the pleadings, though in some cases the 
statement as to the pleading of the parties 
contained in the judgment of the Court is 
considered sufficient, the proper course is to 
produce the written statement( or the plaint, 
as the case may be). The party who is sought to 
be affected by the bar of res judicata should 
have notice of the point which is likely to be 
decided against him and should have an 
opportunity of putting forward his contentions 
against such a decision. 
 (C)Mode of proof : The question as to 
whether certain matters are or not res judicata 
between the parties is a question peculiar to 
the facts and circumstances surrounding each 
particular case and is not confined to the 
judgment but extends to all facts involved in 
it as necessary steps or ground work and 
judgment operates as a bar as regards all the 
findings essential to sustain the judgment. A 
person who set up the plea of res judicata must 
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produce such document as will bring the case 
under Sec.11, C.P.C. or under the general 
principles of res judicata. Similarly a party 
who relies upon certain judgment operating as 
res judicata has the burden of proving all the 
facts necessary to make his plea effective.  
 A decree does not show on what ground the 
case has been decided and does not afford any 
information as to the matters which were in 
issue or have been decided and  is not 
sufficient evidence to support an estoppel by 
record. The decree is only to state the relief 
granted or other determination of the suit. The 
determination may be on various grounds but the 
decree does not show on what grounds and does 
not afford any information as to the matters, 
which were in issue or have been decided. Thus 
where a decree is expressed in general terms 
the judgment may be looked into to see what the 
real issues were, where and how far the decree 
operated as res judicata. A plea of res 
judicata has to be established by the 
production of the judgment and decree in the 
previous suit; in the absence of such judgment 
and decree the admitted facts cannot take the 
place of estoppel by record. A decision on a 
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particular point was obtained in the trial 
Court and it was upheld by the High Court on 
appeal. The same point arose in a subsequent 
suit but no copy of the High Court judgment had 
been filed in the subsequent suit. It was held 
that it was not possible to ascertain on what 
ground that decision of the trial Court was 
upheld. In these circumstances, the contention 
that the said decision should be taken as 
operating as res judicata was not accepted. The 
Privy Council has held that a plea of res 
judicata taken on the ground that the quest5ion 
in issue in the suit was formaly in issue in 
probate proceedings cannot be given effect to 
when the said proceedings are not in evidence 
and there is thus no sufficient evidence to 
support the plea. A judgment passed in the 
previous proceedings showing what the Judge 
understood to have been the question for 
decision in those proceedings was not enough to 
support such a plea. The court cannot give 
effect  to the plea unless it can say for 
itself that the matters in issue in the Council 
affirmed that where the High Court declined to 
allow the appellant to go into the question of 
res judicata on the ground that it had not been 
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properly raised by the pleadings or in the 
issues particularly. It seemed to necessary for 
the appellant if he were going to make use of 
the judgment in the suit of 1900 as res 
judicata to identify the subject in dispute in 
the subsequent case with the subject with that 
of the previous case. 
 Their Lordships of the Privy Council yet 
in another case refused to uphold a plea of res 
judicata on the ground that the summary of the 
plaint as set out in the decree was ambiguous 
and the original pleadings should have been 
filed. The Privy Council refused to allow the 
appellant to put in evidence the documents in 
support of the plea when the appellant was 
remiss in spite of the objection taken in the 
courts below to the defect in the record. 
Therefore to determine the question of res 
judicata it is essential what were right in 
dispute between the Parties and what were 
alleged between them and this must be done not 
merely from the decree but also from pleadings 
and judgment.  
  A.I.R.1944 Odh. 139 
   held  that.... 
95 
  However where the pleadings in the 
previous suit which was not before the Court, 
which was trying the subsequent suit the 
pleadings in the previous suit were 
sufficiently incorporated in the judgment in 
that suit and it could be known what the issues 
before the Court were and it was evident from 
the judgment in the previous suit that the 
genuineness of the will was the main question 
before the Court and the will was held to be 
genuine. It was held that absence of the 
pleadings in the previous suit could not debar 
the defendants from raising the plea that the 
question or the genuineness of the will was 
barred by res judicata.  
 (D)Stage at which plea of res judicata may 
be allowed to be raised : The plea of res 
judicata must be raised at the earliest 
opportunity in the first court. A plea of res 
judicata was, however, allowed to be raised in 
the High Court for the first time in first 
appeal where the judgment of the High Court (in 
another case) sought to be pleaded as a bar was 
delivered after the decision of the trial Judge 
and no further facts were to be brought on  the 
record.  
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  A.I.R.1941 Mad.815 
   held  that.... 
   Ordinarily a plea of res judicata is 
not allowed to be raised for the first time in 
appeal but when the final finding on which the 
plea rests was given while the appeal was 
pending, the Appellate Court is not only 
justified but bound to take notice of the final 
judgment arrived at between the parties and 
give effect to the same and is justified in 
permitting the judgment to be produced  before 
it.  
 A.I.R.1948 Mad.54 
  held  that.... 
 The plea of res judicata being one of law 
and the judgment of prior suit being already on 
the record was allowed to be raised for the 
first time in second appeal.  
  A.I.R.1936 P.C..258 
   held  that.... 
  In a Full  Bench decision of Allahabad 
High Court it was held that in second appeal 
that where plea of res judicata was not urged 
in the two court below or in memo of appeal and 
raised for the first time in second appeal it 
must be considered and determined either upon 
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record as it stood or after remand of finding 
of fact. But in view of decision of Privy 
Council in Jagdish Chandra V. Gour Hari Mohato,  
  A.I.R.1931 All.35 
   held  that.... 
   it is no longer necessary to remand 
the case tolower court for a finding. In 
another Full Bench decision of Allahabad High 
Court, in Ram kinker Rai V. Tufaini Aihir,  it 
has been held that plea of res judicata 
limitation and jurisdiction could be raised for 
the first time in second appeal. An Appellate 
Court can consider the plea of res judicata for 
the first time even thought it has not been 
raised before it by the party concerned. The 
bare fact that the plea was not raised in the 
trial Court, is no ground for holding that it 
must be deemed to have been deliberately 
waived, the lower appellate Court could 
consider it even though not raised in the trial 
Court. 
 
  A.I.R.1934 Mad.551(D.B.) 
   held  that.... 
  But the plea of res judicata though a 
question of law, it can not be raised for the 
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first time in second appeal where the basis for 
the plea was not laid in the lower courts by 
establishing the judgments relied upon as 
constituting the bar.  
 
  A.I.R.1934 All.770 
   held  that.... 
  A plea of res judicata can not be 
allowed to be taken for the first time in 
second appeal requiring remand to the Court 
below for investigation and determination of 
certain facts.  
 
  A.I.R.1929 Mad.775  
  A.I.R.1957 Tripura 11 
   held  that.... 
   The mere fact that a point is res 
judicqta can not be allowed for the fist time 
in second appeal, if it has not been taken in 
the written statement of the defendant nor has 
any issue been raised on it nor has it been 
discussed in that light by courts  below. Where 
the question of res judicata was decided by the 
lower Court in favour of plaintiff but suit was 
dismissed on other  ground and on appeal by the 
plaintiff the High Court reversed the finding 
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of the lower Court and the case was remanded. 
It was then open to the defendants to support 
the order of dismissal on the ground of res 
judicata. They did not do so with the result 
that Court instead of dismissing the suit, 
remanded it to be heard on merits. In view of 
that order at a previous occasion it was held 
that it was too late to say that the suit was 
barred by res judicata. The point as to res 
judicata not raised in the Court below cannot 
below be raised in revision. 
(E) waiver of the plea of res judicata – 
   The plea of res judicata is one in bar 
of a trial of a suit or an issue, and does not 
affect the jurisdiction of the Court may be 
waived by the party. The effect of the waiver 
is the same whether it was omitted to be taken 
by mistake, accident or design. If a party does 
not put forward a plea of res judicata he must 
be taken to have waived it and to have 
intentionally invited the Court to decided the 
case on the merits.  
 
 
 
 
100 
9.plea of res judicata if can be waived.– 
  indeed it can not be that objection 
based on the rule of res judicata can be 
waived. 
 
  A.I.R.1929 Cal. 163 (D.B.) 
  A.I.R.1935 All. 11 
   held  that.... 
  The effect of not pleading the 
previous decree in answer to a plaintiff’s 
claim in a suit stand on the same footing as if 
the defence was raised by the defendant and 
disallowed by the court. It cannot be put on a 
higher footing on any reasoning based upon 
commonsense or law. The bar of res judicata 
being one which does not affect the 
jurisdiction of the Court, but is a plea in bar 
which a party is at liberty to waive. If a 
party does not put forwarded his plea of res 
judicata he must be taken to have waived it, or 
it must be taken to be a matter which ought to 
have been made a ground of attack and deemed to 
have been a matter directly and substantially 
in issue. The party omitting to plead res 
judicata intentionally invites the Court to 
decide the case on merits and having failed to 
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secure a decision on merits should not be 
allowed to go behind the last adjudication and 
ask for the trial of an issue which he could 
have raised at the previous trial. Similarly if 
the plea of res judicata is abandoned or not 
put forward by a party it must be deemed to 
have decided against him. But as already stated 
that a plea of res judicata being a question of 
law and not having been raised in the courts 
below can very well be taken in the appellate 
Court and may not be deemed to have been waived 
when all the necessary papers essential for the 
determination of the issue are before appellate 
Court.  Therefore in other words it can be said 
that a plea of res judicata even if waived by a 
party in the courts below he can revive it in 
the appellate stage, if it does not require 
fresh investigation of facts not proved from 
the record. 
  As a broad proposition of law when 
there are two conflicting decrees the last one 
should prevail on the ground that in the eye of 
law it is binding between the parties and the 
previous decree should be taken as pleaded in 
the latter suit and not given effect to  and 
henceforth be regarded as dead. Where a 
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mistake, however, in the decree has arisen out 
of the mistake of the scribe in copying out the 
list of properties attached to the written 
statement it will not hit the bar of res 
judicata and the entire proceedings of the 
previous litigation may be looked into 
determine the real issue decided. 
 
10. judgements in rem and judgment in  
Personam. – 
There are some cases in which the decision 
although between different parties, can set up 
as an absolute bar to the suit, independently 
of this section; of this nature are judgments 
in rem, such as operate to bind all the world 
on the question as to what is a judgment in 
rem. It has already been pointed out that a 
judgment, as a rule, affects only parties and 
privies. Judgements in rem form an exception to 
this rule, and are valid not only  inter parles 
but  inter omnes or against all the world. 
Judgments in  rem beyond the rule of res 
judicata enunciated in the present section. 
They are dealt with in the Indian Evidence Act, 
Sec.41. 
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11. Judgment not inter partes or in rem.-  
  A judgment, which is not  inter parles  
or  in rem, does not make  the question decided 
by it res judicata in a subsequent suit. But 
such judgment, or the whole record in the 
previous suit, is admissible, as evidence that 
a right had in the previous litigation been set 
up unsuccessfully by one of the parties to the 
subsequent suit. Hence a judgment in a suit by 
A against B a rival claimant for an office 
negativing A’s title as against B is no bar to 
a suit by A against a third party for the 
emoluments of the said office. It is only a 
piece of evidence on the question of title. 
  Section 40, Indian Evidence Act, 
provides : “The existence of any judgment, 
order decree which by law prevents any Court 
from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a 
trial, is a relevant fact when the question is 
whether such court ought to take cognizance of 
such suit or to hold such trial.”  Section 41 
of the Indian Evidence Act provides : that a 
final judgment, order or decree of a competent 
court in exercise of a probate, matrimonial, 
admirably or insolvency jurisdiction which 
confers upon or takes away from any person any 
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legal character, or which declares specific 
things,  not as against any specified person 
but absolutely, is relevant when the existence 
of any legal character, or the title of any 
such person to any such thing is relevant. By 
Sec.4 of the Evidence cannot be allowed to 
disprove the facts established by such 
judgments. 
  The judgments referred to in Sec.40 of 
the Indian Evidence Act are judgments in 
personam which operate as res judicata. It 
applies to a case where the Court has 
jurisdiction to decide the matter and one party 
says that it should not do so because that 
matter has been decided before, and a court may 
be prevented from proceeding with trial of the 
suit, or the issue involving the same matter 
between the same parties which has been 
previously decided by an Indian or a foreign 
court. Thus a judgment in personam only binds 
the parties and not the strangers to the suit 
or proceeding.  
  The judgments in rem referred to in 
Sec.41 of the Evidence Act are conclusive not 
only between the parties to suit but are 
conclusive against the whole world, thus the 
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parties as well as the strangers are put in the 
same category. The legal character or status 
decided by the courts of insolvency, admiralty, 
etc. are judgments in rem and are conclusive 
wherever the status of the person so declared 
is involved against the whole world. In 
Radhakrishin V. Mst. Gangabai it was held that 
“an order adjusting  a person as an insolvent 
and vesting his property in the Official 
Receiver no doubt operates as a judgment in rem 
but the ground on which the order is based has 
no such effect. There is a broad distinction 
between the effect of a judgment in rem and a 
judgment in personam the point adjudicated upon 
in a judgmentin rem is always as to the status 
of the res and is conclusive against the world 
as to that status, whereas in a judgment in 
personam the point whatever it may be which is 
adjudicated upon (it being as to the status of 
the res) is conclusive only between the parties 
or privies.” Thus where the decision of the 
Rangoon High Court declaring Ebrahim an 
insolvent would operate as a judgment in rem 
under Sec.41 of the Indian Evidence Act but the 
decision that Ebrahim was a partner of the 
insolvent firm would not operate as a judgment 
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under Sec.41. A fortiori, the implied decision 
about the nature of the deed of dissolution 
could not be conclusive as a judgment in rem 
under Sec.41. Similarly a decision of a probate 
court in admitting the will to probate so long 
as the order remains in force is conclusive as 
to the due execution and validity of the will, 
and party to those proceeding cannot be 
permitted to contest the will unless the grant 
the grant of probate is revoked.  
  A judgment in personam which is not 
between the same parties or one of the parties 
is a stranger in the subsequent suit may not 
operate as res judicata but serves as a strong 
piece of evidence in support of the matter so 
decided.  
  A.I.R.1959 A.P. 280 (D.B.) 
   held  that.... 
  There is a distinction between a 
person’s right and status and it is only the 
decision about status that can operate as 
judgment in rem.   
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CHAPTER – 4 
RES JUDICATA IN CIVIL CASES 
 
S Y N O P S I S 
1. General view of the Doctrine of res 
judicata.-  
This is the legislative exposition of the  
common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una 
et eadem causa, - The principle of which had 
long been recognized in India, even before the 
enactment of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859. 
The rule has been enunciated in England, as 
observed by their Lordships of the Privy 
Council, in the case of Soorjomonee v. 
Suddanund, in a series of cases with which the 
profession is familiar.   It has probably never 
been better laid down than in Gregory V. 
Molesworth, in which Lord Hardwicke held, that 
where a question was necessarily decided in 
effect, though not in express terms, between 
parties to the suit, they could not raise the 
same question as between themselves in any 
other suit in any other form, and that decision 
has been followed by a long course of 
decisions, the great part of which will be 
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found noticed in the veryable notes of Mr. 
Smith to the case of the Duchess of Kingston. 
The Principle underlying the rule of res 
juidicata has been thus explained by DeGrey, 
C.J., in the celebrated case of the Duchess of 
Kingston. 
A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 
Held that… 
 “From the variety of cases relating to 
judgment being given in evidence of Civil 
suits, these two deductions seem to follow as 
generally true – first, that the judgment of a 
court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon 
the point, is, as a plea, a bar, or as evidence 
conclusive between the same parties, upon the 
same matter, directly in question in another 
Court; secondly, that the judgement of the 
court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon 
the point, is, in like manner conclusive upon 
the same matter, between the same parties 
coming incidentally in question in another 
court for a different purpose; but neither the 
judgment of a concurrent or exclusive 
jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which 
came collaterally in question, though within 
their jurisdiction; nor of any matter 
109 
incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to 
be inferred by argument from the judgment.” The 
substance of the rule as enunciated and 
recognized in England was, however, approved of 
and acted upon in numerous cases by the Judges, 
and imported almost res integra, in this 
country. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 
tacitly recognized the rule in Sec. 2, which 
provided as follows: 
The civil courts shall not take cognizance of 
any suit brought on a cause of action which 
shall have been heard and determined by a couty 
of competent jurisdiction, in a former suit 
between the same parties, or between parties 
under whom they claim. “ The section was held, 
however, not to exclude the operation of the 
general law relating to res judicata as settled 
in England, and in accordance with which, “ 
where a question was necessarily decided in 
effect, though not in express terms, between 
parties to the suit, they could not raise the 
same question as between themselves, in any 
other suit in any other form”. 
 The Present code has adopted the broader 
rule of bar by verdict, a decision of every 
issue in a suit being res judicata in every 
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subsequent suit.   In introducing this clause, 
the Special Committee reported thus: “ It is 
not possible to make a complete exposition of a 
subject so complex as that of res judicata 
within the limits of a section of an Act, and 
the Committee think it better to re-enact Sec. 
13 as it stands in the Code with such 
modifications only as experience has shown to 
be necessary. “ Report of the Select Committee.  
The doctrine of res judicata is not dependent 
on the limited provisions of Sec. 11 but is 
based on the general principles of law that 
multiplicity of suits should be avoided. As 
observed by Mr. Best: “ It would be productive 
of the greatest inconvenience and mischiefs, 
if, after the cause, civil or criminal, has 
been solemnly determined by a court of 
competent and final jurisdiction, the solemnly 
determined by a court of competent and final 
jurisdiction, the parties could renew the 
controversy at pleasure, on the ground either 
of alleged error in the decision, or the real 
or pretended discovery of fresh arguments or 
better evidence.  The slightest reflection will 
show that if some points were not established 
at which judicial proceedings must stop, no one 
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could ever feel secure in the enjoyment of his 
life, liberty of property: while, unjest, 
obstinate and quarrelsome persons, especially 
such as are possessed of wealth or power, would 
have society at their mercy, and soon convert 
into one vast scene of litigation, disturbance 
and ill-will.” The principle of res judicata is 
one of convenience and rest and not one of 
absolute justice and it should not be unduly 
conditioned and qualified by all sorts of 
ingenious attempts at evasion, where there has 
been in fact a fair contest on a question in 
dispute between the parties and the Court 
intended to give and has given a final decision 
on question.  
A.I.R. 1925 Oudh. 
Held that… 
The underlying general principle of the rule of 
res judicata is that the person should not be 
harassed by repeated litigation about the same 
subject matter.  
 
2. Rule of res judicata apart from Sec. 
11, C.P.C.-  
  When a question at issue between the 
parties to a suit is heard and finally decided 
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the judgment given on it is binding on the 
parties at all subsequent stages of the suit. 
Its binding force depends not upon the Code of 
Civil Procedure, Sec. 11, but upon general 
principles of law; if it were not binding, 
there would be no end to litigation. It has 
often been emphasized that the application of 
the doctrine of res judicata should be confined 
to the rule as enacted in the Civil Procedure 
Code. But the principle of finality of 
adjudication has an operation independent of 
the enactment in the Civil Procedure Code. The 
Application of the rule by the courts in India 
should, therefore, be influenced by no 
technical considerations of form, but by matter 
of substance within the limits allowed by law. 
The Principle of finality of adjudication 
has arisen chiefly in execution proceedings, in 
which it is now generally agreed upon that an 
order made at one stage of execution 
proceedings is binding on all the subsequent 
stages.   
 
A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 129.  
Held that… 
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It may be noticed here that although the 
rule of res judicata enunciated in Sec. 11 may 
be applicable in certain execution proceedings 
arising out of the same judgment, and may also 
possibly be applicable in certain cases where 
separate suits have been brought raising points 
which have already been decided in execution 
cases between the same parties still the 
special rules laid down in the explanation to 
sec. 11 which go beyond the ordinary doctrine 
of res judicata ought not to be applied 
generally in execution cases. So it has been 
held that the principle of constructive res 
judicata should be very cautiously applied to 
execution proceedings. The authorities do not, 
however, all return the same answer to this 
question, for while in some cases it has been 
laid down that where the judgement-debtor does 
not object to the first application for 
execution of a decree on the ground of 
illegalities in relation to execution 
proceeding he cannot raise such objection, when 
a subsequent application for execution is made. 
There are other in which the contrary has been 
affirmed. As pointed out by the Judicial 
committee parties should not be allowed to 
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agitate the same question after it has been 
once decided, and the dictum of their Lordships 
has been extended to cases where the parties 
had an opportunity to object to the decision, 
but did not avail themselves of that 
opportunity.  
One Principle seems to be clear and that 
is, that the party who is sought to be affected 
by the bar of res judicata should have notice 
of the point which is likely to be decided 
against him and should have an opportunity of 
putting forward his contentions against such 
decision.  
But when the court, after the service of notice 
of the judgment-debtor to show cause why the 
decree should not be executed, makes an order 
for execution (e.g. that attachment should 
issue), the Court thereby is deemed to have 
decided (whether rightly or wrongly) that the 
execution application was not then time-barred. 
On the same principle an order made in 
execution proceedings, whether right or wrong, 
is res judicata between the parties in 
subsequent execution application where the 
validity of that order comes in question 
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directly for the purpose of deciding whether 
the subsequent application is maintainable. 
 
  The rule has likewise been often 
applied for pronouncements made in the course 
of orders remanding a case to a subordinate 
court or calling for findings. It is not open 
to a court to take two different views of the 
law in different stages of the same case. 
The same appellate Court cannot, therefore, 
pronounce (except where it is moved by an 
application for review) a different opinion on 
a relevant question of law from that which it 
held in a previous stage of the same case and 
on which earlier opinion, it based its decision 
remanding the suit to the lower Court. 
 
 The question has also been raised from 
time to time, whether when a point has once 
been decided between the parties in some 
proceeding other then a suit, such a decision 
is conclusive in a subsequent suit between 
them. There can of course be no such effect 
where the original proceeding is avowedly 
summary and decision is made subject to the 
result of a separate suit. But in the absence 
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of such a provision, the point is by no means 
beyond doubt. Emphasis has often been laid upon 
the fact that the provision in the Code is 
applicable only in respect of adjudications in 
former “suits” but, as observed by their 
Lordships of the Privy Council in the 
undermentioned case the application of the rule 
by the courts in India should be influence by 
no technical considerations of form but by 
matter of substance within the limits allowed 
by law. So a person, whose claim has been 
adjudicated upon in the manner, pointed out by 
the Land Acquisition Act is not at liberty to 
have it re-opened and again heard in another 
suit. But in a proceeding upon an application 
for probate of a will, the only question which 
the Court is called upon to determine is 
whether the will is true or not, and it is not 
the province of the court to determine any 
question of title with reference to the 
property covered by the will. A proceeding 
under the Probate and Administration Act is not 
a suit properly so called, but takes the form 
of a suit according to the provisions of the 
Civil Procedure Code. That being so, the 
finding of a court on the construction of a 
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will being incidental and for the purpose of 
determining the question of the representative 
title of the applicants, cannot be regarded as 
concluding a party to an application for 
probate by res judicata from obtaining a 
construction of the will in a suit brought by 
him. On an application for probate of a will, 
the District Judge passed an order refusing 
probate on the ground that, in the course of 
certain prior proceedings, inter partes, under 
the Guardians and Wards Act, it had been 
decided that the will propounded was not a 
genuine will, and that by virtue of such 
decision the question as to genuineness of the 
will was res judicata, and could not be re-
opened in the subsequent proceedings under 
probate. The order was reversed on the ground 
that the proceedings under the Guardians and 
Wards Act could not so operate as to make the 
question of the genuineness of the will res 
judicata so as to bar the subsequent 
application for probate. The prior decision 
under the Guardians and Wards Act was only a 
decision inter partes and could not affect the 
subsequent application for probate, the 
adjudication upon which will have the effect of 
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a judgment in rem, as provided in Sec. 41 of 
the Evidence Act, and will affect not only the 
parties to the previous proceedings, but the 
beneficiaries under the will and the world at 
large. But where under the Land Acquisition 
Act, Sec. 31, sub-section (2), a dispute as to 
title to receive the compensation has referred 
to the Court, a decree thereon not appealed 
from renders the questions of title res 
judicata in a suit between the parties to the 
dispute, or those claiming under them whether 
or not the decree is to be regarded as one “in 
a former suit” within the meaning of this 
section. The principle which prevents the same 
case being twice litigated is of general 
application, and is not limited by the specific 
words of the Code of Civil Procedure. On a 
similar principle it has been held that where 
settlement courts have fully gone into rival 
claims and dealt with and decided all point 
raised, it is not open in subsequent 
proceedings to one party to deny the status of 
another party as found by such settlement 
courts, or to assert more than was awarded by 
such settlement courts that such judgments may 
be a piece of evidence and sometimes very 
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strong evidence on the question of title. The 
same opinion has been expressed in Peary Mohun 
v. Durlavi. Where, however, the contention is 
that an issue should not be re-tried inasmuch 
as it was directly and substantially tried in a 
former suit between the same parties, the 
question must be determined with reference to 
the provisions of Sec. 11, and it is not open 
to either party to rely upon the principle of 
finality which forms the basis of the general 
law of res judicata apart from these 
provisions. 
There is, however, no denying the fact that the 
rule of res judicata which is a principle of 
the conclusiveness of the judgment, is firmly 
embedded in the juridical systems of most 
countries and modern and as well as ancient. 
The basis of this doctrine is stated by Black 
in his well-known book on judgments, Vol. II, 
p. 599, para. 500 in the following words: 
 
 “That the solemn and deliberate sentence 
of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs 
upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should 
be regarded as a final and conclusive 
determination of the question litigated and 
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should for ever set the controversy at rest, is 
a rule to all civilised systems of 
jurisprudence.” 
A final decision inter partes is accepted as 
irrefragable truth even if the result may be 
that thereby an error is perpetuated. It is 
said that res judicata renders that which is 
straight crooked and makes white appear black. 
Facitex curvo rectum, ex albo nirgrum, but 
nevertheless, a matter which has been 
adjudicated is received as true. 
According to the reasoning of the Roman Jurists 
the aim of the law in barring a subsequent suit 
which had been previously decided was to 
protect litigants from being harassed by 
successive suits, and to guard against the 
public evil which would arise in the shape of a 
general unsettlement and uncertainty of rights 
if judicial decisions were not conclusive. The 
rule that “one right of action should only be 
tried once is reasonable rule to prevent 
interminable litigation and the embarrassment 
of contrary decision.” 
It is a settled principle of law that a 
judgment shall not be contradicted by a 
judgment in a subsequent trial between the same 
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parties where the same right is in question 
(except, of course, by the judgment of a court 
of appeal). 
 In the words of Roman Jurist Julian which 
are equally true today, the plea of previous 
judgment is as a rule a bar whenever the same 
question of right is renewed between the same 
parties of whatever form of action. “Et 
generaliter, ut fulianus definit exceptio res 
judicita obstat quotients inter easdem personas 
eadem quaestio revocatur vel alio genere 
judicie”. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 83. 
Held that… 
 The plea of res judicata was a recognized 
defence to a subsequent suit between the same 
parties relating to the same subject matter 
known as exceptio rei in judicium ded uctao or 
simply exceptio res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1916 P.G.78.  
Held that… 
 It is, however, true that although the 
rule of res judicata is a cardinal principle of 
the legal systems of most countries and many 
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eulogiums have been lavished upon this 
doctrine, said to be most salutary but the 
Judges have not failed to issue a note of 
caution whenever it has been considered 
necessary that the Court should be influenced 
by no technical consideration of form but by 
matters of substance within the limits allowed 
by law. It is worthwhile to reproduce what was 
said by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in delivering the 
judgement of the Board of the Privy Counci in 
Sheparasan Singh v. Ramnandan Pershad Narayan 
Singh. 
 “But in view of the arguments addressed to 
them their Lordships desire to emphasize that 
the rule of res judicata while founded on 
ancient precedent is dictated by a wisdom which 
is for all time. It “hath been well said” 
declared Lord Coke, interest republican ut sit 
finis lituim, otherwise great oppression might 
be done under colour and pretence of law. 
Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an 
English source, it embodies a doctrine in no 
way opposed to the spirit of the law as 
expounded by the Hindu commentators. 
 Vijnanesvara and Nilkantha include the 
plea of a former judgment among those allowed 
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by law, each setting for this purpose the text 
of Katyayana, who describes the plea this: ”if 
a person though defeated at law sues again he 
should be answered ‘you were defeated 
formerly’. This is a called the plea of former 
judgment. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C.  
A.I.R. 1958 Punj.  
A.I.R. 1953 S.C.  
Held that… 
 And so the application of the rule by the 
courts in India should be influenced by no 
technical consideration of form but by matter 
of substance within the limits allowed by law.” 
 The above passage was cited with approval 
by Mahajan, J., in Raj Lakshmi Dassi v. 
Benamali Sen cited in Umrao Singh v. Mst. 
Munni. His Lordship further observed that the 
condition regarding the competency of the 
former Court to try the subsequent suit is one 
of the limitation engrafted on the general rule 
of res judicata by Sec. 11, C.P.C. and has 
application to suits alone. When a plea of res 
judicata is founded on a general principle of 
law, all that is necessary to establish is that 
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the Court that heard and decided the former 
case was a court of competent jurisdiction. It 
does not seem necessary in such cases to 
further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear 
the later suit. A plea of res judicata on 
general principles can be successfully taken in 
respect of judgments of courts of exclusive 
jurisdiction, like revenue courts, land 
acquisition courts, administration courts, etc. 
It is obvious that these courts are not 
entitled to try a regular suit and they only 
exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them 
by the statue. The above dictum of the Supreme 
Court has been universally followed by all the 
courts in India. In another decision of the 
Supreme Court in MohanLal v. Benay Krishna it 
has been re-affirmed that the general 
principles of res judicata apply to execution 
proceedings. It was further held that the 
principle of constructive res judicata is 
applicable to execution proceedings is no 
longer open to doubt. 
 (2004) 1 SCC 497-E Dismissed of SLP of 
admission stage whether can constitution of 
India Art 136. 
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CHAPTER - 5 
SUITS,PRIOR DECISIONS,APPEALS 
AND MISCELLANEOUS 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
1.Suits, meaning of.- 
  The word “suit” has not  been defined in 
the Code of Civil Procedure. Undoubtedly it is 
a term of wide significance. The only 
indication of what is meant by the term “suit” 
is what we get from Sec. 26 of the code of the 
Civil Procedure which runs thus : 
“Every suit shall be instituted by the 
presentation of a plaint or in such other 
manner as may be prescribed.” 
It has been held in Venkata Chandrayya v. 
Venkatarama Reddi that a proceeding that does 
not commence with a plaint is not a suit. 
Their Lordships of the Privy Council while 
interpreting Sec. 3 of the Indian Companies Act 
had held that the word “suit” ordinarily means 
and apart from some context must be taken to 
mean a civil proceeding instituted by the 
presentation of a plaint. 
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A.I.R. 1934 Mad.  
Held that… 
 The term “suit” came up for consideration 
before their Lordships of the Madras High Court 
in a Full Bench decision in Rajgopala Chettiar 
v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras, 
wherein it was observed that the term “suit” in 
the civil Procedure Code can mean only a 
proceeding instituted by the presentation of a 
plaint. 
 Their Lordships while interpreting Sec. 84 
(2) of the Hindu Religious Endowment Act held 
that it must follow therefore that an order 
passed by the District Judge on an application 
under that Act even if that order complies with 
all other requirements of the definition of a 
decree cannot be a decree under the Code 
inasmuch as the application cannot be the 
commencement of a suit and without a suit there 
cannot be a decree and hence an order on an 
application under that Act cannot be called a 
decree and is therefore not appealable to the 
High Court. 
 Another instance may be cited where an 
application for permission to sue in forma 
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pauperis is rejected, there is no adjudication 
in any stage of a suit. Such an application is 
neither a plaint nor a proceeding in a suit nor 
the order of rejection of the leave to sue in 
forma pauperis is a decree. 
 The Privy Council in the case of Mungal 
Pershad Dichit v. Girja Kant Lahiri has held- 
 “It appears to their Lordships that an 
application for the execution of a decree is an 
application in the suit in which the decree was 
obtained.” 
 This and similar other remarks elsewhere 
support the view that the proceedings in a suit 
do not terminate with a decree but the word 
“suit” may fairly be interpreted to include the 
proceedings taken to execute the decree. 
(2004) 1 SCC 712-E 
 
1995 (6) SCC 733. Applicability (Deva Ram V/s 
Iswarchand) 
 supreme court held that in that matter 
involved in the second suit must be directly & 
substantially in issue in previous suit to 
attract the principle of res judicata in second 
suit.   
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 Even act the appellate stage who have not 
been heard in such cases supreme court decided 
in the case of 1995 Supp.(4)SCC 413 
Joginersingh v/s Surinder singh.  
 In this case the decision in the high 
court in that appeal can not operate as res-
judicata  so far as other heirs are concerned 
who have later come to file another appeal. 
Supreme court held that res-judicata can not 
operate against those who have not been heard.  
 
1993(2) UJ SCC 774 Sulochana Amma v/s Narayanan 
Nair. Even in the injunction case res-judicata 
is considered and supreme court held in this 
case that this doctrine is also applied to 
equitable of injunction. 
 The trial court should try the case by the 
same virtue either it may be issue of 
jurisdiction or any other. In such legal aspect 
so many different court are on the same 
decision even  in the case of AIR 1996 SC 987 
Church of south India Trust Association v/s 
Telugu Church council. In this case supreme 
court held that court deciding former such must 
have been competent to try the same by virtue 
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of its pecuniary jurisdiction to try the 
subsequent suit.  
 Even in the can in jurisdiction sometimes 
this doctrine can not operate. We can see in 
the case of 1996(8)SCC 324.Municiple committee 
Sishind v/s Parshottamdas In this case the view 
of supreme court is very clear that Finding 
even  by court having no jurisdiction and it 
shall not operate as res judicata. Court 
finding U/s.30 of the Land Acquisition 1894 
that land acquired belongs to claimant 
Khewantdas and not municipality without 
jurisdiction-same would no operate as res 
judicata for determining Khewantdas title to 
land.  
 
 -Ss. 11 & 100 and Or. 20R. 18-Res judicata 
–Applicability – Earlier suit was filed by 
predecessor of respondents for eviction of 
predecessor of appellants claiming exclusive 
tittle to the suit property- Suit was resisted 
by predecessor of appellants claiming adverse 
possession and alternatively as co-owner on the 
basis of a joint patta granted by Director of 
Settlement to predecessor of appellants with 
predecessor of respondents under S. 18(4) r/w 
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S. 5(2) of T.N. Estates (Abolition and 
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 – Trial 
court dismissed the suit taking the view that 
predecessor of appellants had perfected their 
title by adverse possession while appellate 
court concluded that the parties were co-
owners-Decision of appellate court became final 
in absence of further appeal-Subsequently suit 
for partition preferred by predecessor of 
appellants-Question of title to the suit 
property was directly and substantially 
involved in the earlier suit between the same 
parties and by operation of res judicata, in 
the subsequent suit for partition the 
defendants in that suit (respondents herein) 
estopped from questioning the claim of co-
ownership-Principle of res judicata cannot be 
inapplicable merely because the previous suit 
was only in respect of a part of the property 
while in the subsequent suit the whole property 
was involved,(2003)10 SCC 578-A   
 
2.Former suit, meaning of-Explanation I.- 
There was at one time some controversy as 
to the meaning of the expression “or suit” the 
decision wherein may operate as res judicata in 
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a subsequent suit. In Gururajammah v. Venkata 
Krishama Chetti, the doubt has now been set at 
rest by the present Explanation I which 
provides “the expression ‘former suit’ denotes 
a suit which has been decided prior to the suit 
in question, whether or not it was instituted 
prior thereto". 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P.  
Held that… 
 To put the matter tersely the expression 
“former suit” means a previously decided suit 
and the same rule applies to appeals. This was 
in fact the view adopted by Mahmood, J., in 
Balkishan v. Kishan Lal, and has been 
subsequently followed. As Herman puts it in his 
commentaries on the Law of Res Judicata it is 
not the priority in the commencement of one 
action that renders the judgment obtained 
therein a bar to the recovery of a second 
judgment in another, but because the first 
judgment, when given, whether in the action 
commenced first or last, extinguishes the 
original cause of action, and gives to the 
plaintiff in lieu thereof one of a higher 
nature. From this standpoint, Mahmood, J., in 
Balkishan v. Kishan Lal, and has been 
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subsequently followed. As Herman puts it in his 
commentaries on the Law of Res judicata it is 
not the priority in the commencement of one 
action that renders the judgment obtained 
therein a bar to the recovery of a second 
judgment in another, but because the first 
judgment, when given, whether in the action 
commenced first or last, extinguishes the 
original cause of action, and gives to the 
plaintiff in lieu thereof one of a higher 
nature. From this standpoint, Mahmood, J., held 
in Balkishan v. Kishan Lal, that the doctrine 
of res judicata so far as it relates to 
prohibiting the re-trial of an issue must 
refer, not to the date of the commencement of 
the litigation, but to the time when the Judge 
is called upon to decide the issue; and the 
rule is not limited to the courts of first 
instance, it applies equally to the procedure 
of the first and second appellate courts and, 
indeed, even to miscellaneous proceedings. 
 Thus where the High Court decides the 
matter in issue between the parties in a suit 
subsequently instituted to the suit in 
question, (that is, the firstly instituted suit 
remaining pending, the subsequently instituted 
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suit was decided earlier and having gone 
through all the stages of the first and second 
appeal had become final), the decision on these 
issues is binding on them in this point. 
A.I.R. 1936 Mad.  
Held that… 
 That is, if during the pendency of an 
appeal or revision from the judgment of a lower 
court another judgment establishing title of 
the parties is given in another suit and is 
allowed to become final such judgments coming 
into existence during the pendency of 
proceedings by way of appeal or revision will 
operate as res judicata on the proceedings 
under appeal or revision although such 
judgments have themselves come into existence 
after the judgment under appeal or revision.        
 Principle of res judicata for its 
applicability under Sec. 11, C.P.C., 
contemplates of two suits, i.e. the former suit 
and the subsequent or later suit. Although 
final orders in different stages of the 
proceeding are binding between the same parties 
and their privies on the general principles of 
res judicata. Their Lordships of the Privy 
Council while considering whether an order made 
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by an execution Court in 1867 construing a 
decree to have included mesne profits, and no 
appeal having been preferred against the order 
of the execution Court, whether the matter of 
mesne profits could be re-agitated in a 
subsequent proceeding observed that the matter 
decided by the executing Court was not a 
decision in the former suit, but in a 
proceeding which was merely a continuation. It 
was binding between the parties and those 
claiming under them. The binding force of such 
judgment depends not upon Sec. 13, C.P.C., 1877 
(now Sec. 11 of the code) but upon the general 
principles of law. It was further observed that 
the execution Court had jurisdiction to execute 
the decree and it was consequently within his 
jurisdiction and it was his duty to put a 
construction upon the decree who decided right 
or wrong and it was final as no appeal was 
preferred. 
 If one of the two cross suits between the 
same parties arising out of the same 
transaction is decided before the other and the 
issue for decision in both suits in the same 
the decision in the one suit operates as res 
judicata in the other. 
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A.I.R. 1937 All.  
A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 271 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
1.Subsequent suit, meaning of.- 
In order to invoke the bar of res judicata 
under Sec. 11, C.P.C., the Court which tried 
the former suit was competent to try the 
subsequent suit in its entirety, mere 
competency to try an issue in the subsequent 
suit is not enough. 
A.I.R. 1954 All. 801 (D.B.). 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 214. 
Held that… 
 Subsequent suit means the whole of 
subsequent suit. 
 Now we have the authoritative 
pronouncement from the Supreme Court where the 
words “such subsequent suit” have been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in a very 
recent decision in Mst. Gulab Bai v.C. Manphool 
Bai, wherein his Lordship Gajendragadkar, J., 
who delivered the judgment of the Court thus 
observed: 
 “The word ‘suit’ has not been defined in 
the Code, but there can be title doubt that in 
the context the plain and grammatical meaning 
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of the word ‘suit’ would include the whole of 
the suit and not a part of the suit, so that 
giving the word ‘suit’ its ordinary meaning it 
would be difficult to accept the argument that 
a part of the suit or an issue in a suit is 
intended to be covered by the said word in the 
material clause. The argument that there should 
be finality of decisions and that a person 
should not be vexed twice over with the same 
cause can leave no material bearing on the 
construction of the word ‘suit’ Besides, if 
considerations of anomaly are relevant, it may 
be urged in support of the literal construction 
of the word ‘suit’ that the finding recorded on 
a material issue by the Court of the lowest 
jurisdiction is intended not to bar the trial 
of the same issue in a subsequent suit filed 
before the Court of unlimited jurisdiction. To 
hold otherwise would itself introduce another 
kind of anomaly. Therefore, it seems to us that 
as a matter of construction the suggestion that 
the word ‘suit’ should be liberally construed 
cannot be accepted…… 
 “Having regard to this legislative 
background of Sec.11 we feel no hesitation in 
holding that the word ‘suit’ in the context 
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must be construed literally and it denotes the 
whole of the suit and not a part of it or a 
material issue arising in it.” 
 The word “suit” as it appears in Sec. 13, 
C.P.C., 1867 (now Sec.11 of the present Code) 
must be understood to mean such a matter as 
might have formed the subject of separate suit 
independently of the special provisions of the 
Code which enable the plaintiff to write 
several causes of action in the same suit. Thus 
where too money bonds which were the subject of 
the former suit cannot be allowed to form the 
subject of litigation against and the 
circumstances that the plaintiff has joined 
them in the subsequent suit for four bonds will 
not enable him to obviate the plea of res 
judicata. 
A.I.R. 1919 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1954 All. 801 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
 It is a settled law that if right to 
property cannot be established by reason of its 
having been adjudged against the plaintiff in a 
previously decided suit, the plaintiff cannot 
evade the provisions of Civil Procedure Code 
regarding res judicata by joining several 
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causes of action or by adding some more 
property to the property in dispute in the 
previous suit against the same defendants by 
swelling up the valuation of the subsequent 
suit and instituting it in a court of superior 
or higher pecuniary jurisdiction. 
 A party who has lost in one Court cannot 
be permitted to add causes of action or prayers 
for reliefs in another suit for the purpose of 
swelling the valuation of his suit, and claim 
that the decision in the former suit does not 
operate as res judicata. But if it appears that 
his subsequent suit proceeded upon a cause of 
action which did not exist at the date of the 
previous suit or if that cause of action 
existed it was one which he could not have 
availed of at that time having regard to the 
nature of the suit as if there was the fact 
that he subsequently institutes a suit 
embracing the entire cause of action with the 
result that his suit being of higher value 
would justify him in claiming that the decision 
in the earlier suit was not operative as res 
judicata. 
 If it is possible to treat the entire 
cause of action founded as divisible and if in 
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the earlier suit one of the component parts of 
the cause of action was relied upon, then the 
previous suit will stand as a bar to the extent 
of the matter involved in the earlier suit. 
A.I.R. 1923 All. 176 (D.B.) 
 Held that… 
 But it must be borne in mind that where 
the claim for the rest of the property (not 
forming subject of dispute in the previously 
decided suit) is based on different cause of 
action or cause of nature it cannot operate to 
deprive the plaintiff of his right to set up 
that title in regard to that property which was 
not then in dispute.   
 
A.I.R. 1943 Oudh 338.  
Held that… 
 However, in those cases where the cause of 
action recurring and the claim having been 
decided between the parties in respect of a 
certain period, e.g. claim for arrears of 
maintenance for a certain period a subsequent 
suit for arrears of another period, the issue 
involved in both the suits being whether the 
arrears claimed were in fact due, the former 
decision will operate as bar of res judicata. 
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 The claim decided in a previous suit or 
litigation for a certain period whether 
operates, as res judicata between the same 
parties in a subsequent suit for a subsequent 
period is a question, which depends on the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 
In a question before their Lordships of the 
Privy Council in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. v. 
Broken Hill Municipal Council. 
A.I.R. 1930 Mad.209.  
A.I.R. 1937 Mad.254.(F.B.) 
Held that… 
 Whether a valuation under the Local 
Government Act, 1919, New South Wales, in a 
previous year adjudicated by the Court would 
operate as res judicata as regards the 
valuation for subsequent years it was observed: 
 “The present case relates to a new 
question, namely, the valuation for a different 
year and the liability for that year. It is not 
eadem questio, and therefore the principle of 
res judicata cannot apply.” 
 If a question is decided by a court on a 
reference which depends upon consideration 
which may vary from year to year there can be 
no res judicata. By way of illustration, the 
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valuation of land for purposes of rating for 
each year is so peculiar to that year and has 
to be made on considerations that prevailed in 
prior years that no question should be 
considered as a general principle and what 
happened in one year-whether a matter of 
principle or a matter of detail-should not be 
used in another year and therefore the decision 
of one year is not res judicata in another 
year. 
 But it is clear that even an erroneous 
decision of law in one suit would operate as 
res judicata in the subsequent litigation, 
provided the question arose as between the 
parties and it was substantially in issue 
between them. That this principle would extend 
to cases where the latter suit covers the 
subsequent years or faslis or not if the 
earlier case decides a matter of general 
principle it would be res judicata in later 
years. 
 An extract from the judgment of the Privy 
Council in Hoystead v. Commissioner of 
Taxation, for the proposition that the decision 
in the prior litigation would be res judicata 
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in subsequent suit for subsequent years is 
pertinent in this context: 
 “……… It is settled, first that the 
admission of a fact fundamental to the decision 
arrived at cannot be withdrawn and a fresh 
litigation started with a view of obtaining 
another judgment upon a different assumption of 
fact, secondly the same principle applies not 
only to an erroneous admission of a fundamental 
fact, but to an erroneous assumption as to the 
legal quality of that fact. Parties are not 
permitted to begin fresh litigation, because of 
new views they may entertain of the law of the 
case, or new versions which they present as to 
what should be a proper apprehension by the 
Court of the legal result either of the 
construction of the documents or the weight of 
certain circumstances. If this were permitted 
litigation would have no end, except when legal 
ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle of 
law that this cannot be permitted, another is 
abundant authority reiterating the principle. 
A.I.R.1957 A.P.  
Held that… 
 On a consideration of the authorities on 
the subject the following broad proposition can 
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be laid down in this regard. That in judging 
whether the decision in a previous litigation 
operates as res judicata or not, the test is 
whether it decided a general principle that is 
applicable to the later years also or whether 
it was peculiar or special to that particular 
year; in other words, whether the 
considerations vary from year to year or such 
as would govern the subsequent years also. In 
the decision of that question, it is also 
irrelevant whether the previous judgment was 
erroneous either in law or on fact. 
(2004) 1 SCC 551-A: Rules of Res judicata 
nature of and rational for method to be 
followed in deciding question of Res judicata. 
Dispute in earlier suit relating to only part 
of property in dispute in later suit. Held a 
decision as to a specified part of property 
could not have necessary constituted Res 
judicata for the entire property in dispute in 
the later suit. 
 
2. False suits.- 
If a man fighting a case fights it on 
false statements and does not call necessary 
evidence to support his own statements he 
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cannot afterwards gain any advantage for those 
omissions of lies. He must be considered to be 
as much bound by the decisions as he would have 
been found by the decision if he put forward a 
true case and called all his evidence that was 
available. There can be no escape from the 
operation of the rule of res judicata. 
A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 160. 
Held that… 
 
3.  Finding in unnecessary suits how far 
constitutes res judicata.- 
There is no warrant in law for the 
proposition that a finding given in a suit 
which is perhaps an entirely useless suit and 
need not have been instituted at all does not 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit 
relating to the same matter if the other 
requirements of law as laid down in Sec. 11 
have been fulfilled. The usefulness or 
otherwise of a suit in a question which is 
entirely besides the point and a finding given 
in a suit which the plaintiff need not have 
instituted is as much res judicata as one given 
in a suit which he was bound to institute. 
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A.I.R. 1963 All.  
Held that… 
 Decision on two alternative findings 
whether each one of them operates as res 
judicata.-The law is that when a court decides 
a case on two alternative findings, each one of 
them operates as res judicata and is a binding 
authority and that a trial court should decide 
all issues even though the findings on some of 
them are sufficient to enable it to decide the 
case one way or the other. The law, therefore, 
is not that a finding unnecessarily given is no 
finding; it may bind not only other courts but 
also the parties. It may be that a court should 
not give a gratuitous finding or a direction to 
the prejudice of a total stranger. 
 
4.  Suits instituted without authority 
and suits irregularly constituted.- 
Suits instituted without the authority of 
the party will not operate as res judicata in a 
subsequently instituted suit with proper 
authority. Thus where though the judgment 
obtained by the plaintiff in a prior suit 
between the same parties instituted by the 
defendant’s agent though without authority to 
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do so and the lower appellate Court had found 
that the party was not responsible for the 
fraudulent act of his agent, will not 
constitute res judicata by itself, yet it will 
constitute a strong case in favour of 
plaintiff’s title and possession and it lies 
heavily on the defendant to displace it. 
A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 
Held that… 
 And the decision in a suit irregularly 
constituted is still a decision of a court with 
jurisdiction and if the Court has pronounced 
its decision and passed a decree against the 
party in the suit he must have the decree set 
aside by regular proceeding by way of appeal or 
otherwise. 
A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 687. 
Held that… 
 Similarly when plaintiff filed a suit 
claiming the land in suit in the first instance 
as lies separate property but in the course of 
the trial, he, however, made a distinct 
admission that the land was trust property. The 
Court recording the admission came to the 
conclusion that it was trust property and that 
both the plaintiff and the defendant were 
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jointly entitled to its management. It was held 
that although in form this was a suit between 
two private persons, it was in effect and 
substance a right claimed by the plaintiff on 
behalf of the trust on the one hand and the 
defendant on the other and the defendant was 
bound by that decision. 
A.I.R. 1964 All. 64. 
Held that… 
 
5.Suits dismissed as premature.- 
A suit dismissed as premature suit will 
not ordinarily operate as res judicata in a 
subsequent suit between the same parties 
inasmuch as there could be no decision of the 
questions involved in the former suit and hence 
no decision on merits of the case. Thus where a 
former title suit was dismissed as premature 
because the terms of the kabuliyat had not 
expired when that suit had been brought 
subsequent title suit was not barred by res 
judicata. 
A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 
Held that… 
 In order to create an effective bar of res 
judicata, a suit must have been finally heard 
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and decided and it cannot be said that a suit 
which is rightly dismissed on the ground that 
it is premature is so heard and decided. 
 
 AIR 1996 SC 2367 State of Maharashtra & 
another v/s National constitutional Company 
Bombay.  
 In this case supreme court held that the 
suit should be dismissed on technical ground of 
non-joinder of party. Without adjudicating on 
merits not covered under expression heard and 
finally decided. Such decision of suit would 
not operate as res judicata.   
 
6. Withdrawal of suits without permission 
to file fresh suit.- 
The basic principle of res judicata is 
that there should have been a final 
adjudication on merits. The case of a 
withdrawal of a previous suit without the 
permission of the Court to bring a fresh suit 
is analogous to a dismissal for default and in 
the latter case also as there is no decision on 
merits consequently there is res judicata. 
A.I.R. 1939 Lah. 
Held that… 
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 In other words, where the plaintiffs 
abandon their claim, there is no trial of the 
issues arising between the parties and 
consequently there is no decision which can 
operate as res judicata. To prevent the 
defendants being harassed unnecessarily a 
second time on the same cause of action, the 
law, however, prescribes that the plaintiff 
shall not sue again on the same cause of action 
unless the suit is withdrawn owing to some 
technical defect., etc. and the permission of 
the Court is obtained under O. XXIII, r. l, 
C.P.C. 
A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 
Held that… 
 The result of such a withdrawal, 
therefore, is not to bring in the operation of 
the rule of res judicata embodied in Sec. 11, 
C.P.C., but only to entail the statutory 
penalty enacted in O. XXIII, r. 1, C.P.C., 
itself, namely, that no fresh suit can be 
instituted against those defendants on the same 
cause of action. Nor Explanation V to Sec. 11, 
C.P.C., can be invoked because it can only be 
invoked in respect of any adjudication made by 
the Court. Thus where the plaintiff, who in the 
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first instance, asks for a decree against the 
joint family property so far as the interests 
of the minor sons therein are concerned, 
subsequently withdraws his claim as against 
them without the permission of the Court, the 
rule of res judicata will not apply as there is 
no decision on merits but no fresh suit can be 
brought against these defendants on the same 
cause of action because of the bar of O. XXIII, 
r. l, C.P.C. 
A.I.R. 1940 Oudh.  
Held that… 
 Similarly wherein a suit brought by the 
zamindars against five defendants as “riyas” 
for demolition of certain constructions in the 
sehandarwaza of the defendants. The name of one 
of the defendants was removed from the array of 
defendants without taking permission of the 
Court under O. XXIII, r. l, C.P.C., to bring 
fresh suit against him. Held that the suit was 
brought to an end against him, and his 
subsequent re-impleading means bringing a new 
suit against him and the suit cannot, 
therefore, be decreed against him as no 
permission of the Court was obtained under O. 
XXIII, r. 1(2), C.P.C. 
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A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 178. 
Held that… 
 
7.  Withdrawal of suits with permission 
to file fresh suit.- 
When plaintiff brings a fresh suit after 
withdrawal of the first suit with permission of 
the Court to file a fresh suit the defendant 
cannot plead res judicata in the subsequent 
suit. It has been laid down by their Lordships 
of the Privy Council that where though a claim 
was included in the prior suit, but there was 
no judicial decision upon it, the claim had 
never been judicially considered or adjudicated 
upon between the parties, and all that happened 
was that the plaintiff elected not to proceed 
with that action for the purpose but to seek a 
judicial decision in other proceedings, the 
claim is not barred by res judicata as the 
judgment shows on its face no decision as 
regards that particular issue. The same 
principle will apply where permission to 
withdraw the suit with liberty to bring fresh 
suit, is given by an appellate Court. Thus were 
the defendant filed an appeal which was heard 
and the plaintiff-respondent applied for 
152 
permission to withdraw the suit with a right to 
bring a fresh suit regarding the same cause of 
action and the appellate Court passed an order 
allowing the application and allowed the appeal 
also. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a suit 
on the same ground as previously and the 
defendant raised the plea of res judicata. It 
was held that though the order of appellate 
Court regarding withdrawal was irregular, it 
was not without jurisdiction. Consequently res 
judicata could not be pleaded on the ground of 
the decision of the appeal. The proper 
procedure in such a case would be for the 
appellate Court to set aside the decree of the 
trial Court, and then grant the permission to 
withdraw. Similarly it has been held by Full 
Bench of Madras High Court that an order 
allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his suit 
with liberty to bring fresh suit, made under O. 
XXIII, r. l, C.P.C., but under circumstances 
not within the scope of the rule cannot be 
treated as an order made without jurisdiction, 
such order is consequently not null and void. A 
fresh suit instituted upon leave so granted is 
not incompetent. The Court trying the 
subsequent suit is not competent to enter into 
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the question whether the Court which granted 
the plaintiff permission to bring a fresh suit 
had properly made such order. A Full Bench of 
the Patna High Court also took the same view 
and further observed that the order granting 
permission right or wrong is binding upon the 
parties until it is set aside by some process 
known to law in Chorder (e.g. appeal, revision 
or review) but not in a collateral trial 
proceeding or in subsequent suit. 
A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 
Held that… 
A Full Bench of the Madras High Court 
unanimously held that it is open to an 
appellate Court in proper cases when reversing 
the decree of the lower Court to give the 
plaintiff leave to withdraw the suit with 
liberty to file a fresh suit. In such a case 
where the appellate Court allows the suit to be 
withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit the 
lower Court’s decree is wiped out and the 
subsequent suit is not barred as res judicata. 
  Even in the case of decree the suit is 
clearly barred by this principle  
AIR 1996 SC 2252 Nirmaljit singh & others v/s 
Harnamgingh. In this case These three sons of 
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Boor Singh were parties to the reference to 
arbitration and where also defendants to the 
suit. The decree which has been passed in the 
terms of the award is binding on them. So long 
as the decree stands and has not been set a 
side, the decree is binding to the parties to 
it and can not be ignored. The contention that 
no notice of the filling of the award was 
served on the parties was not raised either in 
the plaint of before the trial court or before 
the first appellate court. This contention was 
raised for the first time in second appeal 
before the high court. The view of the supreme 
the high court was not right in coming to the 
conclusion that in the absence of the notice of 
the filling of the award. The decree in the 
terms of the award can be considered as non set 
and can be ignored so that it would not operate 
as res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 
Held that… 
 Where a suit was allowed by the Court to 
be withdrawn on payment of cost and a second 
suit was filed without complying with the 
condition and the second suit was consequently 
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dismissed. Thereafter a third suit was filed 
after complying with the condition and the 
dismissal of second suit was set up as a bar of 
res judicata to the maintainability of third 
suit, it has been held by the Punjab High Court 
that the basic object of the procedural law was 
to facilitate determination of dispute on 
merits. The provisions of Civil Procedure Code 
debar a fresh suit in four cases, viz. Under 
O.II, r. 2, C.P.C., omission to sue or 
relinquishment of a part of claim; under O. IX, 
r.9, C.P.C., in case of abatement and under O. 
XXIII, r.l, C.P.C., withdrawal or abandonment 
without permission of the court to file fresh 
suit. Thus there is no specific provision in 
the Civil Procedure Code debarring a third suit 
after the dismissal of second suit for non-
compliance with the terms of the permission. 
The dismissal of the suit for non-compliance 
with the conditions stands on the same footing 
as dismissal for non-compliance of provisions 
of Sec.80, C.P.C. or Sec.69 of the Partnership 
Act which amount to what is known as “non-suit” 
and such dismissal will not bar the right of 
the plaintiff to litigate the matter in fresh 
suit after complying with the condition, and as 
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there was no final decision of the case the 
principles of res judicata will not apply. 
A.I.R. 1935 All. 
A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 
Held that… 
 
8. Prior decisions.- 
Two conflicting decisions on same issues-
It is the settled law that on the principles 
underlying the plea of res judicata which aims 
at avoiding multiplicity of litigation and at 
securing finality of two conflicting decrees 
have been obtained by parties from two 
different courts or even from the same court, 
then the last one should be the effective 
decree between the parties and the first decree 
should be regarded as dead. The basis of this 
salutary rule is that if a party who could 
raise the plea of res judicata does not raise 
the same when an opportunity is given to him he 
must be deemed to have waived it. The plea of 
res judicata is not one which affects the 
jurisdiction of a court. It is a plea in bar 
and such a plea can be waived. Similarly when 
there are two conflicting decisions on an issue 
it was remarked by Malik, J., as he then was, 
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in Haji Mohd. Ubed Ullah Khan v. Kunnar Mohd. 
Abdul Falil Khan. 
A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 
Held that…  
That it is the later decision that operates as 
res judicata. If the prior decision inter 
partes is either not cited in a later case 
where the same point arises or, if cited, is 
disregarded by the court which has jurisdiction 
to decide that point, it must be deemed that 
the plea of res judicata was either waived or 
that it was held that the previous decision was 
not binding and it is, therefore, the later 
decision that would be binding between the 
parties. The Madras High Court has also 
expressed the same view somewhat more 
emphatically in Sheshayya v. Venkatadri Appa 
Row, wherein it was held that in cases of 
judgments inter partes, the later adjudication 
should be taken as superseding the earlier, 
whether or not the earlier adjudication was 
pleaded as a bar to the trial of the later 
suit. The plea of res judicata may be waived by 
accident, mistake or intentionally. The maxim 
of competing estoppels or “estoppel against 
estoppel sets the matter at large” is not 
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applicable to estoppel by record. The same rule 
applies to two conflicting orders and the later 
order must prevail over the earlier order. Thus 
where there was a compromise between the 4th 
defendant and some of the judgment-debtors by 
which they were set free. The transferee of the 
decree applied for execution against these 
judgment-debtors also. Their objection was 
allowed. In a second application for execution 
against them also, they objected but their 
objection was lost in default. In a third 
application against them it was held that the 
objection of the judgment-debtors was barred by 
res judicata as the later of the two 
inconsistent orders must prevail. Even an ex 
parte decision in a previous suit will operate 
as res judicata in a subsequent suit. 
 
9. Erroneous decisions.- 
Whether an erroneous prior decision in 
prior suit operates an res judicata in a 
subsequent suit between the parties has been a 
highly controversial matter amongst the various 
High Courts in India. But all the authorities 
of various High Courts have agreed on the point 
that a decision on an issue of fact, howsoever 
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erroneous, is binding on the parties in a 
subsequent suit when the same question is 
directly and substantially in issue. Similarly 
the authorities of the various High Courts seem 
to have agreed that a finding on a mixed 
question of law and fact stands on the same 
footing as a decision on a question of fact and 
even an erroneous decision on a mixed question 
of law and fact is res judicata like the 
decision on a question of fact. The reason 
being that jurisdiction of a court is that 
power to hear and decide and the power to 
decide is the power to decide erroneously as 
well as correctly. Correctness or otherwise of 
judicial decision has no bearing upon the 
question whether it does or does not operate as 
res judicata. A party taking the plea of res 
judicata has to show that the matter directly 
and substantially in issue has also been 
directly and substantially in issue in a 
previous suit and has been heard and decided. 
 Now the controversy that arises amongst 
the various High Courts of India is with 
regards to prior decisions on an issue of law. 
Some of the High Courts have adopted the view 
that an erroneous decision on a point of law 
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would constitute res judicata as much as a 
correct decision on a question either of law or 
fact, which meant that there could be res 
judicata not only on a question of fact, a 
mixed question of law and fact, but also on a 
pure question of law on which the parties might 
be at dispute regarding the matter which was 
directly and substantially in issue in the two 
litigations. 
 Some of the High Courts have adopted the 
view that a decision on a question of law may 
be res judicata but an erroneous decision on a 
question of law cannot be allowed to operate as 
res judicata especially when the law has been 
altered; in the meantime, the decision in the 
earlier suit on a particular question of law 
would not operate as res judicata with regard 
to the same question in a subsequent suit. The 
above view is not justified by the weight of 
authorities to the contrary and the decision of 
the Supreme Court. Hence the above view is no 
longer a good law. 
 Another series of authorities of the 
various High Courts have affirmed the view of 
the lines of English decisions to the effect 
that a decision on an issue of law operates as 
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res judicata of the cause of action (more 
accurately matter directly and substantially in 
issue) in the subsequent suit is the same as in 
the former suit. 
 His Lordship Bhagwati, J., who delivered 
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sundar Bai 
v. Devaji, S.C. Appeal No. 128 of 1951 (S.C.) 
reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 82: 1953 S.C.J. 
693 observed: 
 “Where the rights claimed in both suits is 
the same the subsequent suit would be barred by 
res judicata, though the right in the 
subsequent suit is sought to be established on 
a ground different from that in the former 
suit. It would be only in those cases where the 
rights claimed in the two suits were different 
that the subsequent suit would not be barred by 
res judicata even though the property was 
identical.” 
 Therefore, it is only when we have eadem 
question or the same question that the 
principle of res judicata can apply. But when 
the questions are different the decision in law 
with regard to one matter cannot operate as res 
judicata with regard to a different matter. 
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10. Appeal, meaning of.- 
The word appeal has not been defined in 
the Code of Civil Procedure. According to 
Webster’s Dictionary the first meaning in law 
of the word “appeal” is the removal of a cause 
or a suit from an inferior to a superior Judge 
or Court for re-examination or review. The 
explanation of the terms in Wharton’s Law 
Lexicon which is only different in words, “is 
the removal of a cause from an inferior to a 
superior court” for the purpose of testing the 
soundness of the decrees of the inferior court. 
And in consonance with the broad meaning of the 
words “appellate jurisdiction” means the power 
of superior court to review the decrees of an 
inferior court. Here the two things which are 
required to constitute appellate jurisdiction 
are the existence of the relationship of the 
inferior and superior court and the power on 
the part of the former to review the decrees of 
the latter. This has been well put by Story: 
“The essential criterion of appellate 
jurisdiction is that it revives and corrects 
the proceedings in a cause already instituted 
and does not create that cause. In reference to 
judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction, 
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therefore, implies that the subject-matter had 
already been instituted and acted upon by some 
other court whose judgment or proceedings are 
to be revised” (Section 1761, commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States.) 
 
1995 Supp.(4)SJC 286  
 P.M.A. Metropolitan v/s Moran Mar Marthoma  
in this case supreme court held that the 
appellate decision and not the trial court 
decision operate as res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1932 P.C.  
A.I.R. 1954 S.C.  
Held that… 
 The phrase “when there has been an appeal” 
was construed by their Lordships of the Privy 
Council to mean that any application by a party 
to the appellate Court to set aside or revise a 
decree or order of a court subordinate there to 
is an appeal, even though it is irregular or 
incompetent or the person affected by the 
application to execute were not parties or it 
did not imperil the whole decree or order. 
Their Lordships refused to read into the words 
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any qualification either as to the character of 
the appeal or as to the parties to it. 
 The Supreme Court in Raja Kulkarani v. 
State of Bombay, has held that the word 
“appeal” must be construed in its plain and 
natural sense without the insertion of any 
qualifying words, e.g. valid or competent 
appeal. 
 Whether the appeal is valid or competent 
is a question entirely for the appellate court 
before whom the appeal is filed to determine 
and this determination is only possible after 
the appeal is heard, but there is nothing to 
prevent a party from filing an appeal which may 
ultimately be found to be incompetent, e.g. 
when it held to be barred by limitation or that 
it does not lie before that court or is 
concluded by finding of fact under Sec.100, 
C.P.C. From the mere fact that such an appeal 
is held to be unmaintainable on any ground 
whatsoever it does not follow that there is no 
appeal pending before the court. 
 
A.I.R.1917 Mad. 
Held that… 
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11.Finality of decisions which are  
appealable.- 
There can be no doubt that an appeal is 
only a continuation of the original proceedings 
the decree passed by the appellate court being 
the decree in the suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 
Held that… 
 A decision liable to appeal may be final 
until the appeal is preferred. But once the 
appeal is filed the decision loses its 
character of finality and what was once res 
judicata again becomes res sub-judice, that is, 
the matter under judicial enquiry. The appeal 
destroys the finality of the decision and it 
becomes a pending matter. As pointed out by Sir 
Lawrence Jenkins in Kailash Chandra Bose v. 
Girja Sundari Devi that a decree on appeal 
supersedes the decree passed under appeal and 
the decree of the court of first instance could 
not in the circumstances be pleaded as res 
judicata. In the same way their Lordships of 
the Privy Council have held that if there had 
been no appeal in the first suit the decision 
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of the Subordinate Judge would no doubt have 
given rise to the plea or res judicata. But the 
appeal destroys the finality of the decision. 
The judgment of the lower court is superseded 
by the judgment of the court of appeal. 
 In another case before the Privy Council 
in S.P.A. Annamalay Chetty v. B.A. Thornhill, 
the the appellant maintained that under this 
provision (C.P.C. of 1889, Sec.207 “All decrees 
passed by the Court shall, subject to appeal, 
when an appeal is allowed, be final between the 
parties and no plaintiff shall be non-suited”) 
no decree from which an appeal lies and has in 
fact been taken is final between the parties so 
as to form res judicata, while the respondents 
contended that such a decree was final between 
the parties and formed res judicata until it 
has been set aside the in appeal. Their 
Lordships affirmed that in their opinion the 
former view is the correct one, and where an 
appeal lies the finality of the decree on such 
appeal being taken is qualified by the appeal 
and the decree is not final in the sense that 
it will form res judicata as between the 
parties. Their Lordships further expressed 
regret that the second action was not adjourned 
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pending the decision of the appeal in the first 
action as that would have simplified procedure 
and saved expenses. A contrary view was 
expressed by Mahmood, J., in a Full Bench 
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Bal 
Krishna v. Kishan Lal, after quoting Pothier”… 
That judgments still liable to appeal stand, 
for the purpose of res judicata, on the same 
footing as provisional judgment and that the 
effect of such judgments are only momentary and 
ceases as soon as the appeal is made…” his 
Lordship remarked that such judgments are only 
provisional and are not definite adjudications. 
 
A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1926 Rang. 122. 
Held that… 
 They are only provisional, and not being 
final cannot operate as res judicata. The above 
view was adopted in Chengalavala Gurraju v. 
Madapathy Venkateswara Row Pantulu Garu. It is 
submitted that the above view is not sound, 
because the mere contingency or possibility 
that an appeal may be filed from the decision 
and the appeal court may upset the decision 
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does not affect the finality of the decision 
and it is too remote and too hypothetical. 
 
A.I.R. 1949 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 
Held that… 
 Thus where merely an application for leave 
to appeal to Privy Council was pending in the 
High Court against the decision of the High 
Court and no leave had yet been granted. It was 
held that a mere application for leave does not 
render the decision sub-judice and the judgment 
of the High Court, therefore, cannot be 
regarded as merely provisional. Therefore when 
the judgment of a court of first insance is 
appealed against such judgment ceased to be res 
judicata and becomes res sub-judice and after 
decision by the appellate court it is appellate 
court’s judgment which takes the place of and 
supersedes the decision of the trial court and 
for purposes of applying the bar of res 
judicata the decision of the appellate court 
should be looked into and not that of the court 
of first instance. Where a judgment operating 
as res judicata in a subsequent case is pending 
in appeal, the matter is not res judicata in 
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appeal and the case should be disposed of on 
the merits.  
 
A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 
Held that… 
 It is true that a decree cannot operate as 
res judicata during the time an appeal is 
pending. However, when the appeal is dismissed, 
whatever the grounds, the decree appealed from 
becomes operative and would bind the parties. 
 
A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 222(D.B.) 
Held that… 
-S. 11 and Or. 23 R. 1- Res judicata- 
Withdrawal of suit at appellate stage with 
liberty to file fresh suit on the same cause of 
action-Held, a judgment given in suit which has 
been permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to 
file a fresh suit on the same cause of action 
cannot constitute res judicata in a subsequent 
suit filed pursuant to permission of the court,  
(2004) 1 SCC 471-A    
 
 Now the appellate judgment operates as res 
judicata as regards all findings of the lower 
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court, which though not referred to in it, are 
necessary to make the appellate decree possible 
on such findings. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 All. 
A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 74 (D.B.) 
A.I.R. 1931 Sind 170 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
 But where the appeal is not decided on 
merits but is dismissed on some technical 
grounds the result is the same as if no appeal 
had been filed at all and, therefore, no 
decision of the question by the appellate court 
and no modification of the decree of the first 
court which consequently became final as 
between the parties on each point actually 
decided by it. Thus where the appeal is not 
decided on merits, but abates or where the 
appeal has been held to be defective by reason 
of the absence of the necessary parties or 
where the appeal was withdrawn or where the 
appeal is dismissed for default due to non-
appearance of appellant there is no decision on 
merits of the appeal. But to support the plea 
of res judicata, besides the parties and the 
matter in issue being the same, the matter in 
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issue must have been heard and finally decided. 
If there is an appeal it destroys the finality 
of the decision of the lower court and if the 
ultimate court of appeal dismisses the suit as 
badly framed the merits of the case are not res 
judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 
A.I.R 1946 All. 
A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 
Held that… 
 The same rule would apply where the 
appellate court for any reason does not decide 
or declines to decide a point decided by the 
trial court and disposes of the appeal on some 
other grounds the matter or point so left 
undecided does not operate as res judicata. The 
appellate court whose decision is the test by 
which question of res judicata is to be 
determined has on the materials before it ample 
authority to dispose of the appeal on one of 
the grounds on which the decision of the trial 
court was founded and to leave open and 
undecided the other issue in the case, and in 
such circumstances as was observed by their 
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Lordships of the Privy Council in Parshotam Gir 
v. Narbada Gir it would be contradiction in 
terms to say that the appellate court had 
finally decided the issue though in fact the 
issue was left untouched and undecided. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 All. 243. 
A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 21 (F.B.) 
Held that… 
Thus where the decision of the previous suit 
proceeded in the first court both on the 
question of possession and title but the 
decision of the appellate court was confined to 
the question of possession and title but the 
decision of the appellate court was confined to 
the question of title alone, it was held that 
there was no res judicata regarding the 
question of possession. Before the Full Bench 
of the Madras High Court in Maruvada 
Venkataratnama v. Maruvada Krishnama where the 
suit was for declaration of a will to be a 
forgery the question of its operating as an 
authority to adopt was also raised and 
determined by the lower court but the High 
Court although both the questions were raised 
before it only decided on the genuineness of 
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the will. The Full Bench relying on two Privy 
Council decisions in Sheo Sagar Singh v. Sita 
Ram Singh, Abdulla Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh 
Dass. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 163. 
Held that…  
 Held that the question as to the will being 
operative, as an authority to adopt was not 
barred by res judicata in a subsequent suit. It 
was further held that as the matter was made 
the ground of attack in the trial court and was 
raised in the appellate court, there was no 
ground for the applicability of the doctrine of 
constructive res judicata enunciated in 
Explanation IV to Sec.11, C.P.C., that a mere 
ground of attack relating to the main relief 
should not be regarded as a separate relief, 
and the refusal to entertain a ground which 
related to the relief which was adjudicated 
upon by the judgment, cannot be regarded as a 
refusal of relief. Therefore the constructive 
res judicata referred to in Explanation IV to 
Sec. 11, C.P.C., has also no application in the 
present case. Similarly where in a previous 
suit for ejectment between the same parties the 
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Munsif who tried the suit held that the 
defendants had no right of occupancy but he 
dismissed the suit on the ground the of its 
being instituted before the expiry of the 
agriculture year in which the defendants 
predecessor died. On appeal that decree of 
dismissal was affirmed on the second ground, it 
was held that the decision of first court on 
the first issue would not operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit for ejectment. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1924 All. 
Held that… 
It is open to an appellate court in proper 
cases when reversing the decree of the lower 
court to give the plaintiff leave to withdraw 
the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. In 
such a case where the appellate court allows 
the suit to be withdrawn with liberty to file 
fresh suit, the lower court’s decree is wiped 
out and the subsequent suit is not barred as 
res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1949 (P.C.) 239. 
Held that… 
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12. Finality of appealable decision-No 
appeal preferred-Wrong decision by  
court-Revision lies.- 
Once the plaintiff neglected to take 
remedy of appeal provided to him against the 
decision as to jurisdiction became res judicata 
and final just as much as any other 
unchallenged decision will become final.  
 In a subsequent suit on identical facts he 
court was bound to consider the plea of res 
judicata and if the court has refused to accept 
the plea of res judicata, the statutory 
prohibitions of Sec. 11, C.P.C., even if do not 
amount to deprivation of jurisdiction but are 
only prohibitions of Sec. 11 of the Code would 
amount to actions revisable by the High Court 
under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
 Their Lordships of the Privy Council have 
clearly laid down in Joy Chand Lal v. 
Kamalaksha, the correct principles for the 
exercise of revisional powers by the High 
Courts in India in the following words:    
 
A.I.R. 1927 All. 358. 
Held that… 
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 “There have been a very large number of 
decisions of Indian High Courts on Sec. 115 
(Civil Procedure Code) to many of which their 
Lordships have been referred. Some of such 
decisions prompt the observation that High 
Courts have not always appreciated that 
although error in a decision of a subordinate 
court does not by itself involve that the 
subordinate court had acted illegally or with 
material irregularity so as to justify 
interference in revision under sub-section (c), 
nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results 
in the subordinate court exercising a 
jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or 
failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a 
case for revision arises under sub-sections (a) 
and (b) and sub-section (c) can be ignored. The 
case of Babu Ram v. Munna Lal and Hari Bhikaji 
v. Naro Vishvanath may be mentioned as cases in 
which a subordinate court by its own erroneous 
decision (erroneous; that is, in the view of 
the High Court), in the one case of limitation 
and in the other on a question of res judicata, 
invested itself with jurisdiction which in law 
it did not posses and the High Court held, 
wrongly their Lordships think, that it had no 
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power to interfere in revision to prevent such 
a result.” 
 
A.I.R. 1952 Punj. 
Held that… 
 Discretion under Sec. 115, C.P.C., must be 
exercised by the High Court against a person 
who has neglected or refused to take his proper 
remedies. When he has allowed a decision to 
become final he cannot be heard to say that it 
should not be final. –S. 11 –Res judicata-
Finality of last order-where appeal, revision 
and then writ petition of appellant challenging 
assessment order under Central Excise Act had 
been dismissed on ground of delay and appellant 
did not file SLP against dismissal of writ 
petition, held, assessment had.  
 
A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 241. 
Held that… 
 
13. Adverse finding-Where no appeal 
possible whether res judicata.- 
A party, for instance, an appellant having 
succeeded in appeal could not have preferred 
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any further appeal for challenging an adverse 
finding contained in the judgment. The adverse 
finding in such judgment cannot operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding 
between the same parties. Their Lordships of 
the Privy Council in the well-known case in 
Midnapur Zamindari Co., Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan 
Roy, have observed at page 467: 
 
A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1954 J.& K. 
A.I.R. 1938 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1953 Mys. 
A.I.R. 1955 A.P. 
A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 168. 
Held that… 
 “Their Lordships do not consider that this 
will found an actual plea of res judicata for 
the defendants, having succeeded on other plea 
had no occasion to go further as to the finding 
against them.” 
 It has often been tried to establish that 
where a plaintiff’s suit is dismissed but 
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certain issues are decided adversely to the 
defendant and in view of the fact that on some 
points the court has decided against the 
defendant the decree was not in conformity with 
the judgment and this by itself gave the 
defendant a right of appeal from the decree. 
The matter came up before a Full Bench of five 
Judges of the Allahabad High Court and the 
majority view (Oilfield and Mahmood, JJ., 
dissenting) observed in following words: 
 “We find that the decree before us is, on 
the face of it entirely in favour of the 
defendants and the proper presumption is that 
it has been correctly prepared in advertence to 
the judgment. The mode in which this 
presumption would have been rebutted and the 
decree set right is provided in Sec. 206 of the 
Code (review of judgment) and we do not think 
that any other mode that directly created by 
statute for bringing the decree into conformity 
with the judgment exists, and that until it 
appears from the face of the decree that 
something has been decreed, adversely to the 
defendant, no right of appeal arises, because 
there is nothing in the decree itself for him 
to appeal against.” 
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A.I.R. 1952 Pepsu 76 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
 Thus it is clear that there is no right of 
appeal against the adverse finding contained in 
any judgment.  
 A contrary view, however, has been taken 
by the Pepsu High Court which has held that 
where there was no right of appeal against the 
adverse finding except on question of cost of 
the suit, and the decision of the appellate 
court on points which he could not properly 
decide would only amount to an irregularity. 
Conditions would have been quite different if 
no appeal lay to him at all because in that 
case the entire proceedings of the appeal 
before him would have been vitiated by total 
want of jurisdiction and the judgment would 
therefore be void. But where a court has 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal and if he 
has committed any mistake or irregularity in 
deciding it that does not make his judgment 
void. The judgment of the trial court merges in 
that of the appellate court and the decision of 
the appellate court operates as res judicata.  
 The High Court, however, allowed the 
appeal on other ground also on the assumption 
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that even if there was no right of appeal that 
on appreciation of the evidence on record the 
finding of the lower appellate court could not 
be supported. 
 It is submitted that the principle of law 
enunciated above is not sound. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 All.112. 
Held that… 
 
14. Order rejecting memo. Of appeal.- 
Where a memorandum of appeal is presented 
in court by any unauthorized person, it is no 
appeal at all and the court may reject it for 
that obvious defect, but the court is not 
justified in treating it as an appeal in due 
form and rejecting the same as statute barred. 
Thus an order of rejection of a memorandum of 
appeal which had been presented by a Vakil not 
properly authorised according to law cannot 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent 
proceeding in which an appeal has been filed in 
proper form but beyond time. There was not and 
there could not be any question of res judicata 
before the court and the only question which 
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required consideration was whether prayer for 
extension of time was to be granted or refused. 
A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 238(D.B.) 
Held that… 
 
15. Abatement of suit or appeal under O. 
XXII, rr. 3 to 4, C.P.C.- 
The failure of the appellant in an appeal 
or plaintiff in a suit to bring on record the 
legal representatives of a deceased party 
results in abatement of the appeal or suit, as 
the case may be.  
 The provisions of abatement of suits under 
O.XXII, rr. 3 to 4 and 11, C.P.C., are as 
under: 
 “Order XXII, rule 3,C.P.C.-(1)Where one of 
two or more plaintiff dies and the right to sue 
does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or 
plaintiff alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole 
surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue 
survives, the court, on an application made in 
that behalf, shall cause the legal 
representatives of the deceased-plaintiff to be 
made a party and shall proceed with the suit. 
 (2) Where within the time limited by law 
no application is made under sub-rule (1), the 
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suit shall abate so far as the deceased 
plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application 
of the defendant, the Court may award to him 
the cost which he may have incurred in 
defending the suit, to be recovered from the 
estate of the deceased plaintiff.” 
 “Order XXII, rule 4,C.P.C.-(1)Where one of 
two or more defendants dies and the right to 
sue does not survive against the surviving 
defendant or defendants alone, or a sole 
defendant dies and the right to sue survives, 
the court on an application made in that behalf 
shall cause the legal representatives of the 
deceased defendant to be made a party and shall 
proceed with the suit. 
(2) Any person so made a party may make any 
defence appropriate to his character as legal 
representative of the deceased defendant.  
(3) Where within the time limited by law no 
application is made under sub-rule (1) the suit 
shall abate as against the deceased defendant.” 
“Order XXII, rule C.P.C.-In application of this 
order to appeals, so far as may be the word 
‘plaintiff’ shall be held to include an 
appellant, the word ‘defendant’ a respondent, 
and the word ‘suit’ an appeal.” 
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Now the only question remains whether the 
abatement is of the whole appeal or suit or of 
a part of the appeal or suit, in so far as the 
interest of the deceased party (plaintiffs or 
defendants or appellants or respondents, as the 
case may be) are concerned. It is not possible 
to lay down any general rule which may be of 
universal application and each case must be 
decided on its own facts. The following 
underlying principles are, however, helpful in 
judging the above question: 
(1) If a decree can be passed and given effect 
to in so far the rights of the parties actually 
before the court are concerned, without 
interfering with the interests of others, then 
the suit or appeal can continue, if not, it 
abates as a whole. 
(2) The court must see that it does not pass a 
decree, which it may find itself incapable of 
executing owing to the circumstances that the 
lower court’s decree in favour of the deceased 
party has become final in consequence of the 
partial abatement of the appeal against him. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 
Held that… 
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16. Two suits tried together on the same 
matter, appeal in one if barred if no 
appeal in the other.- 
There is a conflict of decisions as to 
whether where the matter in issue in two suits 
was the same and the suits were tried together 
on the same evidence and disposed of by the 
same Judge, [and the judgment in the one case 
was based on and followed the judgment in the 
other, though separate decrees were drawn up, 
an appeal against one of these decrees is 
barred by res judicata by reasons of the fact 
that no appeal was filed against the other 
decree.] The leading Full Bench decision of the 
Lahore High Court in Mst. Lachhmi v. Mst. 
Bhulli, wherein it was suggested that if the 
appeal is allowed to proceed and is successful 
an anomalous and embarrassing situation of 
having two inconsistent decrees on the record 
of the Court might be created by reason of the 
other decree having become final as no appeal 
was filed against the other decree. 
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A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 
Held that… 
 It was held in the above decision that res 
judicata is either estoppel and verdict or 
estoppel by judgment (or record) and apart from 
this there is no estoppel by “decree”. The 
determining factor is not the decree but the 
decision of the matter in controversy. While 
recognising the weight and justice of the maxim 
that no one shall be vexed twice over the same 
matter. The condition precedent to the 
applicability of the rule is that a cause must 
have been at one time fairly and finally tried 
in a proceeding separate and district from the 
dispute in which the issue is raised again. 
Thus where two suits having a common issue, are 
by consent of the parties or by order of the 
court, tried together the evidence being 
written in one record and both suits disposed 
of by a single judgment, there being but one 
finding and one judgment, on what principle can 
the hearing of the appeal in which this finding 
and this judgment are under consideration be 
barred merely because no appeal has been filed 
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in the connected suit which was disposed of by 
that very judgment. 
 Their Lordships answered that there has 
been in substance as well as in form but one 
trial and one verdict and it will be a travesty 
of justice to stifle the hearing of the appeal 
against such a judgment on the ground that the 
findings contained in it operate as res 
judicata. 
 The party must have at least one fair 
trial of the issue resulting in a decision by 
the court of ultimate appeal as allowed by law 
for the time being in force. As such there can 
be no question of applicability of the 
principles of res judicata the two decrees in 
substance are one.  
 The contrary view in the judicial decision 
of certain High Courts is based on the 
reasoning that two or more decrees could not 
challenge by one appeal and the unappealed 
decree had become final and thus being prior in 
time operate as res judicata to the 
continuation of the decree appealed against, on 
the ground that if the appeal is allowed to 
proceed and is successful an anomolous and 
embarrassing situation of having two 
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inconsistent and contradictory decrees on the 
record of the court might be created. The 
Madras High Court is whole-heartedly in favour 
of the right to proceed. The Allahabad High 
Court has held different view at different 
times, but the tendency of the latest decisions 
is in favour of the right to proceed.  
 The Allahabad High Court has held 
different view at different times, but the 
tendency of the latest decisions is in favour 
of the right to proceed. In the Calcutta High 
Court the opinion of the majority in Mariam 
Nissa v. Joynab Bibi, is in favour of the right 
to proceed. Subsequent decision of the Division 
Benches have, however, taken the contrary view. 
The High Courts of Patna and Rangoon have 
followed the earlier decisions of the Allahabad 
High Court but these decisions are no longer 
considered to be authoritative in that Court 
itself. In the Punjab the rulings are not 
uniform, but the tendency of the latest 
decisions is in favour of the right to proceed. 
There is a conflict in the authorities of Oudh 
Court also, but in recent cases apparently the 
view taken in the five Judges decision of the 
Allahabad High Court in Ghansham Singh v. Bhola 
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Singh, was approved. The Nagpur High Court has 
taken the view in favour of right to proceed. 
Where two suits are tried together and appeals 
are preferred from both but one of the appeals 
abates, the decision in the case the appeal 
from which has abated does not operate as res 
judicata. The controversy has been set at rest 
by the Supreme Court in Shankar v. Narhari, 
their Lordships of the Supreme Court while 
approving the judgment in Mst. Lachhmi v. Mst. 
Bhulli, have held that the question of res 
judicata arises when there are two suits. Even 
when there are two suits a decision given 
simultaneously cannot be a decision in the 
former suit when there is only one suit, the 
question of res judicata does not arise at all 
and where the decrees are in the same case and 
based on the same judgment and the matter 
decided concern the entire suit, there is no 
question of the application of the principle of 
res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1956 Orissa 68 (D.B.) 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 
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A.I.R. 1953 S.C.    
Held that… 
The same judgment cannot remain effective just 
because it was appealed against with a 
different number or a copy of it was attached 
to a different appeal. The two decrees in 
substance are one. 
 After the pronouncement of the above 
decision by the Supreme Court all the High 
Courts in India, except the Orissa High Court, 
have followed the rule of law laid down in 
Shankar v. Narhari referred to above. 
 The Orissa High Court in Suni Devi v. 
Pranakrishna, has observed in this regard in 
the following terms: 
  “Had this decision been a decision of 
the Supreme Court of India the matter would 
have been taken as finally settled. But as is 
seen from the report, it is not a decision of 
the Supreme Court of India but a decision of 
the Supreme Court of Hyderabad which in 
consequence of the merger of Hyderabad and for 
the necessity for the disposal of the appeal 
pending in the Supreme Court of Hyderabad is a 
court consisting of two Judges of the Hyderabad 
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Supreme Court and one Judge of the Supreme 
Court of India, Mahajan,J.” 
 It is submitted that the view of the 
Orissa High Court that the decision in Shankar 
v. Narhari is the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Hyderabad and not a decision of the Supreme 
Court of India is misconceived. From a persual 
of the above judgment it is clear that the said 
judgment was pronounced in accordance with Art. 
374(4) of the Constitution of India which 
provides as under: 
  “On and from the commencement of this 
Constitution the jurisdiction of the authority 
functioning as the Privy Council is a State 
specified in Part B of the First Schedule to 
entertain and dispose of appeals and petitions 
from or in respect of any judgment, decree or 
order of any court within that State shall 
cease, and all appeals and other proceedings 
pending before the said authority at such 
commencement shall be transferred to, and 
disposed of by, the Supreme Court.” 
 The aforesaid decision was pronounced by 
the Supreme Court on 13th October,1950, after 
the commencement of the Constitution on 26th 
January,1950 and hence there can be no room for 
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doubt that the aforesaid decision is not the 
decision of the Supreme Court of India. It 
appears that this fact was not brought to the 
notice of the learned Judges of the Orissa High 
Court. Moreover, now there is no longer any 
room for doubt as in the latest decision of the 
Supreme Court in Badri Narayan v. Kamdev 
Prasad, his Lordship Raghubar Dayal, J., who 
delivered the judgment of the Court has 
affirmed in clear and unequivocal terms that 
the decision in Shankar v. Narhari is the 
decision of the Supreme Court of India.  
 
17. Two appellate decrees in similar 
terms, appeal from one if barred if no 
appeal from the other.- 
Similarly, there is a conflict of case-law 
on the point whether where there have been two 
decrees passed by the Lower Appellate Court, 
and both of them require to be set aside in 
order to give the dissatisfied party the relief 
which he seeks, and a second appeal is filed 
against one decree only, the decision, which 
has been allowed to become final, operates as 
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res judicata in respect of the second appeal or 
not.  
 
A.I.R. 1956 Pat. 87. 
Held that… 
 In some cases, it has been held to operate 
as res judicata, and in others not to so 
operate. But it has been held by a Full Bench 
of the Allahabad High Court that when it 
appears to an appellate Court that there are 
two decrees arising out of two suits heard 
together or raising the same question between 
the same parties or arising out of two appeals 
to a subordinate appellate Court, and only one 
of such decrees is brought before it in appeal 
and there is nothing prejudicial to the 
appellant, in the decree from which no appeal 
has been brought, which is not raised and 
cannot be set right if the appeal which he has 
brought succeeds, the right of appeal is not 
barred by the rule of res judicata, or at all, 
by reason of his failure to appeal from the 
decree which does not prejudice him. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 All. 
A.I.R. 1925 All. 
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A.I.R. 1927 All. 
A.I.R. 1927 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
Held that… 
The same view seems to have been consistently 
maintained in recent cases. Now the controversy 
has been set at rest by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Shankar v. Narhari which is in 
favour of the right to proceed.  
 
18. Finality of interlocutory order.- 
The principle of res judicata applies also 
as between the two stages in the same 
litigation to this extent that a court whether 
the trial court or a higher court having at an 
earlier stage decided a matter in one way will 
not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter 
again at a subsequent stage of the same 
proceedings.  
 Does this, however, mean that because at 
an earlier stage of the litigation a court 
decided an interlocutory matter in one way and 
no appeal had been taken therefrom or no appeal 
did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage 
of the same litigation consider the matter. 
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 Dealing the question almost a century ago 
the Privy Council in Maharaja Moheshwar Singh 
v. Bengal Government, held that it is open to 
the appellate court which had not earlier 
considered the matter to investigate in an 
appeal from the final decision grievances of a 
party in respect of an interlocutory order. The 
following observations of their Lordships of 
the Privy Council may be quoted with advantage: 
  “We are of opinion that this objection 
cannot be sustained. We are not aware of any 
law or regulation prevailing in India which 
renders it imperative upon the suit or to 
appeal from every interlocutory order by which 
he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the 
penalty, if he does not do so, of forfeiting 
for ever the benefit of the consideration of 
the appellate court. No authority or precedent 
has been cited in support of such a 
proposition, and we cannot conceive that 
anything would be more detrimental to the 
expeditious administration of justice than the 
establishment of a rule which would impose upon 
the suit the necessity of so appealing, whereby 
on the one hand he might be harassed with 
endless expense and delay, and on the other 
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inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. 
We believe there have been very many cases 
before this Tribunal in which their Lordships 
have deemed it to be their duty to correct 
erroneous interlocutory orders, though not 
brought under their consideration until the 
whole cause had been decided, and brought by 
appeal for adjudication.”    
 The above view was re-affirmed by the 
Privy Council in Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum 
and Sheonath v. Ramnath. 
 
A.I.R. 1960 S.C.941. 
Held that… 
 There can be no doubt about the salutary 
effect of the rule laid down in the above cases 
on the administration of justice. The very fact 
that in future litigation it will not be open 
to either of the parties to challenge the 
correctness of the decision on a matter finally 
decided in a past litigation makes it important 
that in the earlier litigation the decision 
must be final in the strict sense of the term. 
When a court has decided the matter it is final 
as regards that court. Should it always be 
regarded as final at later stages of the 
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proceeding in a higher court, which had not 
considered it at all merely on the ground that 
no appeal lay or no appeal was preferred? The 
effect of the rule that at every stage of the 
litigation a decision not appealed from must be 
held to be finally decided even in respect of 
the superior court, will put on every litigant 
against whom an interlocutory order is decided 
the burden of running to higher courts for the 
redress of the grievances even though it may 
very well be that though the interlocutory 
order is against him, the final order will be 
in his favour and so it may not be necessary 
for him to go to the appeal court at all.  
Apart from the inevitable delay in the progress 
of the litigation the other party to the 
litigation would also generally suffer by such 
repeated recourse to higher courts in respect 
of every interlocutory order alleged to have 
been wrongly made. It is in the recognition of 
the importance of preventing this that the 
Legislature included a specific section in the 
Civil Procedure Code, viz. Sec. 105, C.P.C., 
which runs thus: 
 “(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, 
no appeal shall lie from any order made by 
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court in the exercise of its original or 
appellate jurisdiction; but where a decree is 
appealed from any error, defect or irregularity 
in any order, affecting the decision of the 
case, may be set forth as a ground of objection 
in the memorandum of appeal. 
 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in 
sub-section (1) where any party aggrieved by 
one order of remand made after commencement of 
the Code from which an appeal lies does not 
appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be 
precluded from disputing its correctness.” 
 Therefore, the Legislature has clearly 
provided that in an appeal from a decree it 
will be open to a party to challenge the 
correctness of any interlocutory order which 
had not been appealed from but which has 
affected the decision of the case. The only 
exception is provided by sub-section (2) of the 
above section which precludes any party from 
taking, on an appeal from the final decree, any 
objection that might have been urged by way of 
appeal from an order of remand wherever such 
appeal from an order of remand is provided 
under the law. 
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 Das Gupta, J., who delivered the judgment 
of the Supreme Court in Satya Dhan v. Deorajin 
Debi, approving the above Privy Council 
decisions has laid down in nut-shell the 
following principles for the applicability of 
the doctrine of res judicata in respect of 
interlocutory orders: 
  “It is clear, therefore, that an 
interlocutory order which had not been appealed 
from either because no appeal lay or even 
though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken 
could be challenged in an appeal from the final 
decree or order. A special provision was made 
as regards orders of remand and that was the 
effect that if an appeal lay and still the 
appeal was not taken the correctness of the 
order of remand could not later be challenged 
in an appeal from the final decision, if 
however, an appeal did not lie from the order 
of remand the correctness thereof could be 
challenged by an appeal from the final decision 
as in the cases of other interlocutory orders. 
The second sub-section of Sec. 105, C.P.C., did 
not apply to the Privy Council and can have no 
application to appeal to the Supreme Court one 
reason being that no appeal lay to the Privy 
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Council or lies to the Supreme Court against an 
order of remand.” 
 
A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 11. 
A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 418. 
Held that… 
 But the interlocutory orders which have 
the force of a decree must be distinguished 
from other interlocutory orders which are a 
step towards the decision of the dispute 
between the parties by way of a decree or a 
final order. Therefore, the case of execution 
of decree stands on a different footing. The 
decision of a dispute as regards execution it 
is hardly necessary to mention is a decree 
under the Civil Procedure Code and a decision 
in execution proceeding being a decree really 
terminates the previous proceedings. The 
execution proceeding though in form is a 
continuation of the previous proceeding, it is 
in substance an independent subsequent 
proceeding. Therefore, the test applied in 
these cases of interlocutory judgment is 
whether the judgment terminates the proceeding 
leading up to a decree or final order such 
judgment if not appealed against operate as a 
201 
bar of res judicata. And if the interlocutory 
judgment which does not terminate the 
proceeding leading a decree or final order no 
bar of res judicata can be attracted. Thus the 
leading case of the Privy Council on the point 
where their Lordships of the Privy Council in 
Ram Kripal Shukul v. Rup Kuari, disagreeing 
with the Full Bench of the High Court held that 
the principle of res judicata applied to 
execution proceedings and the order of 
Mr.Probyn, the District Judge who had earlier 
decided in execution of decree that the decree 
did award mesne profits had never been reversed 
or set aside and it was immaterial that no 
second appeal lie to High Court for if no 
second appeal did lie the judgment was final 
and if an appeal did lie and none was preferred 
the judgment was equally binding upon the 
parties and the High Court as well as the Privy 
Council were bound to uphold the order of Mr. 
Probyn. The above case of Ram Kripal was 
followed by the Privy Council in Bani Ram v. 
Nanhu Mal, which also related to an order made 
in execution proceedings. It was again followed 
by the Privy Council in Hook v. Administrator 
General of Bengal. But where the High Court has 
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remanded a case to the lower court under its 
inherent powers the matter finally disposed of 
by the order of remand cannot be re-opened when 
the case comes back to the lower court. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 253. 
Held that… 
 
19. Miscellaneous proceedings-Decision in 
a proceeding for letters of 
administration or administrative suit and 
succession certificate proceedings.- 
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 
Smt. Raj Laxmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, have held 
that a plea of res judicata on general 
principles can be successfully taken in respect 
of judgments of courts of exclusive 
jurisdiction like revenue courts, land 
acquisition courts, administration courts, etc. 
It is obvious that these courts are not 
entitled to try a regular suit and they only 
exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them 
by the statue. Where the will of a Hindu 
testatrix addressed to her grandson directed 
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that out of the income of specific property, he 
should perform the worship of the family idols 
but there was no provision for the worship of 
the idols after the death of the grandson and 
the balance of the income was to be divided 
between the representatives of the three 
branches of her own family. Administration 
proceedings were taken on the death of the 
grandson and it was decided that out of the 
produce of the house belonging to the estate of 
the testatrix the worship of the idols be 
performed and that the surplus be paid equally 
to the three branches of the family and a 
decree was adopted accordingly. It was held by 
the Privy Council that the order in the 
administration suit was binding on all the 
parties and operated as res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1921 L.B.22. 
Held that… 
Similarly where a decision made in a proceeding 
for Letters of Administration, which was 
contested in its progress, stated that a person 
was a particular relation of the deceased and 
as such was the nearest heir, it was held that 
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the decision would be binding upon those 
claiming through the party who contested the 
relationship in the administration case. In an 
administration suit between the parties if it 
is found that plaintiffs claim against the 
administrator for a share in the estate is 
barred by limitation the determination of that 
issue is res judicata; as regards an 
application by the same plaintiff for a 
revocation of the grant of Letters of 
Administration a decree obtained and executed 
against the former administrator, in whom the 
aggregate of rights and obligations of the 
deceased were vested as legal representatives 
of the estate, is binding upon his successor so 
long as the decree and the sale consequent upon 
it were not the result of fraud or collusin. 
But where an administration suit a decree 
declaring the shares of the heirs to the 
estate, the amount of the funeral expenses and 
the costs to be paid was passed and it being a 
declaratory decree only was not capable of 
execution and another suit praying that the 
shares declared by the previous decree be 
distributed is not barred by res judicata. 
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 There has been a controversy whether the 
probate proceedings are in the form of suit and 
Sec. 11, C.P.C., is applicable for the purposes 
of res judicata or the doctrine of res judicata 
is applicable on the general principles of res 
judicata apart from the limited provisions of 
the Code. 
 The Bombay High Court took the view that 
contentious probate proceedings being required 
to be in the form of a suit under Sec. 83 of 
Probate and Administration Act they constitute 
a suit under Sec. 11,C.P.C. and a finding by a 
probate court in such proceedings though not a 
judgment operates as res judicata between the 
parties thereto. 
 
A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1930 Oudh 29. 
A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
Held that… 
 While other High Courts took a contrary 
view and held that probate proceedings were not 
in the form of suit but the doctrine of res 
judicata applied to such proceedings on the 
general provisions apart from the limited 
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provisions of the Code. However, the privy 
Council settled the controversy in Kalipada 
Dev. Dwijapada Das, by laying down that the 
terms of Sec. 11, C.P.C., are not to be 
regarded exhaustive. The binding force of a 
judgment in probate proceedings depends not 
upon Sec. 11, C.P.C., but upon the general 
principles of law. The rule of res judicata may 
be traced to an English source, it embodies a 
doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the 
law as is expounded by the learned Hindu 
commentators. The application of the rule of 
res judicata, therefore, by the courts in India 
should be influened by no technical 
considerations of form but by matter of 
substance within the limits allowed by law. The 
decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Raj Laxmi 
Dasi v. Banamali Sen has reaffirmed the above 
view of the Privy Council. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1936 Rang. 
Held that… 
 Thus where a question of relationship of 
parties had been decided in a previous probate 
207 
proceeding, a subsequent suit between the same 
parties involving the same question is barred 
by res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 
Held that… 
 Any decision after contest in a probate 
proceeding is res judicata in any subsequent 
proceeding of any sort against the caveators 
who contested it. On general principles of the 
Probate and Administration Act grant of probate 
by a competent court is binding on all the 
contesting parties unless good cause under Sec. 
50 of the said Act is made out to revoke or 
annul the grant of probate of Letters of 
Administration. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad.861. 
A.I.R. 1938 Rang. 
Held that… 
 But where an application for probate by a 
legatee has been dismissed for default, the 
legatee heirs can nevertheless plead the 
existence of the will as a defence to a suit 
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for the property which they claim as belonging 
to them under the will. Similarly the grant of    
Probate after caveat by the heirs will not be 
res judicata in a subsequent suit by the heirs 
of a Mohammedan testatrix, claiming adversely 
to the will, against the beneficiary of the 
will where the issue to be tried in the suit is 
not only the testamentary capacity of the 
testator, but also whether she was aware of the 
invalidity of a release which the meant to 
confirm by means of the will. In the same way 
an incidental or unnecessary finding will not 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. 
Thus where in a suit for Letters of 
Administration, an order while affirming the 
claimant A’s status as the legal son of the 
deceased which was in dispute, also 
incidentally contained a finding that the rival 
claimant M was a legal wife and heir of the 
deceased. The finding went on the principle 
that the claimant A was entitled to fourteen 
annas share in the property, whereas the rival 
claimant M was only entitled to a two annas 
share and, therefore, the former had better 
claim to letters of administration. It was held 
that the finding as to the rival claimant’s 
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status was unnecessary, it could not be said to 
have been heard and finally decided or be res 
judicata in a subsequent suit for a share of 
inheritance by the rival claimant M against A. 
 
A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 
Held that… 
 A decision as to the proof the will given 
by any civil court cannot operate as res 
judicata in probate proceedings taken out in 
the Probate Court. The Civil Court is concerned 
with deciding the rights between the parties. A 
Probate Court is a court of conscience and it 
has to deliver a judgment which would become a 
judgment in rem and will bind not only the 
parties before it but the whole world. 
Therefore, a probate court is a court of 
exclusive jurisdiction on probate matters. The 
Civil Court dealing with the same question 
deciding the same issue cannot pass a judgment 
which would bind the world and would constitute 
a judgment in rem. The decision of civil court 
cannot bind the probate court. The probate 
court must apply its own mind and must satisfy 
its own conscience as to the execution of the 
document and as to the testamentary capacity of 
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the deceased and the satisfaction cannot be 
influenced or effected by any civil court. 
A.I.R. 1923 Rang. 
Held that… 
 In proceedings for letters of 
administration where findings are recorded 
after taking evidence at length like a regular 
suit and it is found that the rival claimant 
was not the legitimate daughter of the 
deceased. The findings in such proceedings will 
bar a subsequent suit for declaration claiming 
as an heir of the deceased. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 29.  
Held that… 
Similarly where a legatee under a will who 
applies for grant of letters of administration 
and is opposed by a party as an heir of the 
deceased on the ground that the will was a 
forgery and the court decides after contest in 
favour of the will being genuine and grants the 
letter of administration it is not open to 
question the genuineness of the will in a 
subsequent litigation between the legatee and 
the heir. But in an application for Letter sof 
Administration where a person has been declared 
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as a fit person for the grant of Letters of 
Administration such a decision will not operate 
as res judicata in a subsequent suit for 
possession of the property as an heir by the 
defeated applicant. 
 
A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1936 Pesh. 
Held that… 
 Decisions under the Succession Certificate 
Act, Sec. 25, upon any question of right 
between the parties are not res judicata. Thus 
where in a previous case, an application by an 
adopted son for succession certificate was 
dismissed by the lower court on the ground that 
there was no valid authority to adopt and no 
valid taking in adoption. The decision was 
confirmed by the High Court on the ground that 
no inquiry need be held in miscellaneous 
petitions into intricate questions of law and 
fact. It was held that there was no final 
adjudication on the validity of adoption and 
the question was not res judiata. But the 
finding of a court under the Succession Act 
with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of 
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a will was held to be conclusive to attract the 
bar of res judicata against the parties 
affected therein. 
 
A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 146 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
 
20. Arbitration proceedings.- 
Where the question whether contracts Nos. 
938 and 947 had any arbitration clause or not 
was put in issue before the Master of Roll in 
the Court of London and he was apparently 
satisfied that all the contracts did contain 
the arbitration clause and on that basis he 
proceeded to appoint the Umpire. The parties 
having agitated that question in a previous 
proceeding and the issue having been decided, 
whether rightly or wrongly by the foreign 
court, the appellant was held to be precluded 
from reagitating the issue before Indian Court 
on principles of res judicata. No appeal having 
been preferred from the decision of Master in 
Court although an appeal lay to the Divisional 
Court. 
 The rule is now well settled that the 
arbitrators must observe the first principles 
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of the justice, be the arbitration commercial 
or of any other kind. Though in tending no 
injustice they must observe fundamental rules 
which govern judicial proceedings. In the 
following cases it has been held that the 
procedure followed by the arbitrators was 
deemed to be an illegality. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 21. 
Held that… 
 In Harvey v. Shelton, it was remarked: “It 
is so ordinary a principle in the 
administration of justice, that no party to a 
cause can be allowed to use any means 
whatsoever to influence the mind of the Judge 
which means are not known to and capable of 
being that and resisted by the other party. It 
is contrary to every principle to allow such a 
thing and I wholly deny the difference between 
mercantile arbitrations and legal arbitrations. 
The first principles of justice must be equally 
applied in every case. Except in the few cases 
where exceptions are unavoidable, both sides 
must be heard and each in presence of the 
other. In every case in which matters are 
litigated you must attend to the 
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representations made on both sides, and you 
must not in the administration of justice in 
whatever form, whether in the regularly 
constituted courts or in arbitrations, whether 
before lawyers or merchants, permit one side to 
use means of influencing the conduct and the 
decisions of the Judge, which means are not 
known to the other side. In this case 
interviews between the arbitrator and one party 
rendered the award invalid.” The above passage 
was approved by the Supreme Court in the case 
of P. Vengamma v. P. Kesanna. In re Gregson and 
Armstrong, where after the close of evidence 
the arbitrator held a meeting and received some 
information in the absence of one of the 
parties, the award was set aside. In Ramsden & 
Co., Ltd. v. Jacobs, Bray, J., held that 
whatever might be the practice, the procedure 
of hearing evidence of one party in the absence 
of the other was absolutely wrong and the award 
was set aside.  
 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 21. 
Held that… 
In Fuerst Bros. & Co. v. Stephenson, the Umpire 
in a commercial arbitration, after he had 
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finished hearing the arbitrators approached one 
of them and asked him for further information, 
which was given it being left to that 
arbitrator to tell the others what was going 
on. The Court set aside the award holding that 
the alleged practice would not justify what was 
done. It is immaterial if the arbitrator or 
Umpire swears an affidavit that information 
obtained by him ex parte has not influenced his 
mind one way or the other or has not resulted 
in any prejudice. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1964 Cal. 
Held that… 
 Where the partition suit was decided upon 
an award given by the arbitrators and a decree 
was granted in pursuance of the award. Held 
that it is well established that a decree 
passed on an award is also conclusive as res 
judicata between the parties.  
 
A.I.R. 1961 Assam 148 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
 But a court, before which an application 
under Sec.14 of Indian Arbitration Act is filed 
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for making the award a rule of the court and 
pass a decree on the basis of the award, holds 
that it was no jurisdiction to entertain the 
application for filing the award, it is not 
necessary for the Court to give decision on 
other issues. Any decision by the Court on the 
other issues cannot be binding on any proper 
court which may entitled to entertain the 
application. 
 
21. Decisions under the Land Acquisition 
Act whether operate as res judicata.- 
  A decision in a proceeding under the Land 
Acquisition Act cannot be treated as a decision 
in a former suit so as to operate as res 
judicata with reference to the property other 
than that to which the enquiry under that Act 
related. On a similar principle a decision by a 
Judge under the Land Acquisition Act on a 
question of title does not operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit between the 
parties. But where a patnidar though a party to 
a reference omits to make a claim at the time 
of the apportionment of the compensation a 
subsequent suit to recover portion of the 
compensation in a Civil Court is barred.  
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A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80. 
Held that… 
So also where in certain land acquisition 
proceeding a dispute arose as to the 
apportionment of compensation between two rival 
claimants and the dispute is decided by the 
Court on the construction of the term of a gift 
deed in which the land acquired was included, 
that decision operates as res judicata as 
between those parties or their representatives 
not only with reference to the extent of the 
money but with reference to other property 
convered under such title in a subsequent suit 
between the parties though not by reason of 
this section but by reason of general 
principles of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 
Held that… 
 The land acquisition proceedings 
recognizing the defendant’s position as a 
tenant in respect of the 33 cents and 33 cents 
alone which was the subject-matter of the land 
acquisition proceedings, will certainly be 
binding on parties. But such a decision will 
218 
not operate as res judicata in respect of other 
properties, which were not the subject matter 
of land acquisition proceedings. 
 
A.I.R. 1936 Pesh. 
Held that… 
Persons who have not come before the Collector 
or the Acquisition Judge are at liberty to 
controvent the award of the Collector in a suit 
and to prove that they were the lawful owners 
of the property, and therefore, there were the 
persons who were entitled to recover the amount 
of compensation awarded for it. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
Held that… 
It has been held by the Supreme Court in Raj 
Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, that the Land 
Acquisition Court had jurisdiction to decide 
the question of title of the parties in the 
property acquired and that title could be 
decided by deciding the controversy between the 
parties about the ownership of the four-anna 
share claimed by S and R. The question of title 
to the four-anna share was necessary and 
substantially involved in the land acquisition 
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proceedings and was finally decided by a Court 
having jurisdiction to try it and that decision 
thus operated as res judicata and estopped S 
and the mortgagees from reagitating that matter 
in the subsequent suit. 
 
22. Insolvency proceedings.- 
A decision on merits in an insolvency 
matter operates as res judicata between the 
parties. Thus where a stranger to the 
bankruptcy whose property is wrongfully seized 
by the receiver applies under Sec.22 of the 
Insolvency Act and his application is dismissed 
on mertis he cannot begin again and raise the 
same issue in a civil court. 
 
A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1963 Orissa. 
Held that… 
Similarly it has been held that decision under 
Sec.7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is 
res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 
Held that… 
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In insolvency proceedings the Official Receiver 
represents the general body of creditors. Where 
the Official Receiver applied to set aside a 
sale by the insolvent as a fraudulent 
preference and it was held that there was no 
fraudulent preference and the High Court held 
on second appeal that the order was not one 
made under Sec.4 of the Provincial Insolvency 
Act. Subsequently a creditor applied under 
Sec.4 of the Act to have the sale set aside as 
fraudulent. Held that the decision of the High 
Court that the first order was not one under 
Sec.4 of the Act bound the petitioner and the 
doctrine of res judicata was applicable and 
therefore the subsequent petition was not 
sustainable. 
 
A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 
Held that… 
Similarly where the decision of the former suit 
was passed by the Subordinate Judge who was 
competent to try the question of title as 
between parties and after adjudication of one 
of them as insolvent, the Official Receiver had 
been impleaded with the permission of the 
Court, it is not open to who was one of the 
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parties in the previous suit to raise the same 
matter again in an application under Sec.4 of 
the Provincial Insolvency Act before the 
Insolvency Court, which has concurrent 
jurisdiction with ordinary Civil Courts to try 
questions of title relating to property alleged 
to belong to the insolvent on the general 
principles of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 All. 
Held that… 
 But a judgment between the creditors and 
the insolvent by the insolvency courts holding 
that the debt of the creditor was not time-
barred would not operate as res judicata 
between debtor and his surety who was not a 
party to the proceedings. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 108. 
Held that… 
 Similarly where a mortgagor dies and his 
property devolves upon an insolvent over whose 
estate a receiver has been appointed, a decree 
for foreclosure in favour of the mortgagee in a 
suit to which the Receiver has not been made a 
party is not res judicata against him even 
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though he had been heard on petitions and 
objections against the decree. 
A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 
Held that… 
Nor decisions against insolvent after 
insolvency precludes pleas in bar as against 
official assignee who is not made a party. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 
Held that… 
 In a case before the Supreme Court a 
person A had executed a usufructuary mortgage 
of his properties in favour of M and a 
subsequent hypothecation bond in favour of K. 
Several other creditors made application for 
adjudging A as insolvent on ground that A had 
committed acts of insolvency by executing 
usufructuary mortgage and hypothecation bonds 
to defeat the interest of the creditors. After 
contest A was adjudged insolvent and an 
Official Receiver was appointed in respect of 
the properties of the insolvent. Subsequently a 
suit for recovery of arrears of rent and also 
the possession of the mortgaged properties was 
filed by M impleading the mortgagors and the 
Official Receiver as parties and was decreed in 
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favour of the mortgagee plaintiff and since 
then he entered into direct possession of the 
properties. Thereafter the Official Receiver 
moved an application under Sec.35 of the 
Travancore Insolvency Regulation for declaring 
the transfer in favour of mortgagee M. A 
preliminary objection was raised by the 
Receiver that the order of adjudication not 
having been appealed had become final and 
operated as res judicata. Their Lordships have 
held that there was no finding that transferee 
M was privy to the acts of insolvency and it 
was not necessary to find at that stage and it 
has not in terms been found that the 
transaction impugned in later case was not bona 
fide so far as the transferee is concerned or 
without consideration matters which directly 
arise in the annulment proceedings. Hence the 
order of adjudication did not bar the later 
controversy and the matter was still open under 
Sec.35 of the said Act. 
     
 
A.I.R. 1956 T.C. 
Held that… 
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 A Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High 
Court in Muhammad Pillai v. Pariyathu Pillai, 
while considering the question whether a 
withdrawal of the insolvency petition with the 
leave of the Court would constitute res 
judicata has remarked that Sec.4 of the 
Provincial Insolvency Act applies only to 
decisions of questions arising in cases of 
insolvency and that no case of insolvency can 
be said to arise when the fact of insolvency 
and the right to maintain the insolvency 
petition is disputed and no order of 
adjudication has been passed. After the order 
of adjudication an insolvency petition cannot 
be withdrawn even with leave of the Court, for 
the debtor has become insolvent by the order of 
adjudication. Therefore it is only an annulment 
of the order of adjudication and not a 
withdrawal of the insolvency petition that can 
be made after the order of adjudication. 
Section 14 of the Act only applies to 
withdrawal before adjudication and the effect 
of such withdrawals before adjudication would 
be to relegate the parties to status quo ante, 
that is, the position of the parties would be 
as if no insolvency petition has been filed and 
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the creditors would be free to enforce their 
claim against the debtor. Thus a compromise 
before the order o adjudication in pursuance of 
which the leave to withdraw insolvency petition 
is applied for and granted by the Court is 
merely a contract or agreement by the parties 
and so when such agreement is sought to be 
enforced or pleaded as a bar of res judicata to 
the claim of the creditors the Court is free to 
consider its validity and binding nature. 
 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 
Held that… 
 
23. Income-tax proceedings.- 
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have 
held that there is no such thing as res 
judicata in income-tax matters. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 Nag. 
Held that… 
Each year is a separate unit that falls for 
scrutiny. The finding that the debt in question 
did not become a bad debt relates to the 
accounting period under consideration only. 
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A.I.R. 1960 Assam. 
Held that… 
 
24. Rent and revenue proceedings.- 
Where a plaintiff sued the defendant for 
his ejectment that the latter was adhiar and 
being a defaulter in rent was liable to 
ejectment under the Assam Adhiar Protection and 
Regulation Act, 1948 and the defence was that 
he was not an adhiar and was not liable to be 
disturbed by any order of Revenue Officer 
passed under the Adhiar Act. The suit for 
ejectment was decreed. Subsequently the 
defendant filed a suit in the civil court for 
declaration of title that he was not an adhiar 
but a non-occupancy tenant and for recovery of 
possession. It was held that the Adhiar 
Protection Act intended to apply to a case 
where the person concerned was admittedly an 
adhiar; but in case of any dispute even if the 
Revenue Court purported to act on the 
assumption that he was an adhiar, and indeed in 
purporting to act under the law, the Revenue 
Officer may have to form his own conclusions as 
to whether any perron is or is not an adhiar 
but in case of any dispute between the parties, 
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any action taken by the Revenue Officer under 
the Act would not confer jurisdiction on him 
which he did not validly possess. Hence the 
order of the Revenue Officer was without 
jurisdiction and did not operate as res 
judicata in the subsequent suit in the Civil 
Court. 
 
A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 
Held that… 
 The pre-emption proceeding under Sec.26-F, 
Bengal Tenancy Act, is not a summary proceeding 
in the sense in which the term is usually 
understood and there is nothing in this 
particular statute to compel the Court to 
confine itself only to prima facie findings on 
the questions of title. The decision on a 
question of title is final and operates as res 
judicata between the parties.  
 
A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1918 Pat. 
Held that… 
 A decree for rent does not ordinarily 
operate as res judicata to the rate of rent 
payable for the period subsequent to the period 
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covered by the decree. In that view the 
judgment and decree of the Small Cause Court 
for arrears of rent will not bar by res 
judicata a bare declaration suit as to rate of 
rent. 
 
A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 
Held that… 
 Question of title gone into in a rent suit 
may operate as res judicata in a subsequent 
suit based on the same title.  
 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 287. 
Held that… 
But where question of title was decided by 
Revenue Court by referring an issue to the 
Civil Court under Sec.271 of the Agra Tenancy 
Act, 1926 and a subsequent suit was filed for 
declaration of title and injunction restraining 
the execution of the decree obtained from 
Revenue Court. It was held beld by the Supreme 
Court that the Revenue Court had no exclusive 
jurisdiction to try the suit of the nature of 
the subsequent suit under Sec.230 of the said 
Act, consequently under the terms of Sec.11, 
C.P.C., the decision of the said issue by the 
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Revenue Court does not operate as res judicata 
for the necessary condition of the competency 
of that court to try the subsequent suit was 
lacking.  
 
2004(1) GLH 487: -Md. Mohammed Ali (Dead) By 
Lrs. V/S Sri Jagadish Kalita and others.  
Res Judicata- Earlier in money suit, plaintiff 
failed to prove his claim for arrears of rent 
court did not decide question of title acquired 
by adverse possession was not barred by res 
judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 
Held that… 
 
25. Summary proceedings and executive 
orders.- 
Decisions which are contemplated to 
operate as res judicata under Sec.11, C.P.C., 
are those which are given after a complete 
observance of the procedure laid down by law 
and not those which are more or less orders 
passed in an executive capacity. 
 
 
230 
A.I.R. 1962 All. 
Held that… 
It has been held that the Government has the 
power to change its mind even in the same case. 
One can visualize a situation where Government 
first decides not to refer a dispute for 
adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal but 
subsequently on receiving more reliable reports 
on the gravity of the situation in the 
locality, it decides to make a reference. The 
executive must have the power in the public 
interest to review its decision in such 
situations and Sec.21 of the U.P. General 
Clauses Act enables any authority to amend, 
vary, or rescind its previous orders. The 
analogy of the principles of res judicata does 
not apply in these matters. The Government can 
always review its previous decision and make a 
reference, provided it acts bona fide and 
within a reasonable time and there is no 
statutory bar against such review. 
 
A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 
Held that…  
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 The Privy Council in Bhagwan Din v. Gir 
Har Saroop laid down the following three 
principles on which decisions in cases to which 
Sec.11, C.P.C., did not apply in terms would be 
res judicata: 
(1) where the decision was in a summary 
proceeding which was not a suit nor of the 
same character as a suit ; 
(2) where there was no appeal from the 
decision, and  
(3) Where the decision had not been made final 
by any provision in the Act. 
If any of the above conditions are present, the 
order in the previous proceedings might be res 
judicata on the general principles, but if none 
of these conditions are present, the order in 
the previous proceedings cannot be res judicata 
even on general principles. Thus on the above 
principles any decision in proceedings under 
the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, 
1949, would not have the effect of res judicata 
in a subsequent suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Raj.  
Held that… 
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 Proceedings for issue of patta under the 
Marwar Patta Act, 1921, are not res judicata 
and it is always open to the parties to apply 
again and if the circumstances have changed the 
authorities concerned can change their mind. 
 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 
Held that… 
 
26. Order passed under O.XXII, r. 5, 
C.P.C.- 
The order passed under O.XXII, r. 5, 
C.P.C., involves a summary enquiry as to who 
should be substituted in place of the deceased 
during the pendency of a suit or appeal same 
question can be reagitated in a separate suit 
and is not barred by the rule of res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1926 All.439. 
A.I.R. 1958 All.573. 
Held that… 
A contrary view has been expressed in an 
Allahabad case in Raj Bahadur v. Narain Prasad 
but this view has not been followed in other 
decisions of the same High Court. 
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A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 
Held that… 
 
27.Evacuee property proceedings.- 
Administration of Evacuee Property Act 
takes preference whenever it comes in conflict 
with other laws because of the provisions of 
Sec.4 of the said Act and the Ordinance which 
runs in the following terms: 
 “The provisions of this Ordinance and of 
the rules and orders made thereunder shall have 
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent 
therewith contained in any other law for the 
time being in force or in any instrument having 
effect by virtue of any such law.” 
 The point which has frequently occurred 
relates to the interpretation of Sec.17 of the 
said Act whether a sale of an evacuee property 
in the execution of any decree which has been 
confirmed after the 14th of August, 1947, can 
be questioned and set aside in view of the 
provisions of Sec.17 of the said Act? Thus 
where a suit for recovery of money was decreed 
on 21st April, 1948 and shortly after wards the 
house of the evacuee-judgment-debtor was put to 
auction sale and the Custodian who represented 
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the` evacuee-judgment-debtor filed objection 
under O.XXI, r. 58, C.P.C., and also under the 
evacuee law claiming that the sale was void and 
liable to be set aside. These objections were 
dismissed and the sale was confirmed. An appeal 
to the District Judge and a second appeal to 
the High Court were also dismissed. A 
subsequent objection claiming benefit of Sec.17 
of the said Act was filed for setting aside the 
auction sale and it has been held that Sec.4 
has not been intended by the Legislature to 
give a right time Custodian to reagitate the 
matter over and over again after it has been 
decided against him. The principle of res 
judicata is a rule of justice and applies to 
execution proceedings. The provisions of Sec.4 
do not come into play and Sec.17 cannot 
abrogate the law of limitation in execution 
proceedings or that it abrogates the principles 
of res judicata. The subsequent objections were 
held to be barred both on grounds of limitation 
and res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 
Held that… 
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 The Supreme Court has explained that in 
view of the policy underlying the intention of 
Sec.17 of the said Act and the mandatory nature 
of the prohibition contained in Sec.17 of the 
Act the sale of evacuee property in execution 
of decree in contravention of Sec.17 was wholly 
null and void. 
 Even in the case of execution proceedings 
this principle will not operate as the res 
judicata SCC is clear in the case of 1994(1) UJ 
(SC)468. 
A.I.R. 1952 Punj. 
Held that… 
Similar view was expressed by Punjab High Court 
that the purpose of the Act is to keep the 
evacuee property intact and safe from any 
orders of a Court or other authority and Sec.17 
prohibits all kinds of sale of evacuee property 
whether they are ordered for the first time in 
execution proceeding or take place in pursuance 
of a direction contained in the decree itself. 
 
A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 
Held that… 
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An application for getting the sale of evacuee 
property held in contravention of Sec.17 would 
lie under Sec.47, C.P.C., because the Custodian 
is a representative of the judgment-debtor, 
such an application for the purposes of 
limitation would be governed by Art.137 of the 
Limitation Act and not Art.127 of the 
Limitation Act. 
A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 
Held that… 
A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court has held 
that it is true that if there is a change of 
law, the rule of res judicata cannot apply and 
as there has been no change of law and the 
amendment in Sec.17 was merely declaratory of 
the law as it always had been the applicability 
of the principle of constructive res judicata 
to an objection in execution proceeding that 
the property was evacuee property and could not 
be sold, will not be excluded for that reason. 
Thus where no appeal after amendment of Sec.17 
was filed against the order dismissing the 
objection of the custodian under Sec.17 to the 
sale of the property in execution which 
objection was filed prior to amendment and the 
order becomes final, it is not open to the 
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custodian to raise the same objection later on 
after the confirmation of the execution sale, 
owing to the bar created by the rule of 
constructive res judicata; where the question 
of notice had already been decided by rejection 
of the previous petition the same question 
could not be re-agitated again. 
 
A.I.R. 1962 Oudh. 
Held that… 
 
28. Proceedings under Industrial 
disputes.- 
A finding given by the Industrial Tribunal 
on the question as to whether certain workers 
are workmen for the purpose of the Industrial 
Disputes Act would not constitute res judicata 
in proceedings arising subsequently under the 
Payment of Wages Act. The object of the 
Industrial Disputes Act and those of the 
Payment of Wages Act as also the functions to 
be discharged by the Tribunals under the two 
Acts are different. The definitions of workmen 
under both the Acts are also not identical.  
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A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 
Held that… 
 Where in a case before their Lordships of 
the Supreme Court a question arose that the 
existing working hours having been found 
reasonable by the Industrial Tribunal in 1950 
there was no sufficient justification for 
changing them in another reference. It was 
pointed out by the Supreme Court: “It is true 
that too frequent alterations have been 
generally deprecated by this Court for the 
reason that it is likely to disturb industrial 
peace and equilibrium. At the same time the 
Court has more than once pointed out the 
importance of remembering the dynamic nature of 
industrial relations. That is why the Court 
has, specially in the more recent decisions, 
refused to apply to industrial adjudications 
principles of res judicata that are meant 
suited for ordinary civil litigation. Even 
where conditions of service have been changed 
only a few years before industrial adjudication   
has allowed fresh changes if convinced of the 
necessity and justification of these by the 
existing necessity and justification by the 
existing conditions and circumstances: During 
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these years, considerable changes have taken 
place in the country’s economic position and 
expectations. With the growing realization of 
need for better distribution of national wealth 
has also come an understanding of the need for 
increase in production as an essential pre-
requisite of which greater efforts on the part 
of the labor force are necessary. That itself 
is sufficient reason against accepting the 
argument against any change in working hours if 
found justified on relevant considerations that 
have been indicated above. We are satisfied 
that in arriving at the figure of 36 working 
hours in a week the Tribunal has given proper 
weight to all relevant considerations. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1958 Cal.456. 
Held that… 
 Section 11, C.P.C., will not be directly 
applicable to industrial disputes but the 
general principles of res judicata are 
applicable to the decision of industrial 
disputes also. 
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A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 
Held that… 
The award of the Industrial Tribunal under 
Sec.19 of the Industrial Disputes Act is not 
perpetual or conclusive like the civil court 
decree or order. The award is not final for all 
times but operative only for the time specified 
in and not beyond that time. 
-S. 11- Res judicata- Industrial disputes – 
Applicability of doctrine of res judicata to – 
Held, applicable provided the court trying the 
subsequent provided the court trying the 
subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the 
earlier court was competent to dispose of the 
proceedings and the matter had been heard and 
finally decided – On facts, since the High 
Court was competent to adjudicate upon the 
dispute and had done so by a reasoned order on 
merits and correctness whereof had not been 
challenged, held, the Labour Court was 
incompetent to entertain the dispute – High 
Court also erred in upholding the award of the 
Labour Court – However, appellant prohibited 
from recovering any amount paid to the 
respondent under S.17-B of Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947, (2004)1 SCC 68 
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A.I.R. 1963 Assam. 
Held that… 
 Though Sec.11 of the Civil Procedure Code 
in terms is not attracted to industrial 
disputes, still, if once a matter had been 
decided by a competent Tribunal, it will not be 
in the interest of the industry to re-open the 
dispute. It can be said under these 
circumstances, that if the same point is re-
agitated again, there is no bona fide dispute. 
But all these observations are based on the 
assumption that the Tribunal at an earlier 
stage was competent and had in fact given an 
award adjudicating on the controversy between 
the parties. 
 
A.I.R. 1920 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1924 All. 
A.I.R. 1962 Raj. 
A.I.R. 1955 Andh. 
Held that… 
 
29. Partition suits.- 
Broadly speaking where an earlier suit for 
partition has ended in a decree but for some 
reason or another there has been no partition 
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by metes and bounds and it is not possible to 
give effect to that decree and the parties 
continue in joint possession even thereafter, a 
second suit for partition does lie. The 
principle is that so long as a property is 
jointly held until that time a right to 
partition continues intact, or, in other words, 
a right to partition is a continuous and a 
recurring right and cannot be lost by mere non-
exercise of it. Thus partition suits stand on a 
footing of their own. But this principle must 
be read subject to an important qualification 
and that is that any questions of right or 
title which might have been finally decided in 
the earlier suit cannot be allowed to be 
reopened in the second suit except perhaps 
where a case fraud or the like may be alleged 
and proved. The decree in the earlier partition 
suit would operate as res judicata only to the 
extent pointed out above and where the earlier 
decree is not enforcible, a second suit for 
possession by partition will be perfectly 
maintainable so long as the parties joint 
interest continues. 
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A.I.R. 1957 Andh. 
Held that… 
 It cannot be doubted that when a 
preliminary decree declaring a right to 
partition or the shares of the parties has not 
been given effect to by the parties proceeding 
to partition in accordance with it and the 
properties continue to be jointly held by the 
co-shares their right to partition continues so 
long as they continue to be interested in the 
joint properties as co-shares. It is competent 
for them to bring a suit for declaration of 
their right and for partition in case their 
right to partition is denied or challenged. 
 It might be that a defendant in a 
partition suit has the liberty given to him to 
seek a partition and separate allotment of his 
share but the law does not oblige him to do so. 
If there had been a final decree in the prior 
partition suit allotting certain property for 
the share of the plaintiff or their vendor and 
directing them to be put in possession of the 
property so allotted, then Sec.47, C.P.C. might 
bar a separate suit and the remedy of the 
plaintiff would be to execute the decree for 
partition. 
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A.I.R. 1955 Pepus. 
Held that… 
Dismissal of a partition suit under Order XXII, 
rule 9, C.P.C., is not a decision on merits, 
hence a subsequent suit for same property by 
same parties is not barred. 
  
A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 
Held that… 
 
30. Applications for Amendment of 
decree.- 
A court is competent to entertain 
successive applications for amendment of 
clerical or arithmetical mistake in a decree, 
or of error arising therein from any accidental 
slip or omission. Such applications for 
amendment of a decree are not barred by the 
rule of res judicata. But if an application for 
amendment has been heard and disposed of on the 
merits, a subsequent application or a 
subsequent suit may not be maintained in the 
same matter, and it may be barred upon general 
principles of law. 
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A.I.R. 1927 Rang. 
Held that… 
For an accidental omission in a decree an 
appeal is not necessary nor an omission to 
appeal bars an application for amendment. 
Moreover Sec.152, C.P.C., allows such an 
amendment at any time. Thus where the High 
Court erroneously referred the petitioner to 
the District Court for amendment of decree and 
the District Court granted the amendment and on 
revision the High Court set aside the order of 
the District Court granting the amendment on 
the ground that the decree of the District 
Court had no jurisdiction to allow the 
amendment. On a second application for 
amendment of decree it was held that the second  
application was maintainable. 
 
A.I.R. 1933 Pat. 
Held that… 
Where an application for amendment of a decree 
was dismissed for default on account of the 
applicant’s failure to file the process forms 
and application for review of that order also 
having been dismissed he applied a second time 
for amendment of the decree. It was held that 
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the previous application for amendment was not 
heard and decided on the merits, the rejection 
of that application did not operate as a bar to 
the entertaining of the second application and 
that the principle of res judicata did not 
apply. 
 
 
A.I.R. 1937 Oudh. 
Held that… 
Similarly where the trial court decided the 
matter between the judgment-debtor and decree-
holder in an application for amendment of 
decree with regard to future interest but the 
court of second appeal disposed of the 
judgment-debtor’s appeal not on the merits but 
on the ground that the court was concerned with 
the execution of the decree, meaning thereby 
that the execution court could not go behind 
the decree and had no power to alter its terms, 
it cannot be said that the court of second 
appeal heard and finally decided the judgment-
debtor’s application for amendment of the 
decree. Such decision does not operate as bar 
by res judicata on the question of the 
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amendment of the decree with regard to future 
interest. 
 
2004(1) GLH 554:- 
Yusufkhan Mehmoodkhan Pathan & Ors. V/S rears 
of Hazi Mohamadbhai Hazi Dudhwala & Ors. S-11 
C.P.C. and Art 136 of Limitation Act. 
Res judicata- Earlier execution petition 
disposed of for want of prosecution Held the 
second execution petition not barred by 
principle of Res Judicata and the same is also 
not barred by period of limitation as the same 
execution petition. 
 
Even in the case of seniority section 11 is 
clear that the case once decided would operate 
at res judicata. 
A.I.R 1991 SC 1134-Nityanand Kar & 
Anr.v/s.State of Orissa and others. 
 In this case Supreme court held that 
matter of seniority once decided would operate 
res judicata not only against employees party 
to the proceedings but against the whole class 
or category to which they belong.  
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A.I.R. 1930 Oudh. 
Held that… 
 
31. Application for review.- 
An application for review is not a suit 
within the meaning of this section and a 
decision of a question arising in an 
application for review cannot operate as 
constructive res judicata. But a party whose 
application for review of a compromise decree 
on the ground of non-consent or that the lawyer 
had no authority to compromise has been 
dismissed, cannot afterwards sue to set aside 
the decree on the same ground. 
 
32. “Res judicata” with reference to 
orders in claim proceedings.- 
A decision between the decree-holder and 
the intervenor does not bind the judgment-
debtor, though there is authority to the 
contrary also.   
 
A.I.R. 1955 All. 
A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 
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A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 
Held that… 
 A claim petition filed under Order XXI, 
rule 58, C.P.C., having been dismissed and no 
suit having been filed under Order XXI, rule 
63, C.P.C., within one year, as provided for by 
the procedural law, from the date of rejection 
of the claim petition, a subsequent suit is 
barred by res judicata. 
 
33. Decisions under the Indian Companies 
Act whether operate as res judicata.- 
As a rule, a question once settled by a 
Liquidating Court cannot be re-opened by a 
regular suit. Even an order settling the list 
of contributories unappealed, becomes final and 
res judicata and the question of liability of 
such person under the list cannot be re-opened. 
Conversely, on dismissal of a suit by the 
voluntary liquidator against a person for the 
recovery of a certain sum due by him to the 
Company, by reason of his begin a shareholder, 
an application by an official liquidator to 
place defendant on the list of contributories 
of the Company is barred. So also where a suit 
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by the liquidator of a company on a promissory 
note executed by a person for money due on 
shares is dismissed on the merits, the same 
matter cannot be re-agitated in the Liquidation 
Court, as the acceptance of the pronote in lieu 
of the shares amounted to a novation of the 
contract to pay the premium and thus the suit 
on the pronote was dismissed on the merits by a 
competent Court.  
 
A.I.R. 1952 Punj. 
A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1922 (P.C.) 80. 
Held that… 
The principles of res judicata applies to 
proceedings under the Indian Companies Act 
outside Sec.11, C.P.C., on the general 
principles of res judicata. Thus where an 
application under Sec.162 of the Indian 
Companies Act for winding up of the company was 
moved by a creditor and the company or its 
directors did not raise objection that the 
creditor had no right to bring the petition as 
nothing was due to him and the winding up 
having been ordered on such petition it 
amounted to a constructive decision of the 
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question of his being a creditor and of the sum 
claimed by him and it was not open to the 
company or its directors to object at the later 
stage of the proceeding that no sum of money 
was due to the creditor concerned.  
 
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1186. 
Held that… 
 
34. Writ petitions to Res Judicata.- 
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have 
expressly held in M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree 
Krishna Sinha on a question having been raised 
before them whether a subsequent writ petition 
under Art.32 of the Constitution which raised 
almost the same controversy which has already 
been decided by the Supreme Court in an earlier 
writ petition under Art.32 of the Constitution. 
Their Lordships thus observed: 
 “In a writ petition under Art.32 of 
Constitution of India the petitioners raised 
almost the same controversy against the 
Chairman and the Committee of Privileges, Bihar 
Legislative Assembly, regarding the validity of 
prohibition for publication of an account of 
certain debate of the Assembly which question 
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had already been decided in the earlier writ 
petition (No.122 of 1958 reported in A.I.R. 
1959 S.C. 395), cannot be re-opened in the 
subsequent writ petition and must govern rights 
and objections of parties which are 
substantially the same and is, therefore, 
barred by res judicata even though the 
personnel of the Committee of Privileges were 
not the same as at the earlier occasion. The 
Committee of Privileges was the same Committee 
so long as it was a committee constituted by 
the same Legislative Assembly…… The fact that 
there was difference of opinion amongst judges 
constituting the Court only shows that there 
was room for difference of opinion but it was a 
judgment of this Court which binds both the 
parties. For application of the general 
principle of res judicata it is not necessary 
to go into the question whether the previous 
decision was right or wrong.” 
 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 
Held that… 
 Now the next question to consider is 
whether it makes any difference to the 
application of the rule of res judicata that 
253 
the earlier decision on which the plea of res 
judicata is raised is a decision not of the 
Supreme Court but of a High Court exercising 
its writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of the 
Constitution of India. An argument was raised 
before the Supreme Court, in the case of Daryao 
v. State of U.P., that one of the essential 
requirements of Sec.21, C.P.C., is that the 
court which tries the first suit or proceeding 
should be competent to try the second suit or 
proceeding and since the High Court cannot 
entertain an application under Art.32 of the 
Constitution its decision cannot be treated as 
res judicata for the purpose of such a 
petition.  
 
A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 217 at p.226. 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156. 
A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 585. 
Held that… 
 The present problem was posed before the 
Supreme Court at several occasions but not 
finally or definitely answered. In Janardan 
Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, and again in Qasim 
Razvi v. State of Hyderabad,it was remarked 
that their Lordships do not consider it 
254 
necessary to decide whether an application 
under Art.32 of the Constitution was 
maintainable after a similar application under 
Art.226 id dismissed by the High Court. Then in 
another case before the Supreme Court in 
Bhagubhai Dullabhai v. District Magistrate, 
Thana, the majority view of the Supreme Court 
expressed that if an order of conviction and 
sentence passed by the High Court would be 
binding on the convicted person and cannot be 
assailed subsequently by him in a proceeding 
taken under Art.32 of the Constitution when it 
appeared that Supreme Court had refused special 
leave to appeal to the convicted person against 
the order of conviction passed by the High 
Court. 
 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1962 Punj. 
A.I.R. 1964 Raj. 
Held that… 
 Ultimately the matter directly cropped up 
for consideration before the Supreme Court in 
Daryao v. State of U.P., when His Lordship 
Gajendragadkar, J., who delivered the judgment 
of the Court, after elaborate discussion of the 
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above question enunciated the following legal 
principles to be applied as a test for the 
applicability of the doctrine of res judicata 
in writ matters: 
  “We must now proceed to state our 
conclusion on the preliminary objection raised 
by the respondents. We hold that if a writ 
petition filed by a party under Art.226 (of the 
Constitution) is considered on merits as 
contested matter and is dismissed the decision 
thus pronounced would continue to bind the 
parties unless it is otherwise modified or 
reversed by appeal or other appropriate 
proceeding permissible under the Constitution. 
It would not be open to a party to ignore the 
said judgment and move this Court under Art.32 
by an original petition made (to the Supreme 
Court) on the same facts and for obtaining the 
same or similar orders or writs. If the 
petition filed in the High Court under Art.226 
is dismissed not on merits but because of the 
latches of the party applying for the writ or 
because it is held that the party had an 
alternative remedy available to it, then the 
dismissal of the writ petition would not 
constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under 
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Art.32 If a writ petition is dismissed in 
limine and an order is pronounced in that 
behalf, whether or not the dismissal would 
constitute a bar would depend upon the nature 
of the order. If the order is on merits it 
would be a bar, if the order shows that the 
dismissal was for the reason that the 
petitioner was guilty of latches or that he had 
an alternative remedy it would not be a bar 
except in cases which we have already indicated 
(above). If the petition is dismissed in limine 
without passing a speaking order then such 
dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar 
of res judicata. It is true that prima facie, 
dismissal in limine even without passing a 
speaking order in that behalf may strongly 
suggest that the court took the view that there 
was no substance in the petition at all, but in 
the absence of a speaking order it would not be 
easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind 
of the Court and that makes it difficult and 
unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is 
a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a 
bar of res judicata against a similar petition 
filed under Art.32. If the petition is 
dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a bar to a 
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subsequent petition under Art.32, because in 
such a case there has been no decision on the 
merits by the Court.” 
 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 223. 
Held that…  
 The scope of the jurisdiction of the High 
Court under Art.226 of the Constitution for the 
issue of a writ of certiorari was explained by 
the Supreme Court in Hari Vishun Kamath v. 
Ahmad Ishaque. 
 
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 440. 
Held that… 
The learned Judge observed: 
 “According to the common Law of England, 
certiorari is a high prerogative writ issued by 
the court of the King’s Bench or Chancery to 
inferior courts or tribunals in the exercise of 
supervisory jurisdiction with a view to ensure 
that they acted within the bounds of their 
jurisdiction. To this end, they were commanded 
to transmit the records of a cause or matter 
pending with them to the superior court to be 
dealt with there, and if the order was found to 
be without jurisdiction it was quashed. The 
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Court issuing certiorari to quash however, 
could not substitute its own decision on the 
merits or give directions to be complied with 
by the Court or Tribunal. Its work was 
destructive, it simply wiped out the order 
passed without jurisdiction and left the 
matter, there.” 
 In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, Mukherjee, 
J., dealing with this question observed: 
  “In granting a writ of certiorari the 
superior Court does not exercise the power of 
an appellate Tribunal. It does not review or 
re-weigh the evidence upon which the 
determination of the inferior tribunal purports 
to be based. It demolishes an order, which it 
considers to be without jurisdiction, or 
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its 
own view for those of the inferior tribunal. 
The offending order or proceeding so to say is 
put out of the way as one which should not be 
used to the detriment of any person. Vide Lord 
Cairns in Walsall’s Quersees v. N.W. Rly. Co.   
 
A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 
Held that… 
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 It was held in Burmah-Shell Co.v. Labour 
Appellate Tribunal that though the High Court 
held in the writ petition that the decision of 
Appellate Tribunal in the appeal preferred to 
it against the award was correct, that did not 
result in the substitution of the finding of 
the High Court for that of the Appellate 
Tribunal. Nor did the order of the Appellate 
Tribunal with its finding merge in the order of 
the High Court in the writ petition. It was not 
the High Court that was the court of competent 
jurisdiction to decide an issue in an 
industrial dispute. That jurisdiction was 
vested only in the statutory Tribunals. 
 The proceedings in the High Court under 
Art.226 of the Constitution were not 
proceedings for the adjudication of an 
industrial dispute. The plea of res judicata 
under such a case, therefore, must be rested 
only on the decision of the Appellate Tribunal 
in appeal against the award. 
 
A.I.R. 1956 Pat. 
Held that… 
On the same facts no person can be twice 
harassed. So far as successive proceedings 
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under Art.226 of the Constitution on the same 
facts and same cause of action are concerned, 
the bar of res judicata will apply to 
successive writs under Art.226 of the 
Constitution. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 
A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 174. 
Held that… 
 Similarly it has been held that where an 
earlier writ was precisely alleged on the same 
facts as the subsequent writ petition except 
that the vires of the ordinance was challenged 
as an additional ground in the subsequent writ 
petition, on the principles of Explanation IV 
to Sec.11, C.P.C., the petitioner ought to have 
challenged the vires of the ordinance in the 
former writ petition although Sec.11, C.P.C., 
does not apply in terms to cases of writ but 
the principles contained in it should be 
applied consequently, the subsequent writ was 
held to be barred by res judicata. 
 The following passage from Halsbury’s Laws 
of England, Vol.9, p.786 with regard to 
successive application for issue of writs is 
noteworthy: 
261 
  “When an application for prerogative 
writ has been made, argued and refused on the 
grounds of defects in the case, it is not 
competent for the applicant to make a second 
application for the same writ on amended 
affidavits containing fresh materials.” 
 
A.I.R. 1961 Manipur 1. 
Held that… 
 Now in the matter of a writ application 
before a High Court under Art.226 of the 
Constitution the decision proceeds on certain 
admitted facts the question in such an 
application is whether the High Court in the 
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction will 
issue a direction to a subordinate authority 
and if the High Court refused to exercise its 
discretion to issue such a direction, the 
dismissal of the application will not amount to 
a decree in a suit within the meaning of 
Sec.11, C.P.C., and such a decision cannot be 
said to have the effect of res judicata in a 
subsequent suit between the parties.  
 
A.I.R. 1963 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 196. 
A.I.R. 1951 Bom.25 
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Held that… 
Prima facie, the decision of one High Court in 
a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution 
in some other High Court. But where the parties 
are not same in both High Courts, the rule of 
res judicata does not apply. Whether in the 
event of the High Court having decided on 
merits the contentions raised in a writ 
petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, 
would allow the same contentions to be re-
agitated in a subsequent suit, it was held in 
Manahem v. Union of India, that against an 
impugned order in a petition under Art.226 of 
the Constitution the only remedy of the 
aggrieved party was by way of an appeal to the 
Supreme Court and the following passage of the 
Full Bench In re Prahalad Krishna Kurne, was 
affirmed:    
 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 
Held that… 
  “Although the decision of the High 
Court refusing a writ or an order under Art.226 
may become final qua the High Court, it is not 
as if the Constitution does not provide other 
remedies to the citizen. He has a right, an 
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independent right, to approach the Supreme 
Court under Art.32. Apart from that there is a 
right of appeal given to the citizen from an 
order of refusal of the High Court to enforce 
his fundamental rights. He has the right to ask 
the Supreme Court to grant him special Leave to 
Appeal under Art.136. Therefore,it is not as if 
the citizen is without a remedy in the event of 
the High Court refusing to review its own 
judgment, however, erroneous the judgment may 
be.”  
 His Lordship held that the same principles 
ought to be held to be applicable as contained 
in Sec.11, C.P.C., in all such matters. 
Therefore the suit was held to be barred by 
rules of res judicata. 
A.I.R. 1954 Hyd. 
Held that… 
 It is submitted that the Bombay view is 
not sound in view of the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P., to 
the effect that if a writ petition under 
Art.226 of Constitution is decided on merits it 
will bar a subsequent writ under Art.32 of the 
Constitution before the Supreme Court on the 
general principles of res judicata. And further 
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the granting of special leave to appeal to 
Supreme Court is not an effective remedy apart 
from the fact that it is discretionary. But a 
previous order of the High Court under Art.226 
of the Constitution quashing the order 
declaring a person as evacuee cannot debar the 
custodian from issuing notice to show cause why 
the property be not deemed to be evacuee 
property to the same person on the basis of a 
new title. 
 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1963 at p. 1566. 
Held that… 
After the Allahabad High Court dismissed the 
petitioner’s writ petitions he applied for and 
obtained a certificate from the said High Court 
to appeal to the Supreme Court but he failed to 
deposit the necessary security for printing 
charges as required by the rules of the 
Allahabad High Court, and in consequence, on 
the 9th August, 1960, the certificate granted 
to him was cancelled. That is now the two writ 
petitions which purported to challenge the 
validity of the notices served on the 
petitioner for the two years 1365 and 1366 
fasli were held to be barred by res judicata. 
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A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1128 at p. 1134. 
Held that… 
 It is well settled that in order to decide 
whether a decision in an earlier litigation, 
operates as res judicata, the Court must look 
at the nature of the litigation what were the 
issues raised therein and what was actually 
decided in it. 
 
A.I.R. 1965 Punj. 507. 
Held that… 
 Where a writ was refused for want of 
evidence such order-refusing writ cannot bar a 
subsequent regular suit on the same facts. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 
Held that… 
 
35. Other miscellaneous proceedings.- 
The dismissal of an earlier application 
for the declaration under the Guardians and 
Wards Act that the petitioner was the guardian 
of the minor will not bar a subsequent 
application for appointment of guardian of the 
minor on the principles of constructive res 
judicata because while applying for being 
declared a guardian the petitioner could not 
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have made an alternative case that the 
petitioner should be appointed guardian 
contrary to the case that the petitioner was 
already the guardian. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Andh. 
Held that… 
 Where on an application of the mortgagor 
his debts were ordered to be scaled down under 
Sec.9-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act 
on the basis that the document executed by him 
was a mortgage and the mortgage was a party to 
the proceeding under that Act, and subsequently 
the mortgagor brought a suit for redemption of 
the mortgage, it was held that the order 
scaling down the debt being between the same 
parties it operated as res judicata on the 
question of the nature of the document. 
 
A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 
Held that… 
 A second application for fixation of 
standard rent in respect of residential 
premises under the West Bengal Premises Rent 
Control Act, 1950 may of course be barred by 
res judicata or principles analogous thereto, 
but, for that, the material circumstances must 
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remain the same. That bar would not apply in 
altered or changed circumstances and, 
therefore, when the situation has materially 
changed by the expiry of the relevant three 
years to entitle the landlord to increase 
standard rent in the new situation a secondary 
application for standardisation of rent would 
well be maintainable and would not be barred on 
principle also. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Mys.113. 
Held that… 
 Section 11 of the Mysore House Rent and 
Accommodation Control Act as well as the rule 
of construction of res judicata prohibit the 
re-investigation of the same point or points of 
dispute. The principle behind the said rule is 
that a question finally decided should not be 
reopened. Section 11 of the said Act lays down 
that the Court shall summarily reject any 
application under Sec.8, sub-section (2) or (3) 
which raises between the same parties or 
between parties under whom they or any of them 
claim, substantially the same issue as have 
been finally decided in a former proceeding 
under that Act. The word “issue” is used in the 
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same sense as is used in Sec.11,C.P.C. It 
refers to the subject matter in dispute. But a 
dispute which arises subsequent to the earlier 
decision cannot be barred by res judicata by 
reason of the earlier decision. Thus where the 
matter in issue in the previous case was as to 
whether the landlord bona fide required the 
house for the use of his brother and mother at 
the time of that application whereas in the 
subsequent case the question for consideration 
is as to whether he bona fide requires it now 
for his own use. The two issues are not 
identical. Held the subsequent application was 
neither barred by the principles of 
constructive res judicata nor under Sec.11, 
C.P.C. 
 
A.I.R. 1965 Assam 18. 
Held that… 
 An application for ejectment of adhiars, 
who were found to be in possession of land in 
excess of 10 acres was rejected by Conciliation 
Board. Subsequent second application on the 
same facts for ejectment will not be barred by 
principle of res judicata. 
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A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 338 at pp. 341-42. 
Held that… 
 
36. Scope and applicability of principles 
of res judicata to election proceedings.- 
Both the appeals Nos. 7 and 8 before the 
High Court arose out of one proceeding before 
the Election Tribunal. The subject matter of 
each appeal was, however, different. The 
subject matter of appeal No.7 filed by the 
appellant related to the question of his 
election being bad or good, in view of the 
pleadings raised before the Election Tribunal. 
It had nothing to do with the question of right 
of respondent No.1 to be declared as duly 
elected candidate. The claim on such a right 
was to follow the decision of the question in 
appeal No.7 in case the appeal was dismissed. 
If appeal No.7 was allowed, the question in 
appeal No.8 would not arise for consideration. 
The subject-matter of appeal No.8 simply did 
not relate to the validity or otherwise of the 
election of the appellant. It related to the 
further action to be taken in case the election 
of the appellant was bad, on the ground that a 
ghatwal holds an office of profit. The decision 
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of the High Court in the two appeals, though 
stated in one judgment, really amounted to two 
decisions and not to one decision common to 
both the appeals. That in his appeal No.8, the 
respondent No.1 had referred to the rejection 
of his contention by the Election Tribunal 
about the appellant and respondent No.2 being 
holders of an office of profit. He had to 
challenge the finding on this point because if 
he did not succeed on it, he could not have got 
a declaration in his favour when respondent 
No.2 was also in the field and had secured a 
larger number of votes. He could, however, rely 
on the same contention in supporting the order 
of the Election Tribunal setting aside the 
election of the appellant and which was the 
subject-matter of appeal No.7. This contention 
was considered by the High Court in appeal No.7 
in that context and it was, therefore, that 
even though the High Court did not agree with 
the Election Tribunal about the appellant’s 
committing a corrupt practice, it confirmed the 
setting aside of his holding an office or 
profit served the purpose of both the appeals, 
but merely because of this the decision of the 
High Court in each appeal could not be said to 
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be one decision. The High Court came to two 
decisions. It came to one decision in respect 
of the invalidity of the appellant’s election 
in appeal No.7. It came to another decision in 
appeal No.8 with respect to the justification 
of the claim of respondent No.1 to be declared 
as a duly elected candidate, a decision which 
had to follow the decision that the election of 
the appellant was invalid and also the finding 
that respondent No.2 as ghatwal, was not a 
properly nominated candidate. The Supreme Court 
was therefore of opinion that so long as the 
order in the appellant’s appeal No.7 confirming 
the order setting aside his election on the 
ground that he was a holder of an office of 
profit under the Bihar Government and therefore 
could not have been a properly nominated 
candidate stands, he could not question the 
finding about his holding an office of profit, 
in the Supreme Court appeal, which was founded 
on the contention that finding is incor-rect. 
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CHAPTER - 6 
Issues 
SYNOPSIS 
 
1. Issue.- 
 
The term “issue” means a point in debate or 
controversy on which the parties take 
affirmative and negative positions. It must be 
taken to indicate the sense that in pleading, a 
single material point of law of fact depending 
on the suit, which, being affirmed on the one 
side and denied on the other, is presented for 
determination. In Wharton’s Law Ltxicon the 
term is thus defined “The point in question, at 
the conclusion of the pleading between 
contending parties in an action, when one side 
affirms and the other side denies. 
 
2. When issues arise.- 
 Issues arise when a material proposition 
of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and 
denied by the other. 
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3. Material proposition.- 
Material propositions are those 
propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff 
must allege in order to show a right to sue or 
a defendant must allege in order to constitute 
his defence. Each material proposition affirmed 
by one party and denied by the other shall form 
the subject of a distinct issue. 
 
4. Kinds of issues. – 
Issues are of two kinds: (a) issues of 
fact and (b) issues of law. 
 
5. Framing of issues.- 
At the first hearing of the suit the Court 
shall, after reading the plaint and the written 
statements, if any, and after such examination 
of the parties as may appear necessary, 
ascertain upon what material propositions of 
fact or law the parties are at variance, and 
shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the 
issues on which the right decision of the case 
appears to depend. 
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6. When Court not required to frame 
issues.- 
Nothing in this rule requires the Court to 
frame and record issues where the defendant at 
the first hearing of the suit makes no defence. 
 
7. Matter directly and substantially in 
issue-Scope and meaning of.- 
In order that a suit may be barred by 
previous decision by operation of the doctrine 
of res judicata, the first requisite condition 
is that the matters directly and substantially 
in issue in both the suits should be the same. 
Section 2 of the old Code of Civil Procedure 
of 1859 (corresponding to Sec.11 of the present 
Code) was in the following words: “The Civil 
Court shall not take cognizance of any suit 
brought on a cause of action which shall have 
been heard and determined by Court of competent 
jurisdiction in a former suit between the same 
parties or between parties under whom they 
claim.”  
 The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in a series of decisions while 
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interpreting the words cause of action in Sec.2 
(corresponding to Sec.13 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1877 and Sec.11 of the present Code) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure has laid down 
the law that the cause of action is to be 
construed with reference to the substance and 
not merely to form. 
 The expression cause of action cannot be 
taken in its literal and most restricted sense. 
But however, that may be by the general law 
where a material issue has been tried and 
determined between the same parties in a proper 
suit, and in a competent court as to the status 
of one of them in relation to the other, it 
cannot, in the opinion of their Lordships, be 
again tried in another suit between them.” 
 In another case it was held by their 
Lordships of the Privy Council: 
  “If both parties invoke the opinion of 
the Court upon a question, if it is raised by 
the pleadings and argued, their Lordships are 
unable to come to the conclusion that merely 
because an issue was not framed which, strictly 
construed embraced the whole of it, therefore, 
the judgment upon it was ultra vires. To so 
hold would appear scarcely consistent with the 
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case of Mst. Mitha v. Syed Fuzl Rub, wherein it 
was held that in a case where there had been no 
issue at all, but where, nevertheless, it 
plainly appeared what the question was which 
was raised by the parties in their pleadings, 
and was actually submitted by them to the court 
the judgment upon it was valid. 
 “The term ‘cause of action’ is to be 
construed with reference rather to the 
substance than to the form of action. But even 
if this interpretation were not correct, their 
Lordships are of opinion, that this clause in 
the Code of Civil Procedure would by no means 
prevent the operation of the general law 
relating to res judicata founded on the 
principle nemo debet bis vexari pro eddem 
causa. This law has been laid down by a series 
of cases in this country with which the 
profession is familiar. It has probably never 
been better laid down than in a case which was 
referred to in Gregory v. Molesworth, in which 
Lord Hardwicke held that when a question was 
necessarily decided in effect, though not in 
express terms between the parties to the suit, 
they could not raise the same question as 
between themselves in any other suit in any 
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other form, and that decision has been followed 
by a long series of decisions, the greater part 
of which will be found noticed in the very able 
notes of Mr.Smith to the case of the Duchess of 
Kingston.”  
 After the above decisions the Legislature 
introduced the words matter directly and 
substantially in issue in the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1877 by deleting the words cause of 
action from the old Code. It is therefore, 
abundantly clear that it is not necessary that 
the cause of action in the former suit and the 
subsequent suit should be identical, but the 
matter directly and substantially in issue in 
both the suits should be same or identical in 
order to attract the applicability of the 
principle of res judicata in the subsequent 
suit. 
 The rule of English law that where the 
allegation on the record is uncertain there is 
no res judicata is also the rule embodied in 
Sec.13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. 
“If a thing be not directly and precisely 
alleged, it shall be no estoppel.” That rule 
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was reproduced in Explanation I of the Sec.13 
of Civil Procedure Code, 1882.  
 
A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1962 Andh Pra. 160. 
Held that… 
Therefore what Sec.11 C.P.C., requires is not 
that the cause of action in the two suits must 
be identical but that the matter directly and 
substantially in issue in the subsequent suit 
should also be directly and substantially in 
issue in the former suit. It will be noticed 
that under Sec.11, C.P.C., not only the suit 
itself may be barred but also an issue. 
 
A.I.R. 1935 Oudh. 
Held that… 
 For the meaning of the phrase matter 
directly and substantially in issue one may 
look into Explanation III appended to Sec.11, 
C.P.C., 1908 which runs thus: 
  “The matter above referred to must in 
the former suit have been alleged by one party 
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and either denied or admitted expressly or 
impliedly by the other.” 
 Thus the phrase matter directly and 
substantially in issue which occurs in Sec.11, 
C.P.C., must mean, according to Explanation III 
of the said section, that the matter above 
referred to, must in the former suit have been 
alleged by one party and either denied or 
admitted expressly or impliedly by the other. 
 
A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 
Held that… 
 In order to test whether a matter is or is 
not directly and substantially in issue between 
the parties it has to be viewed from the three 
aspects: (a) The matter must consist of 
proposition of fact or directly and 
substantially alleged by one party and denied 
or admitted expressly or impliedly by the 
other. (b) Such a proposition has been or might 
and ought to have been, directly and 
substantially the ground of defence or attack, 
in the sense that the plaintiff directly and 
substantially did allege or might and ought to 
have directly and substantially alleged the 
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proposition to show a right to sue, or the 
defendant alleged it or might and ought to have 
alleged it to constitute his defence. (c) The 
matter so determined to be directly and 
substantially in issue must have been heard and 
finally decided.  
 
A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 
Held that… 
A bare assertion in a plaint is not a claim. An 
assertion becomes a claim when the plaintiff 
prays expressly or impliedly for the court’s 
decision upon it. Again an assertion may become 
a claim if the defendant treats it as such by 
denying it and inviting the court’s decision 
thereon. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1956 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 
Held that… 
 Even if a particular matter be not 
included in the formal issues, if it is 
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directly and substantially in issue between the 
parties and if there be a decision thereon, it 
will operate as res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1952 T.C. 
A.I.R. 1957 T.C. 
Held that… 
Similarly, it is now well settled that where a 
point is not properly raised by the plaint, but 
both parties have without protest chosen to 
join issues upon that point, the decision on 
that point would operate as res judicata 
between the parties.    
 
A.I.R. 1924 P.C.  
A.I.R. 1943 All. 
A.I.R. 1927 Oudh. 
Held that… 
Thus an issue raised by parties even improperly 
and decided is res judicata.  
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A.I.R. (1936) Nag. 
A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 
Held that… 
Where the party himself has invited a decision 
and on the decision being adverse to him cannot 
turn round and impeach it on the ground that it 
was premature and should have been decided 
after the preliminary decree had been passed. 
 
A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1961 Cal.422. 
Held that… 
 In another decision of the Nagpur High 
Court it was observed that where a point is 
raised in the pleadings and the parties have 
without protest joined issues thereon a 
decision on it operates as res judicata between 
the parties even though the point was not 
properly raised and the finding on the point 
was not necessary and the previous suit could 
have been decided independently of the decision 
upon that issue. 
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A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1954 Orissa. 
A.I.R. 1964 Manipur 2. 
Held that… 
No hard and fast rule as to what matters or 
issues are directly and substantially in issue 
can be laid down. But in order to determine 
whether a particular issue or matter is res 
judicata, the court can only look at the 
pleadings, the judgment and the decree. It is 
of course not necessary that before a matter 
can be said to be res judicata it should form 
the subject matter of a definite issue. If the 
court can gather from the materials before it, 
viz. The pleadings, the judgment and the decree 
that matter was directly and substantially in 
issue and formed the basis of the judgment 
arrived at in the earlier suit either expressly 
or by necessary implication then the principle 
of res judicata would apply. The Court can only 
look at the manner in which that particular 
matter is dealt with by the parties themselves 
having regard to the course of the litigation 
and the conduct of the parties and the manner 
in which the Court has itself dealt with it. 
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A.I.R. 1958 Andh Pra. 5. 
Held that… 
Where a plaintiff had previously filed a suit 
for ejectment on the ground that he needed the 
premises for his own use and in that suit the 
trial court found the genuine necessity of the 
plaintiff established, but the plaintiff’s 
claim for ejectment was rejected on other 
grounds. Relying on the finding of genuine 
necessity in the earlier suit a subsequent suit 
was filed it was held, that the finding in the 
previous suit on the question of the 
plaintiff’s genuine necessity for the house 
existed at the time of the institution of that 
suit could not by any reasoning operate as res 
judicata in the subsequent case when the basis 
is the plaintiff’s genuine necessity as 
existing on the date of the subsequent suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1946 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 
Held that… 
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 “Matter in issue” in Sec.11, C.P.C., is 
distinct from the subject matter and the object 
of the suit as well as from the relief that may 
be asked for it and the cause of action on 
which it is based, and the rule of res judicata 
requiring the identity of the matter in issue 
will apply even when the subject-matter, the 
object, the relief and the cause of action are 
different. It is the matter in issue and not 
the subject matter of the suit that forms the 
essential test of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 Oudh. 
Held that… 
Similarly for the application of the principle 
of res judicata it is not necessary that the 
subject matter in the sense of the property 
involved in the two suits should be the same. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 
Held that… 
The Supreme Court has also laid down very 
clearly that the test of res judicata is the 
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identity of title in the two litigation and not 
the identity of actual property involved in the 
two cases. 
 
A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 
Held that… 
Where the current controversy was directly and 
substantially in issue in the former suit Sec. 
40 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly provides 
that a previous judgment or order of decree is 
relevant when it is tendered in evidence in 
support of a plea of res judicata in civil 
cases or of autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict in criminal cases. Although a finding 
in a previous suit inter partes does not 
operate as res judicata it is the paramount 
duty of the party against whom it is given to 
displace that finding. 
 
8. Connected issues.- 
As regards questions involved in the suit 
are tried and decided in favour of a defendant 
however, numerous they might be, the estoppel 
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of judgment will apply to each point so decided 
as if it were the sole issue in the case. 
 
A.I.R. 1931 Lab. 
Held that… 
Thus if there are two issues which had been 
determined in a suit and the decision of either 
of these issues was potent enough to defeat the 
plaintiff’s whole suit, then it is open to the 
defendant in subsequent suit to rely upon the 
previous decision on the one or the other of 
the issues and to ask the court to throw the 
then plaintiff’s case as barred by res 
judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 
Held that… 
Where findings on two issues tend to the same 
result and the former decision proceeds on both 
the grounds each finding may operate as res 
judicata but before a matter can be held to be 
res judicata the finding in the previous 
litigation, should be certain and it must be 
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clear that the decree in the previous suit was 
intended to be based on that finding. 
 
A.I.R. 1922 (P.C.) 
A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 
Held that… 
Thus broadly stated when issues have been 
framed, the decision on each issue which 
supports the ultimate decision in the case must 
be regarded as res judicata between the parties 
to the suit. But if a decision on an issue does 
not support the ultimate decree such decision 
cannot operate as res judicata between the 
parties to the suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 
Held that… 
 The same principle will apply where a 
finding upon an issue which is immaterial and 
unnecessary for the determination of the case 
may not have the force of res judicata, yet 
where the parties go to trial, evidence is 
given and the Court at their invitation decides 
the points raised, a finding on one of the 
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issue is conclusive between the parties in 
spite of the fact that it is only one of the 
several grounds on which the judgment was based 
and even if that issue had been decided the 
other way the decree would have been the same. 
 
A.I.R. 1944 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 
Held that… 
Where the suit is based on decision of two or 
more issues and each of the findings 
constitutes an additional and supplemental 
ground for the disposal of the suit, each must 
therefore give rise to the bar of res judicata. 
Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in 
Shiv Charan Lal v. Raghunath, have held that if 
there were two findings of fact either of which 
would justify in law the making of the decree 
which was made, that one of such two findings 
of fact which should in the logical sequence of 
necessary issues have been first found, and the 
finding of which would have rendered the other 
of such two findings unnecessary for the making 
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of the decree which was made is the finding 
which can operate as res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 Oudh.386. 
Held that… 
 The above rule of logical priority of 
necessary issues was no doubt followed by Oudh 
Chief Court in Ram Bali v. Ram Asre, where in 
an earlier suit for possession on the ground 
that the plaintiff and O were members of joint 
Hindu family. The Court decided two points: (1) 
that the pedigree was not proved and (2) that 
plaintiff and O were not joint. Held, when two 
such findings were recorded and when either of 
them would be sufficient to dispose of the suit 
it cannot be said that the finding as to 
pedigree was such as to bind the plaintiff. The 
main question there was one of jointness and it 
was not necessary for that court to enquire 
whether the exact relationship was proved or 
not, therefore decision of that issue was held 
not to be barred by res judicata. But this rule 
of logical priority of necessary issues 
although not specifically overruled is no 
longer a sound law. 
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A.I.R. 1932 (P.C.) 
A.I.R. 1955 All. 
A.I.R. 1951 All. 
Held that… 
 If an issue though not directly arising 
out of the pleadings is framed and a decision 
is actually given the decision will operate as 
res judicata when the same issue arises in a 
subsequent suit on the principle that a party 
having invited the Court, or allowed it without 
protest to decide it is estopped after the 
decision on it has gone against him. 
 
A.I.R. 1939 (P.C.) 
A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 
Held that… 
 In order successfully to establish a place 
of res judicata or estoppel by record it is 
necessary to show that in a previous case a 
court having jurisdiction to try the question 
came to a decision necessarily and 
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substantially in volving the determination of 
the matter in issue in the latter case. 
 
A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 
Held that… 
Thus the relationship of landlord and tenant is 
the very foundation of a decree in a rent suit 
and as such is a matter necessary to be 
determined. When a suit for rent is filed 
unless the defendant admits the Court must 
determine the question as to whether the 
relationship of landlord and tenant has been 
established between the parties before a decree 
can be passed. Where the matter is pointedly 
raised in a suit as to whether the plaintiff is 
landlord and is entitled to a decree as against 
the defendant the matter is directly put in 
issue and is actually decided and therefore it 
cannot be held that it is only an incidental 
question.  
 
A.I.R. 1942 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1956 All. 
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A.I.R. 1927 Oudh 625. 
Held that… 
 When a matter directly and substantially 
in issue in a subsequent suit has been directly 
and substantially in issue in a previous suit 
and has been finally heard and decided between 
the same parties, the issue cannot be reopened 
in a subsequent suit notwithstanding the fact 
that the previous suit could have been decided 
independently of the decision upon that issue. 
 
 The question whether or not the decision 
in a suit for rent operates as res judicata 
upon the question of the amount of rent 
annually payable is dependent upon the scope of 
the issues raised and decided. If the question 
raised and decided relates to the amount 
recoverable for the particular years in dispute 
the decision has not the effect of res 
judicata. On the other hand if the question 
raised is as to the amount of rent annually 
payable, the decision clearly constitutes res 
judicata. The tests are whether the party two 
seeks to reopen the matter in controversy could 
with reasonable diligence have raised the 
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matter, whether he had a fair opportunity to 
obtain an adjudication upon the matter, and 
whether the question formed the proper subject 
of litigation in the previous suit. 
-Art.136-Res judicata-Appeal disposed of with 
matter being remanded to High Court for 
decision on all issues other than the one 
decided by High Court with no view however, 
being expressed on the one issue decided by it-
Effect-Held, issue stood concluded as far as 
High Court was concerned, but open to be 
agitated in future proceedings once High Court 
had rendered decision on the other issues. 
 
A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 144. 
Held that… 
 Where a Court having the question before 
its mind decided that the issue did arise, that 
decision would be as much res judicata as the 
final determination of the issue on merits. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 Orissa. 
Held that… 
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 Where the plaintiffs as well as the 
defendants had proceeded upon certain admitted 
facts and certified copies of judgment and 
decree in the previous suit and straightaway 
proceeded to argue the question whether the 
suit was barred by the principles of res 
judicata. It was held that the plaintiffs not 
having raised the slightest objection it was 
too late to contend that the suit should go 
back to the trial judge for a further finding 
after recording evidence. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1954 Mys. 
A.I.R. 1962 Andh.Pra.160. 
Held that… 
 
9. Matter must be directly and 
substantially in issue in the former 
suit.- 
It is a general rule, that to give a 
decision on a matter in issue in a former suit, 
the effect of res judicata, that matter must 
have been directly and substantially in issue 
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in that suit. A matter cannot be said to be 
directly and substantially in issue unless and 
until it is or becomes material, for the 
decision of the suit, to find as to it. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 290. 
A.I.R. 1928 A. 
A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1925 All. 
A.I.R. 1926 All. 
A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1927 All. 
Held that… 
In other words, the decision on a matter not 
essential for the relief finally granted in the 
former case, or which did not form one of the 
grounds for the decision itself, cannot be said 
to have been directly and substantially in 
issue; but, where the decision on a question 
was essential to the relief granted or the 
decree passed, or where it formed the ground 
work of the decision, then the matter must be 
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deemed to have been directly and substantially 
in issue in the suit. The principle of res 
judicata has no application, where the matter 
in suit has not been directly and substantially 
but only incidentally or collaterally in issue. 
Another phase of the same question is, whether 
the question, decided in the previous suit, was 
in substance a part of the cause of action or 
whether it was only ancillary to the main 
cause. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 
Held that… 
Indeed, the true test is whether the matter has 
been directly and substantially in issue, in 
the former case, and has been heard and finally 
decided…… Other matter may have been directly 
though not substantially but rather 
incidentally in issue and may have been heard 
without being finally decided and the decision 
on these matters does not constitute res 
judicata. The question what was “the matter 
directly and substantially in issue” in the 
previous suit depends on whether the parties in 
the suit and the Court have dealt with the 
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matter as if there was a relief claimed in 
respect of which relief was claimed it was 
dealt with and decided as if it formed a direct 
and principal issue in the suit. It seems 
sufficiently clear that the Courts are 
precluded by this section from trying not only 
any suit but any issue, in which the matter to 
be determined has been directly and 
substantially in issue in another suit between 
the same parties and which has been heard and 
finally decided by a competent Court. It 
consequently follows that a finding of fact on 
a matter not covered by the prayers in the 
plaint may be pleaded as res judicata, in a 
future suit if the question involved in it is 
directly and substantially, in issue between 
the parties and is treated as a relevant fact 
by them and by the Court. So where a claim to a 
certain property was based entirely on a sale-
deed and the question of the validity of the 
sale-deed had arisen directly in a previous 
suit between the same parties, relating to 
another property also included in the deed, 
which could not be determined without a 
decision as to the validity of the sale-deed, 
it was held that the decision in the previous 
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suit must be held to be binding as between the 
parties. But where a plaintiff sued for a half 
share of certain groves by partition, and it 
appeared that there had been a previous 
litigation of the same nature between the 
parties but it related to another grove, it was 
held that as the groves now in suit were 
different from the grove which formed the 
subject-matter of the previous litigation, it 
could not be said that the matter now in issue 
between the parties was directly and 
substantially in issue between them in the 
former litigation and the matter was not res 
judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 Nag.169. 
Held that… 
So where a plaintiff sued for ejectment and it 
appeared that he had previously brought a suit 
for ejectment; and for recovery of rent but on 
defendant’s setting up permanent tenancy had 
abandoned the prayer for ejectment and a decree 
was passed dismissing the claim for possession 
and decreeing rent, it was held that the matter 
was not res judicata as the question of the 
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status of tenant was not directly and 
substantially in issue. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 All.62. 
Held that… 
But where the issue whether A was the nearest 
heir was directly and substantially in issue in 
the former suit and it was heard and decided by 
the appellate Court, the Allahabad High Court, 
held that the subsequent suit involving the 
same question was barred. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Oudh. 
Held that… 
But a finding in a previous suit on the right 
to mortgage does not operate as res judicata in 
a subsequent suit where the question in issue 
is the right to sell rights in a grove. Where 
the contention is that an issue should not be 
retried inasmuch as it was directly and 
substantially tried in a former suit between 
the same parties, the question must be 
determined with reference to the provisions of 
this section. 
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A.I.R. 1926 Pat. 
Held that… 
It is settled law that even if the cause of 
action for a suit be a recurring one every 
matter decided in the suit may be res judicata 
which was directly and substantially in issue 
in the previous suit even though the decision 
in the former suit be erroneous. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 Oudh. 
Held that… 
When a matter directly and substantially in 
issue in a subsequent suit has been directly 
and substantially in issue in a previous suit 
and has been finally heard and decided between 
the same parties, the issue cannot be re-opened 
in a subsequent suit notwithstanding the fact 
that the previous suit could have been decided 
independently of the decision upon that issue. 
 
A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1932 Nag. 
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Held that… 
The rule of res judicata does not depend upon 
the identity of the subject matter, but it 
depends on the identity of the issues. In order 
to consider whether a previous decision is res 
judicata or not the substantial effect of what 
has been decided in the case has to be 
considered.  
 
10. When a matter is substantially in 
issue.- 
“Substantially” evidently, signifies what 
was indicated by the phrase, “in effect though 
not in express terms”, in Lord Hardwicks 
statement of the doctrine of res judicata in 
the case of Gregory v. Molesworth, which is 
cited with approbation by their Lordships of 
the Privy Council in the case of Soorjomonee v. 
Saddanand. In Krishna Behari v. Bunwari Lal,  
their Lordships of the Privy Council said: By 
the general law, where a material issue has 
been tried and determined between the same 
parties in a proper suit, and in a competent 
Court as to status of one of them in relation 
to the other, it cannot be again tried in 
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another suit between them,” and approved a 
dictum in Soorjomonee v. Saddanand, That the 
general law relating to res judicata, founded 
on the principle nemo debet bis vexari pro 
eadem causa, defined by Lord Hardwicks, in 
Gregory v. Moles-worth. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Mad.234. 
Held that… 
As preventing a question, which had necessarily 
been decided, in effect though not in express 
terms, between parties to a suit, from being 
raised as between them in any other suit in any 
other form, must be applied in interpreting the 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It 
is thus clear that the word “substantially” 
avoids the supposition “that a plaintiff may 
evade the application of the rule, merely by 
varying his form of pleading, or by describing 
the subject-matter of his suit, or expressing 
his rights in different language.”As to what is 
a substantial question and what is not a 
substantial question no invariable rule can be 
laid down except that if the parties by their 
conduct of the litigation clearly treated it as 
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a substantial question and the Court also 
further treated it as a substantial question, 
it would be almost conclusive to show that 
question was one substantially in issue. But it 
appears to be generally settled that for a 
matter being in issue it is not necessary that 
it should have been distinctly and specifically 
put in issue by the pleading. The word 
“substantial has not such a stringent 
signification as the word “essential” or the 
word “necessary”. A decision may, therefore, 
operate as res judicata although no issue has 
been expressly raised. The test to be applied 
is whether it plainly appears that the question 
so raised by the parties in their pleading was 
actually submitted by them to the Court and 
judgment given on it. Some cases even go so far 
as to hold, that for the identity of the matter 
in issue, it is not necessary that an issue 
should have been taken in the former suit, it 
appears to be considered sufficient that the 
point was essential to the former judgment; and 
every matter which has been in issue even 
necessary implication, and which must 
necessarily have been decided in order to 
support the judgment, is held concluded. This 
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appears to be the principle underlying the 
decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bhowabul 
v. Rajendro, in which it was held that “a 
decree is, as between the parties to it, 
conclusive both as to the rights of these 
parties and the characters in which they sue," 
and that the defendant could not show that he 
was really the plaintiff in the suit. The 
expression “substantially in issue” means of 
real competence or value; it does not mean 
necessary. Therefore, if an issue is a suit had 
been directly raised and decided, and is not 
manifestly incidental or irrelevant, the Court 
which is considering whether that decision 
amounts to res judicata should not import nice 
questions as to whether the issue had been 
absolutely necessary to the determination of 
the suit, it is sufficient to find that the 
court and the parties thought so, and proceeded 
on that assumption. Their Lordships of the 
Privy Council in Midnapore Zamindari Co., Ltd. 
v. Naresh Narayan have held that an issue is 
res judicata where the judgment of an appellate 
court shows that the issue was treated as 
material and was decided, although the decree 
made merely affirms the decree of the lower 
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court which did not deal with the issue if the 
Court having the question before its mind 
decided that the issue did arise that decision 
would be much res judicata as the final 
determination on merits. If the Court did so 
decide it is immaterial whether it did so 
rightly or not. The question whether an issue 
was substantially raised and decided is a 
matter of fact to be decided upon the 
circumstances of each particular case and 
although no rule of general application can be 
laid down this proposition is well established 
that when a decree of the Court is not based 
upon a finding but was made in spite of it that 
finding cannot be res judicata.  
  
A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 
Held that… 
For the application of the principles of res 
judicata, it is necessary that the matter must 
have been substantially in issue. A matter will 
be substantially in issue if it is of 
importance and value for the decision of the 
case. 
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A.I.R. 1957 Hyd. 23 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
Evidently an unnecessary issue the decision of 
which either may will not affect the decision 
of the suit cannot be said to be substantial 
for the case. 
 
11.When a matter is directly in issue.- 
The word "directly seems to have been used 
in contradistinction to the words 
“incidentally” and “collaterally” made use of 
in the statement of the opinion of the Judges 
in the Duchess of Kingston’s case. It was 
broadly laid down in that case that “neither 
the judgment of a court of concurrent or 
exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any 
matter which came collaterally in question, nor 
of any matter incidentally cognizable.” As to 
when an issue should be considered to have been 
directly raised, and when incidentally or 
collaterally, no hard and fast rule can be laid 
down, except that a fact cannot be in issue 
directly when the judgment can be correct, 
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whether that fact exists or not. Thus where in 
a suit for rent fixed by a lease, the defendant 
pleads for its abatement, on the ground that 
the land is actually less than that entered in 
the lease (the terms of the lease admitting of 
abatement or enhancement with reference to the 
actual area), and it is found that the land is 
really more than that entered in the lease, and 
a decree is given for the claim, the amount 
fixed by the lease; the decision as to the 
excess cannot constitute res judicata because 
the only issue between the parties in the 
former suit was whether the land demised was or 
was not less than or equal to the estimated 
quantity. On the same principle, if a suit is 
brought to procure the entry of satisfaction of 
a mortgage and the judgment is that the 
mortgage is not satisfied because a specified 
amount remains unpaid, this judgment is, in 
subsequent controversies between the parties 
conclusive that the mortgage was not paid, but 
the amount due would be still unsettled because 
it was not in issue in the former suit between 
the parties; the Court observing in the case 
cited, that “It was probably necessary to take 
and state an account between them, which would 
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show how much was due upon the mortgage in 
order to determine whether anything was due; 
but the evidence and inquiry as to the amount 
due was merely incidental or collateral to the 
direct issue, whether anything was due.” In 
India, also, the dismissal of a suit for the 
redemption of a usufructuary or a simple 
mortgage on the ground of the non-payment of 
the mortgage amount, and even a decree given on 
it conditionally on the payment of the amount 
found due and payable in respect of the 
mortgage, does not necessarily bar a subsequent 
suit for redemption; though if that amount was 
a point in issue in the former suit, the Court 
would be barred in the subsequent suit from 
inquiring into the correctness of that finding, 
and the only point which the Court would be 
able to try in the subsequent suit as to 
repayment would be that of the amount repaid 
after the date up to which the amount repaid 
was the point in issue in the former suit. 
Similarly a finding in a suit by certain 
partners as to the amount due to all the 
partners severally on a statement of the 
accounts of a dissolved partnership, was held 
not be res judicata as to the amount due to a 
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partner who in a subsequent suit claimed the 
amount found due to him from the rest of the 
partners who were his co-defendants in the 
former suit, even though the plaintiffs in the 
former suit were also made pro forma defendants 
in the subsequent suit. But a different view 
has been taken in an Allahabad case. The 
Calcutta High Court in Mohima Chandra v. Raj 
Kumar, even held that in a suit for damages for 
the taking away of fruit, the title to the land 
from which they were taken would be in issue 
only collaterally and a finding therein as to 
the said land being the joint property of the 
parties would not bar a suit by one of them to 
have a summary thakbast award in regard to that 
land set aside as wrong. The same view was 
taken also in another case, though the decision 
in it was rested on the ground that the second 
suit was brought for the express purpose of 
determining the plaintiff’s title, and was on 
an entirely different cause of action. This 
view however, has not been accepted in Madras 
where it has been laid down that in if a suit 
for damages for wrongful cutting and carrying 
bamboos from certain land, the question of 
title to that land should be raised, it would 
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be directly and substantially in issue, if the 
question was one which it was material to the 
plaintiff or defendant to raise; and the title 
to the land that was the foundation of the 
title to the trees. The question of a matter 
being in issue directly has arisen chiefly in 
suits for rent or damages. There is a conflict 
of opinion as to whether the decision in a 
former rent suit operates as res judicata in a 
subsequent title suit. In the cases cited 
below, it has been held that the title to the 
property, for or in respect of which, the rent 
or damages are claimed as directly in issue and 
consequently the decision in a former rent suit 
is res judicata in a subsequent title suit; 
while the contrary view has been taken in the 
undernoted cases. In the former class of cases 
it has somewhat similarly been held that the 
rule applies even when the question of title is 
raised not by the original defendant, but by 
some other person intervening to claim the 
title, or impleaded on the ground of his 
ascertaining such claim. In the latter class of 
cases the contrary was held in some early cases 
chiefly on the ground of the apprehension, that 
the question of title may be raised in a suit 
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of small value in a Court of the lowest 
jurisdiction, and thus become binding in regard 
to very considerable property outside its 
jurisdiction.  
 
A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 
Held that…  
Such an argument has, however, no application 
now, as to constitute a decision res judicata, 
it has been made expressly necessary that the 
Court passing it should have had jurisdiction 
over the subsequent suit also. A judgment is 
conclusive only in respect of matters, which 
are directly in issue and not those which are 
brought incidentally during the trial. A fact 
cannot be in issue directly when the judgment 
can be correct whether the fact exists or not. 
 
A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 
Held that… 
But where question in the previous suit for 
declaration was whether the plaintiff was the 
then presumptive reversioner and the question 
in the subsequent suit whether the plaintiff is 
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now the next heir of the last male owner. A 
decision in the former cannot conclude the 
latter. The cause of action for the subsequent 
suit arose only when the succession opened by 
the death of the limited owner several years 
after the decree in the previous suit. The 
prior decision cannot be relied on the question 
of the plaintiff’s title to attract the bar of 
res judicata.  
 
12. Matter directly and substantially in 
issue constructively.- 
The Privy Council in Doorya Prasad Singh 
v. Doorga Kunwari, Sir B. Peacock observed 
thus: 
 “…… Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem 
causa.-This law has been laid down by a series 
of cases in this country with which the 
profession is familiar. It probably has never 
been better laid down then in the case, which 
was referred to in Gregory v. Molesworth in 
which Lord Hardwicks held that when a question 
was decided in effect though not in express 
terms between parties to the suit, they could 
not raise the same question as between 
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themselves in any other form, and that decision 
has been followed by a long course of 
decisions…” In another decision the Privy 
Council has laid down the proposition of law 
that where a plaintiff claims an estate and the 
defendant being in possession, resists that 
claim, he is bound to resist it upon all the 
grounds that it is possible for him, according 
to his knowledge then to bring forward. 
 
A.I.R. 1942 Oudh. 
Held that… 
 The principle of res judicata were not 
dependent on convenience of parties about 
taking certain pleas, the Court has to see 
whether a certain plea, if taken would have 
defeated the suit as brought and if it is found  
by the Court that there was any such plea which 
plea ought to have been taken then it could not 
be taken in a subsequent suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1962 Andh. 
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A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 
Held that… 
 
13. When a matter is collaterally and 
incidentally in issue.- 
A matter can never be said to be directly 
and substantially in issue which calls for a 
decision only collaterally or incidentally and 
it cannot be said to be heard and finally 
decided if the finding on any particular issue 
is not necessary for the decision of the suit. 
The question whether an issue was substantially 
raised and decided depends upon the 
circumstances of each particular case. And 
although no hard and fast rule can be laid 
down, this proposition is well established that 
when a decree of the Court is not based upon a 
finding but was made in spite of it that 
finding cannot be res judicata and further it 
could not said to be finally decided if it were 
not necessary to decide the issue for the 
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purpose of deciding the case, there can be no 
res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1946 Pat. 
Held that… 
Similarly a question which is foreign to the 
suit and unnecessary for decision cannot be 
held to be matter directly and substantially in 
issue so as to operate as res judicata in a 
latter suit. A question which is relevant to 
the issue in a suit will not necessarily be a 
matter directly and substantially in issue and 
a finding on that question will not be res 
judicata unless it is so connected with the 
question in issue that the decision upon one 
must necessarily determine the decision upon 
the other. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 Oudh. 
A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 
Held that… 
 In other words a decision on an issue, 
which is not necessary for the determination of 
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the real question in dispute between the 
parties does not operate as res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 
Held that… 
 The above rule that a judgment or decree 
is not conclusive of anything not required to 
support it, is not a mere rule of construction 
but an unyielding restriction of the powers of 
the parties and of the Court.  
 In the undermentioned cases it has been 
held that a finding in a former suit not 
material or necessary for the disposal of the 
suit or adjudication of the claim for giving 
relief to the plaintiff is an unnecessary 
finding not being a decision on a matter 
directly and substantially in issue and as such 
will not operate as res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 Cal.128 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
 Similarly where the Court expressly stated 
that the decision of the issue is unnecessary 
and the party who pleads (or against whom it is 
318 
pleaded) res judicata was not a consenting 
party to the raising or decision of that 
particular issue in the earlier suit, the plea 
of res judicata would not be supportable. 
 
A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 
Held that… 
In order that an incidental finding in one 
proceeding shall be res judicata in another, it 
is essential that the issue in the second 
proceeding should have been raised and decided 
clearly in the first. 
 
A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 
Held that… 
 Similarly it has been held that a finding 
not necessary to the determination of the suit 
and is not one against which a party could have 
appealed. It is not a matter directly and 
substantially in issue which was heard and 
decided and is not res judicata in subsequent 
suit. 
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A.I.R. 1925 Oudh. 
Held that… 
It is equally true for a finding by an 
Appellate Court on a point not necessary for 
the decision of the suit and on which no issue 
was raised in the primary court and no ground 
taking in memo of appeal cannot operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit between the 
parties. Again, where the main question in the 
previous suit was whether this plaintiff was a 
coparcener with a certain person the Court 
decided two points (1) that the pedigree set up 
by the plaintiff was not proved and (2) that 
the plaintiff was not a coparcener with the 
person in question, it was held that as the 
question as to the exact relationship of the 
plaintiff with the person in question was not 
essential to the decision of the previous suit 
on that question. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 Bom.32. 
Held that… 
In an ejectment suit, where court passes a 
decree for rent only, the finding as to title 
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need not be incorporated in the decree. The 
question of title gone through incidentally in 
a rent suit does not operate as res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 All. 
A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 
Held that… 
Similarly a suit filed by a person against 
another who denies that the relation of 
landlord and tenant existed between him and the 
plaintiff, it is open to the Court to implead 
the person to whom the payment of rent is 
alleged to have been made by the defendant. But 
if any question of title is decided between the 
plaintiff and a third party so added, that 
decision does not operate as conclusive, and a 
suit by the defeated party to establish his 
title can lie in Civil Court. Similarly that 
very finding which is necessary and sufficient 
for the disposal of the case, can operate as 
res judicata and in this connection it is the 
judgment of the lower Appellate Court and not 
that of the trial court which must be looked 
into. 
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A.I.R. 1926 All. 
Held that… 
The above rule may be illustrated wherein the 
previous suit before the Revenue Court the 
plaintiff sued for determination of the amount 
of rent to be paid by third parties on the 
allegation that these third parties were his 
ex-proprietary tenants, and they replied that 
they did not base their tenancy upon an 
agreement with the plaintiff, but they were 
holding from S who was a tenant of the 
plaintiff and S intervened and took the same 
position it was held that it was not necessary 
for the purposes of the decision of that suit 
to determine whether the lease was a benami 
transaction, S was a benamidar of the plaintiff 
and therefore that finding to that effect was 
not res judicata in a subsequent suit by the 
plaintiff against S for possession.  
 
A.I.R. 1923 Lah.523. 
Held that… 
Where the real point in issue in a previous 
suit was whether the mortgage was for necessity 
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or not and it was found as a fact that the 
mortgage was for necessity and therefore there 
was no necessity to arrive at any decision upon 
the question whether M was lawfully adopted son 
of A, it was held that it was doubtful whether 
the finding on the question of adoption was not 
directly and substantially in issue. 
 
A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 
Held that… 
 As already pointed out that the decision 
of an issue is res judicata only when the issue 
arose directly and not incidentally having 
regard to the subject-matter of the particular 
suit or proceeding. Where, therefore, the 
Collector had given his decision in the course 
of a prior proceeding on an incidental issue 
also, but such issue arises in a subsequent 
suit, his decision cannot make it res judicata 
in the subsequent suit. But that decision is a 
piece of evidence under Sec.13, Evidence Act, 
to which some weight must be given in the 
determination of the status of the two estates 
in relation to each other. Nor a matter which 
is res judicata can be agitated afresh merely 
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by reason of a suggestion made in a judgment 
which was unnecessary to the decision of the 
case that the party may bring another suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 
Held that… 
Thus under industrial disputes although 
statutory finality is accorded to the award of 
Industrial Tribunal as modified by Appellate 
Tribunal but the statutory finality is not 
enough to sustain the claim that a decision on 
every one of the collateral issues decided in 
an industrial dispute or an appeal therefrom 
will operate as res judicata when the same 
question arises again as a collateral issue in 
subsequent proceedings even in subsequent 
industrial dispute. The prior decision is 
relevant in the subsequent proceedings but it 
is not conclusive. 
 
A.I.R. 1952 All.  
Held that… 
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14. Disposal of the case on preliminary 
issue.- 
Whether res judicata.-When a case is not 
decided on merits at all but is disposed of on 
preliminary grounds only there can be no 
question of res judicata in a subsequent suit 
between the parties regarding matters or issues 
raised but not decided in the earlier 
litigation. 
 
A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 80. 
Held that… 
Thus when a suit was rejected under O. VII 
r.11, C.P.C., as non-maintainable on the 
preliminary ground that a valid notice under 
Sec.80,C.P.C., had not been issued any 
observation which the Court might have made 
regarding the merits of the suit were of an 
incidental nature and cannot be treated as 
final decision and would not operate as res 
judicata in any subsequent suit between the 
parties. Unless the decision of the preliminary 
issue involves the decision of other issues as 
well. 
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A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 
Held that… 
In an another case Midnapur Zamindari Co., Ltd. 
v. Naresh Narain.  
 
A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 
Held that… 
Before the Privy Council where the previous 
suit for eviction was contested on two grounds: 
(1) the defendants had occupancy rights and (2) 
the suit was premature. The trial court held 
that the suit was premature but that the 
defendants had not the occupancy rights. The 
plaintiff took up the matter to the High Court 
and the defendants also filed a cross-appeal 
against the finding of the lower court to the 
effect that they did not have a right of 
occupancy in the land. Both the appeal and the 
cross-appeal were dismissed. But 
notwithstanding the fact that the defendants 
filed a cross-appeal, their Lordships of the 
Privy Council held that the finding of the 
trial court as regards the absence of an 
occupancy right of the defendants would not 
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operate as res judicata inasmuch as once they 
succeeded on the plea that the suit was 
premature there was no occasion to go further 
as to the finding against them. In a Madras 
case where a suit for eviction was contested by 
a defendant on two grounds. 
 
A.I.R. 1938 Oudh. 
Held that… 
Firstly that he had a permanent occupancy right 
in the land and secondly, that there was no 
valid notice to quit. The trial Court held that 
the defendant has failed to establish his right 
of permanent occupancy but that the plaintiff’s 
suit would in any case fail because no notice 
to quit was given. But as the plaintiff filed 
an appeal which was dismissed by the District 
Judge on the ground that no notice to quit was 
given. The District Judge did not decide the 
question as to whether the defendant 
established his claim to right of permanent 
occupancy. Thus it was clear that the question 
as to whether the defendant had a permanent 
right of occupancy though decided by the Munsif 
was practically left open by the District Judge 
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and also by the High Court in the Second appeal 
and the litigation was disposed of on the 
ground of failure to give proper notice to 
quit. The question was clearly left open by the 
Superior courts and was not finally decided so 
as to operate as res judicata. To apply Sec.11, 
C.P.C., it is necessary to see what is the 
matter directly and substantially in issue in 
the present suit. In judging whether or not a 
previous decision is a bar to a subsequent one, 
the Court must look to the matter directly and 
substantially in issue in both the suits and 
that it was heard and finally decided in the 
previous suit. Even if the matter which is not 
in dispute had been in the previous suit, the 
decision of that suit cannot operate as res 
judicata in the subsequent suit if the previous 
suit is disposed of on a preliminary point. 
Similarly where a suit is dismissed as time-
barred the dismissal does not operate as res 
judicata on the merits. 
 
A.I.R. 1924 All. 
Held that… 
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15. Obiter dictum-Whether res judicata.- 
  Observation or mere expression of 
opinion or a chance or casual remark by the 
Court in the previous judgment not arising out 
of the issues which were before the Court for 
decision; (nor a finding on such question is 
deemed to be necessary for the decision of the 
case) is called an obiter dicta. To constitute 
res judicata the matter must be directly and 
substantially in issue in the former suit. 
Obiter dicta will not constitute the matter res 
judicata in subsequent suit.  
 
A.I.R. 1936 Nag. 
Held that… 
Similarly a mere suggestion by the Court in a 
judgment passed on a point not in controversy 
and in respect of which no issue has been 
framed has no binding effect and does not 
constitute res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 All. 
Held that… 
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 But even an obiter dicta of Supreme Court 
is binding on all the Courts in India. 
 It is true that where a point has not been 
argued and certain general observations have 
been made which may seem to cover points not 
argued before the Court they may not be 
considered to be binding, and in such cases the 
binding nature of the observations of the Court 
may be limited to the points specifically 
raised and decided by the Court. It is also 
true that pronouncements made on concessions of 
Counsels when a point is not argued, are not 
binding. 
 
A.I.R. 1940 All. 
A.I.R. 1950 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1953 All. 
Held that… 
But otherwise even what is generally called an 
obiter dictum, provided it is upon a point 
raised and argued is binding upon the courts in 
India. 
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A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1933 All. 
A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 
Held that… 
 
16. Matter not decided expressly or 
impliedly-whether res judicata.- 
The above heading may be conveniently sub-
divided into two sub-headings, viz., (a) matter 
not raised and not decided, (b) matter raised 
but not decided. A question which has never 
been raised by the parties and never decided by 
the Court in the previous litigation cannot 
operate as res judicata. A finding by way of 
obiter dicta or casual or chance remark would 
be included in this category and cannot operate 
as res judicata as it cannot be taken to be 
such a decision as would bind in a subsequent 
suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 
Held that… 
331 
17. Issue raised but not decided-No res 
judicata.- 
As regards matter raised but not decided 
the rule of res judicata does not come into 
operation unless the matter which is 
subsequently decided by the Court is expressly 
or impliedly decided on the merits in the 
previous proceedings.  
 
A.I.R. 1934 Oudh. 
Held that… 
Thus where the first suit did not give any 
definite finding on the question of title and 
the judgment was very vague and it was not 
proved that the plaintiffs were parties to the 
suit it was held that the second suit where a 
question of title was at issue, was not barred 
by res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1931 All. 
Held that… 
Similarly it has been held that the rule of res 
judicata can be applied to the subsequent 
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proceedings only when the point raised in the 
subsequent proceedings were raised in the 
earlier proceedings and were specially decided. 
The question of the determination of the 
defendant’s tenancy which was neither decided 
nor was it necessary to be decided in a 
previous suit would not operate as res judicata 
in a subsequent suit between the parties. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 Oudh.344. 
Held that… 
In a suit for resumption of a Muafi holding 
subsequent to its transfer the revenue courts 
held that the holding was liable to resumption. 
They decided, however, that as the holding had 
been held for a long time and by two successors 
to the original grantor, the holding should be 
deemed to be a holding in a proprietary right 
under Sec.107, Oudh Rent Act. The transferees 
brought a suit for a declaration that they had 
obtained the title of the transferor as under 
proprietor. It was held that the suit was not 
barred by the rule of res judicata owing to the 
decision of the Revenue Court as the matter in 
Civil Suit was the relief by way of declaration 
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of rights which had arisen in favour of the 
plaintiff by the effect of the rule of equity 
embodied in Sec.43, Transfer of Property Act 
and arising out of the declaration granted by 
the Court of Revenue. The matter surely was not 
only not within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Court of Revenue but was not at all within 
its jurisdiction and did not arise for 
determination in those proceedings. Where a 
particular issue does not arise on the 
pleadings nor is clear from the judgment nor it 
is indicated that the parties knew that they 
had to adduce evidence on it, any finding on 
such issue does not operate as res judicata.  
 It is quite true that a decision would 
operate as res judicata even if it is not 
specific and express, provided it is 
necessarily implied in the decree. For 
instance, a decree which necessarily involves a 
finding on an issue in the affirmative or the 
negative, even though no specific finding was 
recorded on it, would be res judicata in a 
subsequent suit. This rule, however, can have 
no application where the Court has expressly 
left undecided the issue that arose for 
decision in the later suit. In the words of the 
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judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
Parsotam Gir v. Narbada Gir. 
 
A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 
Held that… 
“It would be a contradiction terms to say that 
the Court had finally decided matters which it 
expressly left untouched and undecided.” Thus 
where the Collector dismissed the previous 
suits for rent in limine on the sole ground 
that the land-holder not having complied with 
the statutory requirements entitling him to an 
enhancement of rent, could not sue for water 
rate which he had not hitherto collected. He 
declined to go into the question whether the 
tenant would be liable for the water rate as 
“rent”. Consequently the decision of the 
Collector in the previous suit does not operate 
as res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Orissa 
A.I.R. 1955 Ajmer 12. 
Held that… 
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 Where in an earlier suit the Munsif and 
did not decide the question of title and the 
Civil Judge in appeal had no occasion to decide 
and in fact did not go into the question of 
title. The question of title can be reagitated 
in a subsequent suit between the parties and 
cannot operate as res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1954 All. 
A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1958 Orissa. 
A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 
A.I.R. 1951 H.P.32. 
A.I.R. 1951 H.P.54. 
A.I.R. 1953 Cal.669. 
Held that… 
 When matter not in issue at all-Whether 
res judicata.-When a particular question was 
not in issue at all in the previous suit such 
decision is not res judicata on that question. 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 153. 
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Held that… 
Thus where there was no issue regarding the 
character of tenancy, namely whether it was 
permanent and heritable or otherwise, such 
question of permanency of tenancy was not, 
therefore, directly and substantially in issue 
it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme 
Court that the plea of res judicata cannot be 
sustained.  
 
A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 
Held that… 
It is undoubtedly true that if the parties and 
the Court have dealt with a particular issue as 
a direct and necessary issue, the decision 
would be res judicata and would bind the 
parties even if the issue on a proper 
examination be found to have been unnecessary 
and for incidental and the position would be 
the same if, an issue of this character, the 
parties invite and take a decision from the 
Court. But where the Court expressly stated 
that the decision of the issue is unnecessary 
and the party who pleads (or against whom it is 
pleaded) res judicata in the subsequent suit 
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was not a consenting party to the raising or 
the decision of the particular issue in the 
earlier suit, the plea of res judicata would 
not be supportable. 
 
A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 
Held that… 
Where a point decided in the previous suit is 
not in issue in the subsequent suit but is only 
material to weaken the case of the plaintiff, 
the subsequent suit is not barred by res 
judicata. A judgment can operate as res 
judicata only in so far as it finally 
determines a controversy which is directly and 
substantially in issue in the case. Where the 
question raised in the subsequent suit was 
altogether beyond the scope of the previous 
suit and the issue in the form in which it was 
raised in the subsequent suit did not directly 
arise in the previous suit, the previous suit 
does not operate by way of bar by res judicata 
as there was no dispute as to his being an 
adopted son, the only dispute being whether he 
was then entitled to demand partition. 
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A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 
Held that… 
In the same way a judgment is conclusive on the 
matters which are directly in issue and not 
those which are brought incidentally into a 
controversy during the trial and a fact cannot 
be in issue directly when the judgment can be 
correct whether the fact exists or not. The 
rule that a judgment or decree is not 
conclusive of anything not require to support 
it, is not a mere rule of construction, but an 
unyielding restriction of the powers of the 
parties and of the Court. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 All. 
A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 
Held that… 
 Where the plaint does not disclose a cause 
of action the plaint has to be rejected under 
O. VII, r.11, C.P.C., before proceeding with 
the trial of the suit and it may therefore, be 
said that where there is no cause of action, 
the Court has no jurisdiction to try a case and 
is not competent to decide other issues. Under 
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Sec.11, C.P.C., the bar arises only where the 
issue has been directly and substantially 
raised in a former suit. Where there was no 
cause of action, no matter in the plaint can be 
directly and substantially in issue on the 
former suit. Therefore a suit dismissed on the 
ground that there is no cause of action is not 
a bar under the principles of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 
Held that… 
In a partition suit by a co-sharer the 
defendant co-sharer alleged that he had a right 
of way and right of passing damage over the 
land in suit and prayed that these facts might 
be taken into consideration when the allotments 
were made. There was no issue as to the 
existence of this right of way. The right of 
way was not challenged and indeed it seemed 
from a passage in the trial court’s judgment 
that this right of way was admitted in the 
partition suit, it was held that decision in 
the partition suit could not operate as res 
judicata on the question as to the existence of 
the right of way in favour of the defendant. 
340 
A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 
Held that… 
Illustrations 
 (1) In the year 1892 the mortgagor 
instituted a redemption suit alleging that 
nothing was due under the securities, and 
claiming to be put into possession or, if the 
Court should find that any sum was due, that it 
might order redemption subject to the payment 
of such sum. Decree was passed that the 
mortgagor should pay a certain amount by a 
certain date and in case of default the suit 
should stand dismissed. The default was made 
but the plaintiffs who were the representatives 
and heirs of the original mortgagor brought 
another suit for redemption of the same 
properties. In their plaint, the plaintiff’s 
alleged that the whole of the sum has been 
satisfied out of the increased profits of the 
mortgaged properties, and claimed, (a) 
possession of the shares of the properties by 
redemption on the footing that the mortgage 
money had been satisfied, or (b) if any amount 
of the mortgage money be proved due, a decree 
for redemption in condition of payment of that 
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amount be passed. It was held by their 
Lordships of the Privy Council that the 
question was not res judicata the issues 
decided in the former suit being (1) whether 
the mortgagors were then entitled to redeem, 
and (2) the amount then to be paid if 
redemption then took place. And the issues in 
second suit being (1) Whether the right to 
redeem now exists (2) the amount now to be paid 
if redemption now takes place consequently it 
was held by the Privy Council that the right of 
redemption was not extinguished and another 
suit was maintainable. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 
Held that… 
(2) Where a suit brought for recovery of 
possession of the property on the ground that 
the plaintiff was the proprietor was dismissed 
and another suit was brought by the plaintiff 
as a mortgagor for redemption of the said 
property, it was held that in the earlier suit 
he was not bound to put forward his claim as 
mortgagor and seek redemption on payment of 
mortgage money, that the decision in the prior 
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suit cannot operate as res judicata because the 
matter involved in the two suits is essentially 
different. Where a person sues to eject an 
alleged trespasser he sues as the owner of the 
property, but where he sues to redeem he sues 
as the owner of an interest in it, namely, the 
equity of redemption and the defendant as the 
mortgagee is sued as holding the property as 
security for the debt. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 
Held that… 
 (3) Where a prior suit for share of 
profits was decreed and no question of right to 
partition was raised or decided it was held by 
the Privy Council that in a subsequent suit the 
question of partition was not res judicata, but 
the Court added a declaration to the decree 
that by virtue of the decree in the previous 
suit the decree-holder could execute the decree 
without resorting to a suit for share of yearly 
profits to spare the parties unnecessary 
expense. 
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A.I.R. 1924 Cal.460. 
Held that… 
 (4) Plaintiff sued the defendants, for 
arrears of rent in 1915 on the allegation that 
they held the disputed land under him as his 
tenants the defendants pleaded that they were 
not tenants under the plaintiffs and set up a 
title in themselves. The trial court came to 
the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to 
prove the relationship of landlord and tenants 
between the parties and in this view dismissed 
the suit for rent. The plaintiff then  
instituted another suit to eject the defendants 
on the allegation that they were trespassers, 
it was held that the previous suit does not 
operate as res judicata. The decision is 
conclusive upon one point and one point alone, 
viz. That the defendants were not tenants of 
the plaintiff during the years for which rent 
was then claimed. No other questions were 
essentially in dispute at that stage and they 
cannot rightly be regarded as matters directly 
and substantially in issue in the suit and 
finally decided therein. 
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A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 129. 
Held that… 
 (5) Failure of the reversioners in earlier 
suit for cancellation of deed of gift by window 
is not bar to claim as reversioners after her 
death. The validity of the deed of gift and its 
effect are distinct matters. 
 
A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 241. 
Held that… 
 An adverse finding against a successful 
party-Whether res judicata.-The leading 
authority on this point is the decision of the 
Privy Council in the case of Midnapur Zamindari 
Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy. 
 
A.I.R. 1960 Cal.440. 
A.I.R. 1960 Raj.304. 
A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 128. 
Held that… 
Where a Zamindar filed a suit against his 
tenant claiming possession of certain Chur 
lands. The suit ended in a compromise and a 
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fresh “patta” and “Kabuliyat” fixing an yearly 
rent for eight years were executed. One of the 
terms of the compromise was that after the 
expiry of the period of eight years, a fresh 
“patta” and “kabuliyat” were to be given at a 
fair rate to be settled then. It was also 
agreed that after the settlement of the fair 
rent if the tenant refused to pay the rent, the 
Zamindar could evict him and obtain “khas” 
possession. To that suit the tenant raised two 
defences (1) that he had “Jotedari” or 
occupancy right and (2) that the suit was 
premature. The trial court negatived the 
tenant’s case as to his occupancy rights, but 
held that the suit was premature. The High 
Court agreed with the decision. The Zamindar 
brought a subsequent suit for “khas” possession 
of the land after giving notice to terminate 
the tenancy. The tenant again pleaded occupancy 
rights. The question that had to be considered 
was whether the finding in the prior litigation 
that the tenant had no occupancy rights was res 
judicata. Lord Dunedin observed as follows: 
 “Their Lordships do not consider that this 
will be found an actual plea of res judicata 
for the defendant having succeeded on the other 
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plea, had no occasion to go further as to the 
finding against them…” 
 
A.I.R. 1937 Mad.114. 
Held that… 
Though a finding on an issue may not be 
necessary for the disposal of the suit, yet if 
a party invites the decision of the Court on 
that issue and the Court also considers it 
necessary to go into it and gives a finding 
thereon the decision on that issue will 
constitute res judicata in a subsequent suit, 
provided that the party against whom there was 
finding on that issue, would be in a position 
to carry the matter in appeal.  
 
A.I.R. 1955 Andh. Pra. 282. 
Held that… 
But it has also been held in some cases that 
though a suit is dismissed the adverse finding 
against the defendant would be res judicata in 
a subsequent suit between the same parties, if 
on the basis of that finding, costs in whole or 
in part were disallowed to the plaintiff or 
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awarded to the defendant, for in such a case 
there is a decree against the defendant and it 
becomes final unless he prefers an appeal 
against the same.  
 
A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 114. 
Held that… 
Similarly wherein an earlier suit for recovery 
of possession by the landlord the tenants 
denied the lease and title of landlord and 
claimed adverse possession and the court found 
in favour of landlord as regards lease and 
adverse possession but dismissed the suit and 
appeal therefrom on the ground that landlord 
failed to serve a notice on the tenant to quit 
and disallowed costs of the defendant. It was 
held that the tenant could have appealed 
against the order relating to costs and since 
he did not do so the matter became res 
judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 116. 
Held that… 
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This decision emphasizes the rule that there 
must be something in the decree that entitles a 
party to file an appeal. 
 The Privy Council held that in cases where 
the preliminary decree in a partnership action 
contains certain declarations of rights adverse 
to a party or directions not sustainable in 
law, then it is the plain duty of that party to 
file an appeal and if he does not so, he cannot 
agitate the matter in an appeal against the 
final decree.  
 
A.I.R. 1960 A.P.168. 
Held that… 
And where there was nothing in the preliminary 
decree to which the plaintiff could have taken 
exception and make the foundation of an appeal 
then in an appeal against the final decree the 
matter which is the subject of adverse finding 
in the suit can be reagitated. 
 
A.I.R. 1959 All.530. 
Held that… 
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 Where the creditor’s suit against the sons 
is dismissed after adjudication on merits, the 
principles of Sec.11, C.P.C., would apply and 
execution of the decree against them for 
attachment and sale of their shares in the 
joint family property in order to satisfy the 
decree against their father would not be 
maintainable, but where no such adjudication 
has been made and the claim is dismissed 
against the sons merely on the ground that the 
plaintiff does not wish to proceed against 
them, no such consequence would follow and it 
would be open to the plaintiff decree-holder to 
proceed in execution against them on the ground 
of their pious obligation, and it would then be 
open to the sons to show that their share in 
the joint family property would not be liable 
because the debt was tainted with immorality or 
illegality. So far as O. XXIII, r. 1, C.P.C., 
is concerned it only prevents the plaintiff 
from filing suit in respect of the same cause 
of action which had been withdrawn by him at an 
earlier stage. It does not debar the plaintiff 
from putting his decree into execution against 
the sons if he is entitled to do so under some 
other provision of law. According to Hindu law 
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the sons will be bound for the payment of the 
debt of their father if the debt was not 
tainted with immorality and illegality, 
irrespective of the fact whether the father is 
dead or alive.   
 
A.I.R. 1930 Cal.47. 
A.I.R. 1946 Lah.387. 
A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 222. 
A.I.R. 1927 Mad.273. 
Held that… 
 
18. Subject-matter need not be identical 
in both suits.- 
The decision of a matter which is directly 
and substantially in issue between the parties 
to a suit operates as res judicata between the 
same parties or their representatives in 
interest in a subsequent suit irrespective of 
the fact whether the subject-matter of the two 
suits is identical or is different.  
 
A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 390. 
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A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 118. 
Held that… 
For the application of the principle of res 
judicata it is not necessary that the subject 
matter, in the sense of the property, involved 
in the two suits should be the same.  
 
A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 172. 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad.1172. 
A.I.R. 1928 Nag. 112. 
Held that… 
Nor does not the test as to whether a previous 
adjudication operates as a bar to a subsequent 
adjudication of the same matter lie in the fact 
as to whether the two causes of action are 
different or the same. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 213. 
Held that… 
The cause of action in a partition suit of 
joint family property must be regarded as 
exhaustive of the whole property available for 
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division so far as its existence is known at 
the date of the plaint. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 Nag.322. 
Held that… 
There is, however, nothing in law which compels 
a person to sue on an alternative cause of 
action and failure to do so in a former suit 
does not bar a subsequent suit, either under 
Order II, rule 2 or under Sec.11, Explanation 
IV. But it is settled law that even if the 
cause of action for a suit be a recurring one 
every matter decided in the suit may be res 
judicata which was directly and substantially 
in issue in the previous suit even though the 
decision in the former suit be erroneous. 
 
19. Matter in issue must in the former 
suit have been alleged by one party and 
either denied or admitted by the other: 
Explanation III.- 
It appears to be generally agreed upon 
that to assert the plea of res judicata 
successfully, a defendant must show not only 
353 
that the matter in issue has been in issue in a 
former suit between the same parties, in a 
competent Court, but also that the matter so in 
issue was heard and finally decided by the 
Court. A right or title to be barred by such a 
plea must, moreover, have been alleged and 
denied. Explanation III has extended the 
signification of the expression matter in 
issue, and under it a matter alleged by one 
party may be in issue even if admitted by the 
other party. It is the matter in issue that 
forms the essential test of res judicata. Hence 
it is not enough that the matter was alleged by 
one party. It must appear that the matter 
referred to was alleged by one party and either 
denied or admitted expressly or impliedly by 
the other. The rule of res judicata does not 
apply where the right on which the second suit 
is based is not the same as that asserted in 
the first suit.  
 
A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1933 S.  
Held that… 
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The meaning of the rule is not that a decree 
will bar a man as to matters never raised if 
they are matters relating to the external 
object of the litigation but as to all matters 
which were relevant and examinable upon the 
question of right at issue between the parties. 
It has even been held that when a Court of 
competent jurisdiction, in deciding upon a 
particular subject-matter thinks it necessary 
to go into collateral facts for the purposes of 
its decision, its opinion on those facts is not 
conclusively binding in a subsequent suit which 
relates to a different subject-matter. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 50. 
Held that… 
Where a point is not properly raised by the 
plaint but both parties have without protest 
chosen to join issue upon that point, the 
decision on the point would operate as res 
judicata between the parties. 
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20. Decision on a question of fact.- 
A decision on a question of fact is 
evidently res judicata, within the terms of the 
section. Even a wrong decision in a previous 
suit bars a subsequent suit. It has thus been 
held that an erroneous decree establishing 
rights is as much res judicata between the 
parties as a just decree. The existence of a 
custom is a question of fact and an erroneous 
decision on that point between the same parties 
operates as res judicata even though the 
subsequent suit relates to properties other 
than those involved in the prior suit. Where a 
question is finally decided between the 
parties, the fact that the grounds given for 
decision are erroneous do not prevent the 
matter from being res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 404. 
A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 23. 
Held that… 
 When a Court of law has in any proceeding 
before it, decided upon evidence or in the 
absence of evidence a question of fact, it is 
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not competent to it to allow that question to 
be again re-opened except in the very 
restricted terms laid down by the provisions 
for review of judgment. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 404. 
Held that… 
Thus where on a previous petition being 
dismissed, the petitioner files another 
petition praying for an apparently different 
relief, but the relief is such as rests only on 
the same question of fact as in previous 
petition, that petition cannot be entertained. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 717. 
Held that… 
It is now a settled law that a decision on a 
question of fact, howsoever erroneous it may 
be, constitutes res judicata between parties to 
the suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1935 Pat.526. 
A.I.R. 1938 Nag.195. 
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Held that… 
 The reason being that jurisdiction of a 
Court is the power to hear and decide and the 
power to decide erroneously as well as 
correctly. Correctness or otherwise of judical 
decision has no bearing upon the question 
whether it does or does not operate as res 
judicata. A party taking the plea of res 
judicata has to show that the matter directly 
and substantially in issue has also been 
directly and substantially in issue in previous 
suit and has been heard and decided. 
 An erroneous decree establishing rights is 
as much res judicata between the parties as a 
just decree and evidence offered to prove that 
the former decision is erroneous is irrelevant. 
A party’s ignorance of a ground of plea during 
the former litigation does not make the former 
decision any the less binding. 
 
A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 545. 
Held that… 
Thus where an earlier decision was wrongly held 
to be res judicata though the parties in the 
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subsequent suit were not the same as in the 
prior suit. The same question came up for 
decision in a third suit. The parties to the 
second and the third suit were the same. It was 
held, that though there is a mistake of fact as 
regards the parties, yet the Judges who decided 
the second suit decided that the matter was res 
judicata between the parties and therefore 
their decision was final and their Lordships 
were not competent to go behind the earlier 
decision. Such questions whether a kabuliyat is 
binding on a party to a suit is a question of 
fact for the purposes of res judicata and 
cannot be re-opened or the existence of a 
custom is a question of fact and an erroneous 
decision on that point between the same parties 
operates as res judicata even though the 
subsequent suit relates to properties other 
than those involved in the prior suit. 
 
21. Decision on mixed question of law and 
fact.- 
The same rule applies to a case where the 
prior decision was as to a mixed question of  
law and fact. In other words, an issue of mixed 
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question of law and fact stands on the same 
footing as an issue of fact, and evidently a 
decision come to on a mixed question of law and 
fact may operate as res judicata. The question 
whether by custom the right to receive the 
offerings at a shrine is alienable or not is a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
 
A.I.R. 922 Lah.329. 
Held that… 
 When the existence of certain facts and 
the legal effect of such acts are both to be 
found before a question is answered, it is a 
mixed question of law and fact. Thus whether a 
tenancy is a permanent one or not is a mixed 
question of law and fact. 
 
A.I.R. 1924 Cal.600. 
A.I.R. 1926 Cal.80 
Held that… 
A finding on a mixed question of law and fact 
stands on the same footing as a decision on a 
question of fact and operates as res judicata. 
A judgment operates as res judicata with regard 
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to all the findings that are necessary and 
essential to the judgment. Even an erroneous 
decision on a mixed question of law and fact is 
res judicata like the decision on a question of 
fact. 
 
A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 777(F.B.) 
Held that… 
Decision on such questions as to whether an 
issue is barred by res judicata or not or the 
decision on the lord or the construction or 
interpretation of terms of a will in a certain 
manner or the question whether a document was 
an award or a partition deed or interpretation 
of other documents, are all mixed questions of 
law and fact and would attract the principles 
of res judicata in a subsequent suit between 
the parties. 
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22. Decision on a question of law.- 
Under the Code of 1882 there was a 
conflict of opinion as to whether a question of 
law operated as res judicata in respect of 
another subject-matter in a subsequent suit it 
being held by the High Courts of Bombay and 
Madras that it did not and by the High Courts 
of Calcutta and Allahabad that it did. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1965 Raj.42. 
Held that… 
In order to settle this controversy and to give 
effect to the decisions of the Calcutta and 
Allahabad High Courts, C1. (a) of para. 1 of 
the section originally proposed was framed by 
inserting the words “by a finding of fact or of 
law or of both”. The Statement of Objects and 
Reasons as to which proceeded thus: “It is 
proposed to affirm the view entertained both at 
Allahabad and in Culcatta that a pure finding 
of law may operate as res judicata. This 
coincides with the English practice of holding 
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parties to be stopped by a former judgment, 
however erroneous, if it stands unreversed by a 
competent Court, though it is open to them to 
contend that the judgment does not accurately 
represent the findings. On the other hand, it 
is desirable to limit the operation of the 
principle to adjudication on merits, with a 
view to excluding, for instance, dismissals on 
a preliminary question of jurisdiction.” But 
the subject was found to be unsuitable to the 
scheme of skeleton Act, and was consequently 
struck out. Nevertheless the same view has been 
reiterated both by the Bombay and Madras High 
Courts in more recent decisions and it has by 
them been held that where there has been a 
decision on an abstract question of law, e.g. 
the construction to be placed on a section in 
an enactment, and not a concrete question, such 
as the construction of a document entered into 
between the parties to a suit, it is no longer 
of a question of res judicata, as a Court can 
form its own opinion as to what the law is. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1925 All. 
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A.I.R. 1927 All. 
A.I.R. 1926 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1932 Pat.337. 
Held that… 
The Calcutta High Court has in several cases 
maintained that an erroneous decision on a pure 
question of law in a suit does not operate as 
res judicata, in a subsequent suit between the 
same parties where the cause of action in the 
subsequent suit is not identical with the cause 
of action in the previous suit and the same 
view has been propounded by the other High 
Courts.   
 
A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1930 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1930 Rang. 
Held that… 
It is otherwise, however, where the cause of 
action in the subsequent suit is the same as 
that in the former suit. So it has been held 
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that a previous decision on a question of law 
which affects the subject-matter of the 
subsequent suit or creates a legal relation 
between the parties or defines the status of 
either of them is as binding upon them as a 
previous decision on a question of fact. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 
Held that… 
It has even been held that an erroneous 
decision on the question of the construction of 
a document operates as res judicata. But a case 
must be decided upon the law as it stands when 
the judgment is pronounced and not upon what 
the law was at the date of a previous suit, and 
if the law has been altered in the meantime and 
the effect of this law has been differently 
interpreted by judicial decision or altered by 
statute, a decision on a point of law in an 
earlier suit will not operate as res judicata 
with regard to the same question in a 
subsequent suit. For instance, where a 
stipulation as to the payment of interest 
contained in a kabuliyat is held to be penal 
and, therefore, unenforceable, and the law is 
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subsequently altered by judicial 
pronouncements, the decision as to penal nature 
of the stipulation will not operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit to recover rent 
on the basis of same kabuliyat. But it does not 
matter whether the decision previously given 
was, according to a later decision in another 
suit, erroneous as a proposition of law. 
 
A.I.R. 1931 All.635. 
Held that… 
A statutory right conferred by a new Act may 
even be made a foundation of defence to the 
plea of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 Cal.777. 
Held that… 
 The question as to whether an issue of law 
is res judicata inter partes, and if so, in 
what circumstances, has been the subject-matter 
of decisions of the various High Courts in 
England and India. The High Courts in England 
had no difficulty in holding that there was a 
bar when the cause of action was not the same 
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and what was decided in the former case was 
only a point of law, though in England the term 
res judicata is confined to the cases where the 
res, i.e. the cause of action is the same and 
in other cases the bar is called the bar of 
estoppel by record. The principle that there 
can be the bar of res judicata even where what 
was decided in the former suit was a pure issue 
of law will be found stated in Halsbury’s Laws 
of England, Vol. XIII, Art. 464 (p.410): 
 “………… And this principle applies whether 
the point involved in the earlier decision and 
as to which of the parties are estopped, is one 
of fact, or one of law, or one of mixed law and 
fact.” 
 In support of this case Halsbury refers to 
two below mentioned cases. At page 344 it is 
quoted in Halsbury “…………… No question of fact 
which was directly in issue between the parties 
to the action before Bray, J. and which was 
decided by him, could be further litigated by 
either party and the same would apply to the 
exact point decided by Bray, J., whether it 
were a point of law or of mixed law and fact.” 
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 The expression “cause of action” as used 
in Sec.2 of Civil Procedure Code of 1859 ran as 
follows: 
 “The Civil Courts shall not take 
cognizance of any suit brought on a cause of 
action which shall have been heard and 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction 
in a former suit between the parties under whom 
they claim.” 
 Their Lordships of the Privy Council in 
Krishna Behari v. Brojeshwari, while 
interpreting the expression “cause of action” 
used in the above section remarked: 
 “The expression cause of action cannot be 
taken in its literal and most restricted sense. 
But however that may be, by the general law 
where a material issue has been tried and 
determined between the same parties in a proper 
suit, and in a competent court, as to the 
status of one of them in relation to the other, 
it cannot……… be again tried in another suit 
between them.” 
After the above decision by the Privy Council 
the Legislature introduced the words “matter 
directly and substantially in issue” in the 
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Civil Procedure Code of 1877 and thereafter in 
subsequent amendments. In England there cannot 
be a bar of res judicata unless the same cause 
of action is put in issue in the second suit as 
was put in issue in the first. What the English 
jurists therefore call the bar of res judicata 
is the bar created by the use of the word 
“suit” in Sec.11, C.P.C. Even in England there 
can be a bar on analogous principles even 
though the cause of action is not the same, 
viz. The bar of “estoppel”. 
 
A.I.R. 1942 Bom.257. 
A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 430 
Held that… 
 Regarding the bar of “estoppel” Halsbury 
in Vol. XIII, Art.469, at page 409 mentions: 
 “But provided a matter in issue is 
determined with certainty by judgment an 
estoppel may arise where a plea of res judicata 
could never be established, as where the same 
cause of action has never been put in suit. A 
party is precluded from contending the contrary 
of any precise point, which having been once 
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distinctly put in issue, has been solemnly 
found against him. 
 “Though the objects of first and second 
actions are different, the finding on a matter, 
which came directly (not collaterally or 
incidentally) in issue in the first action is 
conclusive in a second action between the same 
parties and their privies. And this principle 
applies, whether the point involved in the 
earlier decision, and as to which of the 
parties are estopped, is one of fact or one of 
law or one of mixed law and fact.” 
 Another authority from England in (1926) 
A.C. 94:(1926)95 L.U.P.C. 33 which has been 
followed by Madras High Court in Mahadavappa 
Sommappa v. Dharmappa Sanna and also by 
Calcutta High Court in Santosh Kumar v. 
Nirpendra Kumar, Lord Carson who delivered the 
judgment of the Board of observed: 
 “It has been pointed out that no such 
question was raised or pleaded either before 
the District Court or the Supreme Court in New 
South Wales, nor has there been any 
adjudication or finding upon it. There is, 
however, no substance in this contention. The 
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decision of the High Court related to a 
valuation and liability to a tax in a previous 
year, and no doubt as regards that year the 
decision could not be disputed. The present 
case relates to a new question, namely the 
valuation for a different year and the 
liability for that year. It is not eadem 
questio and, therefore, the principle of res 
judicata cannot apply.” 
 The above case is a clear authority for 
the proposition that in England a point of law 
cannot possibly conclude the parties by the 
principle of res judicata in a subsequent 
litigation not based upon the same cause of 
action when the facts to which the law is to be 
applied are different. 
 We come across another authority of 
English law in fones v. Lewis wherein Bankes, 
L.J., at page 344 remarked: 
 “………… It has been argued that this 
decision operates as an estoppel between the 
overseers of the parish for the time being and 
the respondent and it is impossible for the 
latter in any subsequent dispute with the 
former to say anything contrary to that 
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decision. I do not take this view. There is no 
real dispute as to the law of estoppel between 
the parties or privies. 
 “No question of fact which was directly in 
issue between the parties to the action before 
Bray, J. and which was decided by him could be 
further litigated by either party, and the same 
would apply to the exact point decided by Bray, 
J., whether it were a point of law or of mixed 
law and fact. But the reasons which led the 
learned Judge to his decision upon the precise 
point do not bind the parties in a subsequent 
litigation.” 
 Therefore, so far as the English law is 
concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever, that a 
point of law cannot be taken to be res judicata 
between the parties between any future 
litigations from them facts in relation to 
which it was decided. 
 
A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1955 A.P. 
Held that… 
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 Now coming to the authorities of the 
Indian High Courts we find that some High 
Courts have adopted the view that an erroneous 
decision on a point of law would constitute res 
judicata as much as a correct decision on 
question either of law of fact, which meant 
that there could be res judicata not only on a 
question of fact, a mixed question of law and 
fact, but also on a pure question of law on 
which the parties might be at dispute regarding 
the matter which was directly and substantially 
in issue in the two litigations. 
 
A.I.R. 1928 Cal.777. 
Held that… 
Rankin, C.J., delivering the judgment of the 
Full Bench in Tarini Charan v. Kedar Nath. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 All. 
A.I.R. 1921 Bom.87. 
A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 
Held that… 
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Gave the reasons for the above view that 
whether a decision is correct or erroneous has 
no bearing upon the question whether it 
operates or does not operate as res judicata. 
For this purpose it is not true that a point of 
law is always open to a party. Section 11, 
C.P.C., says nothing about causes of action, a 
phrase which always requires careful handling. 
Nor does the section say anything about points 
or points of law or pure points of law. 
Questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be 
dealt with as though they were the same. 
Questions of procedure, questions affecting 
jurisdiction, questions of limitation may all 
be questions of law. In any case in which it is 
found that the matter directly and 
substantially in issue in the former suit and 
has been heard and finally decided by such 
court, the principle of res judicata is not to 
be ignored merely on the ground that the 
reasoning, whether in law or otherwise of the 
previous decision can be attached on a 
particular point, what is made conclusive 
between the parties is the decision of the 
Court and the reasoning of the Court is not 
necessarily the same thing as its decision. The 
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object of the doctrine of res judicata is not 
to fasten upon parties special principles of 
law as applicable to them inter se, but to 
ascertain their rights and the facts upon which 
these rights directly and substantially depend 
and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming 
nugatory by precluding the parties from re-
opening or re-contesting that which has been 
finally decided. Thus the above view 
hereinafter called I view upholds that an 
erroneous decision on a point of law will 
constitute res judicata as much as a correct 
decision on a question either of law or of 
fact; on a mixed question of law and fact some 
of the High Courts have adopted the view that a 
previous decision on a question of law was res 
judicata in a subsequent suit. In Chhaganlal v. 
Bai Harkha, it was held that a plea of estoppel 
by res judicata could prevail even where the 
result of giving effect to it would be to 
sanction what was illegal in the sense of being 
prohibited by statute.    
 
A.I.R. 1922 Lah.329. 
A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 
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A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 
A.I.R. 1930 Rang. 
Held that… 
 Some of the High Courts have adopted the 
view hereinafter called the II view that a 
decision on a question of law may be res 
judicata but an erroneous decision on a 
question of law cannot be allowed to operate as 
res judicata so as to prevent a court from 
deciding the same question on its arising 
between the same parties in a subsequent suit.  
 
A.I.R. 1953 T.C. 193. 
A.I.R. 1925 Cal.1193. 
Held that… 
On a pure question of law like limitation, the 
decisions in prior suits will not operate as 
res judicata especially when the law has been 
altered in the meantime, the decision in the 
earlier suit on a particular question of law 
would not operate as res judicata with regard 
to the same question in a subsequent suit. 
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A.I.R. 1953 S.C.65. 
Held that…  
 The above view that an erroneous decision 
on a question of law would not operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit between the same 
parties is not justified by the weight of 
authorities to the contrary and by the decision 
of Supreme Court in Mohanlal v. Benoy Krishna.  
 
A.I.R. 1931 Bom.  
A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 
A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 
Held that… 
Hence it is submitted that the above view of 
the High Courts has been shaken by the Supreme 
Court decision and is no longer a good law. 
 Another series of authorities of various 
High Courts have affirmed the view hereinafter 
called the III view on the lines of English 
decisions to the effect that a decision on an 
issue of law operates as res judicata if the 
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cause of action in the subsequent suit is the 
same as in the former suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 
Held that… 
But as far as the present Sec.11, C.P.C., is 
concerned what one has got to bear in mind is 
not the cause of action in the two suits but 
the matter directly and substantially in issue 
in the two suits. Hence even any erroneous 
decision on a question of law which has been 
directly and substantially in issue in the 
former suit and has been heard and finally 
decided will operate as res judicata between 
the parties in a subsequent suit when the same 
question of law is again directly and 
substantially in issue in a subsequent suit. 
 Now to sum up the whole thing and to bring 
about a possible reconciliation between the 
apparently divergent views, viz. The first view 
where it has been held that even an erroneous 
decision on the issue of law operates as res 
judicata and the third view that a decision on 
an issue of law operates as res judicata if the 
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causes of action (or to put it more accurately 
where matter directly and substantially in 
issue) in the two suits are the same.  
 It would be convenient to refer to certain 
observations from the Full Bench decision of 
the Calcutta High Court in Santosh Kumar v. 
Nripendra Kumar: 
 “An abstract question of law dissociated 
from and unconnected with the rights claimed or 
denied as between the parties to the litigation 
is of no importance or value to them or to the 
decision of the case itself and cannot be said 
to be substantially in issue and is not eadem 
question and the principles of res judicata 
cannot apply.  
 
A.I.R. 1944 Lah.282. 
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 82. 
Held that… 
It is not every decision of a question of law 
between the parties which is binding but only 
that decision on such a question which affects 
the subject-matter or creates a legal relation 
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between the parties or defines the status of 
either of them, which is binding.” 
 Therefore whenever a question of law rises 
as to whether a question of law operates as res 
judicata the question that the court must 
address itself is: 
 “Is it the question of law which is 
dissociated from and unconnected with rights 
claimed or denied as between the parties to the 
litigation? If it is dissociated or 
unconnected. (i.e. an abstract question of law 
has been decided) then the question of law does 
not constitute res judicata. If on the other 
hand the question of law is directly connected 
or associated with the rights claimed or denied 
and constitutes the very decision of the court, 
then the question of law would operate as res 
judicata.” 
 Relying on a judgment of the Full Bench of 
the Lahore High Court in Mst. Sardaran v. Shiv 
Lal, his Lordship Bhagwati, J., who delivered 
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunderbai 
v. Devaji, observed:          
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A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 
Held that… 
 “Where the right claimed in both suits is 
the same the subsequent suit would be barred by 
res judicata though the right in the subsequent 
suit is sought to be established on a ground 
different from that in the former suit. It 
would be only in those case where the rights 
claimed in the two suits were different that 
the subsequent suit would not be barred as res 
judicata even though the property was 
identical.” 
 Therefore, it is only when we have eadem 
question or the same question that the 
principle of res judicata can apply. But when 
the questions are different the decision in law 
with regard to one matter cannot operate as res 
judicata with regard to a different matter. 
 Now coming back to the first and the third 
view adopted by the various High Courts 
referred to above, can be reconciled in this 
manner. What becomes res judicata is the matter 
which is decided and not the reason which leads 
the Court to decide the matter. But neither the 
reasoning nor the mental process which the 
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Judge undergoes in order to come to the 
decision can operate as res judicata. It is 
never safe to lay down extreme general 
propositions of law that in no case a question 
of law can operate as res judicata. If the law 
is interpreted as a mere reasoning which leads 
up ultimately to the final decision, then that 
decision of law does not become res judicata in 
subsequent suits when the facts which have got 
to be determined are entirely different. The 
distinction between res judicata and judicial 
precedent established by court must always be 
borne in mind. When a court interprets the law, 
when it construes as a statute or determines 
what the position in law is with regard to a 
particular matter, that constitutes a judicial 
precedent set up by that court and that court 
may well follow the precedent when similar 
cases come before it where the same law has to 
be considered and interpreted. But if certain 
facts had to be determined on an application of 
the law to those facts or an interpretation of 
law with regard to those facts when the law 
applied to or interpreted with regard to those 
particular facts would constitute res judicata, 
and it would not be open to a party to say that 
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the law was different either in its 
applicability or in its interpretation with 
regard to those facts from what had been 
decided in the earlier suit.  
 A decision given by a court on question of 
law does not bind the same parties when those 
parties are litigating with regard to an 
entirely different right. The decision of law 
would only be binding between the same parties 
as res judicata if the right that a party 
claimed was the same in the former suit and in 
the later suit. If the certain facts were 
determined on an interpretation of law and it 
was held that a party had a certain right or 
that he was not entitled to a particular right 
then it would not be open to that party, in a 
subsequent suit to challenge the interpretation 
of the law and ask the court to decide that he 
had the right or to the other party to allege 
that he did not have the right. 
 Therefore, the first and the primary 
consideration in applying Sec.11,C.P.C., is to 
decide what is the res which has been 
determined. It is only the res which is 
determined which could become res judicata. But 
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if the res is the finding of certain facts then 
what becomes res judicata is only those facts 
and not the interpretation of the law which led 
the Court to find those facts. 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 
Held that… 
 Even an erroneous decision of law in one 
suit would operate as res judicata in the 
subsequent litigation, provided the question 
arose as between the parties and it was 
substantially in issue between them. In judging 
whether the decision in a previous litigation 
regarding recurring cause of action, operates 
as res judicata or not, the test is whether it 
decided a general principle that is applicable 
to the later years also or whether it was 
peculiar or special to that particular year, in 
other words, whether the consideration vary 
from year to year or such as would govern the 
subsequent years also. 
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CHAPTER – 7 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
 
A.I.R. 1932 Nag. 
A.I.R. 1932 All. 
A.I.R. 1929 All. 
A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 
A.I.R. 1963 Pat.16. 
Held that… 
1. Identity of causes of action.- 
Section 11, C.P.C., does not require the 
causes of action to be the same nor the reliefs 
claimed to be the same before the doctrine of 
res judicata can come into operation; what the 
section requires is that the matters in issue 
shall be the same and it makes no distinction 
between question of fact and questions of law. 
In Abdul Ghani v. Nabendra Kishore, it has been 
made clear that the rule of res judicata 
requiring the identity of the matter in issue 
will apply even when the subject-matter, the 
object, the relief and the cause of action are 
different. Mr. Wells says: “It is on the 
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principle that cause of action needs not be the 
same although the issue must be the same, that 
the rule rests, namely, that a suit on one 
promissory note or bond will be conclusive upon 
another executed under the same circumstances, 
if also sued on”. In Bouchand v. Dias, Branson, 
C.J., said referring to a number of cases that 
in them, “the cause of action in the second 
suit was different from the cause of action in 
the first, but the former determinations were 
held to be conclusive because the same question 
was determined in the first suit on which the 
second depended. So long as the same question 
of right has been determined between the same 
parties, the identity of form of action is not 
requisite.” Mr. Freeman says: “Whatever may be 
the form of action, the issue is deemed the 
same whenever it may in both action be 
supported by substantially the same evidence. 
If so supported a judgment in one action is 
conclusive upon the same issue in any other 
suit, though the cause of action is different.” 
 
A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 
Held that… 
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2. Same cause of action.- 
“Cause of action”, however, is not only 
the infringement of the right at a particular 
moment. The expression “cause of action” and 
“party of cause of action” must be taken as 
meaning respectively the material facts and any 
material fact in the case for the plaintiff. In 
Chand Koer v. Pratap Singh, their Lordships of 
the Privy Council have laid down as follows: 
 
A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 
A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 
Held that… 
 “Now the cause of action has no relation 
whatever to the defence which may be set up by 
the defendant, nor does it depend upon the 
character of the relief prayed for by the 
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds 
set forth in the plaint as the cause of action 
or in other words, to the media upon which the 
plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a 
conclusion in his favour.” 
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 Similarly it has been laid down that a 
cause of action should ordinarily mean the fact 
or facts which compel plaintiff to bring an 
action in court, but it is generally accepted 
that the expression means everything which if 
not proved gives the defendant an immediate 
right to judgment-every fact which is material 
to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to 
succeed and every fact which the defendant 
could have a right to traverse. In Halsbury’s 
Laws of England the learned author says that 
cause of action means every fact which is 
material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff 
to succeed and that every fact which the 
defendant would have right to traverse forms an 
essential part of the cause of action which 
accrues upon the happening of the latest of 
such facts. 
 “A cause of action is to be regarded as 
the same if it rests upon facts which are 
integrally connected with those upon which a 
right and an infringement of a right have 
already been once asserted.” 
 The expression “cause of action” can be 
reasonably used in connection with proceedings 
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other than suits and it must be construed with 
reference rather to substance than the form of 
action. 
 The decision in previous suit in which the 
cause of action was split up with a view to 
confer jurisdiction on an inferior court 
operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit 
between the same parties in which the same 
cause of action is not split up and 
consequently the suit is instituted in a court 
of superior jurisdiction. Similarly a decree on 
an award which is not strictly in accordance 
with the terms of reference will nevertheless 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit on 
the same cause of action. 
 Where a landlord obtained a decree for 
ejectment against a tenant on payment of 
statutory compensation but allowed execution of 
decree to become barred by time. Wallis, C.J., 
while dissenting from Kulti Ali v. Chindan, 
held that ordinarily when a person has a cause 
of action, it is merged in the decree, transit 
in rem judicatum and then his remedy is in 
execution, and if he does not enforce his 
remedy and allows it to become barred his 
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rights are gone, and a fresh suit for ejectment 
is barred by res judicata. Similarly a 
subsequent suit for the same cause of action 
and the same subject-matter was held to be 
barred by res judicata, where under a 
compromise A and B were bound to pay 
maintenance to C every year, while A paid the 
whole amount for two years and then sued B for 
contribution. The appellate Court rejected the 
plaint as disclosing no cause of action because 
the compromise did not contain any clause as to 
contribution; A then sued again on the same 
cause of action and the same subject-matter. 
 It is necessary that the cause of action 
on which both the suits are based should be the 
same. 
 
A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 
Held that… 
Thus res judicata cannot come into operation 
where the subject matter of the two suits as 
also the capacities in which they were brought 
are altogether different and the causes of 
action of the two suits are also not the same. 
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A.I.R. 1953 S.C.J.693. 
Held that… 
 In a matter before the Supreme Court it 
was contended that the judgment of the Privy 
Council in the prior litigation could not 
operate as res judicata about the title to the 
four annas shares of the estate because the 
subject-matter of those proceedings was the 
compensation money (a sum of Rs.900) and not 
the property that is the subject-matter of the 
present suit. Their Lordships after quoting 
with approval a Privy Council decision in 
Bhagwati v. Ram Kali laid down in clear and 
emphatic terms that the test of res judicata is 
identity of title in the two litigations and 
not the identity of the actual property 
involved in the two cases.  
 
A.I.R. 1954 S.C.82. 
A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 282. 
Held that… 
At another occasion the Supreme Court in Sunder 
Bai v. Devaji, has approved and affirmed the 
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principle of law laid down in Mst. Sardaram v. 
Shiv Lal wherein it was held that where the 
right claimed in both suits is the same the 
subsequent suit would be barred as res judicata 
though the right in the subsequent suit is 
sought to be established on a ground different 
from that in the former suit. It would be only 
in those cases where the right claimed in the 
two suits were different, that the subsequent 
suit would not be barred as res judicata even 
though the property was identical. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 Pat.365. 
A.I.R. 1952 Punj. 252. 
Held that… 
 In the above ruling the first suit was 
only to establish a charge on a certain 
property, while the second suit was based on 
ownership and on those circumstances it was 
held that the second suit was not suit for the 
same right that was litigated upon the first 
suit, and that not only were the grounds of 
title different from those of the first suit 
but the right itself was different, that is 
ownership in the case and a charge for 
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maintenance in the other and, therefore, it was 
held by the Full Bench that the plaintiff could 
not be said to be litigating under the same 
title as in the first suit, simply because the 
house in respect of which the two suits had 
been fought out was the same. 
 
A.I.R. 1957 Raj.321. 
A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 
A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1937 Mad.214. 
A.I.R. 1918 Bom.1. 
Held that… 
 But it is now a settled law affirmed by a 
long series of authorities of the Privy 
Council, Federal Court and various High Courts 
in India that a second suit for same relief for 
redemption of mortgage is maintainable even if 
a decree for redemption of mortgage had been 
obtained in a prior suit and had remained 
unexecuted or had become barred by lapse of 
time. So long as the right to redeem does not 
extinguish under Sec.60 of the Transfer of 
Property Act a second suit for the same relief 
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is not barred by res judicata. The 
extinguishment of the right of redemption can 
take place under the above section only by 
conduct of parties or by a decree of a court 
and in the latter case the decree, the meaning 
and the effect of the decree should clearly 
point out such extinguishment and it is only 
under such circumstances that prior decree can 
operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent 
suit for redemption of mortgage. 
 
A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 172. 
Held that… 
 
3. Where causes of action are different-
Whether res judicata.- 
The test as to whether a previous 
adjudication operates as a bar to a subsequent 
adjudication of the same matter does not lie in 
the fact as to whether the two causes of action 
are different or the same. 
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A.I.R. 1929 Cal.445. 
Held that… 
Where the causes of action in two suits are 
different the estoppel by res judicata should 
be limited to matters distinctly put in issue 
and determined in the prior action and it 
should further be restricted to questions of 
fact and mixed questions of law and fact and 
should not be extended to pure questions of 
law. 
 
A.I.R. 1935 Lah.369. 
Held that… 
Thus a Full Bench of Lahore High Court in 
Masjid Shahidganj v.S. G.P. Committee where a 
mutwalli of a mosque had filed a suit for 
possession of the mosque which was dismissed on 
the ground that the opposite party had acquired 
a title to it by adverse possession. The mosque 
subsequently having been demolished, another 
suit was subsequently brought on behalf of the 
mosque and the Muslim community for declaration 
of right to pray at the mosque and for its 
restoration. It was held by the majority of the 
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Bench (Din Mohammad, J., dissenting) that 
Sec.11, C.P.C., applies not only to the final 
decision but also to the issues. The real issue 
in the subsequent suit was whether the mosque 
in question retained its character as a mosque 
till when it was demolished. The decision of 
this issue depended upon the question whether 
the defendants had perfected their title by 
adverse possession and as a consequence the 
rights of all Mohammedans in the mosque had 
been lost, therefore even if there was no 
prayer for possession in the subsequent suit, 
it was barred by res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1954 Mys. 
Held that… 
Where the causes of action are different it 
cannot be said from the mere fact that the same 
relief is claimed in both, that the later suit 
is barred by reason of the earlier suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1937 Oudh 263. 
A.I.R. 1963 Raj. 119. 
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Held that… 
Thus where the plaintiff’s prior suit was for 
rectification of the sale-deed so as to show 
that the area of the property purchased was a 
certain figure and that possession over certain 
portion be decreed in his favour. In a 
subsequent suit it was prayed that portions of 
the building covered by the sale-deed in 
respect of which the defendant failed to 
deliver possession and wrongfully retained 
possession be decreed to him. It was held that 
though both suits arose out of the same 
transaction, the cause of action was different 
and the subsequent suit was not barred by 
Sec.11, C.P.C., or under O. II, r.2, C.P.C.  
 
A.I.R. 1961 H.P.18. 
A.I.R. 1963 Orissa 130. 
Held that… 
Where causes of actions and issues are 
different in such cases there are no 
conflicting decrees and the rule of res 
judicata is not attracted. Some of the 
circumstances may be enumerated where the 
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causes of action of issues were deemed to be 
different and the bar of res judicata was not 
applied. If the allegations made in the 
subsequent suit are not identical with the 
allegations made in the earlier suit, e.g. 
first suit for ejectment of tenant and second 
suit for possession against trespasser is not 
barred by res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1953 Assam.57(D.B.) 
Held that… 
 The decision of a prior suit between D and 
P for claim to an office will not bar by way of 
res judicata a subsequent suit between the son 
of D and son of P for the claim to the office 
wherein P claimed by virtue of his being the 
senior male member of the family and did not 
claim under his father D. 
 
A.I.R. 1933 Rang.106. 
A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 
A.I.R. 1922 All. 401(1). 
A.I.R. 1922 Upp.Bur.1. 
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Held that… 
Thus where first suit based on contract of 
lease and second suit for compensation based on 
tort or where first suit was for declaration of 
right to possession and second suit was for 
partition or first suit as reversioner and 
second suit as window’s heir or first suit for 
declaration of title only and second suit for 
possession or first suit was for interest and 
the subsequent suit for mortgage amount or 
first suit by co-heir for possession against 
widow which was conditionally decreed and 
ultimately suit was dismissed for non-
fulfillment of condition but a subsequent suit 
for possession against the donee was not barred 
by res judicata or first sent of ejectment 
decreed but decree allowed to become time-
barred.  
 
A.I.R. 1930 All.479. 
A.I.R. 1927 Pat.58. 
A.I.R. 1952 Punj.123. 
A.I.R. 1961 All.266(D.B.) 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 
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A.I.R. 1956 A.P. 141 (F.B.) 
Held that… 
The tenant meanwhile denied the title of the 
landholder a subsequent suit for ejectment on 
ground of forfeiture by denial of title, or 
first decree for cess does not operate as res 
judicata because cess is a recurring charge or 
first suit for arrear of rent and second suit 
for ejectment of the tenant or where in an 
earlier suit auction sale was challenged and in 
the subsequent suit private sale was challenged 
which came into existence subsequent to the 
auction sale and a fresh cause of action 
accrued in respect of the later sale-deed or 
where the earlier suit was instituted by A (the 
mother of the plaintiff in the subsequent suit) 
was a declaratory suit in a representative 
capacity. The cause of action was to remove the 
cloud on the title to the estate by reason of 
the alienation affected by her mother and the 
cause of action on which the subsequent suit 
was based was that on the death of the 
grandmother the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover possession of his grandmother’s 
properties.   
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A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 63. 
Held that… 
Illustrations 
 1. Heirs of a deceased Mohammedan sued his 
widow for immediate possion of his property 
held and retained in possession by the widow in 
lieu of dower debt, on the ground that the 
dower debt had already been satisfied. They 
also claimed mesne profits for same period 
before and during suit. The suit was decreed on 
condition that the plaintiffs were to pay to 
the widow certain amount as the balance of 
dower debt, within a certain time. The sum was 
not paid and the suit thus stood dismissed. The 
widow thereupon gifted away the property 
mentioning in the gift deed that she had become 
absolute owner of the property. It was held by 
the Privy Council that the effect of the non-
payment by plaintiff in the prior suit had not 
the effect of conferring absolute estate on the 
widow and the decision in the prior suit did 
not extinguish plaintiff’s right to claim 
possession at any future time, a question 
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different from that adjudicated, i.e. a right 
to immediate possession.  
    
A.I.R. 1935 Cal.607. 
Held that… 
 2. A landlord finled a suit of ejectment 
of tenant after giving notice to quit. The 
relationship of landlord and tenant was not 
proved and the suit was dismissed. The landlord 
subsequently filed a suit for rent against the 
defendants for the same land. This suit was 
also dismissed on the ground that relationship 
of landlord and tenant was not established. 
Another suit by the landlord was subsequently 
filed in which he stated that the defendants 
were his tenant but the tenancy had been 
terminated by reason of the denial of the 
defendants as to their relationship having been 
given effect to by the final decisions in the 
prior suits. The plaintiff based his cause of 
action on the forfeiture of the tenancy on two 
datas of the final decision in the prior suits 
and prayed for possession on declaration of 
title. It was held that the subsequent suit was 
not barred by res judicata. The judgments 
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passed therein were no doubt res judicata, but 
res judicata on a very limited point, viz. On 
the point that there was no relationship of 
landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and 
defendants at the time when the notice to quit 
was server or for period in claim in the rent 
suit. It was not res judicata on the point of 
the plaintiff’s title or on the point as to 
whether there was relationship of landlord and 
tenant between the plaintiff and defendant at a 
time prior to the date when the notice was 
served on the defendants. 
 
A.I.R. 1933 Rang. 106. 
Held that… 
 3. The plaintiff instituted a suit against 
the defendant on the allegation that the latter 
had rented a room in the former’s house and 
claimed rent for a certain period. This suit 
was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff 
did not prove tenancy. Subsequently plaintiff 
filed another suit against the defendant 
claiming compensation for use and occupation of 
that room by defendant for the same period. The 
lower court dismissed the second suit on the 
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ground of res judicata. It was held by the High 
Court that the first suit was based on contract 
and the second on tort and these two being 
mutually exclusive causes of action when 
plaintiff sued on one of them and failed he was 
entitled to sue on the other contrary cause of 
action and consequently the second suit was not 
barred by res judicata. 
 4. Where B was employed by N as his cash 
keeper and B and his father R jointly executed 
a bond to B as surety for the proper delivery 
of money’s received by B for N and N afterwards 
took two others as partners and on defalcation 
by B after the two partners came in N and his 
partners sued B and R on their surety bond the 
defence was that no cause of action arises 
against B and R, the plaintiffs were suing on 
the bond which was given to N alone, and not to 
the firm as formed subsequently to the 
execution of the bond and the suit was 
dismissed because under Sec. 260 of the 
Contract Act the surety bond was discharged. 
Held such dismissal could not affect any cause 
of action based on the debt against A and R. 
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A.I.R. 1942 Oudh.354. 
Held that… 
 5. Certain Hindu reversions brought a suit 
to recover possession of a share of certain 
land contesting a sale-deed executed by two 
widows, A and B. In that suit both the parties 
treated A alone as having title as a Hindu 
widow in the entire property sold and the 
defendants raised no plea based on title of B. 
The suit was decreed and a declaration was 
granted that the sale would be valid only for 
A’s lifetime. In a subsequent suit for 
possession of the property brought on the death 
of the widow the defendants raised a plea based 
on the title of B. Held that the decree in the 
previous suit related to the transfer of the 
whole of the property sold and not to a portion 
of it and that the defence based on the title 
of B as a co-vendor was barred by res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 204. 
A.I.R. 1929 All. 844. 
A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 194. 
Held that… 
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4. Cause of action accruing during the 
pendency or after the prior suit.- 
There can be no res judicata regarding a 
cause of action that arose subsequent to the 
prior suit, or if a cause of action in a 
subsequent suit had not arisen on the date of 
the presentation of the plaint in the prior 
suit.  
 
A.I.R. 1939 All. 52. 
A.I.R. 1932 All. 169. 
A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 788. 
Held that… 
Thus the decree in the previous suit awarding 
mesne profits up to the date of that suit can 
not be res judicata upon the question of mesne 
profits for the subsequent period because the 
cause of action for the two suits are quite 
different.  
 
A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 792. 
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Held that… 
The Calcutta High Court has enunciated the 
principle of divisibility of cause of action 
into prior and subsequent cause of action and 
has laid down that the cause of action of 
subsequent suit arising at the time of the 
previous suit, the previous suit does operate 
as res judicata in respect of the entire cause 
of action of the subsequent suit but where the 
cause of action is divisible into previous 
cause of action and subsequent cause of action 
only that part of the cause of action relied 
upon in the previous suit shall be barred by 
res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 668. 
Held that… 
Dismissal of the first suit for declaration of 
title is no bar to a subsequent suit for 
declaration of title by adverse possession 
which had matured subsequently. In all such 
cases where decree for possession was passed in 
favour of the plaintiff but the decree not 
having been executed within three years became 
unexcitable having become time-barred a fresh 
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suit for ejectment was not barred by res 
judicata because neither Sec.11, C.P.C., nor 
Sec.47, C.P.C., operate as a bar. The reason 
being that the plaintiff is not suing upon the 
same cause of action, he is alleging that he 
has obtained judgment and that the defendant is 
under a legal obligation to him under that 
judgment and that obligation arises out of 
matters subsequent to those litigated in the 
original suit. A decree determines questions 
between parties in litigation at the 
commencement of the suit, the plaintiff here is 
relying on something in his favour at the end 
of the suit and independent of questions 
originally litigated. Indeed, questions 
originally litigated cannot be reconsidered in 
the suit upon the decree and that is all 
Sec.11, C.P.C., provides. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 All.421. 
Held that… 
In cases of alienations and transfers by a 
senior member of the family and the same being 
cancelled or set aside on the suit of other 
members the vendee or transferee for 
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consideration are not barred from maintaining a 
suit for recovery of money. Thus where 
plaintiffs purchased a certain property from a 
Hindu father and the sale was subsequently 
cancelled in a suit by the sons to set it aside 
on their depositing a certain sum in court. 
Plaintiffs there after sued the sons of vendor, 
for the balance of the purchase money. Held 
that the suit is not barred by the principles 
of res judicata as money paid to the father as 
consideration for the sale at the time of the 
sale cannot be regarded as a debt of the father 
until the sale had been set aside and the right 
of the vendee to get back the sale 
consideration from the father has accrued. 
 
5. Recurring cause of action.- 
The right to sue for partition unlike 
other suits is a continuing right incidental to 
the ownership of the joint property. Therefore 
so long as the property remains joint 
notwithstanding the dismissal of previous suit 
one of the co-owners has a good cause of action 
to bring a fresh suit for partition. 
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A.I.R. 1923 All.761. 
Held that… 
A decision of a point of law does not operate 
as res judicata if the cause of action in a 
subsequent suit is different from that in the 
former suit as often happens in the case of 
recurring liability, such as maintenance 
allowance or even ejectment suits. Thus where a 
suit to eject a tenant accrues fresh every 
year, the previous decision that an ejectment 
suit was not maintainable in a Revenue Court 
cannot operate as res judicata. Thus where a 
joint owner fails to execute the decree which 
he obtained in a previous suit for partition, 
and brings a fresh suit for obtaining 
partition, it is not barred by previous non-
executed decree. A decree-holder is not barred 
from bringing a fresh suit for possession of 
property for which he got a conditional decree 
previously and failed to execute it. 
 
A.I.R. 1938 Mad.287. 
Held that… 
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Similarly in a suit for partition to which 
parties were Indian Christians, a decree for 
1/3 share was obtained by X in 1919 against her 
sister Y and her brother. The decree, however, 
was not executed as the parties had agreed in 
1920 not to take any advantage of the decree 
which had been passed and had continued to be 
in joint possession of the properties treating 
the decree as if it had not been in existence. 
The parties, however, fell out in 1932 and X 
having been forcibly dispossessed instituted a 
suit under Sec.9 (now Sec.6), Specific Relief 
Act, to recover possession of the properties of 
which she was dispossessed by Y through her 
husband and her son and obtained a decree, Y 
then filed a suit for partition and possession 
of her share which was contested by X as being 
barred by res judicata by reason of the decree 
in suit under Sec.9 (now Sec.6), Specific 
Relief Act. It was held that the parties did 
not give effect to the decree of 1919 and 
continued in joint possession of the properties 
as per subsequent agreement, the second suit 
for partition was not barred. The decision in 
suit under Sec.9 (now Sec.6), Specific Relief 
Act, operated as res judicata only to the 
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extent of the finding given therein that she 
was dispossessed and nothing more and did not 
operate as a bar to the second suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1926 Pat.288. 
Held that… 
 The right to bring a suit for partition, 
unlike other suits, is a continuing right 
incidental to the ownership of the joint 
property. It may be that at one time the desire 
for partition may cease, circumstances may 
again occur which make it desirable or 
necessary that partition should take place. It 
was further observed that no question of title 
was determined in the previous litigation ad so 
no question of res judicata arises.         
 Even if the cause of action for a suit is 
a recurring one, every matter decided in a 
previous suit may be res judicata which was 
substantially and directly in issue. 
 
A.I.R. 1945 Lah.210. 
Held that… 
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6. Constructive res judicata- Whether 
applicable.- 
The ordinary rule is that an alternative 
claim need not be added if there would be a 
distinct incongruity between the two claims and 
there would be a considerable incongruity if 
the plaintiff had been seeing on the basis that 
there was a valid sale in his favour and at the 
same time on the ground that the sale had been 
avoided at his instance. Thus where two 
distinct mortgages are created successively on 
the same property by the same debtor, in favour 
of the same creditor, the creditor may either 
sue on the first including the claim as to the 
second or sue separately on each claim and he 
is not debarred from adopting the latter 
procedure either by Sec.11, Explanation 4, or 
O.II, r. 2, C.P.C. 
 
A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 21. 
Held that… 
Similarly where the causes of action of the two 
suits are different the rule of constructive 
res judicata will not apply, e.g. where the 
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suit in the Revenue Court was for partition and 
the latter suit was filed in the civil court 
for a declaration of the plaintiff’s title as 
against strangers. It was held that the later 
suit was not barred by the principle of res 
judicata. 
 But in a suit for recovery of possession 
on the strength of title the plaintiff must 
establish his title in that very suit by urging 
and proving all that would go to establish his 
title. He cannot reserve one or more of such 
grounds for a future suit. Thus in a suit for 
possession if plaintiff sues for property on a 
false claim when he has a true claim and a 
cause of action for the same property of which 
he was aware, he must be taken to have 
abandoned his true claim and cause of action. 
Again, where a transaction of mortgage has 
become fully re-opened, so that the rights and 
liabilities of the parties can be dealt with by 
the Court before which the suit is brought in 
respect of that transaction, whether the suit 
is for foreclosure by the mortgagee or for sale 
by the mortgagee, or in the alternative for 
foreclosure or sale by the mortgagee or for 
redemption by he mortgagor, all questions 
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(including even claims for rent due on 
transactions inseparably connected with the 
mortgage) relating to the taking of accounts 
between the mortgagor and the mortgagee ought 
to be decided in one and the same suit and no 
second suit can be brought by either party 
arising out of that same transaction. Thus on a 
suit upon a mortgage where the defendant omits 
to put forward a counter-claim for any sum that 
may be due to him from the mortgagee arising 
out of the mortgage transaction a separate suit 
for recovery of that sum is not maintainable. 
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CHAPTER – 8 
PARTIES TO THE SUIT OR 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
SYNOPSIS 
1. Decision in a suit is res judicata 
only between the parties and their 
privies.- 
Parties to the suit or litigation may be 
of the following categories : 
 (a) Persons may be parties to the suit in 
which a decree or judgment has been obtained. 
 (b) Apart from the parties to the suit, 
persons who in the language of Sec.13 of the 
Civil Procedure Code, 1877 (now Sec, 11 of the 
present Code), claim under the parties to the 
former suit or, in the language of English law, 
privies to those parties. Privies are according 
to Lord Coke of three kinds-Privies to blood 
privies in estate, privies in law. In Wharton’s 
Law Lexicon, page 764, privies have been 
divided into six kinds: 
416 
 (1) Privies in blood, (2) Privies in 
representation, as the executor or 
administrator to his testator or intestate, (3) 
Privies in estate, (4) Privies in respect of 
contract, (5) Privies in respect of estate and 
contract; (6) Privies in law. 
 (c) Persons who though not claiming under 
the parties to the former suit were represented 
by them therein. Such are persons interested in 
the estate of a testator or intestate in 
relation to the executor or administrator; 
shareholders in a company in relation to the 
registered offices of that company, members of 
a joint undivided family in such cases as those 
referred to in Jogendra v. Funindro. Where the 
interest of a joint and undivided family being 
in issue, one member of that family has 
prosecuted a suit or has defended a suit, and a 
decree may afterwards be considered as binding 
upon all the members of the family, their 
interests being taken to have been sufficiently 
represented by the party to the original suit.” 
(d) Strangers, neither privies to nor 
represented by the parties to the former suit.  
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In the first place the judgment may be an 
honest one, obtained in a suit conducted with 
good faith on the part of both plaintiff and 
defendant. In such a case the previous judgment 
is clearly binding on classes (a), (b) and (c). 
Class (d) strangers to the former suit will be 
in no way affected by the judgment if it be 
inter parties; but if it be in rem passed by a 
competent court, they will be bound by and 
cannot controvert it. 
In the second place the judgment may be 
passed in a suit really contested by the 
parties thereto, but may be obtained by the 
fraud of one of them against the other. There 
has been a real battle but a victory unfairly 
won. In this, again classes (a), (b), (c) and, 
as regards judgment in rem, class (d) are in 
one and the same position, which is that of the 
parties themselves. The judgment is binding on 
them so long as it remains in force, but it may 
be impeached for fraud and set aside if fraud 
is proved.  
 
A.I.R. 1964 Manipur 2. 
Held that… 
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A matter to be res judicata must have been in 
issue in a former suit between the same parties 
or between parties under whom they or any of 
them claim, litigating under the same title. It 
is a fundamental proposition of the doctrine of 
res judicata that a decision in a suit operates 
and can operate as such only between parties to 
that suit and their privies. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 Lah.900. 
A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 
A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 161. 
Held that… 
Indeed the rule is generally in keeping with 
the existing law, in so far as the latter 
provides that unless the parties to the suits 
are the same or represent the same interest the 
decision of a matter in a prior suit does not 
bar the decision of the same matter in another 
suit.    
 
A.I.R. 1927 Lah.259. 
A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 252. 
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A.I.R. 1929 All. 500. 
A.I.R. 1964 Tripura 19. 
Held that… 
Hence a decree obtained in a suit to which the 
parties litigating a subsequent suit were not 
parties is not conclusive and binding as 
against them. But a party who is privy to a 
decree is bound by the decree whether he has 
notice thereof or not. But obviously a person 
interested in litigation is not bound to apply 
to make him a party and in default he is not 
bound by the result of the litigation. But it 
is reasonable that the same set of persons or 
persons claiming under them, should be bound by 
previous proceedings concerning the same 
matter. There is no hardship in holding that a 
man shall be bound by that which would have 
bound those under whom he claims quoad the 
subject-matter of the claim, for he who feels 
the advantage, ought also to feel the burden 
(qui sentit commodum sentire debet etonus), and 
no man can, save in certain cases excepted by 
the statute law and the law merchant, transfer 
to another a better right than he himself 
possesses. By parties must be understood all 
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who are individually named on the record. Hence 
a person who has purchased the equity of 
redemption prior to a suit brought to enforce 
the mortgage is not bound by the decision 
therein if he was not himself made a party to 
the suit. 
 
A.I.R. 1927 Oudh 354. 
Held that… 
But when an infant sues by his next friend, the 
infant is the party and not the next friend and 
the Court would look to the real parties in a 
benami transaction, and if they were the same, 
the action would be barred under this section. 
A party introduced in the record by fraud, and 
without his knowledge, would not be concluded. 
In determining the persons whose names are on 
the record, the time of the decision of the 
suit is looked at. Thus all those persons are 
deemed parties, whose names are on the record 
at the time of the decision. And a person 
intervening in a suit is considered a party, no 
matter at what stage of the suit he may 
intervene. But if at any stage a person 
withdraws himself by the leave of the Court, or 
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has his name struck off, or is dismissed from 
the suit, he cases to be a party, even though 
the order for striking off the name may have 
been given by mistake, and the name should have 
appeared in the final decretal order two years 
afterwards. But the wrong continuance of a 
person’s name as a plaintiff on the record 
after his withdrawal from the suit, will not 
affect the validity of the decrees passed 
against him on cross-petitions. And a person 
who will have died during the proceedings will 
not be a party, even if his name should have in 
ignorance of his death, remained on the record 
up to the decision, and a decision against him 
in such a case will not be res judicata against 
his representatives; though a subsequent suit 
on the same cause of action shall be barred 
under O.XXII, r.9(1) of the Code. Nor can a 
person whose name is not on the record when 
judgment is given or decree made, make himself 
a party by applying for the execution of the 
decrees. Persons other than parties to suit, in 
which a decree or judgment, to use the more 
general term, has been obtained, may be divided 
into three classes with reference to their 
position as affected by such judgment.  
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A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 108. 
Held that… 
A person who applied to be made a party but was 
refused is not bound by the decision in the 
suit. These classes are: 
 (a) Persons who in the language of the 
section claim under the parties to the former 
suit, or, in the language of English law, 
privies to those parties. 
 (b) Persons who though not claiming under 
the parties to the former suit were represented 
by them therein. Such are persons interested in 
the estate of a testator or intestate in 
relation to the executor or administrator; 
shareholders in a company in relation to the 
registered officer of that company, and in 
India members of a joint and undivided family, 
in such cases as those referred to in Jogendro 
v. Funindro. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 Oudh 342. 
A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 232. 
Held that… 
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 “Where the interest of a joint and undivided 
family being in issue, one member of that 
family has prosecuted a suit being in issue, 
one member of that family has prosecuted a suit 
or has defended a suit, and a decree has been 
made in that suit which may afterwards be 
considered as binding upon all the members of 
the family, their interests being taken to have 
been sufficiently represented by the party in 
the original suit.” 
 (c) Strangers, neither privies to nor 
represented by the parties to the former suit. 
When a judgment has established the right to 
any property between two parties, it is not 
open to a third person though not party to the 
judgment to set up the right of that party 
whose title has been found against as against 
the successful party. Such case forms the 
exception to the rule of res inter alias acta 
the decision as to the character of the 
plaintiff cannot be regarded as res judicata in 
a subsequent suit for maintenance when the 
defendants were not parties to those 
proceedings. 
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 As a rule where a decree has been honestly 
obtained without frand it cannot be 
subsequently disputed by the parties thereto or 
their privies or by persons who were 
represented by such parties. Strangers to the 
suit are not bound by such a decree if it be a 
decree inter partes, but if it be a decree in 
rem and passed by a competent Court, they are 
bound by it and cannot controvert it. But where 
a decree has been obtained by means of the 
fraud of one party against the other, it is 
binding on parties and privies and on persons 
represented by the parties so long as it 
remains in force, but it may be impeached for 
fraud and may be set aside if the frand is 
proved. In the case of judgments in rem the 
same rule holds good with regard to persons who 
are strangers to the suit. And where a decree 
has been obtained by the fraud and collusion of 
both the parties to the suit, it is binding 
upon the parties. It is also binding upon the 
privies of the parties; except probably, where 
the collusive fraud has been on a provision of 
the law enacted for the benefit of such 
privies. But persons represented by but not 
claiming through the parties to the suit may, 
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in any subsequent proceedings, whether as 
plaintiff or defendant, treat the previous 
judgment so obtained by fraud or collusion as a 
mere nullity, provided the fraud and collusion 
be clearly established. The same rule applies 
with regard to strangers where the previous 
judgment is a judgment in rem. 
 
A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 
Held that… 
It is unquestionable, as a general proposition, 
that where a person possesses an interest, 
acquired before the suit in an estate, which 
interest is not represented by any of the 
parties to the suit, the decision will not be 
res judicata against him. Thus a vendee from a 
party prior to a suit will not be bound. 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 633. 
Held that… 
 The Supreme Court has held that where Sec. 
11, C.P.C., does not apply in terms because the 
parties in prior suit and the subsequent suit 
are not the same nor parties claiming through 
them; it would not be permissible to rely upon 
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the general doctrine of res judicata. The Court 
while dealing with a suit can be the provisions 
of Sec.11, C.P.C., and no other. 
  
A.I.R. 1957 Ker.86. 
Held that… 
Where the parties in the two suits are 
different the prior finding cannot operate as 
res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1960 Raj. 
Held that… 
A prior decision cannot operate as res judicata 
against a defendant where he would have no 
right of appeal from that the ultimate judgment 
being in his favour.  
 
A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 507. 
Held that… 
Where in a previous proceeding for scaling down 
the debt of the mortgagor under Madras 
Agriculturists Relief Act, the parties were 
treated as debtor and creditor and the debt 
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under the mortgage was scaled down. In a 
subsequent suit for redemption of the mortgage 
by the mortgagor the defendants took the plea 
that the document was not a mortgage but lease. 
Held, that the previous suit between the same 
parties on the question of the nature of the 
document operated as res judicata.  
 
A.I.R. 1957 H.P. 16. 
Held that… 
Where in an earlier suit between A and B relief 
was claimed on the ground that the parties held 
the land in lieu of rendering services, viz. 
Sevapuja to the deity and in subsequent suit 
brought by B against A and deity it was urged 
that parties were not identical. Held, that the 
right in the earlier suit was claimed through 
the deity in the earlier suit and parties in 
both suit are identical hence the prior 
decision operated as res judicata on the 
general principles of res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1952 Nag.129. 
Held that… 
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 But a succeeding tenant is not precluded 
from moving an application for fixation of fair 
rent of the same premises about which the Rent 
Controller had fixed a fair rent (under C.P. 
and Berar Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949) 
at an earlier occasion with the outgoing 
tenant. The Rent Controller can always consider 
the circumstances whether the rent fixed is 
insufficient or excessive. Neither the earlier 
order of the Rent Controller fixing a fair rent 
operates as res judicata nor on the principles 
of natural justice a succeeding tenant was 
bound by a decision to which he was not a 
party. 
 
A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 248. 
A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 750. 
A.I.R. 1953 T.C. 245. 
Held that… 
Where only one of the parties to the subsequent 
suit for instance defendant alone was involved 
in the previous litigation and the plaintiff 
was not a party thereto, the previous judgment 
although does not constitute res judicata yet 
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has abundant evidentiary value and the court 
has to pay attention to it. 
  
A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 63. 
Held that… 
 Where two brothers filed separate writ 
petitions against orders of allotment of land 
by Custodian of Evacuee Property in respect of 
different properties and both writs were 
dismissed and only one brother filed Letters 
Patent Appeal it was held that there was no 
question of conflicting decisions as the 
parties for all practical purposes were 
different. 
 A judgment of a superior court of record 
like a High Court has effect on two classes of 
persons. Firstly, as between the parties to the 
judgment and their privies it is binding and 
conclusive unless reversed by a superior court 
of appeal or amended by the Court itself, 
according to law. Moreover the original cause 
of action on the basis of which the action 
commenced is merged in the judgment and its 
place is taken by the rights created between 
the parties by virtue of the judgment. 
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A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 46 (D.B.). 
Held that… 
But as regards persons who are not parties to 
the judgment, and it becomes a valuable 
precedent on any disputed point of law, not 
merely as a guide but as an authority to be 
followed by all courts of co-ordinate or 
inferior jurisdiction administering the same 
system until it is overruled by a Court of 
superior jurisdiction or by a validly enacted 
statue. It has been pointed out in Halsbury’s 
Laws of England, III Ed., Vol. 22, p. 796: 
 “the enunciation of the reason or 
principle on which the question before a court 
has been decided, is alone binding as a 
precedent. This underlying principle is often 
termed the ratio decidendi, that is to say, the 
general reasons given for the decision or the 
general grounds on which it is based, detached 
or abstracted from the specific peculiarities 
of a particular case which give rise to the 
decision. The concrete decision alone is 
binding between the parties to it, but it is 
the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a 
consideration of the judgment in relation to 
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the subject-matter of the decision which alone 
has the force of law.” 
 “Reciprocity” Test. – Mr. Spencer speaking 
of the English law says: 
 “Mutuality, or reciprocity, is often said 
to be a condition of estoppel by res judicata. 
This means that where A is said to be estopped 
as against B by a judicial decision, it has 
always been considered material, in the 
solution of the question, to inquire whether, 
if the decision has been the other way, B would 
have been estopped thereby as against A. This 
question has not yet received an authoritative 
decision in India.  
 
A.I.R. 1963 All.  
Held that… 
 
2. Proper parties and necessary parties-
Impleadment of.- 
In respect of every suit there are certain 
persons who are essential to be impleaded as 
defendants; if they are not, no relief can be 
granted against them or in the suit. These 
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persons full into two classes, (1) of those 
against whom the relief is sought, and (2) 
those whom the law requires to be impleaded as 
defendants, even though no relief is sought 
against them. Under O. I, r. 3, C.P.C., all 
persons against whom any right to relief is 
alleged to exist should be impeaded as 
defendants. No relief can be granted against a 
person who has not been impleaded as a 
defendant. If relief can be claimed against two 
persons but only one is impleaded as a 
defendant relief can be granted against him 
only; not only can no relief be granted against 
the other but also the fact that the other has 
not been impleaded will not cause relief to be 
refused against the one impleaded, see R.9 of 
O.I. There are various provisions in statutes 
requiring certain persons to be impleaded as 
defendants, such as O.XXXIV, r.1,C.P.C., 
Secs.49,59,183 and 246 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. 
If these persons are not impleaded as 
defendants the suit will fail. Order I, rule 9, 
is subject to any special or local law, or any 
special form of procedure prescribes by any 
other law, vide Sec.4, C.P.C. Consequently if 
any law prescribes that a certain person must 
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be impleaded as a defendant, even though no 
relief is sought against him, the failure to 
implead him will be fatal to the suit, 
notwithstanding the provision in O.I, r.9. 
Persons who are not essential to be impleaded 
as defendants to a suit again fall in two 
classes, (1) of those who are in some way 
interested in, or connected with, the relief 
sought against others and (2) of others, who 
are not at all interested in, or connected 
with, it. Persons of the latter class must not 
be impleaded as defendants at all, but persons 
of the former class may be impleaded as proper 
parties at the discretion of the plaintiff by 
way of abundant caution, or to avoid future 
litigation and the relief will not be refused 
on the ground that they have not been 
impleaded.  
 
3. Res judicata as between co-
defendants.- 
This section does not preclude the 
decision upon any issue from operating as res 
judicata merely because the issue is raised as 
between co-defendants if the matter involved 
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was directly and substantially in issue in a 
former suit and the other necessary conditions 
are satisfied. The words “between the same 
parties” in this section qualify not only the 
words “former suit” but the whole expression 
“in issue in a former suit”.  
 
A.I.R. 1927 Rang. 
A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 114. 
A.I.R. 1932 All.643. 
A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 271. 
A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 231. 
A.I.R. 1963 Guj.183. 
Held that… 
But in order that a finding in a case should be 
res judicata between co-defendants, three 
things are necessary, (I) that there should be 
a conflict of interest between co-defendants; 
(ii) that it should be necessary to decide on 
that conflict in order to give to the plaintiff 
the relief appropriate his suit; and (iii) that 
the judgment should contain a decision of the 
question raised as between the co-defendants.  
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A.I.R. 1950 Assam 119. 
Held that… 
And the co-defendants must have been either 
necessary or at least proper parties in the 
former suit. 
A.I.R. 1931 P.C.  
A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 115. 
Held that… 
 If the above three conditions are 
fulfilled it is immaterial whether the co-
defendant did not enter an appearance in the 
earlier suit and also that he was not a 
necessary party to the suit, if the appellant 
was at all events a proper party to the suit 
and had the right to be heard if he so desired. 
If his legal position.   
 
A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 250 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
Where conflict of interest between co-
defendants was decided against defendant and he 
did not file appeal but filed a subsequent suit 
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the earlier decision would constitute bar of 
res judicata. 
 
A.I.R. 1958 Assam 179 (D.B.) 
Held that… 
Thus where in a previous suit under O.XXI, r. 
63, C.P.C., by the decree-holder against the 
claimant wherein judgment-debtor was also 
impleaded as a pro forma defendant, it was 
found that the property belonged to the 
claimant and not to the judgment-debtor and the 
finding was upheld in appeal. A subsequent  
suit by the successor of the judgement-debtor 
against the claimant was held to be barred by 
res judicata on the ground that a decision 
would operate as res judicata even as against a 
proforma defendant in a previous suit, when it 
is clear that his interest was in conflict with 
that of the other set of defendants and the 
plaintiff could not get relief without a 
decision of that conflict by the court. The 
test of res judicata between co-defendants will 
apply where an issue between co-defendants on 
the question which was necessary to be 
determined in order to give plaintiff the 
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relief he claims and the question was in fact 
so determined. And the following passage from 
Cottingham v. Earl of Shrewsbury2 was quoted 
with approval by their Lordship of the Pivy 
Council in Minni Bibi v. Triloki Nath3. 
“If a plaintiff cannot get at hisright 
without tying and deciding a case between 
co-deendants, the Court will try and 
decide that case, and the co-defendants 
will be bound, but if the relief given to 
the plaintiff does require or involve a 
decision of any case between co-
defendants, the co-defendants will not be 
bound as between each of them by any 
proceeding which may be necessary only to 
the decree the plaintiff obtains.” 
The same rule was reiterated by the Privy 
Council in a more recent case of Chandu Lal V. 
Khalilur Rehman4, with the further observation 
that the doctrine may apply even though the 
party against whom it is sought to enforce it 
did not in the previous suit think fit to enter 
appearance and contest the question. But to 
this the qualification must be added that, if 
such party is to be bound by a previous 
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judgement and it must be proved that he had or 
must be deemed to have had notice that the 
relevant question was in issue and would have 
to be decided. A matter raised and actually 
contested between co-defendants in prior suit 
will operate as res judicata in a subsequent 
suit in which such co-defendants are arrayed as 
plaintiff and defendant5. Another phase of the 
same question is that a decision will operate 
as res judicata between defendants inter se 
only if there was an active controversy between 
time and a judgement was given defining their 
rights and obligation inter se1. That is to 
say, for a decision in a previous suit to 
operate is res judicata between two co-
defendants an adjudication defining their 
rights and obligations inter se is absolutely 
necessary2. That adjudication may however be 
actual or implied3. Where the position of co-
respondents was that of co-defendants and that 
question not being in dispute before them the 
finding in the case could not be conclusive4. 
It is nevertheless necessary to establish that 
there was a conflict of interest among the 
defendants inter se5. It is further necessary 
that there should be a conflict distinctly and 
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expressly raised between them and the decision 
of that conflict as between them should be 
necessary for the disposal of the suit6. A 
judgement can operate as res judicata between 
co-defendants where there interests are 
conflicting. It is otherwise, however, where 
there is no conflict of interest and no 
decision as between the defendants themselves8, 
and still more where the defendant in the 
subsequent suit was not a necessary party in 
the prior suit and even the adjudication was 
obtained by a fraudulent concealment of the 
true fatcts9. It will be a fortiory case where 
a decision as between the defendants was not 
necessary to give the appropriate relief to the 
plaintiff and defendants. But for this effect 
to arise, there must be conflict of interests 
amongst the defendants and a judgement defining 
the real rights and obligations of the 
defendants inter se. without necessary the 
judgement will not be res judicata amongst the 
defendants, not will it be res judicata amongst 
them by mere inference from the fact that they 
have collectively been defeated in resisting a 
claim to a share made against them as a group2. 
The rule is, in fact, of quite a general 
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application that if a plaintiff cannot get at 
his right without trying and deciding a case 
between co-defendants the court will try and 
decide that case and the co-defendants be   
bound3. But if the relief given to the 
plaintiff does not require or involve a 
decision of any case between co-defendants, the 
co-defendants will not be bound as between each 
other by any proceeding which may be necessary 
only to the decree the plaintiff obtains4. It 
is thus clear that when the same parties were 
contending in the former suit, in fact though 
not in form, as where they were co-defendants 
on the record, but their interests were 
different, and there was an issue between them, 
when in the position of plaintiff and 
defendant. On the same principle, a decision as 
to a common question, such as the tenure of a 
village community, in a suit by one member of 
the community against the other members would 
not be a res judicata so as to bar a subsequent 
suit involving that same question between the 
defendants, unless the defendants were 
distinctly at issue on the point, and acted as 
opposite parties, and the order made so as to 
affect the rights of the defendants among 
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themselves1. A decree for partition is not like 
a decree for money or the delivery of specific 
property, which is in favour of the plaintiff 
in the suit. It is a joint declaration of the 
rights of persons interested in the property of 
which partition is sought, and such a decree, 
when properly drawn up, is in favour of each 
shareholder or set of shareholders having a 
distinct share2. Hence where in a suit for 
partition the decree declares the shares of 
every one of the parties interested in the 
property, the declaration as to the extent of 
the shares of the defendants is as binding 
between the co-defendants them selves as 
between the defendants and the plaintiff3. But 
the decision in a previous suit for ejecting 
the defendants on the ground of trespass does 
not operate as res judicata on the question of 
the validity of the partition deed, where there 
was no contest between the defendants and where 
it was not necessary for one of them to raise 
the question of validity of the partition4. 
Similarly, where in 1911 the proprietors of 
one-third share4 of a zamindari sued the 
tenure-holders for arrears of rent at the rate 
of Rs.1,518 odd on the basis of a lease which 
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described the area as 675 bighas and the latter 
contended that they were in occupation of only 
400 bighas and the rent was accordingly only 
Rs.900 and it was subsequently agreed that the 
area was 545 bighas and the suit was decreed on 
those terms, and then the proprietors of the 
remaining two-thirds share of the zamindari 
sued the tenure-holders for arrears of rent, 
impleading the proprietor of the one-third 
share, under Sec. 148-A of the Bengal Tenancy 
Act as a pro forma defendant,the tenure-holders 
again set up the same plea and it was decided 
that the rent was only Rs.900 and in the 
present suit by the proprietors of the one-
third share for rent, tenure-holders pleaded 
that the decree in the second suit operated as 
res judicata, it was held that it did not 
operate as res judicata inasmuch as the 
question of the amount of rent payable which 
was issue between the plaintiff-landlord and 
the tenure-holder in the second suit was not 
directly and substantially in issue between the 
pro forma defendants and the contesting 
defendants5. So also the decision in a previous 
suit for a declaration that the mortgage was 
without consideration and necessity to the 
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effect that all the consideration had not 
passed and that necessity was not proved does 
not operate as res judicata on the question of 
the validity of the mortgage deed, where there 
was no conflict of interests between the 
mortgagor and the mortgagee and no contest 
between them6. It is other wise, however, where 
a pusine mortgagee brought a suit on the foot 
of his mortgage and impleaded the mortgagor and 
the prior mortgagee as defendants to the suit 
and the mortgagor denied his liability under 
the prior mortgage, and an issue as to the 
validity and binding character of the prior 
mortgage was tried and decided against the 
mortgagor1. But an ex part decree on a bond 
obtained against two joint debtors does not 
operate as res judicata as between those two 
debtors, when the question of their respective 
liability is raised in a contribution suit 
brought by one of them against the other2. It 
will be a fortiori case where the decree in the 
former suit had been simply one dismissing the 
suit and saying nothing as to the merits of 
either of the rival defendants of the liability 
between two defendants inter se was left 
undetermined. In this connection recollect that 
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the fact that the defendant in the previous 
suit had no right of appealing against the bar 
decision because the suit was dismissed, will 
not affect the operation of the bar, when such 
defendant having the right to be joined as a 
plaintiff chose to contest the suit as a co-
defendant5. A part from it, where a decision 
dismissing a suit in fact is wholly against the 
defendant, such defendant can appeal against 
it6. A decision of issue in a precious suit 
between co-defendants cannot operate as res 
judicata if such decision is obtained by 
collusion and fraud and under circumstances 
when parties cannot be said to be properly 
represented7. The judgement given in anearlier 
suit under O.XXI, r. 63, P.C., would operate as 
res judicata as between co-defendants, provided 
the three requisite conditions for the 
applicability of the rule of res judicata 
between co-defendants are satisfied8. But where 
compromise was entered into between plaintiff 
and eontesting  defendants only the rest were 
treated ex parte and the determination of 
rights inter se was not necessay nor was there 
any such determination either directly or by 
implication. The compromise decree will not 
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operate as res judicata against non-contesting 
defendants, but it is evidence of fact that a 
suit was brought and also that compromise was 
entered into9. 
 An ex parte decree can also operate as res 
judicata. And it will so operate between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. If a defendant 
does not appear or does not file a written 
statement, the claim will be deemed to have 
been derived. There can be no presumption that 
if the defendant does not appear it will be 
deemed in that he has admitted the plaintiff’s 
claim. The matters at issued and decided in 
that case, therefore become res judicata 
between them. But an ex parte decree cannot 
operate as res judicata between co-defendants 
inter se as the conditions for the 
applicability of the principles of res judicata 
among co-defendants are not fulfilled10. Thus 
where a suit brought by plaintiff-creditor for 
recovery of debt against the widow and adopted 
son of the deceased debtor the adopted son 
remained ex parte throughout. The widow in her 
written statement had derived that the co-
defendant to be an adopted son of her husband. 
The suit was decided against the widow and a 
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decree was passed against the assets of the 
deceased. The finding of the other co-defendant 
being an adopted son of the deceased, is res 
judicata between plaintiff and the widow but in 
a subsequent suit between the widow and the 
other co-defendant the question of being 
adopted son of deceased cannot operate as res 
judicata1. 
 
4. Res judicata as between co-
plaintiffs.-  
The principal res judicata is applicable 
in a dispute between the co-plaintiff2. But for 
a decision to be res judicata between co-
plaintiffs the same conditions that are 
required in the case of codefendants are 
essential3. Accordingly it has been held that a 
finding to become res judicata as between co-
plaintiffs must have been essential for the 
purpose of giving relief against the 
defendants4. It has even been held that the 
doctrine of res judicata can be applied only to 
questions which have been actively contested in 
the earlier of the proceedings5. It has som 
what similarly been hold that in the absence of 
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a conflict of interest between persons ranged 
as co-plaintiffs in a suit, the decision in the 
suit would not bind their successors as res 
judicata6. It has also somewhat similarly been 
held that the decision in a former suit on a 
point of fact, which was not directly and 
substantially in issue in that suit, cannot 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit as 
between parties who were arrayed on the same 
side in the former suit with no difference 
whatever between them7. As an instance of the 
cases in which a decision is binding on the 
plaintiffs7 inter se, reference may be made to 
the case of Krishnan v. Kanan8 in which a 
decision in a suit by the vendor and purchaser 
of a property against the persons in possession 
of it negativing the vendor’s title to it was 
held to be res judicata as to that title in a 
suit by the purchaser for the recovery of the 
purchase money and the cost incurred by him in 
the previous litigation. 
 As between paties arrayed on the same side 
in the previous litigation whether as co-
plaintiffs or as co-defendants, a matter can be 
es judicata only if in the previous suit there 
was a matter directly and substantially in 
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issue between the co-plaintiffs or the the co-
defendants and an adjudication upon that matter 
was necessary to the determination of the suit. 
It is well settled that unless there is an 
active contest between the parties arrayed on 
the same side in the previous suit, a decision 
with regard to which contest is necessary for 
the final determination of the matter in 
controversy in the suit, any decision given in 
the previous suit cannot operate as res 
judicata between them or between parties 
claiming through or under them in any 
subsequent suit9. Similarly, it has been held 
that an issue may be res judicata between co-
plaintiffs as well as co-defendants and 
although for an issue to be res judicata 
between co-plaintiffs there must be a eal 
contest between them yet when the interestsof 
various plaintiffs are common and no question 
of adopting two conflicting position as between 
themselves arises the decision arrived at by 
the united efforts of all will bind them for 
ever, especially when the only person concerned 
in holding the opposite positions had a full 
fight10. A female inherited some watan and non-
watan lands from her father. A died leaving 
449 
behind her husband B and three daughters C, D 
and E, B obtained decree for recovery of watan 
lands on his own behalf and on behalf of 
daughters C, D, E. Subsequently C married and 
sued her father for 1/3 share. It was held that 
former suit by B did not operate as res 
judicata as against C because it was not 
necessary in the former case to decide the 
rights between daughters and the father inter 
se1. On principle the rule of res judicata will 
not apply unless there is a conflict of 
interest among the co-plaintiffs, and a 
judgement defining the real rights and 
obligations of the co-plaintiffs inter se. 
Further the adjudication inter se between the 
co-plaintiffs should have been necessary to 
give appropriate relief to the defendants2. 
 
5. Pro forma defendants.-  
A person who is added as a pro forma 
defendant to a suit is concluded by the 
decision come to in that suit3. In other words, 
a person, who has been impleaded in a suit 
merely for the sake of form, will be a party to 
the suit, so as to be barred by a decision 
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therein4. It is sometimes mainly with that a 
person is made a party. The decision in such a 
case must therefore be treated as an 
adjudication of the right as between the 
plaintiffs on the one side and the defendants 
collectively and severally on the other except 
only so far as the decree itself contains any 
modification or reservation in regard to any of 
the individual rights5. A decision arrived at 
in a previous suit cannot operate as res 
judicata against a person who was in that suit 
merely a nominal defendant6. Thus where an 
issue relating to A’s rights in the property 
claimed by B from C and others, in possession 
of the said property, is decided by a court 
unnecessarily against A who is not in 
possession of the property in dispute and from 
whom no relief is asked by B while the ultimate 
determination of the suit proceeds upon a 
different ground, its decision thereon does not 
become res judicata in a subsequent suit 
brought by A against B and others for 
recovering his interest in the property 
previously in dispute7. 
 There is a divergence of judicial of 
opinion on the question whether an earlier 
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decision against a defendant, who was only a 
pro forma defendant and against whom no relief 
was claimed the earlier decision shall or shall 
not operate as res judicata against such pro 
forma defendant. 
 The Calcutta High Court relying on Privy 
Council decision in Minni Bibi V. Triloki Nath1 
observed on the relevant passage of the above 
case at page 166: 
“It is true that the appellant did not 
enter an appearance in the suit, and it is 
also said that she was not a necessary 
party to it; but their Lordships do not 
regard either of these factors as really 
material. The appellant was at all events 
a proper party to the suit and had the 
right to be heard if she so desired. If 
she chose to stand by……it could not affect 
her legal position.” 
 And followed by two later decision of the 
Privy Council to the same effect in Maung Sein 
Done V. Ma Pan Nyun2. The above three decision 
of the Privy Council were given while 
cosidering the question of res judicata as 
applicable between co-defendants. The view of 
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Calcutta High Court finds support in Sethurama 
Iyer v. Ram Chandra Iyer3,Mohendra Nath v. Mst. 
Shamsunnessa Khatun4, Hafiz Mohammed v. Swarup 
Chand Hukum Chand5, Firm Deoki Nandon Roy v. 
kalee Pershad6, Manjur Mondal V. Ahmmad Mondal. 
A party may be joined as a defendant in a suit 
merely because his presence is necessary in 
order to enable the court to effectively and 
completely adjudicate upon the questions 
involved in the suit. In such a case, no relief 
is sought against him and the matter in issue 
between him and any other party. A decision in 
such a suit cannot be res judicata against him 
or his representatives-in-interest in 
subsequent proceedings8. In a case where a co-
mortgagee field a suit against the mortgagor 
impleading other mortgagees as defendants, the 
suit was dismissed in default, subsequently the 
other mortgagees filed a suit against the 
mortgagor. It was held O. IX, r.9, was 
inapplicable in such a case, and the subsequent 
suit is not barred under the same9. 
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6. Judgement against benamidar is res 
judicata against real owners- 
A judgement against the benamidar is res 
judicata against the true owner10. In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary it is to be 
presumed that the benamidar has instituted the 
suit with the full authority of the beneficial 
owner11. The decision in the suit would be as 
much binding upon the real owner, as if the 
suit had been brought by the real owner12. The 
principle is the same whether the suit is 
instituted by or against the benamidor. The 
decision in the suit, in either case, is 
equally binding on the real owner13. 
 The decision is conclusive between the 
parties both as regards the character in which 
the suit is brought and as to the rights 
declared by the decree. But a third party who 
is not a party to the suit may show that the 
suit was really carried on for his benefit1. A 
decree between benamidar and real owner, though 
collusive, would be binding on them2. But the 
rule of res judicata has been made applicable 
in cases of decree in favour of or against a 
benamidar where the real owner has allowed the 
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dispute to fought out between his benamidar and 
a third party and has abstained from coming 
forward3. 
 A benamidar repesents the real owner and a 
decree , the person claiming to be beneficially 
entitled, though not a party is fully affected 
by the rule of res judicata. It is a well 
settled rule of law that unless there is an 
allegation of fraud or collusion the real owner 
is as much bound by the decree passed in a suit 
by or against farzidar (banamidar) as the 
farzidar himself and the onus to prove fraud is 
on the real owner. But if a transaction is not 
intended to be given effect to, or if a 
document of title is executed only as a sham 
and showy deed, there is no real purchaser, and 
the principles of a benamidar representing the 
real owner are not applicable to such a case 
and the previous suit for declaration of title 
and possession by the so-called benamidar would 
not operate as res judicata in a subsequent 
suit by the real owner. The distinction between 
a benami transaction and a sham transaction has 
been clearly laid down by their Lordship of the 
Supreme Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. 
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Commissioner of Income-tax, in the following 
words: 
“In this connection, it is necessary 
to note that the word ‘benami’ is issued 
to denote two classes of transaction which 
differ from each other in their legal 
character and incidents. In one sense, it 
signifies a transaction which is real, as 
for example, when A sells properties to B 
but the sale-deed mentions X as the 
puchaser. Here the sale itself is genuine, 
but the real purchaser is B, X being the 
benamidar. This is the class of 
transactions which is usually termed as 
benami. But the word benami is also 
occasionally used perhaps not quite 
accurately, to refer to a sham 
transaction, as for example, when A 
pur[orts to sell his property to B without 
intending that his title should cease or 
pass to B. The fundamental difference 
between these two classes of transaction 
is that whereas in the former is an 
operative transfer resulting in the 
vesting of title in the transferee, in the 
latter there is none such, the transferor 
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continuing to retain the title 
notwithstanding the execution of the 
transfer deed. It is only in the former 
class of cases that it would be necessary 
when a dispute arises as to whether the 
person named In the deed is the real 
transferee, or B, to enquire into the 
question as to who paid the consideration 
for the transfer, X or B. But in the 
latter class of cases, when the question 
is whether the transfer is genuine or 
sham, the point for decision would be not 
who paid the consideration but whether any 
consideration was paid.” 
 
7. Judgement against minor how far res 
judicata.-  
In a suit instituted on behalf of, or 
against a minor, the minor is the party to the 
suit, and not his  guardian or next friend who 
should have really instituted or defended it. 
Hence a decree passed against a mino properly 
represented is binding upon him. But a minor is 
not bared by res judicata where there was 
negligence of the next friend in the previous 
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suit as where he failed to putforward a plea on 
behalf of the minor which it was his duty to 
put forward and the suit was decided against 
the minor. But where no fraud or negligence is 
proved a previous decision will operate as a 
bar. A guardian ad litem who omits to set up a 
real defence on behalf of the minor and 
deliberately sets up a false plea instead, is 
guilty of gross negligence and a decision in 
such a suit will not be res judicata against 
the minor. Certain creditors of the defendant 
filed insolvency prtitions to adjudicative him 
insolvent. But before any order of adjudication 
was passed the creditors applied to withdraw 
the insolvency petitions on account of 
compromise entered into between the defendants 
and his creditors and the minor creditors nor 
any counsel had certified to the court that 
compromise was beneficial to the interest of 
the minor nor did the insolvency court consider 
the question that that compromise was 
beneficial to the minor and under the 
compromise the creditors were to accept only 
eight annas in a rupee in full satisfaction of 
the debts. Held that the order granting leave 
to withdraw the insolvency petition did not 
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constitute res judicata so far as the question 
whether compromise was beneficial to the minors 
was concerned, that the guardian acted in a 
manner highly prejudical to the interest of the 
minor. Hence the compromise was not binding on 
the minor and he was entitled by a subsequent 
proceeding to recover the full amount due. 
 Decree obtained against a minor 
represented by a guardian ad litem and if no 
negligence on the part of the guardian in 
conducting the previous litigation is made out, 
a subsequent suit by the same issue is clearly 
barred by Sec.11, C.P.C. 
 Whether a minor can avoid a decree passed 
against him on the ground of gross negligence 
of the guardian ad litem even if the minor had 
not succeeded in proving fraud and collusion on 
the part of the guardian ? The Madras High 
Court has held in affirmative. The same view 
was affirmed by the Calcutta High Court which 
has held that the minor’s right to bring such a 
suit is an exception to the ordinary rule 
according to which a decree can be set aside 
only on grounds of fraud and collusion and is 
based on board principles of justice, equity 
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and good conscience. Neither Sec. 2 or Sec. 44 
of the Evidence Act nor Sec. 11, C. P.G., bars 
such a suit. The Lahore High court, the Patna 
High Court, the Travancore-Cochin High Court 
and Cochin High court, and Allahabad High court 
have affirmed the same view. The Allahabad High 
court in Siraj Fatma V. Mahmood Ali’s case has 
further laid down the test to be applied in 
such cases: 
“The test of negligence should be the 
not doing of what a reasonable man guided 
by prudent considerations which regulate 
the conduct of human affairs would do or 
doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would nor do. The 
negligence in order to be a good ground 
for the avoidance of a decree must be of 
such a nature as to justify the inference 
that the minor’s interests were not at all 
protected and therefore he was not 
properly represented. The direct result of 
the negligence must be a serious prejudice 
to the minor and the negligence must not 
be merely such as might be innocently 
committed even by a reasonable person 
taking the ordinary precautions which he 
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would have taken in his own case. Where 
the negligence is so gross as to amount to 
a clear violation of the duty cast upon 
the guardian, although not brought to the 
notice of the court at the time the decree 
can be avoided.” 
 The Bombay High Court in the earlier 
decision shared the above view. But the latter 
decision of the same High Court have taken a 
contrary view. In view of the preponderance of 
authorities of the other High Courts the Bombay 
view does not lay down the correct law. 
 But whether the failure on the part of the 
guardian to file an appeal amounts to gross 
negligence it has been held that a guardian who 
after defending the suit bona fide and 
conducting it to the best of his ability elects 
to abide by the decision given by the Court 
without preferring an appeal against it holding 
it to be correct and that an appeal would be 
useless cannot be said to have acted 
negligently in not preferring an appeal. 
Similarly where the plaintiff’s guardian was 
his own brother who was as much interested in 
success of the suit as the plaintiff was; and 
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there was no proof that the guardian acted 
negligently in conducting the suit, nor was 
there any proof of collusion. The only 
negligence alleged was after the decision of 
trial country by not preferring an appeal, it 
was held that negligence was a beach of duty 
caused by the omission to do something which a 
reasonable and prudent man guided upon  those 
considerations which ordinarily regulate such 
conduct and which a reasonable or prudent man 
would not do. The standard by which it is 
determined whether or not a person is guilty of 
negligence is the conduct of a prudent man in 
the particular situation. Judging from this 
standard the guardian who failed to file an but 
who contested the suit to the best of his 
ability cannot be guide of any negligence much 
less gross negligence and the plaintiff in the 
subsequent suit is bound by the decree in the 
previous suit on the ground of res judicata. 
 Thus where sanction is accorded by the 
Court to bring about a compromise, it will be 
deemed to be beneficial to the interest of the 
minor, if it secures to the minor demonstrable 
advantage or averts some obvious mischief. No 
doubt in face of the certificate of the Court 
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onus lies on the plaintiffs to prove fraud or 
collusion, or that interest of minor was not 
properly safeguarded, or that the Court was not 
informed of all the circumstances when it 
accorded the sanction for compromise. But the 
sanction does not stand in the way of minor 
getting the compromise decree set aside if the 
compromise is against the interest of the minor 
and brought about by gross negligence.  
 Where in a declaratory suit by F against 
his brother G and vendees C and H on the 
allegation that G had no right to sell the 
joint property to C and H, and the sale-deed 
was void being without legal necessity and 
without consideration. The trial court decreed 
the suit. The lower appellate court holding the 
sale-deed to be valid dismissed the suit. The 
plaintiff field a second appeal against C and 
H, the vendees only. It was held that on the 
failure of the plaintiff to implead his brother 
G as a party to the second appeal, there was no 
appeal against the finding of the lower 
appellate court holding the sale-deed to be 
valid, which became final and consequently 
became res judicata between the plaintiff nd 
the brother G and must also be regarded as res 
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judicata between the plaintiff and the vendees 
to C and H who claimed through G.  
 When the person who appointed guardian for 
the suit of a minor defendant whose interest 
was adverse to that of the minor it could not 
be said that the minor was properly represented 
in the suit. Therefore minor was not a party in 
the proper sense of the term.  
 Such a decree if passed in the suit is a 
nullity so far as the minor is concerned.  
 In a case in which proposed guardian has 
expressed his unwillingness to be the guardian 
and the Court proceeds without appointing 
another person as guardian, the minor has not 
been represented in the suit. The decree in 
such a suit cannot operate as res judicata. 
 
8.Parties in subsequent suit claiming 
under parties in former suit.- 
 A suit by or against parties who claim 
under or through the parties in the original 
decided case is barred by this section. But in 
order to estop a party in a subsequent suit by 
the decision in a former suit against another 
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party on the ground that the former claims 
under the letter within the meaning of this 
section it must be show that the party in the 
former suit represented the interest claimed in 
the latter suit. A party represents all 
interests owned by him at the time of the 
action as also interest belonging to others 
which are subordinate to him. A decision 
against  him will bind interests acquired from 
him subsequently and all subordinate interests 
represented by him whensoever acquired. As to 
when one party can be said to claim under 
another, it may be broadly observed, that a 
person is not deemed to claim under another, if 
in fact he does not claim under that other, 
though he might have done so and his interests 
were almost identical with that other. The 
question as to exact cases in which he can be 
said to so claim is of substantive law, and 
only brief reference will be made here to such 
aspects of it as have come before the Courts in 
British India with reference to the doctrine of 
res judicata. Thus a decision as to a person 
being the legitimate son of another in a suit 
against that other is res judicata in a suit 
against him by another son of that other. But 
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the donee of a house can not be estopped as 
being privy in estate by a judgement obtained 
in an action against the donor commenced after 
the gift. It is, however, a well settled rule 
of law that when both parties in the subsequent 
litigation claim through the same person, there 
is no bar of res judicata. In order that a 
decision in a suit between A and B may operate 
as res judicata in a subsequent suit between A 
and C it is necessary to show that C claims 
under B by a title arising subsequently to the 
commencement of the first suit. Thus a 
purchaser, mortgagee, lessee or donee of a 
property is not estopped by a decree obtained 
in a suit against the vendor, mortgagor, lessor 
or donor commenced after the date of the 
purchase, mortgage, lease or gift. Where rights 
claimed in both suits are the same, if the 
plaintiff claims title through the other 
person, in whom Court found title is not barred 
as res judicata. 
 The phrase “between the parties under whom 
they of any of them claimed” in Sec. 11, 
C.P.C., must of necessity refer to parties who 
have obtained the same property in respect of 
which the previous decision was given. If the 
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property in the two suits was different a 
transferee of one property is not bound by the 
decision as between the parties interested in 
another property. If the law were otherwise, it 
might work great injustice to bona fide 
transferees of property even though that 
property is not the subjective-matter of 
pending litigation. In effect, it would amount 
to an unwarranted extension of the doctrine of 
lis pendens embodied in sec. 52 of the Transfer 
of Property Act. 
 A plea of res judicata is of no avail to a 
defendant, where the plaintiff does not claim 
her share in the pension through her mother but 
she claims it through her father. In an earlier 
suit failure on the part of the mother(of the 
plaintiff) to assert that the defendant was not 
entitled to make any deductions in the pension 
does not therefore operate as constructive res 
judicata on the ground that the plaintiff does 
not claim from her mother but from her father.  
 Where in a prior suit there was an issue 
as to whether H had been validity adopted by M. 
This issue was found in favour of H by the 
decree based on the compromise and the award, 
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between H and his adoptive mother, widow of M 
on the one side and by the ancestor of the 
defendants in the subsequent suit, on the 
other. The same issue was sought to be raise in 
the subsequent suit. The title put forward in 
the later suit was not different from and 
independent of the title put froward in the 
earlier suit, because the plaintiff in the 
later suit, viz M claim under and from H 
himself being his natural father. Held that the 
compromise decree in the prior suit would 
operate as res judicata on H and also against M 
when he claims from and under H. the plaintiff 
M cannot therefore succeed unless the adoption 
of H is found to be invalid. The decision on 
this question in the earlier suit concludes it, 
and therefore it operate as res judicata 
against the plaintiff also in the subsequent 
suit. 
 A person though he was himself not a party 
to the previous litigation but claims through 
the persons who were actually parties to the 
earlier suit is equally bound as much as the 
person who were actually in that suit. 
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9.Hindu son does not claim under his 
father.-  
A Hindu son in a joint family becomes 
entitled by reason of his birth and in his own 
right, to a right which he can enforce against 
his father, and he does not claim under his 
father within the meaning of this section. 
Therefore the dismissal of a suit for 
redemption of a mortgage of a joint family 
property brought by the father in a joint Hindu 
family alone would not be a bar to a subsequent 
suit for redemption by the sons, inasmuch as 
the sons’ title was not through their father, 
but was separate and independent. It has no 
doubt been held that a decree obtained against 
a Hindu father for a debt is binding against 
the other members of a Hindu family; but that 
depends, “more on the obligation of a Hindu son 
to pay his father’s debt not improperly 
incurred, and upon the presumption in some of 
these cases that the action was bought against 
the father as the representative and the family 
property. Where the plaintiff had no title to 
the land in dispute when the decree in the 
previous suit was passed against his father and 
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his title to the said land came into existence 
on the death of his father under a sanad, which 
created a tenure of successive life estate, the 
decision in the prior suit cannot operate as 
res judicata against the plaintiff. 
 Under the Mitakshara law sons by birth an 
equal ownership with the father in ancestral 
immovable property and the sons can enforce 
their right by a partition even against their 
father’s wishes. The sons have independent 
coparcenary rights of their own in ancestral 
property. They do not claim through the father 
nor are their rights derived from or through 
their father. This principle has been modified 
to a large extent by another rule of Hindu law 
that a son is bound to discharge the debts of 
his father if not tainted with immorality to 
the extent of his interest in the family 
property. Therefore where a creditor enforces 
the pious obligation of the sons to pay their 
father’s debts by proceeding against the sons 
interest in the ancestral property he must 
prove that there was a real debt of the father 
in existence, if the factum of the debt is 
denied by the sons. The burden of establishment 
that there was a real debt of the father in 
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existence rests upon the creditor who seeks to 
make the sons’ interest liable. 
 But there is a great distinction between 
cases in which a Hindu father sues in respect 
of a contract which he is empowered under the 
Mitakshara law as manger to make on belief of 
the family and cases in which a father sues in 
respect of rights of which he can only hold in 
an equal measure with other coparceners. The 
question as to whether a Hindu father 
sufficiently represents all the coparceners in 
a given litigation is a question which has to 
be decided with reference to the circumstances 
of the case. In case of a Hindu family where 
all have rights it is impossible to allow each 
member of the family to litigate the same point 
over and over again, and each infant to wait 
till he comes of age and then bring an action, 
or bring an action by his guardian before; the 
court looks to explanation VI to Sec.11, 
C.P.C., to see whether or not the leading 
member of the family has been acting either on 
behalf of minors in their interest, or if they 
are majors with the assent of the majors. Where 
the mortgage executed by the deceased father of 
a joint Hindu family is not found to be for 
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legal necessity and a simple money decree is 
passed against the estate of the deceased in 
the hands of the sons and as against grandsons 
the mortgage suit is dismissed (the debt not 
having been shown to be for illegal or immoral 
purpose) the decree can be executed against the 
interest of subsequent born grandsons to 
contend on the strength of explanation VI to 
Sec.11 C.P.C., that the decree of dismissal 
against the interest of the grandsons in 
existence at the decree operated as res 
judicata against their interest as well.  
 
 10.  Co-heirs do not claim under each 
other.- 
A decision in a suit by one of several co 
heirs does not bind the others. Where in a suit 
a person claims the whole estate for himself 
and assets his exclusive title to it and 
repudiates the interests of all the other heirs 
of the previous owner, he cannot be held to 
have represented the interests of the other 
heirs for the purpose of Sec.11, C.P.c. 
 But where two persons field a suit on 
death of a third person that they were three 
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brothers and forward a pedigree in their 
support, the pedigree was not proved and it was 
decided that they were not brothers. In a 
subsequent suit the heirs of one the above two 
persons alleged they were heirs of the deceased 
and pleaded the same pedigree. It was held that 
the persons through whom the heirs contested in 
the subsequent suit were parties to the first 
suit, that in the first suit the question of 
relationship was directly and subsequently in 
issue as it was head and finally decided by a 
court which had jurisdiction to try the 
subsequent suit, and hence the rule of res 
judicata in Sec.11, C.P.C., applied and the 
subsequent suit was barred. 
 
   11.Co-owners co not claim under each other.- 
    Co-owners are held not to claim under 
each other. A judgement rendered against one 
co-owner, does not therefore bar a suit against 
another co-owner. 
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12. Co-tenants do not claim under each 
other.-  
A decree for ejectment by the landlord 
against one of several joint tenants of a 
holding does not bind the other tenants. 
 
13.How far administrators represent 
deceased’s heirs and legatees.- 
 It is a general rule, that an 
administrator represents the deceased’s heirs 
relating to the deceased’s property, even if 
there is an irregularity in his appointment. 
Hence a decree against an administrator binds 
the estate and his successors.  
 Karnavan.- The Karnavan or managing member 
of a Malabar trawad(family) is in similar 
position to a Hindu father under the Mitakshara 
law. Hence a decree against a Karnavan if not 
impleaded in a representative capacity in 
respect of the trawad property does not 
necessarily bind the members not actually 
bought on the record.  
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14. How far tansferor and transferee 
claim under each other.-  
A transferee claims under the transferor, 
and is bound by any decision against him prior 
but not subsequent to the date of the transfer 
but the transferor cannot be said to claim 
under the transferee, and therefore cannot as 
such be estopped by a decision against the 
latter. 
 
15. How far lessee and lessor claim under 
each other.-  
A lessee claims under his lessor and his 
successors-in-interest, but the lessor cannot 
be said to claim under the lessee and therefore 
cannot, as such, be estopped by a decision 
against the letter. But a lessee under a lease 
granted before a suit brought by or against his 
lessor is not bound by the decision therein 
against the latter, if he(the lessee) was not 
himself a party to the suit. A decree against a 
registered tenant will not bind the real owner 
unless he claims through that tenant. 
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 Since the lessee does not occupy a 
representative capacity and the lessor cannot 
be said by a lesser against a third person 
cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent 
suit by the lessor against the same person. 
 
16. Shebait of an idol bound by a 
decision in a suit to which his 
predecessor was party.-  
The shebait of an idol can hardly be said 
to claim under his predecessor, but a decision 
obtained against him, is considered binding on 
his successor. Where a shebait has incurred 
debts in the service of an idol, for the 
benefit and preservation of its property his 
position is analogous to that of a manger of an 
infant heir, and decrees properly obtained 
against him in respect of debts so incurred are 
binding upon succeeding shebait. But a decree 
by consent against the shebait of temple as 
such who to the knowledge of the plaintiff has 
been dismissed from temple is not binding on 
the properties of the endowment in the hands of 
his successor-in-office. Where in a suit for 
recovery of possession of certain property the 
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trustee of a temple who was a defendant omitted 
to put forward a valid defence on behalf of the 
temple and an ex parte decree was passed 
against the temple and a fresh suit was filed 
by the succeeding trustee to establish the 
rights of the temple in respect of the very 
same property, it was held that the second suit 
was barred by res judicata as the decree passed 
in the prior suit was the result of gross 
negligence on the part of the then trustee. 
Where a mahant impeaching an alienation of muth 
property by his predecessor has been dismissed 
the decision binds the succeeding mahant and 
the suit for possession challenging the sale 
will be barred by res judicata under Sec. 11, 
C.P.C., in the absence of collusion or fraud. 
Where certain deities are not properly 
represented in a suit, decisions in proceeding 
in which they are not properly represented will 
not bind them and no remedy available to them 
will be barred by reason of the proceedings. 
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17. How far mortgagor and mortgagee claim 
under each other.-  
A mortgagee claims under the mortgagor, 
and is bound by any decision against him prior 
but not subsequent to the date of mortgage but 
a mortgagor cannot be said to claim under the 
mortgagee, and therefore cannot as such be 
estopped by a decision against the latter, 
unless he is a party. The estate which has 
already vested in a mortgagee cannot be 
represented in, or adjudicated upon, a 
subsequent litigation to which he is not a 
paty, consequently the decision in the suit is 
not binding on the mortgagee. Any decision 
obtained against a mortgagor after the 
execution of a mortgagee deed cannot operate as 
res judicata against the mortgagee, if he (the 
mortgagee) was not a party to the suit. Much 
less will a decision between a tansferee of the 
mortgagor and a third person operate as res 
judicata between the mortgagee and each 
transferee when the same question arises in a 
subsequent suit. The mortgagee cannot be 
considered to be litigation under the same 
title in the subsequent suit as the mortgagor 
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did in the earlier suit. Nor can he be said to 
be litigation under the same title as the 
transferee of the mortgagor. When in a mortgage 
suit a mortgagor claims only a paramount title 
and raises a plea of misjoinder on that basis 
and succeeds in getting the suit dismissed 
against him which really means in law, his 
dismissal or discharge from the suit, on such 
plea, he forfeits his right of redemption, if 
any, in respect of the said mortgage and 
becomes disentitled to claim such right in any 
future proceeding. This was laid down by the 
Judicial Committee in the well-known case of 
Nilkant Banerji v. Suesh Chandra, which has 
always been followed. 
 As a mere mortgagee, he would not be bound 
by any earlier decision against the mortgagor 
if his(mortgagee’s) title arose prior to the 
suit in which the decree against his mortgagor 
possessing only the equity of redemption has 
not in him any such estate as would enable him 
sufficiently to represent the mortgagee in the 
suit instituted after the mortgage. The 
doctrine of res judicata would however not be 
applicable unless the mortgagee could be said 
to be claiming under the mortgagor in the 
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previous suit filed against the mortgagor. In a 
sense it could be said that the mortgagee is a 
person claiming under the mortgagor if in an 
execution of a decree against the mortgagor the 
mortgagee purchases all the interest of the 
mortgagor. But as observed by Mahmood J., in 
Sita Ram V. Amir Begum: 
“The plaintiff in the present suit 
could not be treated as a party claiming 
under his mortgagors within the meaning of 
Sec. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (now 
Sec. 11 of the present Code),and that 
section must be interpreted as if after 
the words ‘by a title arising subsequently 
to the commencement of the former suit’ 
had been interested.” 
   Mahmood J., relies on observation of an 
American writer Mr. Bigelow. It is worthwhile 
referring to what that learned author says on 
this point: 
“Having ascertained the effect of 
judgement estoppels upon the actual 
parties to the record, let us now inquire 
into the effect and operation of personal 
judgements against those who were not 
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strictly or nominally parties to the 
former suit, but whose interests were in 
some way affected by it. And first of 
privity, which by Lord Coke, is divided 
into privity in law, i.e. by operation of 
law, as tenant by the courtesy; privity in 
blood, as in the case of ancestor and 
heir, and privity in estate, i.e. by 
action of the parties, as in the case of 
feoffox and feofee. These division are 
only important in deciding the extent of 
the doctrine of privity and as the rule of 
law, are not different in questions of 
estoppel in these divisions, it will not 
be necessary to present them separately. 
But it should be noticed that the ground 
of privity is property and not personal 
relation. Thus an assignee is not estopped 
by judgement against his assignor in a 
suit by or against the assignor alone, 
instituted after the assignment was made 
through, if the judgement has preceded the 
assignment the case would have been 
different, hence privity in estoppel 
arises by virtue of succession. Nor is a 
grantee of land affected by the judgement 
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concerning the property against his 
grantor in the suit of a third person 
begun after the grant. Judgement bars only 
those whose interest is acquired after the 
suit, excepting of course the parties.” 
   Similarly it has been held in numerous 
decision that a mortgagee will not be affected 
by an adjudication made between the mortgagor 
and another person without the mortgagee on 
record in a suit filed subsequently to the 
creation of the mortgage. The mortgagee no 
doubt is a person claiming under a party 
because of the mortgagor becoming a party in a 
proceeding subsequently instituted. Having 
created a mortgage the mortgagor could in a 
subsequent proceeding only represent, the 
equity of redemption which alone vests in him 
and not the mortgagee interest which vests in 
the mortgagee. 
 
18. Landlord and tenant.-  
A recognition by a thicadar of the 
purchase of a portion of a tenancy by a tenant 
and its amalgamation if made in good faith is 
binding on the landlord. It is not necessary 
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that such a recognition to be binding must be 
for the benefit of the estate. A previous 
decision as to the question of the area of a 
tenancy is res judicata in a subsequent suit 
between the parties. But a previous decision in 
which the question as to the nature of tenancy 
was raised but was not decided is not res 
judicata in a subsequent suit between the 
parties. The decision is a previous suit for 
rent, whether ex parte or inter partes, 
operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit 
for rent, even for a different period, if it 
decides any question which arises in the suit 
or if it omits to decide any question which 
ought to have been decided if objections were 
taken by a party. When the defendants have been 
defeated in a severalty the question is res 
judicata in a subsequent suit. But a previous 
decree awarding rent at a certain rate for the 
suit period is not res judicata as to rate of 
rent in a subsequent suit. It is evidence in so 
far only as the rate of rent allowed in that 
case is concerned. But the decision in a rent 
suit in which the title of a person is in issue 
for the purpose of deciding his right to 
receive a share of the rent, operate as res 
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judicata in a subsequent civil suit by him 
relating to the property. An ex parte decree in 
a suit for rent which is afterwards satisfied 
by the tenant operates as res judicata on the 
question of relationship of the landlord and 
tenant between the parties in a subsequent suit 
for ejectment. A suit brought by a tenant 
against a third person does not operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit brought by the 
landlord against the same person, for the 
tenants does not occupy representative capacity 
and the landlord cannot be said to be a person 
claiming through the tenant. A decision that 
the terms of the tenancy include a valid and 
binding term as to the payment of interest on 
arrears of rent will also operate as res 
judicata. 
 
19. Grantor and Grantee.-  
Since the transferee of a grantor of a 
licence is not bound as such by the licence 
under Sec. 59, Easements Act, it follows that 
the transferee is also not bound by the result 
of a previous litigation between the grantor 
and the grantee, if the claim of the grantor 
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has failed by reason of his failure to prove 
the ground on which he sought he ejectment. 
 
20. Judgement-debtor how far represented 
by attaching creditor and execution 
purchaser.- 
 A judgement- creditor attaching and 
selling the property of his debtor does not 
represent that debtor as regards that property, 
even though he has often to rely on and support 
the debtor’s title to it; his position thus 
being like that of a purchaser at a sale 
arrears of revenue who is held not to claim 
through the defaulting proprietor. But it is 
not so in case of auction-purchasers at an 
execution sale. An auction purchaser at a court 
sale acquires only the right, title and 
interest of the judgement-debtor and while he 
is not a representative of the judgement debtor 
for the purpose of Sec. 47, C.P.C., he is a 
party claiming under the judgement-debtor for 
the purposes of Sec.11. Attachment does not 
create any specific charge on the property 
attached. It does not, by itself, give the 
attaching decree-holder in strictness a title 
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to the attached properties but it is the basis 
of the decree-holder’s right to assert the 
judgement-debtor’s interest in the property 
attached and the right created in favour of the 
decree-holder by attachment is a claim under 
the judgement-debtor within the meaning of Sec. 
11, C.P.C. After attachment of property of 
judgement-debtor a suit by plaintiff for 
declaration that it belonged to him and the 
judgement-debtor was also made a party and the 
suit was decreed in plaintiff’s    favour. A 
subsequent attachment in another decree against 
the same judgement-debtor was bound by the 
previous judgement in declaratory suit and also 
the subsequent attaching creditor as well as 
the auction-purchaser on the principles of res 
judicata. Although the orders passed in 
execution are governed by Sec. 11. C.P.C., the 
order affects only parties or their privies and 
not strangers who had not derived their title 
from the parties where the execution and the 
decree-holder appeals against the order without 
joining the auction-purchaser, the auction-
purchaser would not be bound by the decision in 
appeal, where the mortgagee’s title arose prior 
to the suit in which the decree against the 
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mortgagor was obtained, and the mortgagor 
possessing only the equity of redemption had 
not in him any such estate as would enable him 
sufficiently to represent the mortgagee, the 
mortgagee is not bound by the decision in the 
suit. An auction-purchaser does not obtain any 
title to the properties purchased until 
confirmation of the sale by the Court so as to 
render him a claimant under the person whose 
rights are sold. Thus where though there was an 
order passed by the Court confirming the sale, 
that must be deemed to have been vacated on the 
Court having allowed the application by the 
petitioner to restore his application to set 
aside the sale which had been dismissed for 
default. The order of confirmation was 
consequent on the dismissal of the application 
to set aside the sale and when that application 
was restored to file, the order confirmation 
became automatically cancelled. Similarly the 
position of an auction purchaser is merely of a 
person who had bid at a court auction sale 
which is sought to be set aside by an 
application field in that behalf and which is 
pending. The confirmation of sale can only be 
after that application is dismissed. The 
487 
auction-purchaser, therefore, has no title to 
the properties till confirmation of sale and he 
can not be regarded as a person claiming under 
the judgement-debtor. 
 
21. a son does not claim under his father 
under customary law.-  
Under the customary law a son that has a 
right in his ancestral property, and cannot be 
said to be said “claiming under” his father 
within the meaning of this section.  
 
22. Nature of title derived from a 
party.-  
This section contemplates a case where a 
party derives title from a party to the 
previous litigation subsequent to the previous 
litigation. There is nothing in the section to 
suggest that where the plaintiff has derived no 
title subsequent to the previous suit, the 
subsequent suit should invoice the consequence 
of being dismissed. On the same principle, 
purchaser, mortgagee, or donee of a property is 
488 
not estopped by a decree obtained in a suit 
against the vendor, mortgagor or donor 
commenced after the date of the purchaser, 
mortgage or gift. 
 
23. Litigation under the same title.-  
The section requires as one of the 
conditions for the plea of res judicata to be 
supported, that the parties should be 
litigation under the same title in the 
subsequent suit as they were litigation under 
in the first suit. But the words under comment 
do not refer to the identity of the grounds of 
action, but mean that the question must have 
been raised and decided in the same right, that 
is to say in the right of the parties to the 
second suit, and not in the right of any other 
person. From which it follows, that in order 
that the rule of res judicata may apply the 
disputed title between the two parties must be 
the same in both cases. And where in a 
subsequent suit the parties are not litigation 
under litigation under the same title, the 
decision padded in a previous suit is not res 
judicata. Or, in other words, where in a 
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subsequent suit the parties litigate under a 
title different to that under which they 
endeavoured to support their claims in a 
previous suit, the decision in the latter suit 
will not operate as res judicata in the 
subsequent suit. For instance, it has been 
repeatedly held that a judgement against a 
party used as an individual will not be an 
estoppel or in a subsequent suit in which he 
may sue of be sued in another capacity of 
character; as in the letter case he is in 
contemplation of law a distinct person and a 
stranger to the prior proceeding and judgement. 
Thus a decision against a person in his 
individual capacity does not bind his successor 
in the office of trustee of an endowment or 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit 
against him as representing the community, or 
operate as res judicata in a subsequent scheme 
suit under Sec. 92, C.P.C. or operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent suit brought in the 
capacity of a trustee for the purpose of the 
recovery of the property impressed with a 
trust. Similarly, in Muhammad Din V. Rahim Gul 
the plaintiffs in the two suits were held to be 
acting in different capacities, when in the 
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former they promoted with others a joint claim 
of prescription to certain property, whereas in 
the latter they propounded a private and 
exclusive title of ownership to that property. 
Similarly in Suraj Kuar V. Nagina Singh the 
occupancy tenants were held to be litigation, 
in different capacities in the two suits, when 
in the former they disputed the right of 
original proprietor’s successors to dispossess 
them of the proprietary rights, whereas in the 
latter they claimed restoration of their 
occupancy rights. In Ahmad Khan V. Bhagbhari, a 
person impleaded as the representative of the 
one of the heirs of a certain person was held 
not to have been a party in his own right as 
heir to that person. And the dismissal of a 
claim made by any one as the heir of a person 
does not bar a claim as his son’s heir. In 
Ishri Dat V. Har Narain, a person claiming 
under two deeds of sale, one of which was 
executed simply as the other was held invalid 
for want of registration, was held to claim 
under different titles. On the same principle, 
if a purchaser of one of the mortgaged 
properties is a party in a suit for the 
recovery of the mortgage amount by a sale of 
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all the mortgaged properties he may afterwards 
purchase from a person claiming to be the owner 
of the equity of redemption in them, who was 
not a party in the owner of the equity of 
redemption in them, who was not a party in the 
former suit. 
 But a Hindu reversioner, who brings a suit 
during the lifetime of the female heir for a 
declaration that a particular transaction is 
invalid after latter’s death, and on the issue 
being raised about his alleged relationship 
with the last male holder his suit is dismissed 
on the ground that he failed to prove his 
alleged relationship as a reversioner, cannot 
maintain a suit for possession as the actual 
heir after the death of the female heir as in 
the subsequent suit he does not litigate under 
a different title. Similarly, in Rafiq-un-nisa 
V. Absul Shakur the plaintiff in the subsequent 
suit was held to be litigating under a 
different title, where he sued for recovery of 
money by sale of a property alleging that he 
had obtained an assignment of the mortgagee 
rights held by another over the property, and 
the suit was dismissed on the ground that the 
deed obtained him did not amount to an 
492 
assignment, but created only a sub-mortgage of 
the mortgagee rights, and he instituted a fresh 
suit for sale as a sub-mortgagee. Bibi Wasilan 
V. Mir Syed Husain is another instance in which 
the parties were litigating under different 
titles. Where in a former suit between a 
reversioner to the estate of a widow and a 
purchaser from her, an issue was raised as to 
whether there was legal necessity for the 
widow’s alienation and it was decided adversely 
to the purchaser but the reversioner’s suit 
failed for a moiety of the property because it 
was not found that that moiety had passed to 
him then, and he failed another suit after  
that moiety had passed to him; it was held that 
the question of legal necessity was res 
judicata as in both the suit the plaintiff 
litigated as the owner of the revision and the 
defendant as the purchaser from the widow. 
Where a suit for maintenance under britipatra 
was dismissed on the ground that the document 
did not bind the estate, a second suit under 
the same document for a declaration of his 
right to maintenance is barred on somewhat 
similar grounds. Where a suit was bought by two 
persons as members of the public for a 
493 
declaration that certain property was Wakf 
property and it had been decided that it was 
not so, a subsequent suit by any other member 
is likewise barred. It has somewhat similarly 
been held that a decision in a suit by a 
saranjamdar for possession of India situate in 
saranjam village having been dismissed, a 
subsequent suit by the brother of the previous 
sarajamdar for the same relief, is barred. It 
has also somewhat similarly been held that 
whrer it is necessary to establish or deny a 
custom in a family, and where pains have been 
taken to bring upon the record every branch of 
the family, and where that custom has been the 
subject of contest and thoroughly thrashed out 
in the presence of all branches of the familym 
tha matter cannot be again raised by the 
descendants of those branches even though 
cetain branches did not take an active part in 
the contest, but contended themselves with 
admitting that the custom existed. But where a 
suit is brought by a person to recover 
possession form a stranger of math property 
claiming it as heir of deceased mohunt, but he 
does not produce any certificate of succession 
to establish his heirship and the suit is 
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thereupon dismissed, the dismissal is no bar to 
a suit by him as manager of the math om behalf 
of the math. Similarly the dismissal of a suit 
brought by a son against his father for 
maintenance claimed under an agreement is no 
bar to a suit by him against the father for a 
declaration that he is enttitled to maintenance 
out of certain lands in the hands of the father 
held under a sanad from Government whereby, it 
was alleged, the lands were charged at the time 
of grant with the maintenance of the junior 
members of the family. The Official Assignee 
does for certain purposes represent the 
insolvent, but he has other capacities such as 
the representative of the body of creditors; 
and in each case in order to determine what 
particular character he holds regard must be 
had to the circumstances. If in a case he is 
litigating under the same title under which the 
insolvent had previous litigated, he may be 
held to be the legal representative of the 
insolvent and the decision in the previous case 
would operate as res judicata against him. But 
where in a suit the Official Assignee claims 
certain properties as belonging to the 
insolvent and, therefore, available for the 
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benefit of all the creditors, he cannot be 
deemed to claim under or be litigating under 
the same title as the insolvent. The words    
“between parties under whom they or any of them 
claim litigating under the same title” cover a 
case where the latter litigant occupies by 
succession the same position as the former 
litigant. The words of the section do not make 
any distinction between different forms of 
succession. For the purpose of this section, it 
cannot be said that the decision on a plea of 
jus tertii is a decision between the parties 
litigating under the same title, when the jus 
tertii is put forward and actually relied on a 
later case by such third person. The phrase 
“litigating under same title” means litigating 
in the same capacity. If the parties are 
litigating in the same capacity it does not 
matter whether the transfer attached in one 
case is a mortgage and in the other case a 
gift. The subject-matters of the two suits need 
not be the same. The words mean that the demand 
should have been of the same quality in the 
second suit as in the first one. A party cannot 
be said to be litigating under the same title 
within the meaning of Sec. 11 where in the 
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previous suit he was litigating in the capacity 
of a reversioner and in the subsequent suit he 
claims as owner. 
 Their Lordship of the Supreme Court in 
Sunder Bai V. Devaji Shankar, while considering 
the interpretation of the term “litigatimg 
under the same title” thus observed : “The real 
ratio governing such class of cases is to be 
found in a decision of Full Bench of the Lahore 
High Court in Mst. Sardaran V. Shit Lal, where 
it was held that where the right claimed in 
both suits is the same the subsequent suit 
would be barred as res judicata though the 
right in the subsequent suit is sought to be 
established on a ground different from that in 
the former suit. It would be only in those 
cases where the rights claimed in the two suits 
were different that the subsequent suit would 
not be barred as res judicata even though the 
property was identical. It is, therefore, clear 
that the plaintiff in the case before us was 
litigating in the same title, i.e. in the same 
right as the adopted son of Shankar though that 
claim of his was sought to be based on a later 
adoption than the one in the former suit.” 
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 A person having two capacities, one as a 
Karnavan of a jarwad and the other as an uralan 
of dewasworm filed a suit against another 
shrine claiming that the defendant shrine was 
subsidiary shrine owing allegiance to the 
plaintiff dewasworn and bound to render homage 
to it by making certain recurring payments. 
Another suit had been previously instituted 
against the same defendant for the same relief. 
But there the uralan figured as plaintiff suing 
on behalf of the institution. In the later suit 
he figured as plaintiff suing through trustee 
(who happened to be the same person in both 
suits). In both the suits the right put forward 
was on behalf of the dewasworn and not in his 
capacity as the Karnavan of the jarwad. In both 
the suits, the two shrines were plaintiff and 
defendant respectively and were represented by 
the same individual. “Litigating under the same 
title” means “litigating under the same 
capacity of same right”. 
 The reliefs were identically the same. 
Held that the later suit was barred by the 
principle of res judicata. Where the plaintiff 
challenged the sale in execution in both the 
suits as an infingement of his right of 
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ownership, in the first suit he maintained that 
he was the sole owner, while in the subsequent 
suit, he claimed to be a member of a joint 
family. According to O.2,r.1, C.P.C., the 
plaintiff was bound to frame the suit so as to 
get a final decision on the subject-matter in 
dispute and prevent further litigation as far 
as possible. The subsequent claim was not so 
dissimilar that its union with the claim in the 
precious suit would have led to confusion. The 
suit was therefore barred by constructive res 
judicata. Where A filed a suit against the 
trustees and mahant of a certain temple on 
allegations that certain attached properties 
belonged to him and not to the temple and 
obtained a decree in his favour, subsequently 
certain worshippers of the temple sued the 
heirs of A for declaration that the said 
property belonged to the temple. It was held 
that no doubt the plaintiffs worshippers were 
not successors of the trustees and mahant of 
the temple who were defendants in the prior 
suit but the plaintiffs worshippers did not 
claim any personal right of their own nor they 
had set up a jus tertii but sued for the 
benefit of the temple. Therefore the title 
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litigated was same thought the agency asserting 
the title previously was different from that 
asserted now. The defendant was a lessee in 
actual possession and enjoyment of the village, 
was liable to pay land revenue and was sued by 
the lessor for the recovery of rent. The lessee 
was subsequent to the decision in the suit 
appointed lambardar and the lessor sadar 
lambardar. In a fresh such suit by the lessor 
to recover rent for the subsequent years 
claiming the amount of enhanced land revenue it 
was held that the parties were “ litigating 
under the same title” within the meaning of 
Sec.11 and subsequent suit was barred by res 
judicata. The mere fact that the lessor and the 
lessee acquired the additional capacity of 
sadar lambardar and lambardar respectively, 
would not alter the nature of the suit and 
would be barred by res judicata. A person 
pleading his right to possession as purchaser 
in a prior suit and suing for possession and 
later on his right to possession as 
usufructuary mortgagee of the same property was 
held to be litigating in the same title for 
purpose of res judicata. In each of the two 
suits he is litigating in his individual 
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capacity for his own self and in his own 
interest, consequently the bar of res judicata 
will apply.  
 
24. Litigating in different characters or 
capacities –  
One who, thought in name a party to both 
proceeding, is shown to have litigated in 
different characters or capacities is in 
contemplation of law, not one person, but two. 
Though physically the same, he is jurally a 
different person in the second litigation from 
the person he was in the firs or, in the more 
accurate phraseology of the civilians, he wears 
separate and distinct personae, and plays 
separate and distinct parts, in the two 
proceedings; whence it follows that a judgement 
recovered by him in one character cannot be set 
up as a bar to a claim subsequently made by him 
for the same relief in another character any 
more than in estoppel cases, where a similar 
diversity of persona appears, a res judicata 
can be set up as an estoppel. Conversely, 
whenever the former judgement has been 
recovered by one who, though physically 
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distinct from the plaintiff in the subsequent 
proceedings, is yet cited to him in interest, 
as in the case of master and servant, or two 
common informers, both representing the public 
in a sense, there is, in eontemplation of low, 
one persona only, and the identity of parties 
is accordingly established. There is, of 
course, no diversity of personae within the 
meaning of the above rule, merely because the 
party litigates as plaintiff in one of the 
proceedings, and in the other as counter-
claimant, or by way of set-off. It has even 
held that a who has accepted statutory 
compensation in proceedings before a court of 
summary jurisdiction to which he was not 
strictly a party at all, is barred from 
afterwards suing in a civil court for damages 
beyond the limited amount which the Magistrate 
had jurisdiction to award. Where the plaintiff 
instituted a suit claiming as a reversioner and 
subsequently instituted another suit claiming 
title as owner, it was held that the plaintiff 
was suing in a different capacity in the latter 
suit for the purposes of Sec.11, C.P.C. 
Where the parties are not litigating in the 
subsequent suit under the same title under 
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which they litigated in the former suit the 
plea of res judicata must be overruled. Where 
the claim made in the two money suits was on 
hand notes different from the one, on which the 
claim was made in the small cause suit. 
Therefore it was held that the parties were not 
litigating under the same title and bar of res 
judicata will not prevent the Small cause Court 
from going into the question of fact again. 
Even when the plaintiff in the later suits was 
the plaintiff in the previous suit, and the 
first and second defendants in the later suit 
were parties to the prior suit. But the 
plaintiff had brought the previous suit in a 
capacity different from that on the basis of 
which he instituted the later suit. In the 
prior suits he claimed to be the nearest 
presumptive reversioner to the estate on the 
death of the window while in the later suit, on 
the death of the window he claims to be the 
nearest reversioner entitled to succeed. A 
finding that on the date of the previous suit 
the as plaintiff was the nearest presumptive 
reversioner cannot operate as res judicata in 
the later suit for possession. Where a 
Mohammedan window was allowed by a previous 
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order to hold her husband’s property till her 
life-time in lieu of her dower debt and could 
resist the claim of the creditors till her 
dower debt was discharged. The prior order will 
not operate as res judicata in a subsequent 
claim by the decree-holder when the widow has 
transferred the husband’s property by gift 
purporting to convey absolute ownership with 
possession to the donees. The res adjudicated 
in the earlier case being different from the 
latter, res judicata will not apply. Former 
suit for title on dhardhura custom and 
subsequent suit for title on other basis no 
question of res judicata. Wherein a suit for 
possession by a monk as representative of the 
Sanghas of ‘Kyaungdaik’ is dismissed, a 
subsequent suit by him for possession in the 
capacity of the presiding  monk is not barred 
by res judicata. First suit for declaration as 
owner and subsequent suit as mortgagee to 
enforce the mortgage, titles in both suits held 
different, bar of res judicata could not apply. 
First suit as owner against person in wrongful 
possession having been dismissed a subsequent 
for accounting as co-sharer was not barred by 
res judicata. A decision in a suit for 
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possession and management of a certain estate 
against certain persons in their personal 
capacity does not bar a subsequent suit against 
the same persons as shebaits and manager and in 
respect of the property of the idol. Where in a 
former suit the respondents had claimed the 
right to property as full owners of it by 
survivorship on death of R and they did not 
claim as reversioners of R, not did they allege 
that R was a separated brother, in a subsequent 
suit the respondents claimed title as 
reversioners of R treating him as a separated 
brother and accepting that the widow of R had 
succeeded to the property of R as R’s heir as a 
limited owner and the respondents claimed title 
as reversioners of R on the death of the widow, 
the last limited owner. It was held that the 
title in the two suits was clearly different 
and the doctrine of res judicata did not apply. 
Plaintiff in both suits in different capacities 
no question of res judicata arises.  
 
25.Explanation VI-  
Explanation VI of the present section is 
exactly the same terms as the corresponding 
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Explanation V of sec. 13 of the Code of 1882, 
which says that “where persons litigate bona 
fide in respect of a private right claimed in 
common for themselves and others, all persons 
interested in such right shall, for the purpose 
of this section, be deemed to claim under the 
persons so litigating” The Explanation was 
first enacted as Explanation V of Sec.13 of the 
Code of 1877 in which Sec. 30 (now O.I,r.8) was 
first enacted. Section 30 again was taken with 
an important modification from O.XVI, r.9, of 
the new Rules of the Supreme Court which 
embodied the practice of the Court of Chancery 
in representative suits, as explained by Lord 
Eldon in Cockburn v. Thomson O.XVI, of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court under the Judicature 
Act provided that “ where there are numerous 
persons having the same interest in one cause 
of matter, one of more of such persons may sue 
or may be authorised by the Court of a Judge to 
defend in such cause or matter, on, behalf or 
for the benefit of all persons so interested,” 
and where a plaintiff properly so sues, the 
persons whom he represents are bound. This rule 
was reproduced in Sec. 30 of the Code of 1877, 
with this important modification that the 
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permission of the Court is required to enable 
the plaintiff to sue in such a case, whereas 
under O.XVI, r.9, no such permission is 
required, in the case of plaintiffs. It 
therefore follows that in India the Legislature 
considered that that a plaintiff ought not to 
be allowed to represent the order parties 
interested in the case mentioned in the section 
without the leave of the Court. Section 30 and 
the Explanation were, as mentioned above, 
enacted at the same time, and must be read 
together, and it has sometimes been stated that 
the Explanation is applicable only to cases 
where the consent of the Court to the 
institution of the suit had been given under 
Sec.30. The Madras High Court thus sometimes 
held that a decision in a former suit against a 
Karnavan sued as representative of the family 
was not res judicata on account of the 
Explanation, except when the procedure 
prescribed by Sec.30 had been followed. But a 
bother construction of the Explanation was 
adopted sometimes and in an early case it was 
held, that a decision in a suit against a 
Karnavan as such in respect of certain property 
of the tarwad in his possession would be 
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binding on the junior members of the family, as 
they would be deemed to be claiming under him, 
and Forbes and Kernan, JJ., said, “ Explation V 
is not limited in its language to a suit under 
Sec.30...In such suits the party suing or 
defending must have permission of the Court to 
sue or defend, and must in the plaint of 
defence purport to sue or defend expressly on 
behalf of himself and the others, and notice is 
required to be given to those interested who 
are not parties to the suit.” And that decision 
has been followed in Vasudev v. Sankaran in 
which a Full Bench of the Court has broadly 
held that when a Karnavan sues or is sued in 
his representative capacity, and acts honestly, 
the other members of the tarwad are bound by 
the decision though they may not have been 
parties to the suit, and the procedure 
prescribed by Sec. 30 was not followed. It must 
then be taken as settled that the Explanation 
applies not only to cases where leave of Court 
has been granted under O.I., r.8, but also to 
causes where some of the persons claiming a 
private right in common with others litigate 
bona fide on behalf of themselves and such 
others. Hence a decision in a suit, instituted 
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and conducted bonafide by some only of 
agraharamdars of a village against the zamindar 
and the other agraharamdars for a declaration 
as to the kuttubadi payable by them to the 
zamindar, is res judicata against the 
representative of an agraharamdar who was 
defendant but died pending the appeal and whose 
legal representative was accidentally not 
brought on record either in the appeal or the 
second appeal. It is said that this Explanation 
does not refer to the case of a defendant at 
all but only to the case of a plaintiff. But it 
is not in terms so limited. In the first of the 
last cited cases, Innes, J., observed that the 
Explanation did refer to bona fide defences, 
but bona fide claims. There does not appear, 
however, to be any sufficient grounds for such 
a restriction and the observation was dissented 
from by Kernan , J., the other member of the 
Bench, whose view has found approval in 
subsequent cases. But be that as it may, a 
right to relief can be said to be “ claimed in 
common” under the Explanation only as between 
parties who would be benefited by such relief 
if granted and who have such an interest in the 
relief claimed that they could join as co-
509 
plaintiffs under O.I., rr. 1, 4(a). A suit 
cannot be maintained by one person on behalf 
others standing in the same relation with him 
in the subject of the action, unless the relief 
suoght by him is beneficial to those whom be 
seeks to represent and such others are 
necessarily interested in the relief suoght. 
The rule of English law is thus stated in 
Deniell’s Chancery Practice. “ In order to 
enable a person to sue on behalf of himself and 
others who stand in the same relation with him 
to the subject of the action, it is generally 
necessary that it should appear that the relief 
sought by him is beneficial to those whom he 
undertakes to represent; where it does not 
appear that all the persons intended to be 
represented are necessarily interested in 
obtaining the relief suoght such a suit cannot 
be maintained. As to the expression “in common” 
the Calcutta High Court is in favour of placing 
a restricted signification on it. It holds that 
the explanation does apply where the right 
claimed under one title, but prescriptive one 
which each person claims individually in 
respect of his own house and premises, and that 
it is applicable only to cases where several 
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different persons claim an easement or other 
person right by one common title, as for 
instance, where the inhabitants of a village 
claim by custom a right of pasturage over the 
same tract of land, or a right to take water 
from the same spring of well. The Punjab Chief 
Court, on the other hand, takes a broader view 
and, in Chet Ram v. Bahal Singh, Barkley, J., 
observed that the contention that this 
“Explanation only applies to suits for right of 
way, easements and the like” has no foundation 
either in the language of the section of in the 
principles of interpretation of statutes. It 
has been held sometimes that the Explanation is 
applicable only to the cases n which the 
private right claimed by the parties in the 
former suit was expressly claimed and purported 
to be claimed in common for themselves and 
others; and that it does not mean that a 
judgement obtained against a co-sharer in the 
property is binding against another co-sharer 
in the property, and clearly it would not be so 
where the first suit did not purport to have 
been litigated bona fide in respect of a right 
claimed in common by more than one person. The 
reason for inclusion of public rights in this 
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Explanation is to give effect to suits relating 
to public nuisances under Sec.91, C.P.C. The 
expression “public right” means a right in 
which many members of the State, i.e. public at 
large, are interested; whereas the community, 
that is, a certain class of persons. The 
essence of a litigation, which is carried on by 
a private party for injuries sustained by him 
in the exercise of a right common to him and 
others, is that there is a public right and 
that the party suing has suffered special 
damage in enforcing that right. The fact that 
in obtaining this individual remedy, it is not 
open to him to get a declaration embodied in 
the decree that the right is a public one, will 
not affect the principle of res judicata. 
Hence, where the Court gives a finding in such 
a suit that the right is a public right, it 
becomes res judicata in a subsequent litigation 
by virtue of this Explanation. But if the 
plaintiff suing for a declaration that he is 
owner of a piece of land free from any right on 
the part of the public to sue it as a highway, 
choose to bind the public he must comply with 
the provisions of O.I., r.8 and must observe 
the conditions on which permission is given by 
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the Court under that rule. Explanation 6 is not 
controlled by O.I, r.8. Hence, if a suit field 
or defended by some alone as representing a 
class or community, though without  any 
permission applied for and obtained under O.I, 
r.8, is allowed by the opposite party and by 
the Court to proceed in that character and if 
it is bona fide conducted as a representative 
and if the issue, the evidence and the 
judgement dealt with the right as one litigated 
for the whole class, then the judgement in the 
suit binds the whole class and operates as res 
judicata with reference to a subsequent similar 
suit field or defended by some on behalf of the 
class after permission obtained under O.I.,r.8. 
In order to make Explanation 6 applicable, 
there ought to be community of interest claimed 
on the strength of a common title and the claim 
must have been made in good faith for 
enforcement or defence of that common right on 
behalf of all persons having such common 
interest. The words “bona fide” in the 
Explanation can only apply to a litigation 
where every attempt is made to bring all the 
persons interested before the Court. The 
meaning of due and caution be applied to one 
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who puts forward only his own right as one of a 
body of persons who have equal right with 
himself. 
 In order to bring a suit within 
Explanation VI to Sec.11, C.P.C., it is 
essential to prove the following : 
(1) That there must be a right claimed by one 
or more persons in common for themselves 
and others not expressly named in the 
suit; 
(2) That the parties not expressly named in 
the suit must be interested in such right, 
and 
(3) That the litigation must have been 
conducted bona fide on behalf of all 
parties interested. 
If a representative suit governed by O.I, 
r.8, C.P.C., is failed, but the prescribed 
procedure is not followed, the decision may not 
bind the other persons on whose behalf the suit 
was brought. Explanation VI to Sec.11, C.P.C., 
because there may be a suit in which a person 
claims a right in common to himself and others 
though not governed by O.I, r.8, C.P.C. 
Therefore Explanation VI to Sec.11, C.P.C., 
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applies not only to representative suits 
governed by O.I.,r.8,C.P.C., but also to other 
suits. 
 The distinction between a suit which is 
expressly a representative suit under O.I, r.8, 
C.P.C., and a suit in which there is no such 
claim but to which Explanation VI to Sec.11, 
C.P.C., may apply has been recognised by the 
Judicial Committee in Kumaravelu Chettiar v. 
Ramaswami Ayyar. At page 189 their Lordship 
said: 
“As to authority they are impressed by 
the fact even before the Code of 1908 
there were several decisions- Thanakoti v. 
Maniappa may be selected as typical in 
which the view was taken that if what may 
be called an O.I, r.8 suit was to have the 
benefit of the Explanation the conditions 
of the rule must have been complied with 
fully. While in other cases in which it 
might superficially be supposed that the 
opposite view had been taken it will be 
found that the question at issue was not 
so much whether where none of the 
conditions of the rule had been complied 
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with the benefit of the Explanation could 
be extended to the decree in a suit 
expressly within the terms of the rule-
which in the present case-as whether to 
bring the decree within the Explanation 
the conditions of the rule had not to be 
observed even in a suit which while within 
the words of the Explanation was not 
within the words of the rule at all. And 
the result of the decision has shown that 
the Explanation is not confined to cases 
governed by the rule but extends to 
include any litigation in which apart from 
the rule altogether parties are entitled 
to represent interested persons other than 
themselves. Oder I, rule 8, applies when a 
suit can be brought against ‘numerous’ 
parties. If there are only two parties 
O.I,r.8,C.P.C., cannot apply. 
“Under the Hindu law, only a next 
reversioner can file a suit would bind the 
whole body of reversions. It would be 
necessary in such a suit for the plaintiff 
to claim that he was suing on behalf of 
the reversioners. But Explanation VI to 
Sec.11, C.P.C., does not only persons when 
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such a suit is bought but it also applies 
whenever a person claims a right private 
or public, in common to himself and 
others, provided he does so bona fide. 
Thus when a suit is borught by a remoter 
reversioner who challenges an alienation 
made by a Hindu widow on the ground of its 
being without legal necessity, if the 
plaintiff expressly claims the right in 
common to himself and others similarly 
situated and has field the suit bona fide, 
Explanation VI applies because all the 
requirements are satisfied.” 
   The following observations of their 
Lordships of the Pivy Council in Lingangowda 
Patil Dod-Basangowda Patil v. Basangowda Bistam 
Gawda Patil, at page 56 are very helpful in the 
regard: 
“In the case of a Hindu family where 
all have rights, it is impossible to allow 
each member of the family to litigate the 
same point over and over again, and each 
infant to wait till he becomes of age and 
then bring an action by his guardian 
before, and in each of these cases, 
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therefore, the Court looks to Explanation 
VI to Sec.11, C.P.C., to see whether or 
not the leading member of the family has 
been acting either of behalf of minors in 
their interest or if they are majors, with 
the consent of the majors”. 
  The principle that a suit by a reversioner is 
always in a representative capacity and that a 
finding arrived at in that suit binds all the 
reversioners and all those who derive their 
title from them is now well established.  
  Explanation VI to Sec.11, C.P.C., refers to a 
case in which the person sought to be bound by 
the decision is deemed to be represented in the 
previous suit by virtue of proceedings having 
been taken under O.I., r.8, C.P.C., or 
otherwise. If the plaintiffs to nominee are 
different persons in the earlier and later 
suits, but in both cases they are 
representatives of the same public as such, the 
plaintiffs in both cases are in substance the 
same. Where the previous suit was not 
representative and the person sought to be 
bound by the decision arrived  at in the case 
cannot be deemed to have been represented in 
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that litigation, Explanation VI to Sec.11, 
C.P.C., can have no application. Broadly 
speaking Explanation VI to Sec. 11, C.P.C., 
applies only to cases in which there is some 
indication that the suit was of a 
representative character and the observations 
of their Lordship of the Privy Council in 
Amissah V. Karbah are helpful in this regard: 
“Their Lordships do not doubt that an 
action by or on behalf of a family may 
result in res judicata but such an action, 
if it is to bind absent or future members 
of the local rules of procedure or by a 
representation order or in some other way 
that all such members can be regarded as 
represented before the Court.” 
  If a person is impleaded as a party in his 
capacity as the person representing the entire 
family, the whole family must have been bound 
by that decision, otherwise the family cannot 
be said to have been properly represented if 
other members of the family were lift out. 
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26.Result stated.-  
From the case-law bearing upon Explanation 
VI the following propositions appear to emerge: 
    First- Where the plaintiff or the 
defendant sues or is sued in a 
representative capacity, which attaches to 
him under the general law, the decision 
binds the entire body whom he represents. 
These are cases of administrators, 
trustees, shebaits, mutawallis, the 
Official Assignee for certain purposes, 
Hindu widow representing her husband’s 
estate a holder or inam lands and the 
like.  
Second-Where a person acting in a 
representative capacity has no such 
authority under the general law, if his 
litigation is to be representative one to 
bind others, he must get some other 
authority to assume representative 
characters; such authority need not 
necessarily be express, it may be 
implided. 
Third.-Such authority, if it is to be 
had from the Court is ordinarily obtained 
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in the form of an order under O.I., r.8, 
of the Code. But it need not necessarily 
be in that form. If the suit is filed in a 
representative form and it is allowed to 
proceed in that character without 
objection and, if a general issue is 
framed 
so as to put in issue the right of the whole 
class in whom it is alleged to exist, and the 
evidence adduced is of a general character and 
the findings in the judgement are general is 
nature, that judgement is binding on the whole 
class notwithstanding that no leave under 
O.I,r.8, has been obtained.   
 
27. Decree against widow when binding on           
reversioners.-  
It is now settled by consensus of 
authorities that where the estate of a deceased 
Hindu has vested in a female heir, a decree 
fairly and property obtained against her in 
regard to the estate is, in the absence of 
fraud or collusion, binding on the reversionary 
heir; and where merits are tried and trial is 
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fair and honest, a Hindu lady otherwise 
qualified merely owing to a personal disability 
or a disadvantage as a litigant. In other 
words, a decree obtained on a fair trial, in a 
suit by or against a Hindu widow, daughter or 
mother, in possession of the estate of the last 
full owner, operates as res judicata as regards 
the question tried in the suit and is 
consequently operative against the ultimate 
eversiones. The leading decision on the point 
is that by their Lordships of the Pivy Council 
in Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Sivaganga, in 
which Turner, L.J., in delivering their 
Lordships, Judgement, spoke of it as a general 
rule “ that, unless it could be shown that 
there had not been a fair trial of the right in 
that suit, or in other words, unless that 
decree could have been successfully impeached 
on some special ground, it would have been an 
effectual bar to any new suit”. This rule was 
adhered to in a later case by Lord Romilly who, 
however, added that it was the duty of the 
widow as heiress not only to represent but also 
to protect the estate, as well in respect of 
her own as of the reversionary interest. These 
cases down an equitable rule which has been 
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adopted by all the High Courts. But, inasmuch 
as the widow’s estate is ordinarily a limited 
one and as she represents the reversioners only 
in some special cases, it must be shown that 
the litigation was one in which the entire 
interest was as stake. Such is necessarily the 
suit in which she sues for recovery of the 
inheritance or attacks the factum or validity 
of an adoption which, if good, would divest her 
estate. But in a litigation which is qualified 
and personal to a widow in possession of life 
estate or arises out ofacts of her own 
affecting the estate, the widow, whether, she 
be plaintiff or defendant, does not represent 
the estate fully so as to give rise to a bar of 
res judicata against the reversioners. The 
principle that where a Hindu widow in whom her 
husband’s estate has vested, represents the 
estate in a litigation, to which she is a 
party, the decision in each litigation, fairly 
and honestly conducted, given for or against 
her will bind the reversioners, is applicable 
only if the widow did as a matter of fact, 
truly represent the estate in the prior 
litigation, but if in such prior suits, she was 
litigating an absolute title to the estate 
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inconsistent with her position as a Hindu widow 
inheriting her husband’s estate and with the 
interests of the reversioners in general, she 
could not be said to be representing the estate 
or the reversioners and the decision will be 
binding on the reversioners. A Hindu widow can 
not be deemed to represent her husband’s estate 
so as to bind the reversionery heirs of her 
husband in relation to anything which she may 
have done herself to the prejudice of these 
reversionary heirs. She represents the estate 
as against the strangers for the purpose of 
protecting or preserving it. A decree obtained 
by a mortgagee against a Hindu widow alone , on 
the basis of mortgage not executed by her for 
legal necessity cannot bind the reversioners. 
Nor are the reversioners liable to pay the 
costs of the mortgage suit to the extent of the 
amount of the mortgage money which was taken 
for legal necessity. It has somewhat similarly 
been held that suits against the widow for 
arrears of rent or maintenance chargeable to 
the estate were personally against the widow 
and did not involve the rights of the 
reversiners. In this connection a question 
arises and has been considered in several cases 
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whether a compromise decree binds the 
reversioners. It was at one time held that it 
did not. Since a compromise was a contract and 
a decree on a compromise was indistinguishable 
from a alienation inter vivas which did not 
bind the reversioners, how could it then 
become(it was said) more binding by the fect 
that it was embodied in a decree. But a 
compromise decree may still be a fair decree 
more fovourable  to the reversioner than what a 
decree might have been if passed on contest. It 
cannot therefore be asserted as a general rule 
that no compromise binds the reversioner. The 
more correct rule would appear to be that 
though the reversioner as such cannot ipso 
facto reject a decree passed on compromise, the 
question whether he is or is not bound by such 
a decree depends upon whether it answers the 
general test. Moreover a compromise may amount 
to a family settlement and the reversioner will 
then be bound by it. It is immeterial whether 
it is called a compromise, for a even 
compromise is valid if it is a fair settlement 
of rival claims. It has been so held by the 
Privy Council in which the reversion had 
connected on the strength of the earlier cases 
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that a compromise was indistinguishable from an 
alienation, but the Privy Council overruled 
this contention holding the compromise had been 
made under the advice of the District Officer 
and that as a settlement of the family dispute 
it bound the reversioners. These cases have 
overruled the contrary view held by the Indian 
Courts and settled the rule that a decree 
passed on a fair compromise will equally bind 
the reversioners if it is a fair settlement. It 
is not an alienation or subject to its 
restrictions. A compromise out of court stands 
on the same footing and its validity is subject 
to the same test, viz. It is valid and would 
bind the reversioners if it is compromise made 
for the benefit of the estate and for the 
personal advantage of the heiress. But though 
the limited owner’s right to compromise a claim 
is now beyond controversy, it must be a 
compromise and not merely an alienation in the 
guise of a compromise. Every compromise pre-
supposes a bona fide claim and if there was no 
claim there could be no compromise. This is no 
exception to the rule that a compromise is 
binding if it is fair and made with due regard 
to the interest of the reversioners. However 
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that may be, it is quite clear that a 
compromise or an award decree will bind the 
reversioners if the conditions, which make a 
decree against a limited owner binding on the 
estate, are absent. Similarly, a decision in 
suit against the Hindu widow holding a life 
estate under the will of the her husband is not 
binding on the remainderman under the will. 
Wher the relief sought by revesioners against 
cerrtain widow is a personal one and no 
declaration has been sought for avoiding any 
particular transfer and there was no finding 
that any transfer was or was not for lega 
necessity, the mere dismissal of a suit for 
injunction cannot operate as res judicata in 
respect of a suit for possession after the 
death of the widows. A new cause of action 
arises in favour of the actual reversiones at 
the death of the widows and the second suit is 
not barred. On a line with these decisions the 
case of Pahar Singh v. Shamser fang, in which 
it was held that judgement in the remote 
eversioners, suit did not operate as res 
judicata on the question of adoption against 
the nearer reversioner (and their 
representatves) who were arrayed on the side of 
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the defendants and who could not very 
conveniently appeal from the dismissal 
particularly when they were denying that these 
was any collusion between them and the adoptive 
mother. Nor is a decree, for possession of 
properties in favour of plaintiffs, who had 
acquired title under the adopted son and who 
alleged dispossession by the widow after such 
acquisition of title, binding on the     
reversionners. A claim for the widow after such 
acquisition of title, binding on the 
reversioners. A claim for possession by way of 
denunciation of alienation by a previous holder 
of land is based on a different cause of action 
from a claim for redemption and is no bar to a 
suit for redemption of a mortgage by 
representative of the mortgagor. A Hindu woman 
cannot in a suit on a mortgage of the property 
executed by herself deny that she had power to 
alienate the prperty, and, therefore, the 
question of her power to alienate it is not in 
issue in the suit so as to bar it from being 
agitated by her heirs in a subsequent suit for 
possession after her death. Where in a suit 
instituted agaisnst a widow for possession of 
immovable property it was open to her to plead 
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the invalidity of an adoption but she failed. 
She must be held to have raised it, and the 
question as to adoption is res judicata in any 
subsequent suit between the reversioners to her 
husband’s estate and the alienees. Where, 
however, a Hindu widow sued for a declaration 
that a certain execution sale was not valid and 
binding, but it was dismissed not on the merits 
but on the grounds that it was barred by 
Sec.47, C.P.C., a suit by the reversioners 
after the widow’s death was held not be barred 
by res judicata as there was no adjudication on 
the merits in the prior suit. If in a previous 
suit brought by a person claiming to be next 
reversioner on the ground of an illegal 
relationship it is held that there is no 
relationship between him and the deceased and 
on that finding the aliention made by the 
female owner was not declared as invalid 
against the reversioner, it will not be open to 
the same man when inheritance opens by the 
death of the last female owner who intervened 
between him and the last male owner, to contend 
that previous finding on the issue of heirship 
specially raised and decided is not binding. 
Similarly, if the Court held that the 
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alienation was invalid but refused a decree to 
the plaintiff on the ground that he was no 
reversioner it is not permissible for the same 
party to contend that he is the immediate heir 
when the last limited owner dies. But in such a 
case if it held that the plaintiff was the 
reversionaty heir and on such a finding a 
decree is awarded that the alienation was not 
binding on the estate it is not open to the 
defendant was not binding on the estate it is 
not open to the defendant or a person claiming 
through her to contend in the subsequent suit 
by the same reversioner, for possession on the 
death of last female owner that he was a 
stranger to this family.  
 The right of a widow succeeding to her 
husband’s property is that of an owner of 
property and powers are though limited but so 
long as she is alive no one has any vested in 
erest in the succession. A reversionay heir 
although having only a contingent interest is 
recognized as having a right to bring a 
representative suit against the widow for the 
conservation and due administration suit 
against the widow for the conservation and due 
administration of the estate so that the corpus 
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may go unimpaired to those entitled to 
reversion. The law permits the institution of 
suits in the life-time of the female owner to 
remove a common apprehended injury, to interest 
of all the reversioners and whenever action is 
taken by the presumptive reversioner it is in a 
representative capacity on behalf of all 
reversioners. A reversioner can question the 
acts of the Hindu widow without waiting for her 
death because evidence by lapse of time be not 
available for that purpose. The next immediate 
reversioner should have the right of the suit 
in the first instance. A more distant 
reversioner can bring such a suit if those 
nearer in succession are in collusion with the 
widow or have precluded themselves from 
interfering. The reverssioner is bound by the 
decision against the female heir in her 
representative capacity. The right of a 
reversioner to impeach an alienation by a 
qualified Hindu female owner and his right to 
impeach on adoption by a Hindu widow rest in 
essence on identical ground, viz, the necessity 
to protect the reversionary interest and in 
both the cases the reversioner occupies a 
representative position and any decision in a 
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litigation fairly and honestly conducted, given 
for or against Hindu females, who represented 
the estate although they had only a qualified 
interest. Similarly where a suit by the widow 
challenging the surrender executed by her on 
ground or fraud and misrepresentation against R 
the next reversioner on the allegation that R 
was not her husband’s sister’s son, the suit 
having been dismissed, because the widow made 
admission in the Court that R was her husband’s 
sister’s son. It was held that decision will 
not operate as a bar of res judicata because 
the question whether R was her husband’s 
sister’s son or not was not litigated by the 
widow representing the estate on behalf of the 
future reversioners to the estate and also 
because the question was not decided on merits, 
on the basis of evidence on record.  
 In deciding a question of res judicata a 
widow represented the estate in such a manner 
as to bind the reversioner by an earlier 
decision against her, the test would be 
afforded by the fact whether or not the widow 
put up a bona fide and serious contest in the 
earlier suit. If the answer is in affirmative, 
i.e. a bona fide and serious contest, it will 
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constitute res judicata and shall be binding on 
the reversioners also, otherwise not. 
 It is quite true that a Hindu widow though 
owning only the limiting estate represents the 
absolute estate for certain purposes, and that 
a decree in a suit concerning the absolute 
estate if obtained against her without fraud or 
collusion would be binding on the reversioners; 
but if a suit though concerning the absolute 
estate, is determined upon a ground personal to 
the female heir, for instance, if a suit 
brought by a Hindu widow to recover possession 
of immovable property appertaining to her 
husband’s estate is dismissed on the ground of 
its having been alienated by her in favour of 
the defendant in the absence of legal necessity 
being shown, the decree in such a case ought 
not to bind reversioners in subsequent suits 
for recovery of absolute estate which vested in 
the reversioners. Similarly it has been held 
that in cases in which the suits either 
conducted of defended by a widow are personal 
to herself and originate in her own acts do not 
bind the reversioners who claim not through the 
widow but from the last male owner. Thus where 
the estate of a deceased Hindu was partitioned 
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between his two widows A and B in 1895. B died 
in 1897 and after her death her share was 
enjoyed by daughters and their sons. In 1910, 
there was a suit by one of the daughters of B 
against suit by the adopted son to recover 
possession of the property which had gone into 
the possession of B, it was held that in the 
previsous litigation it could not represent the 
estate of her deceased husband as whole, and, 
therefore the decision against her in the 
previous suit was not res judicata against the 
adopted son of his father and not though A. 
Similarly Hindu widow who failed to recover 
possession of the property sold in execution of 
a decree and in a subsequent suit by 
reversioners, it was held that the previous 
suit by Hindu widow for recovery of possession 
in her own right which she enjoyed for many 
years and from which she was dispossessed does 
not operate as res judicata against a 
reversioner to recover possession of property. 
A decree or order of a competent Court fairly 
and properly obtained against a Hindu widow 
which may bind the succeeding reversioner, must 
involve a decision of a question of title and 
not a mere question of possession. 
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 In a nut-shell the principle may be 
summarised that in order that a decree fairly 
and properly obtained against a widow may have 
the effect of res judicata against the 
reversioners, the suit in which the decree was 
made should have been in respect of the estate 
represented by her, but if the suit was in 
relation to anything which she may have done 
herself to the prejudice of the reversionay 
heirs or in her personal rights, she cannot be 
said to be litigating in respect thereof as 
representing the estate. A widow cannot be 
deemed to represent the estate so as to bind 
the reversionay heirs of her husband, in resect 
of anything which she may have done herself to 
the prejudice of said reversionary heirs. She 
represents the estate as against strangers, for 
the purpose of protecting or preserving it, but 
if the purpose had no connection with the 
protection or preservation of the estate and is 
only a personal affair originating from her own 
acts she cannot bind the reversionary heirs of 
her husband. With a view to find out whether 
the widow represented the estate in litigation 
one to look into the nature of allegations put 
forward and the issues raised, tried and 
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decided in the former suit. Was it a claim by 
or against the widow personally or whether it 
raised the question of her inheritance ? If the 
contention raised were of the latter type 
connected with her inheritance and the trial 
was with reference to them the widow would 
surely be regarded as representing the estate. 
If not, the litigation must be deemed to be 
personal to her and not binding the estate. 
 A decree obtained against the widow in her 
capacity as the holder of the estate of her 
husband in a suit fairly obtained is binding 
upon the succeeding heirs. Hence where in a 
suit by a widow a finding of fact as to whether 
certain adoption was valid or not is fairly and 
honestly fought out and so far as the question 
of adoption was concerned the widow was 
representing the estate as otherwise she had no 
capacity whatsoever to challenge the adoption, 
a subsequent suit by a reversioner on the death 
of the widow is barred by the rule of res 
judicata. The principle of the above decision 
was reiterated in Chaudhai Risal Singh v. 
Balwant Singh, Lingowda Dod Basangowda v. 
Basangowda Bistongowda, Mst. Urbasi Dharauni v. 
Chandra dharam. But the limited owner having 
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claimed full ownership acts against the 
interests of the reversioners. Thus where in a 
suit brought by the next presumptive 
reversioner for cancellation of a deed executed 
by the limited owner under the terms of which 
she acknowledged her daughter-in-law as the 
owner of the estate, it cannot be said that the 
limited owner represents the estate and any 
decision obtained in such suit would not 
operate as res judicata between two rival 
reversioners who claim to be entitled to the 
estate. 
  
28. Reversionera’s suit in a 
representative capacity.-  
Since the reversioner’s suit is a 
representative suit in which he represents 
fully the whole reversion it follows that a 
decision given in his suit operates as res 
judicata against reversioners. This is the 
logical outcome of the identity of interest on 
the part of the general body of reversioner, 
near and remote, to get rid of the transaction 
which they regard as destructive of their 
right. In this view “ it is impossible to 
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resist the conclusion that if the right 
litigated is a common right, and if that 
litigation has been honestly conducted, the 
other reversioners are affected by the law of 
res judicata. This is a logical result of the 
decision of the Judicial Committee. A suit by a 
reversioner for setting aside an alienation 
made by a Hindu widow in possession is brought 
by him in a representative capacity, that is, 
as representing the whole body of reversioners, 
for the protection of the estate. A decree in 
such a suit is, therefore, binding not only 
between the reversioner who brought the suit 
and the transferee, but also as between the 
whole body of reveresioners on the one hand and 
the transferee of his representative in title 
on the other. This is so, not because one 
reversioner must in that case be deemed to 
claim though another, but because the 
reversioner who sues represents the others and 
Explanation VI comes into operation. A suit 
instituted in the interests of an estate and 
for the benefit of not only the plaintiffs, but 
all persons who come to succeed after them, is 
a representative suit and the decision arrived 
at therein, in the absence of any fraud of 
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collusion, is binding on subsequent 
reversioners and operates as res judicata. But 
it has been held, in a suit brought by persons 
alleging themselves to be the nearest 
reversioners against a Hindu widow and her 
transferees to set aside an alienation made by 
the widow of the estate of her deceased 
husband, that the fact in a previous suit of 
similar character bought by the father of the 
plaintiffs the widow and her transferee did not 
set up the defence that the plaintiff was not 
in fact the nearest presumptive reversioner was 
no bar to the setting up of this plea in the 
present suit. One reversioner cannot be said to 
be claiming under another reversioner within 
the meaning of Explanation VI. Therefore a 
decision in a previous suit that a person is 
not a reversione of an alienor will not operate 
as res judicata in a subsequent suit by another 
reversioner to challenge an alienation by the 
same alienor.  
 A suit by a reversioner for declaration 
that alienation made by a widow or other 
limited heir is void, except for her life is 
always a representative suit on behalf of the 
reversioners then existing or thereafter to be 
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born, and that all of them have a single cause 
of action arising on the date of the 
alienation. The litigation is in respect of a 
private right claimed in common to himself and 
others and therefore Explanation VI to Sec.11, 
C.P.C., clearly applies.  
 A decree fairly and properly passed in 
such a suit, whether it is for or against the 
revesioner suing, operates as res judicata for 
the whole body of reversioners. Inasmuch as a 
decree obtained or finding given in favour of a 
reversioner enures for the benefit of all 
members of the reversionary body, a decree 
passed or finding arrived at against him 
injures the right of other reversioners as 
well.  
 Declaratory decree in favour of the 
reversioners to the estate of Deceased in 
regard to a gift by the widow and a suit by the 
subsequently adopted son to recover possession 
of the property gifted on the strngth of 
declaratory decree. It was held that the 
reversioners had represented no one but 
themselves and that the adopted son did not 
claim through them but directly through his 
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adoptive father. Section 11, C.P.C., therefore, 
had no application. A suit brought by a 
reversioner is for the benefit of all the 
reversioners entitled to sue and just any 
finding given in favour of a reversioner 
benefits all members of the reversionary body, 
a finding arrived against him injures every 
body concermed.  
 Wherein a suit by a Hindu widow against 
reversioner H it was contested by H on the 
ground that he had perfected his title by 
adverse passession for over 12 years. But 
although the suit was neither instituted 
against H as a manager of joint family nor 
contested by H as such manger but the case was 
contested by H that the house belonged to him 
and his brother F jointly. It was held that 
earlier decision operated as res judicata in a 
subsequent suit for possession by H for himself 
and for the benefit of brother F. 
 
29. Suit by one member of a Hindu family 
including manager:-  
The manager of a joint Hindu family 
possesses the right to represent the family in 
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a suit affecting the joint family. Hence a 
decree obtained by or against a manager will be 
presumed to have been obtained by or against 
him in his representative capacity and as such 
will bind the whole family. In some cases, 
however, the Courts seek to distinguish the 
case of the father and any other manager, 
holding that while the former may, the latter 
cannot, bind the family by any decree passed 
against him. But the Privy Council have held 
that apart from certain textual powers 
possessed by the father such distinction has no 
legal support. In the case of a Hindu family 
where all have rights it is impossible to allow 
each member of the family to litigate the same 
points over and over again and the Court has, 
in each case, to look to Explanation VI to see 
whether or not the leading member of the family 
has been acting either no behalf of minors in 
their interest or, if they are majos, with the 
assent of the majors. That one member may 
possess the right to represent the family in a 
suit affecting the joint family has even been 
recognized by the Privy Council who said: Their 
Lordships “ think that this case can not in any 
degree be likened to those which sometimes 
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occur in India wherein the interest of a join 
and undivided family in issue, one member of 
family has prosecuted a suit or has defended a 
suit and a decree has been passed in that suit 
which may afterwards be considered as binding 
upon all the members of the family, their 
interest being taken to have been sufficiently 
represented by the party in the original suit.” 
A fortiori a decree for partition made in a 
suit instituted by a member of joint Hindu 
family is res judicata as between all co-
sharers who are parties to the suit. But a 
decree against the father will not operate as 
res judicata in a suit, by the sons to set 
aside the sale in respect of their shares in 
the property, for a son in an undivided Hindu 
family, except in Lower Bengal, does not claim 
under his father. It has somewhat similarly 
been held that the dismissal of a suit for 
redemption of a mortgage of joint family 
property brought by the father in a Hindu 
family alone would not be a bar to a subsequent 
suit for redemption by the sons. But a decree 
in a suit on a mortgage obtained against a 
Hindu mortgagor whose minor undivided sons are 
bot made parties to the suit, is binding on the 
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minor sons as res judicata, inasmuch as they 
were sufficiently represented by their father 
in the first litigation. But a statement by a 
mortgagee’s pleader in a suit brought for 
recovery of a mortgage debt against a Hindu 
father and his sons that the sons may be 
discharged so far as their interest in the 
joint family property was concerned and a 
simple money decree passed against the father 
does not estop the decree-holder from 
proceeding against the joint family property in 
execution, nor does the decision in that suit 
operate as res judicata n a subsequent suit 
brought brought by the sons for a declaration 
that the joint family property was not liable 
to attachment and in execution of the simple 
money decree passed against the father. But the 
dismissal of a suit by the father to set aside 
an execution sale of the jagir bars a suit by 
the son on his succession for the same purpose. 
But where a sale by a Hindu father was set 
aside in a suit by the sons on their depositing 
a certain sum and the vendee sued the sons of 
the vendor, for the balance of the purchase 
money, it was held that the suit was not barred 
by the principles of res judicata. An alienee 
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of a portion of a joint family property is not 
barreed by res judicata from suing to enforce 
his right by the fact that in a previous suit 
by another alienee of some other items 
belonging to the joint family for possession of 
those items he was impleaded as a party an 
dfailed to enforce his remedies. Where a 
judgement of a competent court is passed after 
a fair and bona fide contest against the 
defendant’s father, who held a particular jagir 
for life, as representing the estate and not in 
his personal capacity, the decree is binding on 
the defendant who succeeds to the jagir, 
although he may not claim the jagir under his 
father, and he is estopped from questioning the 
title of other persons decided in the previous 
suit against his father. A plea of res judicata 
as regards question of validity and 
consideration for the mortgages the son it he 
does not claim the family property through his 
father but claims it by reason of his birth as 
a co-parcener in the family. 
A mere alienation by a coparcener of his 
share in the joint family property or a suit by 
a non-alienating coparcener to have it declared 
that his share is not bound by the alienations 
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or even a suit for partial partition by such a 
non-alienating coparcener to recover his share 
from the alienee would not by itself affect a 
division in status between himself and the 
other coparcener. An alienee can bring a suit 
for general partition, and such a suit would 
not be barred be res judicata by reason of the 
decree in the previous suit for partial 
partition brought by a non-alienating 
coparcener. It is well settled that the joint 
family would be bound by a decree property 
passed against the manager of the family either 
in respect of a family property or a family 
debt. 
Where the father was not litigating in the 
previous action in a representative capacity 
there would not be in effect a party to the 
previous litigation hence no bar of res 
judicata will be created in any subsequent 
suit. Similarly when the sons are called upon 
to discharge the pious duty of the sons to 
discharge the personal decree passed against 
their father on the alleged personal debt of 
the father the sons are entitled to show that 
debt was non-existing, fictitious or illusory. 
The father while defending a suit filed against 
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him by a creditor for recovery of the debt not 
incurred by him for the benefit of the family 
does not represent his sons, not even qua the 
plea of non-existence of the debt, which may or 
may not be raised by him, and the sons are not 
bound by the decree in respect of this plea 
under the principles embodied in Explanation VI 
to Sec.11, C.P.C., moreover the right to 
challenge the existence of the debt, if 
conceded to the sons does not work any hardship 
on the creditor because he can by impleading 
the sons in the suit brought against the 
father, have the matter adjudicated upon in the 
presence of the sons. But where the nature of 
the decree or the existence of the debt was not 
denied it was observed by their Lordships of 
the Supreme Court in Sidheswar Mukherjee v. 
Bhubneshwar Prasad, that the money decree 
passed against the father certainly created a 
debt payable by him. If the debt was not 
tainted with immorality it was open to the 
creditor to realise the dues by attachment and 
sale of the sons coparcenery in the joint 
property. Similarly Kapur, J., in Surindra Nath 
v. Sarilia Hindi Mahajani School, held that 
where there has been bona fide contest between 
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the father and the creditor or where a decree 
has been fairly obtained it is not open to the 
son to reagitate the question of the existence 
of the debt.  
Where a reversioner brings suit he 
represents the entire reversionary body; the 
estate and every one who is interested in the 
property after the death of widow. Such an 
action may not bind the reversioners in case it 
can be shown that the suit was collusive, but 
the result certainly binds the transferee 
against whom the decision is rendered. This 
distinction was made by their Lordships of the 
Privy Council in Mata Prasad v. Nageshwar Sahji 
and Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pragash Ojha. 
Between the reversioners suing and the 
transferee, the decision obtained is for the 
benefit of the reversioners it that decision is 
against the transferee. There is no need for 
another suit to establish the same points, 
provided the earlier suit was in a competent 
Court and all other conditions of Sec. 11, 
C.P.C., were satisfied. 
Similarly any member of the joint family 
can bring a suit to reclaim property from a 
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trespasser for the benefit of the family as a 
whole. Explanation VI to Sec.11, C.P.C., 
applies to such cases. 
 
30. Decree against manager of endowment,  
shebait or trustee.-  
From the fact that the manager represents 
the trust in all suits affecting its interest, 
it follows that decrees fairly obtained by or 
against the manager as representative of the 
trust equally bind both his successor and the 
trust. But before applying the principle of res 
judicata to such judgements, Court should be 
satisfied that the judgements relied upon are 
untainted by fraud or collusion, and that the 
necessary and proper issues have been raised, 
tied and decided in the suits which led to 
them. A decree obtained by one of the trustees 
on behalf of a trust against the other 
trustees, either for a declaration that the 
property in dispute was trust property or for 
rendition of accounts in a suit brought in the 
interests of the trust or for the protection of 
the trust property, is binding as much on the 
trustees who are parties to the suit as on all 
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persons interested in the trust for the shebait 
as representing an idol is binding on the 
succeeding shebait in the absence of fraud of 
collusion. It has even been held that a decree 
obtained in a suit against the shebait of an 
idol, where the shebait is not expressly 
described as such and representing the idol, 
but where, as a matter or fact, he sets up no 
title adverse to that of the idol and defends 
the suit on behalf of the idol, is binding upon 
the idol. But a suit between members of a Hindu 
family, the plaint describing both plaintiffs 
and defendants of a family idol, and praying 
for a scheme for the management of property 
stated to be debutter and the performance of 
the worship, can not be regarded as a suit in 
which the idol is plaintiff. Consequently, a 
finding therein that the property was not 
proved to be debutter raises no res judicata in 
a later suit in which the plaintiffs are the 
same and another family idol, represented by a 
shebait (one of the defendants in the earlier 
suit), and the prayer is for a declaration that 
the properties were owned by the idols as 
debutter property. Nor does a decision that a 
will purporting to create a religious endowment 
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and to appoint shebaits was wholly valid bar, 
the question as to validity of its provisions 
regarding succession to the shebaitship, when 
the only question in the previous case was 
about the extent of bequest that operated under 
the will. However, the decision in a previous 
suit failed by certain worshippers under Sec.14 
of XX of 1863 for removal of trustees is res 
judicata in a latter suit by certain other 
worshippers under O.I, r.8, C.P.C., for 
declaration that certain temple endowments were 
public property. It has also somewhat similarly 
been held that a previous adjudication between 
the two sections of a place wherein the parties 
represented other members of the caste under 
Or. I, r. 8, as to their respective rights to 
the office of a local temple concludes not only 
the temple trustee in the absence of fraud of 
a, but also all the members of the communities 
of all time. It has somewhat similarly been 
held that a trustee of a devawsam, a karnam, a 
holder of watan lands, an administrator of the 
estate of a deceased person, a shebait, a 
holder of saranjam lands, represents each his 
successor, therefore a decree against him will 
bind his successor. On the same principle a 
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decree against the karnavan of a tarwad in his 
representative capacity binds the other members 
of the tarwad. It is doubtful whether the froad 
proposition enunciated in Fenkins v. Roberston 
as explained by Vaughan Williams,J., in In re 
South America and Mexican Co., namely, that “ 
persons instituting a suit on behalf of the 
public have no right to bind public by a 
compromise decree, though a decree passed 
against them on contest would bind the public” 
is applicable in India to suits of a 
representative character falling within the 
purview of Sec.92, as read in the light of 
Explanation VI. A decree allowed to be passed 
against a temple owing to the gross negligence 
of the trustee does not operate as res judicata 
in a latter suit by the succeeding trustee on 
behalf of the temple.  
 Where Government land on being transferred 
in trust, vested in the Municipality and 
belonged to it and a decree was passed against 
Municipality granting a declaration to the 
plaintiffs that they had obtained an 
indefensible title by adverse possession. It 
was held that the decree obtained against the 
Municipality operated as res judicata in a 
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subsequent suit by government as the 
Municipality represented the title for the time 
being and was constituted a trustee. Wnere a 
suit by a mahant impeaching an alienation of 
math property by his predecessor has been 
dismissed, the decision binds the succeeding 
mahant and his suit for possession challenging 
the sale will be barred by Sec.11, C.P.C., in 
the absence of collusion or fraud. A house 
belonging to the deosthan was sold by N and B, 
the two trustees of the deosthan to the 
plaintiff R for Rs.2000 and plaintiff was put 
in possession of the house. Another trustee G 
and C pujari of the deosthan instituted a suit 
for declaration, that the sale in favour of R 
was void, and for possession. In defence R 
contended that in the event of sale being found 
to be void deosthan should be put on term to 
pay Rs.2000 to R. The suit was decreed 
unconditionally. There was no appeal. 
Subsequently R filed a suit for recovery of 
Rs.2000 against N and B and deosthan. Held that 
the controversies and the issues in the prior 
suit were between the deosthan and the vendor R 
and the issue whether N and B should be ordered 
to refund was not raised in the pleading hence 
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the judgement in the first suit could not 
operate as res judicata. That a compromise made 
bona fide for the benefit of the estate and not 
for the personal advantage of the limited owner 
will bind the reversioners quite as much as a 
decree on contest. Only if a compromise is 
shown to be either collusive or not fairly 
obtained that the same is not binding in a 
future litigation. It is competent for the 
plaintiffs in a representative suit brought in 
accordance with the provisions of O.I, r.8, 
C.P.C., to compromise the suit and a compromise 
decree in such will bind the persons who are 
requested through parties on the record of the 
suit and will operate as res judicata, provided 
the compromise or settlement is bona fide. 
Though the idol is the owner of the properties 
the right to sue or be sued is vested in the 
shebaits. Thus the mere omission to describe 
the defendants as shebaits in the debutter 
estate when the defendants could not be parties 
to the suit except in their capacity as 
shebaits and could not enter into any 
compromise save in that capacity.  
 The question whether an ex parte decree 
against a limited owner or a shebait of a muth 
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or a manager or a trustee of a temple or 
charity owner or a charity stand on a better 
footing than a consent or compromise decree 
against such limited owner, shebait, etc. it is 
been held that it does not make any difference 
in principle. A decree obtained against a 
limited owner or a shebait of a muth or a 
manger or a trustee of a temple or charity, 
without the necessary and appropriate issues 
raised, tried and decided could not bind the 
reversioners, or the succeeding shebait or 
manager trustee and it could be re-opened in a 
subsequent suit. 
 A shebait has no authority to annihilate 
the interest of the deities in the endowed 
properties and enter into a compromise wholly 
prejudicial to the interest of the deities, 
hence the compromise petition and the decree 
based thereon are in consequence void and 
illegal and cannot operate as res judicata. 
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31. Other representative suits or 
proceedings- 
 It has somewhat similarly been held that a 
decision in a suit,by some members of the 
public, for a declaration that certain property 
was waq f property, is res judicata against a 
suit by or against a benamidar is res judicata 
against the other members. It has also somewhat 
similarly been held a decision in a suit by or 
against a benemidar is res judicata against the 
real owner. It has creditors as well as the 
company, and if an order is made against him 
upholding the claim of a particular creditor to 
a charge on the company’s properties so 
represented. The Municipal Board represents the 
public in disputes about wells and other things 
which are used in them; and any decision 
between the Mnicipal Board and the defendants 
in a previous litigation about such a well, 
will operate as res judicata against the letter 
even if the suit is brought by other persons 
and not by the Municipal Board.  
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CHAPTER – 9 
COMPETENT COURT 
 
 
1. Court meaning of :- 
 
The word “Court” has not been defined any 
where in the Code of Civil Procedure. By 
looking into the judicial pronouncements one 
finds that the word “Court” should be 
understood in its ordinary legal sense “a place 
where justice is judicially administered” ( 
Stroud). There is nothing in the Code of Civil 
Procedure which would indicate that the term 
“Court” has been used in the Code in any 
special or enlarged sense. Thus the conception 
of Court is closely associated with the 
judicial functions which it performs and 
thereby acts as a court. Therefore it clearly 
follows as a logical consequence that 
administrative officers are not court. Thus for 
instance, a senior subordinate Judge does not 
exercise his powers in view of any authority 
delegated to him by the provincial Government, 
but in view of the statutory provisions 
embodied in the Civil Procedure Code. 
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2. Competence of Court. :- 
   
  Whatever estoppel by record is said to 
arise out of a judgment, it is presumed that 
the Court which pronounced the judgment had 
jurisdiction to do so. The lack of jurisdiction 
deprives the judgment of any effect, whether by 
estoppel or otherwise. 
 
AIR 1964 Pat 452 
 
  Therefore there is a distinction between 
an inherent want of jurisdiction in a court and 
want of jurisdiction on grounds which have to 
be determined by the court itself. The first 
make a decree a nullity which can be ignored 
and need not to set aside (separately). The 
second does not make the decree a nullity, but 
only voidable; such a decree can be set aside 
by adopting the proper procedure, but cannot be 
impeached collaterally. A Court which is 
empowered by law to try a suit, has power to 
try it rightly or wrongly the validity of a 
decree does not depend on whether it embodies a 
correct decision. A judgment of a court having 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the 
parties to the suit and having territorial and 
pecuniary jurisdiction, however, erroneous, 
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cannot be a mere nullity and cannot be 
collaterally challenged. 
 
AIR 1950 ALL 488 
 
 It must be noted that the jurisdiction of 
a court Sec.11 of the Code of Civil procedure 
is not to be considered in same light as one 
would consider a case proceeding under Sec. 115 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. A decree 
without jurisdiction under Sec.11, Civil 
Procedure Code, must be a decree in which a 
Code had no jurisdiction to entertain, and the 
mere fact that the Court acted illegally or 
with material irregularity in the exercise of 
its jurisdiction will not affect the 
jurisdiction of the Court under the provisions 
of that section. 
 
1. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of 
Civil Courts to entertain civil suits-
What amounts to. - 
 
AIR 1964 Sec.322 
 
 In dealing with the question whether civil 
court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit is 
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barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind 
the fat that there is a general presumption 
that there must be a remedy in the ordinary 
civil courts to a citizen claiming that an 
amount has been recovered from him illegally 
and that such a remedy can be held to be barred 
only on very clear and unmistakable indications 
to the contrary. The exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain civil 
causes will not be assumed unless the relevant 
statute contains an express provision to that 
effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable 
implication of that nature. The mere fact that 
a special statute provides for certain remedies 
may not b itself necessarily exclude the 
jurisdiction of the civil courts to deal with a 
case brought before it in respect of some of 
the matters covered by the said statute. 
 
2. Reference under Land Acquisition Act 
to Civil Court -If it can decide 
validity of reference. - 
 
  As pointed by the Privy Council in 
Nussewanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeem Khan, 
wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an 
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Act, and such jurisdiction is only given upon 
certain specified terms contained in the Act 
itself, “ it is universal principle that these 
terms must be complied with, in order to create 
and raise the jurisdiction, for if they be not 
complied with the jurisdiction does not arise.” 
 
 In deciding the question of jurisdiction 
in a reference dismissed by the District Judge 
on the ground that it was made after the expiry 
of the period of two months prescribed by 
proviso (b) to sub-section (2) or Sec.18 of the 
Travancore Land Acquisition Act, 1089. The 
question for determination was whether he had 
the jurisdiction to do so. 
 
  It was further held that the District 
Court is certainly not acting as a court of 
appeal or revision; it is only discharging the 
elementary duty of satisfying itself that a 
reference which it is called upon to hear and 
decide is a valid and proper reference 
according to the provisions of the Act under 
which it is made. That is a basic and 
preliminary duty which no tribunal can possibly 
avoid. 
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3. Power of Tribunals of limited 
jurisdiction to decide their own 
jurisdiction. - 
 
It is well settled that, unless the 
Legislature expressly confers upon a tribunal 
of limited jurisdiction the excessive power to 
decide facts upon which it can assume 
jurisdiction to do a certain act or to pass a 
certain type of order, it has no jurisdiction 
to decide those preliminary or jurisdictional 
facts finally. While it has necessarily to come 
to its own conclusions on those facts in order 
to exercise its jurisdiction relating to 
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, its 
decision on those fats is liable to be 
challenged in the civil court. A tribunal of 
limited jurisdiction can not have unlimited 
power to determine the limit and to assume 
jurisdiction or, in other words, it cannot 
usurp jurisdiction on a wrong decision relating 
to jurisdictional facts. 
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4. Concurrent jurisdiction – Meaning of. 
- 
 
  The proposition of the rule of concurrent 
jurisdiction was explained in the leading case 
on the subject of Mst. Edun v. Mst. Bechun, 
wherein Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J, observed as 
follows: 
  “It appears to me therefore that the rule 
which is laid down, viz. that to render a 
judgment of one Court, between the same parties 
upon the same point conclusive in another Court 
the two courts must be courts of concurrent 
jurisdiction. The concurrency of jurisdiction 
is a necessary part of the rule which creates 
an estoppel in such a case. ” 
 
 it is quite clear that in order to make  
decision of one Court final and conclusive in 
another court, it must be a decision of a Court 
which would have had jurisdiction over the 
matter in subsequent suit in which the first 
decision is given in evidence as conclusive. 
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5. Plea of res judicata extends also to 
judgments of Court of exclusive 
jurisdiction. - 
 
  The plea of res judicata is not limited to 
the provisions of this section, nor is it 
limited to a judgment of a court of concurrent 
jurisdiction being  pleaded as  bar to the 
subsequent suit which is dealt with in the said 
section but it extends also to a judgment of a 
court of exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
 The judgment of a court of exclusive 
jurisdiction directly upon the point is 
conclusive upon the same matters between the 
same parties, Coming incidentally in question 
in another court for different purposes, 
 
  Section 11, C.P.C., embodies the doctrine 
of res judicata, as already pointed out earlier 
that the section is however not exhaustive and 
the doctrine of res judicata has often been 
invoked and applied to cases not strictly  
within the compass of that section. The maxim 
that no man should be vexed twice over the same 
cause ( Nemo debet bis vexari pro una eadem 
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causa ) is considered to be a principle of law 
which has to be given effect to and followed 
without being unduly restricted by the terms of 
the statute as enacted in Sec.11, C.P.C. 
 
6. Preferential jurisdiction. - 
 
The plea of  res judicata should be given 
effect to it the Court which passed the decree 
in the first suit is a  court of jurisdiction 
competent to try the subsequent suit, whenever 
its inability to entertain the subsequent suit 
arises, not from incompetence, but from the 
existence of another Court with preferential 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
7. Question of exclusive jurisdiction of 
a tribunal – Determination of – 
Fundamental principles. - 
 
The following tests or fundamental 
principles should be borne in mind in deciding 
cases, where the question of exclusive 
jurisdiction of a tribunal is raised: 
1. the general law of the country is not 
altered by special legislation made 
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without particular reference to it, though 
a statute passed for a particular purpose 
must, so far as that purpose extends, 
override general enactments. 
2. If there is a manifest absence of 
jurisdiction in the tribunal which makes a 
determination, the civil courts will have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the 
matter.    
3. It is for the Court of general civil 
jurisdiction to determine what is the 
scope of the authority given to a 
statutory tribunal and to investigate the 
question as to whether a special or 
subordinate tribunal has acted within the 
limits of its jurisdiction. 
4. Even where jurisdiction is given to the 
statutory tribunal to determine certain 
facts so as to give itself jurisdiction, 
it will be for the Court of general 
jurisdiction to adjudicate as to what are 
the powers which the statute has given to 
such an authority or tribunal. 
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8. Erroneous decisions of courts of 
exclusive jurisdiction how far operate 
as res judiacata. - 
 
As early as 1853 Coleridge, J.held in 
Bunbury v. Fuller, as follows. 
 
“It is general rule that no Court can give 
itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a 
point collateral to the merits of the case upon 
which the limits of its jurisdiction depends; 
and however, its decision may be final on all 
particular making up together that subject-
matter which, if true is within its 
jurisdiction and however necessary in any case 
it may be for it to make a preliminary enquiry 
whether some collateral matter be or be not 
within its limits, yet upon the preliminary 
question its decision must always be open to 
enquiry in a superior Court, ” 
  
   
9. Whether declaratory decrees operate 
as res judicata. - 
 
An important question of law is often 
raised that a prior declaratory decree may not 
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operate as res judicata under Sec.11, C.P.C., 
the former decision is binding on the parties 
to the subsequent suit under Sec.35, Specific 
Relief Act, raising as it does the same 
question between the same parties. That is, in 
other word, whether Src.35 of the Specific 
Relief At must be read subject to Sec. 22, 
C.P.C., or otherwise. There is a difference of 
judicial opinion on this point. 
 
 Section 35 of Specific Relief Act reads: 
 
“A declaration made under this Chapter is 
binding only on the parties to the suit, 
persons claiming through them 
respectively, and where any of the parties 
are trustees on the persons for whom, if 
in existence at the date of the 
declaration. Such parties would be 
trustees.” 
 
 
10. Decisions of Probate Courts how far 
res judicata in civil courts. - 
 
  A court acting under Act V of 1881 is a 
court exercising a special jurisdiction and the 
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proceeding is of as special character even when 
it is a contentious proceeding and is quite 
distinct from a suit in a civil  court to cause 
or prevent a will from being operative as a 
disposition of property. It is a preliminary 
proceeding to determine whether the whole 
document propounded or any, and if so what part 
of it is the will of the testator. Hence a 
decision under the Act does not operate as res 
judicata in subsequent suit to establish title. 
It is held that in such cases the question 
before the Court is one of representation of 
the estate and not of distribution and it is 
only for the purpose of determining the former 
question that the Court is called upon to 
decide  whether a party would be entitled to 
the whole or any part of the estate. 
Consequently, the decision come to by the Court 
as to the right of a party to inherit does not 
operate as res judicata in a suit for 
administration or for possession of the 
property belonging to the estate. A question of 
status decided in such proceeding can be gone 
into again in a regular suit. It must not, 
however, be supposed that in no case can the 
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decision of the Probate Court operate as res 
judicata in a subsequent regular suit. 
 
  A plea of res judicata on general 
principles can be successfully taken in respect 
of judgment of probate courts. It is obvious 
that these courts are not entitled to try a 
regular suit and they only exercise special 
jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute. 
When a plea of res judicata is founded on 
general principle of law all that is necessary 
to establish is that the Court that heard and 
decided the former case was a court of 
competent jurisdiction. It does not seem 
necessary in such cases to further prove that 
it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit. 
 
 
11. Decisions of criminal courts whether 
operate as resjudicata - 
 
  The decision of a criminal court does not 
operate as res judicata in a civil suit in 
respect of the same cause of action. It is a 
general rule which has been acknowledged and 
followed in India as well as in England that a 
judgment in a criminal case ( unless indeed, 
570 
admissible as evidence in the nature of 
reputation ) cannot be received in a civil 
action to establish the truth of the fact upon 
which it is rendered, and that a judgment in a 
civil action cannot be given in evidence for 
such a purpose in criminal prosecution. In fact 
the courts have held that a proceeding of 
criminal court is not admissible as evidence; 
that a civil court is bound to find the facts 
itself, that a conviction in criminal case is 
not conclusive in a civil suit for damages in 
respect of the same act, that a civil court is 
not bound to adopt the view of a Magistrate as 
to the genuineness or otherwise of a document, 
that a suit for money forcibly taken from the 
plaintiff by the defendant is maintainable in 
the civil court, notwithstanding the 
defendant’s acquittal in the criminal court on 
the change of robbery, that in a suit for 
damages for assault, the previous conviction of 
the defendant in a criminal court is no 
evidence of the assault and that the factum of 
assault must be tried in the Civil Court. But 
an order by a Magistrate under Sec. 146 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code declaring a party to be 
entitled to possession of certain lands, is 
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conclusive on the point of actual possession in 
a subsequent in a civil court. 
 
  Thus in a suit of compensation for 
malicious prosecution the plaintiff has to 
prove independently of the acquittal that the 
prosecution was malicious and without probable 
and reasonable cause and further that the 
prosecution must be proved to be false to the 
knowledge of the defendant. It has been held 
that in such cases the judgment of the criminal 
court can be looked at merely to establish the 
fact of acquittal, but the ground of acquittal 
cannot be looked at by the civil court, it lies 
upon the civil court itself  to undertake an 
entirely independent enquiry before satisfying 
itself of the absence or otherwise reasonable 
and probable cause. 
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CHAPTER – 10 
HEARD AND FINALLY DECIDED  
 
1. Heard and finally decided –Meaning 
and scope General.- 
 
One of the essential for the operation of 
the rule of res judicata as laid down in Sec.11 
of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the 
former suit should have been heard and finally 
decided. “Res judicata” said Romilly in Fenkins  
v. Roberson, “by its very words means a matter 
upon which the Court has exercised its judicial 
mind and has come to the conclusion that one 
side is right and has pronounced a decision 
accordingly. In my opinion, res judicata 
signifies that the Court has, after arguments 
and consideration, come to a decision on a 
contested matter.” Therefore, it is clear that 
in order to substantiate a plea of res 
judicatait is not enough that in order to same 
and that the same matter is in issue, it must 
also be shown that the matter was heard and 
finally decided. In other words an adjudication 
on merits, no matter on what ground, is the 
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sine qua non for the operation of the rule of 
res judicata in a subsequent suit. 
 
A mere opinion of the Court on a matter 
not necessary for the decision of the case and 
not arising out of the issues before it is 
obiter dictum and cannot be said to be a 
decision on any issue, and is, therefore, not 
res judicata. 
 
When a question at issue between the 
parties to the suit is heard and finally 
decided, the judgment  given on it is binding 
on the parties at all stages of the suit. 
 
 
2. No matter left undecided is deemed 
decided.- 
 
A matter cannot be considered to be 
finally decided, unless in point of fact it was 
actually decided by all the tribunals before 
which that particular matter came for decision. 
And no matter can be deemed to be decided which 
is left expressly undecided, or as to which the 
party raising it is refereed to a separate 
suit. The general effect of the decisions may 
be said to be that a question though raised in 
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the previous suit between the same parties does 
not become res judicata if is has not been 
adjudicated upon but on the other hand has been 
left open. Indeed this was conceded by the 
Calcutta High Court in a case decided as far 
back as in 1880. And this decision was followed 
by the Punjab Chief Court in Saiful Rahman 
v.Umar – ud - Din. And the rule will apply 
where the original Court decided an issue, but 
the judgment is superseded on appeal, the 
Appellate Court dismissing the suit on some 
preliminary point, and considering that the 
original Court should not have decided the 
issue. 
 
 
3. Suits allowed to be withdrawn with 
liberty to bring fresh suit whether res 
judicata.- 
 
  When plaintiff brings a fresh suit after 
withdrawal of the first suit with permission of 
the court to file a fresh suit the defendant 
cannot plead res judicata in the subsequent 
suit. If has down by their Lordships of the 
Privy Council that where though a claim was 
included in the prior suit, but judicially 
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considered or adjudicated upon it, the claim 
had never been judicially considered or 
adjudicated upon between the parties, and all 
that happened was that the plaintiff elected 
not to proceed with that action for the purpose 
but to seek a judicial decision in other 
proceedings, the claim is not barred by res 
judicata as the judgment shows on its face no 
decision as regards that particular issue. Same 
principle will apply where permission, to 
withdrawn the suit with liberty to file fresh 
suit is given by an appellate Court.  
 
4.Decision to be res judicata must be 
final and not Provisional or 
interlocutory.- 
 
  To constitute res judicata the decision 
must have been final. A judicial decision is 
deemed final when it leaves nothing to be 
judicially  determined or ascertained 
thereafter, in order to render it effective and 
capable of execution. The decision of a suit on 
a preliminary point does not bar a subsequent 
suit on the same cause of action. But the 
decision on the preliminary point on which the 
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suit fails is res judicata in regard to that 
point itself in a subsequent suit. A 
preliminary decree or judgment, or a decision 
upon a motion in the course of a trial, cannot 
ordinarily result, if the case goes no further, 
in precluding the parties from drawing the 
matter into issue again. The case must have 
gone to a complete termination, so that nothing 
more is necessary, for the purpose of the suit 
to settle the rights of the parties or the 
extent of those rights. In England 
interlocutory orders do not have the force of 
res judicata for the reason that they do not 
dispose of or terminate the cause. 
 
 
 
5. Provisional orders how far final.- 
 
  A provisional order grows into a permanent 
one, when steps are not taken, or, being taken, 
fail to displace it within a certain time, 
becomes no doubt, res judicata after the lapse 
of that time, just as where an appeal is not 
made in the absence of an express provision to 
the contrary. But provisional orders, such as 
are passed on claims to attached property which 
become conclusive if a suit is not bought to 
577 
set them aside within certain period, would not 
be final; if the suit should be dismissed not 
on the merits, but simply as the attachment had 
been withdrawn and therefore the matter of 
dispute came to an end, and there remained no 
object on which adjudication could operate. The 
validity of an order made at one stage of a 
litigation unless forthwith challenged by an 
appropriate proceeding in a superior tribunal 
is conclusive between the parties and cannot be 
questioned or collaterally attacked at a later 
stage. 
 
 
6. Where a decree is appealed from, it 
is the appellate decree which should 
be looked at to see whether a matter 
is res judicata. - 
  It had already been remarked that upon 
appeal a matter ceases to be res judicata and 
becomes res sub judice. The appeal destroys the 
finality of the decision, the judgment of the 
lower Court is superseded by the judgment of 
the Court of appeal, and in deciding whether a 
decree operate as res judicata it is the 
appellate decree that should be seen. Thus it 
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has decided that where a decision of a lower 
Court is appealed to a superior tribunal, which 
for any reason does not think to decide the 
matter, the question is left open and is not 
res judicata. It has also been held that when 
the judgment of a Court of first instance upon 
a particular issue is appealed against that 
judgment cases to be res judicata and becomes 
res sub judice and if the Appellate Court 
declines to decide that issue and disposes of 
the case on other grounds the judgment of the 
first Court upon that issue is no more a bar to 
a future suit than it would be if that judgment 
had been reversed, b the Court of appeal. 
 
7. Consent decrees may be res judicata.- 
 
 This section is not strictly applicable to 
compromise decrees, as it applies in terms to 
what has been heard and finally decided by a 
court. A consent decree, however, has to all 
intents and purposes the same affect res 
judicata as a decree passed in invitum. In 
other words a consent decree is as binding on 
the parties to the proceeding in which it is 
made as a decree made after a contentious 
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trial. This has been held repeatedly by the 
Privy Council as well as by the High Courts. 
Thus it was held by the Privy Council in 
Radhika v. Nilamani, that when a state of facts 
is accepted as the basis of a compromise, where 
a suit pending decision is amicably adjusted, 
and when the compromise is not vitiated by 
fraud, those who were parties to it and their 
privies should not after wards be heard to say, 
for the purpose of reviving the controversy, 
that the real state of things was otherwise. 
This case has been followed in other in other 
cases. It is thus clear that a consent decree 
until set aside, operates as an estoppel and 
the parties are not entitled to give the go-bye 
even to a particular clause in an existing 
decree on the ground that the clause, if 
resting on no higher authority than the 
agreement between the parties, would be bad in 
law. 
   
 A compromise decree is res judicata in so 
far as it relates to matters within the scope 
of the suit, and in regard to extraneous 
matters it is a legal record of the agreements 
between the parties and as such available to 
them as evidence. But where a suit for 
580 
partition is dismissed under a compromise which 
was not carried out, a second suit for 
partition is not barred by res judicata. The 
right to bring a suit for partition is a 
continuing right incidental to the ownership of 
the joint property. Where a plaintiff 
practically withdraws his claim having come to 
terms with the defendat, the dismissal of his 
suit does not operate even as a consent decree. 
 
8.Finality of ex-parte dectee.- 
 
An ex parte decree will operate res 
judicata if  it has not been set aside 
according to law and has become final. For the 
purposes of res judicata it is immaterial 
whether the suit is decided ex parte or after 
contest. It is well established principle that 
decree once passed cannot be challenged by a 
separate suit except on the ground of fraud 
practiced on the court. 
 
When the decrees where ex parte in the 
sense that after filing their written statement 
and taking part in the proceedings for a 
considerable time the defendants defaulted in 
appearance during the last stage. An ex parte 
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dectee will operate as res judicata in respect 
of all grounds of defense against the actual 
claim in the suit as also all matters 
inconsistent with such claim which might and 
ought to have been raised. Thus the questions 
whether there were two  separate tenancies  or 
only one and whether the Court of Small Causes 
had jurisdiction to try a suit for ejectment  
were not merely incidental or ancillary to the 
plaintiffs claim in the prior suit but went to 
the very root of his claim for ejectment as 
brought. 
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CHAPTER – 11 
COMPROMISE AND CONSENT DECREES 
– WHETHER RES JUDIATA 
 
1. Meaning.-  
 
  A compromise decree is not a decision by 
the court. It is the acceptance by the court of 
something to which the parties had agreed. A 
compromise decree merely sets the seal of the 
court on the agreement of the parties. The 
court does not decide anything. Nor can it be 
said that the decision of the court is 
impellent in it. In other words, consent decree 
is merely the record of a contract between the 
parties to a suit, superadded by the seal of 
the court. 
 
2. Compromise decree and res judicata.-  
   Section 11 of the Code does not 
strictly apply to consent decrees as it applies 
to what has been heard and finally decided by a 
court. 
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3. Compromise decree and estoppel.- 
 
   Though a consent decree does not 
operate as res judicata, such decree is as 
binding upon the parties thereto as a decree 
passed in invitum. If  the compromise is not 
vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, 
misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed 
at such compromise is binding to the parties. 
There is no distinction between decrees passed 
after contest and decrees passed on compromise. 
Compromise decree will, therefore, create an 
estoppel by conduct. 
  
 
4. Conclusions.- 
 
   A judgment by consent is intended to 
stop litigation between the parties just as 
much as a judgment resulting from a decision of 
the court at the end of a long drawn out fight. 
A compromise decree creates an estoppel by 
judgment. The following observations of Mulla 
have been approved by their Lordships of the 
Supreme Court in Sunderabai v. Devaji. “The 
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present section does not apply in terms to 
consent decrees; for it cannot be said in the 
cases of such decrees that the matters in issue 
between the parties have been heard and finally 
decided within the meaning of this section. A 
consent decree, however, has to all intents and 
purposes the same effect as ‘res judicata’ as a 
decree passed ‘in invitum’. It raises an 
estoppel as much as a decree passed in 
invitum.” 
 
DECREE OBTAINDED BY FRAUD 
 
1.Fraud : Meaning.- 
 
  AIR 1994 SEC. 853 
 
  A fraud is an act of deliberate deception 
with the design of securing something by taking 
unfair advantage of another. It is a deception 
in order to gain by another’s loss. It is 
cheating intended to get an unwarranted and 
undeserved advantage. “Fraud is an extrinsic 
collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn 
proceeding of Courts of Justice. ” 
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1.Fraud and res judicata  - 
 
  If a party obtains a decree from a court 
by practicing fraud, he cannot be permitted to 
invoke the doctrine of res judicata. A judgment 
may be res judicata and my not be impeachable 
from within, but it may be impeachable from 
without. 
 
 
2.Nature  - 
 
  The fraud may be either fraud on the part 
of the party in whose favour judgment o decree 
has been made; or fraud on the court 
pronouncing the judgment or passing the decree. 
Such fraud, however, must be actual and 
positive, a meditated and intentional 
contrivance to keep the opposite party and the 
court in ignorance of the real facts of the 
case and the obtaining of the decree by that 
contrivance. In other words, such fraud should 
be external and apparent, consisting of 
representation designed and intended to mislead 
and not a mere concealment of fact or 
irregularity in conduct of proceedings.  
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CHAPTER – 12 
BAR BY FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL 
CASES Sections 13 & 14 OF C.P.C 
 
1. Foreign judgment – Meaning and Scope.  
- 
 
   A foreign judgment is the judgment of 
a foreign Court, which term is in India, 
applied to every “Court situated beyond the 
limits of India which has no authority in India 
and is not established or continued by the 
Central Government.” It is doubtful whether the 
order of a Special Commissioner appointed by an 
India Ruler within his territory, is a foreign 
judgment within the meaning of this section or 
whether it is a mere Executive act. 
  
 
2. Clause (a) – Foreign judgment to be 
conclusive must be of Court having 
jurisdiction.  - 
   In order that a judgment may be valid 
and entitled to the recognition of foreign 
tribunals, it is indispensable that the Court 
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pronounced the judgment should have a lawful 
jurisdiction over the cases, over the subject 
of the action, and over the parties to the 
action; and if the jurisdiction fails in either 
of these respects, the judgment will be a 
nullity. 
 
  Rejecting the plea that conclusiveness of 
a foreign judgment set up as a bar where that 
judgment was delivered after the suit in which 
it is pleaded was instituted. The Supreme Court 
thus laid down the law on the point. The 
language of Sec. 13 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
3. Execution of decree. - 
 
   A decree of a foreign Court may be 
enforced by proceedings in – execution in 
certain specified cases, vide Sec. 44 of the 
Civil Procedure Code. But the language of that 
section does not compel a British Court to 
grant execution of a decree of a Native Court. 
The language of the section is permissive in 
form; it did empower the then Governor – 
General in Council to direct that such a decree 
shall in all cases be executed by the British 
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Court. It is competent to the executing Court 
to refuse execution of a foreign decree sought 
to be executed in India, under Sec. 44 on the 
ground that such decree was passed without 
jurisdiction. Or that it was vitiated by fraud 
or thee were some other circumstances mentioned 
in this section. In other words an application 
under Sec.44 for the execution of a decree of a 
foreign Court may be resisted on any of the 
grounds mentioned in this section. But where 
the defendant has voluntarily submitted to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign Court he cannot 
resist the application for execution of a 
decree of such Court on the ground of want of 
jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER – 13 
LIS PENDENS IN CIVIL CASES 
 
 
  SECTION 10 C.P.C. 
 
  No Court shall proceed with the trial of 
any suit in which the matter in issue is also 
directly suit between the same parties, or 
between parties under whom they or any of them 
claim litigating under the same title where 
such suit is pending  in the same or any other 
Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the 
relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the 
limits of India established or continued by the 
Central Government and having like 
jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. 
 
  Explanation – The pendency of a suit in a 
foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in 
India from trying a suit founded on the same 
cause of action. 
 
1. Object of the section.- 
 
   The purpose of this statutory 
provision is to prevent a collision between 
courts, and to secure to the parties a certain 
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and unfluctuating adjudication of their rights, 
and at the same time avoid the vexation of  
unnecessary suits. 
 
 
2. Rate of lis pendens not co-extensive 
with that of res judicata. - 
 
   The rule contained in this section 
forms no part of the rule of res judicata, 
though the reason upon which it is based is in 
some respects similar in principle to the 
doctrine of res judicata. The distinction 
between the two rules, however, is vast. The 
rue in this section relates to matters which 
have passed into rem judicatam. The one bars 
only a “suit” the other bars both the trial of 
a “suit” and of an “issue” subject to their  
respective conditions. 
 
3. No Court shall proceed with the 
trial. -  
 
   The words “proceed with the trial of ” 
are substituted  for the word “try” which 
occurred in the corresponding section of the 
old Code. This change indicates that it is only 
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the trial of the suit that is not to be 
proceeded with. It does not dispense with the 
institution of a suit within the proper time 
when the law requires such institution. In 
other words, this section does not bar the 
institution of suits  but only their trial, and 
in this respect there is no substantial 
difference between the language of the new and 
the old Codes. 
 
4. Matter in issue. - 
 
   Matter in issue under Sec. 10, C.P.C., 
means the entire matter in controversy not 
merely one of the several issues in the suit. 
Therefore a court has no power under this 
section to stay a suit on account of some of 
the issues which it involves being also issues 
in another pending suit. This section cannot b 
applied if the matter in issue is not the same 
in the two suits and the parties do not fill 
the same legal position. It is however, not 
necessary that the relief sought in the two 
suits should be identical. If the matter in 
issue in the two suits is the same, the later 
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suit must be stayed without regard to the 
relief  sought. 
 
 
5. Same parties. - 
 
   This section requires that the earlier 
suit shall be between the same parties as the 
later or between parties under whom they or any 
of them claim litigating under the same title, 
that is to say, this section applies only when  
the plaintiff and the defendant are the same in 
both suits. This section does not apply where 
the two suits are not between the same parties 
or between  parties under  whom the or any of 
them claim litigating under the same  title 
even though some of the questions in the two 
suits are  the same. Where the same person sues 
in different capacities, it is the same as if 
thee were different  persons. 
 
6. Litigation under the same title. - 
 
   This section requires, among other 
things, that the suit should be between parties 
litigating under the same title and the issue 
should be the same in both suits. 
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7. For the same relief.- 
 
   The effect of the omission of the 
words “for the same relief” in the present Code 
in not to make a change in the existing law. 
What the section intended is that if all the 
matter in dispute are substantially the same 
them the fact that the relief claimed in the 
subsequent suit is not identical with  the 
relief claimed in the previous suit shall not 
operate to enable the parties to continue the 
litigation. So where a second suit is 
instituted for the same relief, such that the 
matter in issue in it is also directly and 
substantially in issue  in a previously 
instituted suit between the same parties, the 
proper procedure is to stay it pending the 
decision of the earlier suit. 
 
 
8. For the same cause of action.- 
   The pendency of another action between 
the same parties for the same cause of action 
might be set up by way of defense. 
 
9. Bar of trial.- 
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   This section does nor bar the 
institution of a suit, it merely provides that 
when two suits are pending only one can be 
allowed it merely  provides that when two suits 
are pending  only one can be allowed to proceed 
and the suit first filed takes priority. But it 
does not bar the trial of a suit  for rent for 
a period subsequent to that included in the 
previously instituted suit for rent or when a 
litigation regarding rent for a previous year 
is pending in second appeal before the High 
Court. 
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CHAPTER – 14 
LAW AND PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA 
IN CRIMINAL CASES 
 
Section 403, Cr. P.C., including Sec.26 
General Clauses Act. 
 
  Section 403, Cr. P.C., 
(1) A person who has been tried by a court of 
competent jurisdiction for an offence and 
convicted or acquitted of such offence 
shall, while such conviction or acquittal 
remains in force, not be liable to be 
tried again for the same offence, nor on 
the same facts for any other offence for 
which a different charge from the one made 
against him might have been made under 
Sect.236, or for which he might have been 
convicted under Sec.237. 
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any 
offence may be afterwards tried for any 
distinct offence for which  a separate 
charge might have been made against him on 
the former trial under Sec.235, sub-
section (1). 
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(3) A person convicted of any offence 
constituted by any act causing 
consequences which together with such act, 
constituted a different offence from that 
of which he was convicted, may be 
afterwards tried for such last – mentioned 
offence,  
if the consequences had not happened, 
or were not know to the Court to have 
happened, at the time when the was 
convicted. 
(4) A person acquired or convicted of any 
offence constituted by any acts may, 
notwithstanding such acquittal or 
conviction, be subsequently charged with 
any tried for, any other offence 
constituted by the same acts which  he may 
have committed if the Court by which he 
was  first  tried was not competent      
   to try the offence with  which he is 
subsequently charged. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the 
provisions of Sec.26 of the General 
Clauses Act, 1897, or of  Sec.188 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Act V of 1898. 
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CHAPTER – 15 
OPINION OF SR.ADVOCATE  
SHRI K.B.SANGHVI 
 
  After the research of this doctrine my 
view is that principle of Res- Judicata is not 
only a legal maxim or provision of law, but in 
fact it is a basic concept of law. Res judiata 
is a legal principle  incorporated in so many 
statutes and in fact it can be said that the 
source of res judicata is from the principle of 
natural justice – an uncodified law of the 
nature from ancient time. In fact res judicata 
is based on the maxim of roman jurisprudence 
which says that there should be the end of law 
suits. Res judicata is described in Latim Maxim 
“Memo debt bis vaxary pro una eteademcausa” 
i.e. no man should be condemn twice for the 
same causes. In short, res judicata is a 
principle founded on ancient precedent is 
dictated by a wisdom is for all time. The basis 
aim to incorporate this principle in various 
statute is to put end of endless litigation and 
to see that there should be a end of certain 
litigation and person involved in litigation 
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should be sure that once a judgment on merit 
ends the problem otherwise there will be no 
security for any person who has to face endless 
litigation. That is why principle of res 
judiacta is not a technical principle but a 
fundamental doctrine to end the endless 
litigation. In fact res judicata is estople 
against the frivolous and false litigation on 
the same cause and with an intension to harass 
the rivalry litigation. So, this doctrine is 
really a rule of convenience and basically it 
is founded on equity justice and good 
conscience.  
  “Res judicata” is the exact word used in 
Section - 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 
in fact Section – 11 is a Caveat against the 
law court not to try any suit or issue in which 
the matter directly or substantially in issue 
which has been decided  in former suit between 
the same party. So Section – 11 clearly 
prohibits legal battles if the same battle has 
fought  in merits and decided by the competent 
court. It puts stop on further litigation. Only 
conditions for application of Section – 11 are 
that litigation should be between the same 
parties and issue decided in former suit should 
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be a subject matter of the second suit them law 
court will throw away the matter later 
subsequently instituted inter alia holding that 
prior judgment is at least binding to the same 
parties in further and future and future 
litigations. It is required to be noted that, 
it is not necessary that there should be two 
suits for invoking Section – 11 but there are 
also cases in which doctrine of res judicata 
can be invoked in the same proceeding. Suppose 
an interlocutory application was decided on 
merits in suit and become final after the 
exhausting of all appellate jurisdictions them 
same kind of application subsequently field in 
same suit is also prohibited under Section – 11 
is applicable in all suits directly and 
substantially and issue decided on merits. This 
provision is meant to curb unless litigations, 
once the matter is decided on merits. So this 
is a safe guard against all future litigations 
and judgment on merits full stop the all future 
litigations so in fact res judicata is a live 
insurance of further litigations. 
 
 As stated earlier in every important 
statute there is a presence of this principle 
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of res judicata in various forms. To begin 
with, the source of all the laws that is our 
Constitution of India. Article – 20(2) is in 
fact a modified version of res judicata in 
Criminal jurisprudence. Article – 20(2) of 
Constitution of India provides that “No person 
shall be prosecuted and punished for the same 
offence more than once”. Taking the shelter of 
this constitutional provision, there is a 
provision in Criminal  Procedure Code under 
Section – 300 of  the Code Section – 300 of 
Code of Criminal Procedure provides that person 
once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for 
same offence. This provision is incorporated 
under Chapter – XXIV under the heading of 
General provisions as to inquiry and trials. 
Section – 300 is a Criminal Procedure version 
of res judicata principles and Section – 300 of 
C.R.P.C. governs the entire principles of 
Autrefois acquit and autrefois  convict. 
Australian principle “Principle of issue 
estopple” has been followed in India. Though 
there is no provision of prohibition of 
successive bail application but India Court has 
developed legal precedent by cantina of 
judgments especially from Apex Court that once 
601 
a bail application is decided on merits, same 
cannot be entertained on same grounds. So, for 
successive bail application one has to show the 
change of circumstances from escaping the 
criminal principles of res judicata and unless 
ad until new set of circumstances are show, 
India Court has never encouraged successive 
bail applications one the bail application was 
decided on merits. This principle applies not 
only application for regular bail under Section 
– 437 and 439 of C.R.P.C. but also applies to 
Anticipatory bail under Section – 438 of 
C.R.P.C. 
 
 Same principles of res judicata was 
incorporated in another form in Evidence Act 
from Section – 40 to 43 of Evidence Act. The 
previous judgment relevant to bar a second suit 
or trial is a provision to curb various  
litigations, though of the same nature, but 
instituted under the various provisions of 
different laws. Decision of Civil Court in 
respect of civil rights of the parties bars 
criminal complaint regarding the same taking 
the shelter of Section – 40 of the Evidence 
Act. Section – 11 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure is a Caveat against the Court whereas 
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Section – 115 of  Evidence Act is a Caveat 
against the litigating parties to curb the 
future litigations once the matter is decided 
finally. If a litigating party make certain 
declaration in a proceeding them in future 
litigation of that party is estopped from 
taking the contrary plea. So this is a one kind 
of principle of res judicata. Estopple can be 
against the conduct behavior and certain stands 
taken in the proceedings and further that party 
can not be permitted to have the contrary plea 
which it has taken earlier. So this principle 
also aim to curb the problem and successive 
future litigation and especially to stop the 
party from taking the contrary plea each and 
every time. Though estopple is not operating 
against the statute but any kind of declaration 
of the fact by litigating party estopped from 
changing its version subsequently and that is 
called estopple. 
 
 In service jurisprudence same principle is 
applicable in respect of departmental inquiry. 
A civil servant once change sheeted 
subsequently cannot be charge sheeted on the 
same grounds. So, if a second departmental 
inquiry is contemplated after the completion of 
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first inquiry then if it is on the same ground, 
court will stay the further department 
proceedings. In service jurisprudence this 
modified version of res judicata is called as 
principles of double jeopardy. 
 So, principle of res judicata is a pious 
principle intended not only to prevent a new 
decision but also to prevent a new 
investigation so that the same person cannot be 
harassed again and again in various proceedings 
upon the same questions. Doctrine of res 
judicata is also applicable to quasi judicial 
authorities too. The principle of res judicata 
can be invoked not only in separate subsequent 
proceedings but they also get attracted in 
subsequent stage on same proceedings. The rule 
of res judicata will prevent a defendant from 
setting up in a subsequent suit, a plea with 
was decided between the parties in previous 
suit. It is essential that former judgment must 
be that of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
So in fact doctrine of res judicata can be term 
as a rule of conclusiveness of judgment as to 
the points decided in every subsequent suit of 
the same parties. 
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CHAPTER – 16 
CONCLUSION 
 
  It is no doubt true that the rule of res 
judicata as indiated in Sec.11 of the C.P.C has 
some technical aspect for instance the rule of 
costuctive resjudicata may be said to be 
technical, but the basis on which the said rule 
rests is founded on consideration of public 
policy. It is the interest of the public at 
large that a finality should attach to the 
binding decisions pronounced by courts of 
competent jurisdiction and it is also for the 
public interest that individuals should not be 
vexed twice over with the same kind of 
litigation. 
 It is clear that the doctrine of 
resjudicata applies to static situations and 
not to charging circumstances. 
 The bar of resjudicata will apply only 
when it is pleaded and proved In fact  the 
underlying object of the doctrine of 
resjudicata is that the parties are not made to 
defend the same cause of action twice over when 
it had been concluded on merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER – 17 
SUGGESTIONS 
 
  After conducting all this research on the 
subject, we seek an iota of catholicity, we 
feel like suggesting theme which are already 
existing in the court or which should come into 
force because of the change that has been 
shopping the global scenario.  
 
(1) TEST.- 
A Statutory and simple test to apply 
in defer meaning whether the previous 
decision operates as resjudicata on 
principles  analogous thereto is to 
find out whether the first court could  
go into the question agitated in the 
subsequent suit. If it could the 
decision would operate as resjudicata 
between the parties but if it could 
not the subsequent suit would not be 
barred by resjudicata. Therefore when 
a suit is filed by the party or 
through Advocate, before filing a suit 
an affidavit should filed with the 
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suit that they have not filed any suit 
regarding the same cause or by same 
parties previous this suit. 
 
(2) PROPER INTERPRETATION OF LAW AND CASE  
LAW.- 
It is the duty of the Advocate to come 
with clean hand but some times Advocates are 
handicap because parties have no idea about the 
matters. Actually when matter comes before the 
Advocate. They have to properly  interpreate  
before the court. 
Each case law has its own valuation 
Relevant case law study should be cite and 
interpreat. 
  
(3) MERIT SHOULD BE PRESERVED.- 
The merits of the controversy in issue in 
the suit and do not of course put on end to it 
even in part. It is the duty of the court of 
preserve the merit. 
 
(4) TO AVOID ABUSE OF PROCESS.- 
When matter comes before the court, it 
should be not registered by the registrar it 
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the case was decided first, though it 
registered when judges come to know about the 
previous matter, at very first hearing stage it 
should be not be rejected but returned to the 
parties with clear reason. 
 
(5) AT FINAL ARGUMENT.- 
This plea should be taken by party, but 
even later stage this doctrine should be 
consider even after final argument.  
 
(6) BURDON OF PROOF SHOULD NOT LIE ONLY 
ON THE ASSERTER.- 
The onus is on the party who contends that 
an earlier decision operates as resjudicata 
between the parties. He has to establish that 
the matter in issue in the subsequent suit was 
also in issue in the former suit and it had 
been heard and finally decided between the same 
parties by a competent court. Mere bald 
assertion is not sufficient. 
 
(7) PENAL ACTION.- 
If parties are aware about the previous 
suit, intentionally they have not prefer to 
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file appeal against the order passed by the 
lower court. After some time they filed a fresh 
suit such parties should be penalize by fine. 
 
(8) ISSUE OF RESJUDICATA SHOULD BE HEARD 
AS A PRELIMINARY ISSUE.- 
The issue of resjudicata can be decided as 
a preliminary issue for abuse the process of 
law courts are busy if this issue can decided 
as early clear picture may  come before the 
court. 
If one issue is decided in favour of a 
party and it is sufficient for the disposal of 
the suit and the suit is disposed of 
accordingly a decision another issue against 
him should not aperate as resjudicata. 
 
(9) JUDGMENT MUST FIELD WITH DECREE.- 
At the time of considering resjudicata, 
decree without judgment is not give the support 
of resjudicata. It is essential that the former 
judgment must be that of a court of competent 
jurisdiction judgment must field with a decree. 
A plea of resjudicata can only be founded on a 
valid decree. 
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